Downfall, Netflix documentary
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Downfall, Netflix documentary
For those who have Netflix and find crash investigations interesting, I can highly recommend “Downfall, The Case Against Boeing”. It’s a very good look at what happens when a massive aviation company who talks the safety talk finally gets caught out.
Shocking how willing this company was to lie about known safety issues even after killing hundreds of people. All in the name of profits and saving face.
Not pointing any fingers but it should really serve as a warning to any companies who operate in a similar way here in Oz. Safety is never a product of your past record but rather a product of your present ethics.
Shocking how willing this company was to lie about known safety issues even after killing hundreds of people. All in the name of profits and saving face.
Not pointing any fingers but it should really serve as a warning to any companies who operate in a similar way here in Oz. Safety is never a product of your past record but rather a product of your present ethics.
Here we go again. For those that haven't flown the 737 there are two switches to turn off if the stab moves in an unintended way. They are turned off as a 'Memory Item'. The Lion crew never turned them off and the Ethiopian crew turned them off after the aircraft was so out of trim it was impossible to fly and then turned them back on again!!! Boeing is not entirely to blame for these two accidents but is certainly not blameless.
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I have not flown the 737 ...
But lets do what you say.
The system kicks in and trims the aircraft, lets say, 8 or 10 degrees Nose Down, before you react by acting on those 2 switches.
Now you have an aircraft trimmed 8 or 10 degrees Nose Down, and, to the best of my knowledge, you can not trim Nose Up because those switches are Off.
Do you think that you are going to get out of it ?
But lets do what you say.
The system kicks in and trims the aircraft, lets say, 8 or 10 degrees Nose Down, before you react by acting on those 2 switches.
Now you have an aircraft trimmed 8 or 10 degrees Nose Down, and, to the best of my knowledge, you can not trim Nose Up because those switches are Off.
Do you think that you are going to get out of it ?
Yes. I would do the memory items for Runaway Stab and then fly the aircraft manually. There is no way if you had been trained properly on the aircraft, if you were armed with MCAS knowledge as the ET crew were, if you could fly a jet with pitch and power, if you valued your life, you would not have immediately hit the the Stab Trim switches or asked your colleague to do it the second the thing was trimming away from your desired state. Read the report and tell me how long it took ET to put the Stab Trim switches to cutout and how many cycles of MCAS nose down they had before the FO, yes FO, suggested to the Capt to put them to cutout. Yes they had simultaneous stall and overspeed warnings but Boeing didn't invent the Unreliable Airspeed memory items after these crashes. Keep in mind both aircraft were in daylight VMC. They could see their horizon. Boeing took short cuts for sure to keep their competitor from gaining an edge on them. They assumed pilots were more capable and that's their gross miscalculation.
Here we go again. For those that haven't flown the 737 there are two switches to turn off if the stab moves in an unintended way. They are turned off as a 'Memory Item'. The Lion crew never turned them off and the Ethiopian crew turned them off after the aircraft was so out of trim it was impossible to fly and then turned them back on again!!! Boeing is not entirely to blame for these two accidents but is certainly not blameless.
And that was discussed internally pre Ethiopian. As for the whole MCAS tied to a single AoA vane, well fck me, words can’t describe how insane that is
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I have not flown the 737 ...
But lets do what you say.
The system kicks in and trims the aircraft, lets say, 8 or 10 degrees Nose Down, before you react by acting on those 2 switches.
Now you have an aircraft trimmed 8 or 10 degrees Nose Down, and, to the best of my knowledge, you can not trim Nose Up because those switches are Off.
Do you think that you are going to get out of it ?
But lets do what you say.
The system kicks in and trims the aircraft, lets say, 8 or 10 degrees Nose Down, before you react by acting on those 2 switches.
Now you have an aircraft trimmed 8 or 10 degrees Nose Down, and, to the best of my knowledge, you can not trim Nose Up because those switches are Off.
Do you think that you are going to get out of it ?
Last edited by sleeper; 19th Feb 2022 at 16:18. Reason: Grammatical
Here we go again. For those that haven't flown the 737 there are two switches to turn off if the stab moves in an unintended way. They are turned off as a 'Memory Item'. The Lion crew never turned them off and the Ethiopian crew turned them off after the aircraft was so out of trim it was impossible to fly and then turned them back on again!!! Boeing is not entirely to blame for these two accidents but is certainly not blameless.
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Very likely this detail has been discussed before, but what is the reason that causes Boeing to be so afraid that the Max gets into a stall situation, to the point that they came up with MCAS ?
Goes into something similar to a super stall situation, that is impossible to get out of it, or is it something else ?
