MH370 - "new" news
This flightpath is NOT compliant with the satellite data. eg the proposed flightpath crosses Arc 2 (1941:03) at either 6.2N93.5E or 8.5S92E, thus the required groundspeed you are proposing from MEKAR is either 141knots or 835knots. It is not possible.
The flightpath you have proposed is very complicated.
It is a poor match for debris drift or barnacle growth.
Whereas, the flightpath diversion to Banda Aceh is simpler and compliant with the satellite data.
The flightpath you have proposed is very complicated.
It is a poor match for debris drift or barnacle growth.
Whereas, the flightpath diversion to Banda Aceh is simpler and compliant with the satellite data.
https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/792371...istmas-island/
An oxygen bottle rupture due to improper maintenance.
…..
The risk of an oxygen bottle rupture is extremely remote, if correct maintenance procedures are followed. But, if the operator doesn’t follow the correct maintenance procedures, all bets are off, it’s NOT the manufacturer’s fault.
I know of only one case of bottle rupture as a primary cause, and that was not maintenance procedures.
Corrosion will cause a leak, not a rupture.
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This new report is extremely flawed. It is more likely that they have started with a pre-conceived pilot hijacking scenario and tried to bash this evidence into the hole.
Maybe they should look at the evidence first and then arrive at the most likely scenario and endpoint.
Prior to departure the oxygen bottle was serviced by Malaysia.
There wasn’t any change in behaviour as the crew passed through security. They are observed smoking prior to departure.
The aircraft departed KL and climbed to FL350/Mach 0.82
During the turn at IGARI, the transponder ceased transmission.
Aircraft turns back at about 25 degrees angle of bank, descends to FL340 and accelerates to Mach 0.84, flies in heading mode or manually until south of Penang.
Observed on primary radar by multiple Malaysian and Thai radar sites. Inherent errors in primary radar displays incorrect and unrealistic altitude changes.
No ACARS received, no comms received. No SATCOM log off.
Manually deleting the Flight ID would record a SATCOM log off.
FO cell phone connects to a cell tower when aircraft south of Penang at 1752:27.
Aircraft diverts to VAMPI-MEKAR-NILAM in LNAV still at Mach 0.84/FL340.
SATCOM call made TO aircraft via Indian Ocean satellite but can’t connect via the aircraft’s left High Gain Antenna at 18:03.
At 1822:12, the aircraft is 10 NM NW of MEKAR and leaves Malaysian primary radar range.
All Indonesian primary radar recordings at Lhokseumawe, Medan, Sabang and Sibolga are not available!
At 1825:27, aircraft initiates a SATCOM logon request to Indian Ocean Satellite. No Flight ID received from aircraft.
Aircraft must be heading south by 1840 to comply with satellite BTO / BFO data.
SATCOM call made TO aircraft at 1840, it connects but is not answered.
Approximately every hour, the satellite confirms that the aircraft is still on line, this timing can determine the aircraft’s distance (the 7 arcs) from the satellite.
Seven hours after the disappearance, the aircraft initiates a SATCOM log on. Again there isn’t a flight ID, and the aircraft is descending between 5000 to 15000 feet per minute.
Around 36 pieces of debris have been found from just about every part of the plane.
Debris barnacle analysis finds optimum sea temperature range for barnacle growth between 18-24C.
Debris drift analysis finds locations south of Latitude 40S and north of Latitude 20S unlikely.
Confirmed debris analysed by the ATSB confirms flaps where not deployed at the end of flight.
Now for the most likely scenario and endpoint.
The topped up crew oxygen bottle ruptured due to poor maintenance practices by Malaysia. (Soap and water for leak detection tests!)
The adjacent P105 Left Wire Integration Panel and Left AIMS Cabinet is obliterated.
The crew are overwhelmed and bombarded with left systems failures, ie no left transponder, no left FMC, no left HGA, no left Autothrottle, DU failures, no AMU, no ACARS, etc
The crew divert to the nearest suitable airport (Penang) at the default LRC speed of M0.84 and appropriate altitude.
They start to run checklists and problem solve.
FO turns on cell phone to call for help.
Approaching Penang, they manually switch to the right FMC, the software reset deletes the Flight ID.
Without the valid landing altitude data, the cabin altitude warning message shows at 15,000 feet, not 10,000 feet. And unfortunately for the crew, they have missed the gradual decompression event and start to become hypoxic (earlier for smokers). Mentally confused they program a diversion to Banda Aceh airport via NILAM and SANOB.
They eventually succumbed to hypoxia and pass out.
A flight attendant on portable oxygen attempts to revive the pilots, but can’t. The oxygen masks for the pilots are connected to… the ruptured oxygen bottle!