It's been a very long time since I last studied stability
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Technical discussions aside. How is it that a company can go from a beleaguered cash strapped airplane maker who had to hide certain elements of its design from the FAA in order to avoid new type rating status, to one who can afford to pay a multi billion dollar fine in order to avoid criminal charges? And remain in business? Let us not forget the guy who was at the helm, the captain of the company you could say, got a golden handshake in return for overseeing the culpable homicide of a few hundred people. Corporate filth masquerading as leaders pedalling profits disguised as safety, I’m glad we are above all that down under.
Last edited by gordonfvckingramsay; 19th Feb 2022 at 21:20.
Thanks for your input !
Very likely this detail has been discussed before, but what is the reason that causes Boeing to be so afraid that the Max gets into a stall situation, to the point that they came up with MCAS ?
Goes into something similar to a super stall situation, that is impossible to get out of it, or is it something else ?
It's been a very long time since I last studied stability
Very likely this detail has been discussed before, but what is the reason that causes Boeing to be so afraid that the Max gets into a stall situation, to the point that they came up with MCAS ?
Goes into something similar to a super stall situation, that is impossible to get out of it, or is it something else ?
It's been a very long time since I last studied stability
A little bit surprised at those that are astounded by the corruption involved in big bucks. Always has been. What is the saying, "power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely". Money makes power.
Here we go again. For those that haven't flown the 737 there are two switches to turn off if the stab moves in an unintended way. They are turned off as a 'Memory Item'. The Lion crew never turned them off and the Ethiopian crew turned them off after the aircraft was so out of trim it was impossible to fly and then turned them back on again!!! Boeing is not entirely to blame for these two accidents but is certainly not blameless.
It’s one thing doing memory items in a simulator, when you are expecting things to go wrong, but it’s quite different in the actual aircraft. If you have had a serious system failure for real then you will know what I am talking about. A failure situation that starts off with a stick shacker, altitude and speed disagreements with master cautions, does not immediately shout out trim failure, unless of course, you’ve seen it in the simulator before hand, along with what will happens to the aircraft if you don’t catch it in time and how you might dig yourself out of that hole.
A critical component of the flight control system that can quickly trim the aircraft full nose down, taking its input from only one sensor?? Seriously mate, have a word with yourself. As far as I’m concerned, Boeings once incredible reputation for safety and reliability will never be the same again, especially with the amount of BS they have spouted since the accidents.
As for the FAA, they should have led the groundings of this Frankenstein aircraft. Instead it was the Chinese CAAC, then even when almost every other civil aviation authority had grounded them, the FAA were still kissing Boeings backside.
in most accidents there is usually something the pilots could have done to avert the disaster, yet fortunately we have come a long way from just simply blaming the aircrew. Instead, quite rightly, we look at the system as a whole, including the design, certification, regulation, training and operation of the aircraft. There is no blame here that can or should be directed at the pilots.
Here we go again. For those that haven't flown the 737 there are two switches to turn off if the stab moves in an unintended way. They are turned off as a 'Memory Item'. The Lion crew never turned them off and the Ethiopian crew turned them off after the aircraft was so out of trim it was impossible to fly and then turned them back on again!!! Boeing is not entirely to blame for these two accidents but is certainly not blameless.
No one is immune to startle factor. Even heros - both real heros and pprune heros!
System design must not rely on an ace response in 10 seconds.
Here we go again. For those that haven't flown the 737 there are two switches to turn off if the stab moves in an unintended way. They are turned off as a 'Memory Item'. The Lion crew never turned them off and the Ethiopian crew turned them off after the aircraft was so out of trim it was impossible to fly and then turned them back on again!!! Boeing is not entirely to blame for these two accidents but is certainly not blameless.
You are entirely missing the point, this is not about those two specific accidents. It is about a company culture where the internal communications showed:
- They deliberately downplayed and hid information about MCAS so that it didn't trigger any additional training for customers.
- They penalised financially any employee who put in writing any safety concerns about ANY aircraft programme or quality issues
- They determined that they had made the MCAS response so powerful with it related to a single source of information that crew would have 10 seconds to respond appropriately or face a catastrophic loss of the aircraft.
- They knew should they release internal documents about the design of MCAS it would lead to a grounding of the fleet so they didn't release them.
- They knew the design was likely the main contributing factor in the loss of lives but once again internal emails show them openly discussing that they should just pin it on the pilots as most will believe that since they weren't American pilots they acted badly.
- Should ANY aircraft with a system design that can lead to loss of the aircraft in 10 seconds be certified?