All occupants peacefully pass out from hypoxia.
The aircraft continues on autopilot. At Top Of Descent to Banda Aceh, the serviceable right Autothrottle slows the aircraft to the descent speed, the inop left throttle remains at the high power setting for Mach 0.84
As the aircraft turns left at NILAM towards SANOB, the aircraft switches from the failed left high gain antenna to the serviceable right high gain antenna, mounted on the right side of the aircraft, since the satellite is now on the right side of the aircraft (direction to satellite is about 262 degrees true). The aircraft can finally initiate a renewed log on with all occupants deceased (arc 1). The aircraft overflies Banda Aceh heading south, where it reverts to heading MAGNETIC at the end of route. (Note Indonesia is not releasing primary radar data)
The aircraft passes all arcs on time, meets BFO data, meets actual wind/temperature recordings, meets fuel exhaustion precisely, communicates with the satellite via the right HGA, conforms with autopilot constraints, meets barnacle analysis, meets drift analysis, and meets debris damage observed.
Where the ATSB search went wrong was they kept pushing the pilot suicide constant speed/switch to constant true heading solution, because a constant speed/constant magnetic heading overshoots arc 6 and 7 due to the changing magnetic variation in the southern Indian Ocean.
BUT… if you consider the accident scenario (oxygen bottle rupture) with the crew trying to save the plane, then due to the massive thrust lever differential at top of descent to Banda Aceh, the left engine runs out of fuel up to an HOUR earlier than the right! Due to envelope protection features, the slower single engine speed during the last hour now causes the aircraft to crash at the seventh arc at around 34 South 93 East, when the right engine flames out and autopilot disengages.
Auto engine restart momentarily powers SATCOM causing log on (arc 7).
The aircraft hits the water at high velocity and out of control.
The ATSB only searched about 2NM inside the arc at 34S 93E, because it concentrated the search at 38 South 88 East out to 40 NM wide.
Maybe they should look at the evidence first and then arrive at the most likely scenario and endpoint.
Prior to departure the oxygen bottle was serviced by Malaysia.
There wasn’t any change in behaviour as the crew passed through security. They are observed smoking prior to departure.
The aircraft departed KL and climbed to FL350/Mach 0.82
During the turn at IGARI, the transponder ceased transmission.
Aircraft turns back at about 25 degrees angle of bank, descends to FL340 and accelerates to Mach 0.84, flies in heading mode or manually until south of Penang.
Observed on primary radar by multiple Malaysian and Thai radar sites. Inherent errors in primary radar displays incorrect and unrealistic altitude changes.
No ACARS received, no comms received. No SATCOM log off.
Manually deleting the Flight ID would record a SATCOM log off.
FO cell phone connects to a cell tower when aircraft south of Penang at 1752:27.
Aircraft diverts to VAMPI-MEKAR-NILAM in LNAV still at Mach 0.84/FL340.
SATCOM call made TO aircraft via Indian Ocean satellite but can’t connect via the aircraft’s left High Gain Antenna at 18:03.
At 1822:12, the aircraft is 10 NM NW of MEKAR and leaves Malaysian primary radar range.
All Indonesian primary radar recordings at Lhokseumawe, Medan, Sabang and Sibolga are not available!
At 1825:27, aircraft initiates a SATCOM logon request to Indian Ocean Satellite. No Flight ID received from aircraft.
Aircraft must be heading south by 1840 to comply with satellite BTO / BFO data.
SATCOM call made TO aircraft at 1840, it connects but is not answered.
Approximately every hour, the satellite confirms that the aircraft is still on line, this timing can determine the aircraft’s distance (the 7 arcs) from the satellite.
Seven hours after the disappearance, the aircraft initiates a SATCOM log on. Again there isn’t a flight ID, and the aircraft is descending between 5000 to 15000 feet per minute.
Around 36 pieces of debris have been found from just about every part of the plane.
Debris barnacle analysis finds optimum sea temperature range for barnacle growth between 18-24C.
Debris drift analysis finds locations south of Latitude 40S and north of Latitude 20S unlikely.
Confirmed debris analysed by the ATSB confirms flaps where not deployed at the end of flight.
Now for the most likely scenario and endpoint.
The topped up crew oxygen bottle ruptured due to poor maintenance practices by Malaysia. (Soap and water for leak detection tests!)
The adjacent P105 Left Wire Integration Panel and Left AIMS Cabinet is obliterated.
The crew are overwhelmed and bombarded with left systems failures, ie no left transponder, no left FMC, no left HGA, no left Autothrottle, DU failures, no AMU, no ACARS, etc
The crew divert to the nearest suitable airport (Penang) at the default LRC speed of M0.84 and appropriate altitude.
They start to run checklists and problem solve.
FO turns on cell phone to call for help.
Approaching Penang, they manually switch to the right FMC, the software reset deletes the Flight ID.
Without the valid landing altitude data, the cabin altitude warning message shows at 15,000 feet, not 10,000 feet. And unfortunately for the crew, they have missed the gradual decompression event and start to become hypoxic (earlier for smokers). Mentally confused they program a diversion to Banda Aceh airport via NILAM and SANOB.
They eventually succumbed to hypoxia and pass out.
A flight attendant on portable oxygen attempts to revive the pilots, but can’t. The oxygen masks for the pilots are connected to… the ruptured oxygen bottle!
All occupants peacefully pass out from hypoxia.
The aircraft continues on autopilot. At Top Of Descent to Banda Aceh, the serviceable right Autothrottle slows the aircraft to the descent speed, the inop left throttle remains at the high power setting for Mach 0.84
As the aircraft turns left at NILAM towards SANOB, the aircraft switches from the failed left high gain antenna to the serviceable right high gain antenna, mounted on the right side of the aircraft, since the satellite is now on the right side of the aircraft (direction to satellite is about 262 degrees true). The aircraft can finally initiate a renewed log on with all occupants deceased (arc 1). The aircraft overflies Banda Aceh heading south, where it reverts to heading MAGNETIC at the end of route. (Note Indonesia is not releasing primary radar data)
The aircraft passes all arcs on time, meets BFO data, meets actual wind/temperature recordings, meets fuel exhaustion precisely, communicates with the satellite via the right HGA, conforms with autopilot constraints, meets barnacle analysis, meets drift analysis, and meets debris damage observed.
Where the ATSB search went wrong was they kept pushing the pilot suicide constant speed/switch to constant true heading solution, because a constant speed/constant magnetic heading overshoots arc 6 and 7 due to the changing magnetic variation in the southern Indian Ocean.
BUT… if you consider the accident scenario (oxygen bottle rupture) with the crew trying to save the plane, then due to the massive thrust lever differential at top of descent to Banda Aceh, the left engine runs out of fuel up to an HOUR earlier than the right! Due to envelope protection features, the slower single engine speed during the last hour now causes the aircraft to crash at the seventh arc at around 34 South 93 East, when the right engine flames out and autopilot disengages.
Auto engine restart momentarily powers SATCOM causing log on (arc 7).
The aircraft hits the water at high velocity and out of control.
The ATSB only searched about 2NM inside the arc at 34S 93E, because it concentrated the search at 38 South 88 East out to 40 NM wide.
That's a highly likely scenario indeed. Regarding depress - presumably the crew would have received a Cabin Alt EICAS (however who would know if the EI bay was damaged) so if they didn't that would explain why no emerg descent initiated (no crew oxy left anyway).
I remember frequently taxiing (in our 777) past that Egyptair B777 left out on the field in Cairo with the very visible big hole burnt out from the FO's oxy fire and wondered how that would pan out if it happened in flight!
I saw Mark and Co live back in the '80s. Not impressed. He could play the guitar like a demon but couldn't sing to save himself. Not much on showmanship either; I don't think they even knew which city they were in. The King on the other hand was a true showman and performer. Shame about his burger fetish. At least Mark had the good grace to disappear.... just like Elvis and 370.
PS: Watchdog - nice try!
PS: Watchdog - nice try!
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Captain Shah must have had some premonition that scenario was going to unfold so he flew the route on his home sim. just so they would have some record where it would end up. The early onset hypoxia due being a smoker is a bit of a myth, an air force medico who ran the hyperbaric chamber told me old ladies and smokers did the best and footy players the worst, acclimatised metabolism and all that.
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I do smile when a scenario that has never previously occurred with a COPV air bottle installed in an airliner, is touted as the "most likely scenario" when a pilot hijacking, one of several recorded incidents, occurred just three weeks before MH370 disappeared.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethiop...nes_Flight_702
All the answers you seek are in the coordinates created by Zaharie in his Flight Sim program. It may require a little lateral thinking however.
Context: The ATSB determined that the waypoints were created by Zaharie on the 2 Feb 2014.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethiop...nes_Flight_702
All the answers you seek are in the coordinates created by Zaharie in his Flight Sim program. It may require a little lateral thinking however.
Context: The ATSB determined that the waypoints were created by Zaharie on the 2 Feb 2014.
why would Zaharie want to "hide" the plane and yet at the same time leave the coordinates in his computer? It doesn't make sense at all. He also regularly practiced landing with big planes on Christmas Island but somehow those flights from his sim have been ignored.
https://www.reddit.com/r/MH370/comme...middle_of_the/
https://www.reddit.com/r/MH370/comme...middle_of_the/
why would Zaharie want to "hide" the plane and yet at the same time leave the coordinates in his computer?
Perhaps he deleted the routes but was unaware how deleting works on a hard drive.
He also regularly practiced landing with big planes on Christmas Island but somehow those flights from his sim have been ignored.
The notion that waypoints/routes/flights were left on or deleted from the Captain's home flight simulator data is one of those misrepresentations. Nothing related to the flight simulator session from 2 February 2014 was manually saved or manually deleted. Each of the recovered files from that session had been automatically created by the flight sim program in the background at certain times during the session, and each was then simply overwritten by the program when the next one was auto-generated. It is highly unlikely that the operator was even aware of the background auto-generation function.
…He [Zaharie] also regularly practiced landing with big planes on Christmas Island but somehow those flights from his sim have been ignored.
https://www.reddit.com/r/MH370/comme...middle_of_the/
https://www.reddit.com/r/MH370/comme...middle_of_the/
…….Each of the recovered files from that session had been automatically created by the flight sim program in the background at certain times during the session, and each was then simply overwritten by the program when the next one was auto-generated. It is highly unlikely that the operator was even aware of the background auto-generation function.
Unless there were multiple flights to this same random location. Do we know if there was more than one such flight?
Very interesting. … So, one possible scenario which may have caused the creation of these files is Zaharie playing in the sim and tooling around over Penang, gets called away to play a round of golf and leaves the sim running to fly itself on heading mode to some random spot until it runs out of fuel…
Of note though (and this is just one of the many details that was either ignored or, more likely, just missed completely) is that the total "in sim" flying time for the session was only 72 minutes (the first file is timestamped 15:26 and the last, 16:38). Fuel at take-off was 68,424 kg. For fear of stating the blindingly obvious, you can't "fly" 68 tonne of fuel to exhaustion in 72 minutes in a B777-200LR (and no, that is not a typo; the sim aircraft was a -200LR with GE90s, not an ER with Trents). And, we can be almost certain that the fuel load was not manually adjusted down to a lesser amount during the sim session because doing so would have caused the sim program to automatically create a temporary file (of the same sort as the four complete and two partial files that were recovered) and we don't have evidence of that happening.
Long story short, the operator almost certainly used the fuel jettison function to get to fuel exhaustion. And (and here's another of the many details that was either ignored or missed completely), fuel exhaustion occurred before the aircraft was manually relocated to the Southern Indian Ocean. The sim aircraft almost certainly reached fuel exhaustion while it was somewhere near the north-western end of Sumatra, likely somewhere near Banda Aceh.
Just by the bye, the 15:26 departure time, the fuel load (68,424 kg) and departure from WMKK along R467, were factors pointing to at least the start of that session being a simulation of the Captain's upcoming flight on MH150 to Jeddah on 4 February.
We know that there were other flight details saved to the hard drive. Those details have never been made public.
Last edited by MickG0105; 15th Feb 2023 at 22:15. Reason: Added clarification
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…fuel exhaustion occurred before the aircraft was manually relocated to the Southern Indian Ocean. The sim aircraft almost certainly reached fuel exhaustion while it was somewhere near the north-western end of Sumatra, likely somewhere near Banda Aceh.
…We know that there were other flight details saved to the hard drive. Those details have never been made public.
…We know that there were other flight details saved to the hard drive. Those details have never been made public.
1. Is it necessary to ‘fly’ these things in real time? I.e you say that he (Zaharie) couldn’t have flown the 777 to fuel exhaustion in 72 minutes on his sim. Is it not possible to ‘fast forward’ the flight so you’re not sitting there doing nothing for many hours?
2. How do we know that the aircraft was ‘manually’ relocated to the southern ocean?
3.is there a source for the statement that other details on his sim have been withheld?
You can actually see the impact of this in sim whenever you manually relocate the aircraft; when the simulation restarts at the new location there's a fleeting WTF moment as the program adjusts.
This particular quirk was first noted by Victor Iannello and Yves Guillaume in a paper they co-authored in 2016.
And I'd hastened to add that "never made public" and "withheld" likely have two different meanings.
Last edited by MickG0105; 16th Feb 2023 at 06:55. Reason: Tidy up
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Nine years on since MH370 disappeared, and it’s quite unbelievable that there’s still withheld data, and that they never fully searched the accident scenario end site (40 NM of 34S 93E, following a diversion to Banda Aceh airport with left systems inoperative on autopilot).
Conclusion shopping the pilot hijack scenario with misinformation has been, and is, fruitless. Cue in NETFLIX.
Conclusion shopping the pilot hijack scenario with misinformation has been, and is, fruitless. Cue in NETFLIX.
