MH370 - "new" news
[QUOTE=GBO; the speed observed on primary radar from Penang to the last primary radar point at 1822:12, will equate to the aircraft being too far west of the 1825:27 BTO arc (satellite data).
Using THEIR thinking, then the only way around this is to disregard the 1825:27 BTO arc and use the 1828:06 BTO arc [/QUOTE]
This is an example of taking one bit of information and using it -- incorrectly -- to build a pillar for a preferred theory. To suggest that the "only way around" the speed observed on primary radar is to disregard the 1825.27 BTO arc divulges an ignorance of primary radar -- especially that particular primary radar.
Grizz
Using THEIR thinking, then the only way around this is to disregard the 1825:27 BTO arc and use the 1828:06 BTO arc [/QUOTE]
This is an example of taking one bit of information and using it -- incorrectly -- to build a pillar for a preferred theory. To suggest that the "only way around" the speed observed on primary radar is to disregard the 1825.27 BTO arc divulges an ignorance of primary radar -- especially that particular primary radar.
Grizz
This is an example of taking one bit of information and using it -- incorrectly -- to build a pillar for a preferred theory. To suggest that the "only way around" the speed observed on primary radar is to disregard the 1825.27 BTO arc divulges an ignorance of primary radar -- especially that particular primary radar.
Grizz
Grizz
It ignores the 1825:27 BTO arc.
The flightpath that fits the evidence (primary radar, satellite data) is:
MEKAR-NILAM-SANOB-(ANSAX)-Banda Aceh, with a slow down at TOPD.
The slow down doesn’t fly past the 1825:27 arc.
Those pesky facts!
GBO if the crew had the presence of mind to divert to Penang why did they not descend?
Why did they miss a master warning for cabin altitude?
Why did they overfly Penang and turn NW?
If flight modes changed from LNAV to HDG then who did this if the crew were unconscious?
Why did the aircraft then turn S?
Finally your thoughts on this track…
Why did they miss a master warning for cabin altitude?
Why did they overfly Penang and turn NW?
If flight modes changed from LNAV to HDG then who did this if the crew were unconscious?
Why did the aircraft then turn S?
Finally your thoughts on this track…
Last edited by Icarus2001; 25th Dec 2022 at 23:52. Reason: To add image.
The resultant failures, task complexity, mental overload and higher priorities can result in the descent being overlooked.
Without the valid landing altitude data, the cabin altitude warning message shows at 15,000 feet, not 10,000 feet. Without 4 DUs, the PFD, ND, MFD and EICAS information are competing for space on the remaining 2 DUs. The crew may have selected the right inboard to MFD to run checklists, thus there is no EICAS information immediately visible, it requires the crew to switch the right inboard back to EICAS. Things can be overlooked in a stressful cockpit and mildly hypoxic.
Both pilots were smokers, as stated on their last medical renewals. They are more susceptible to hypoxia.
If the crew should miss the GRADUAL decompression event, hypoxia will lead to mental confusion. Strange decisions will be made.
The aircraft was heading south because the autopilot was following the diversion route to Banda Aceh via VAMPI-MEKAR-NILAM-SANOB-(ANSAX)-Banda Aceh. Once it reaches Banda Aceh it is already heading south. It continues south on autopilot until fuel exhaustion. ie 34S 93E with inop left Autothrottle
It ignores the primary radar data through the Malacca Strait.
WSPR data is not accurate enough to plot a course.
The WSPR flight path is extremely complex, when compared to the simple diversion to Banda Aceh route via NILAM-SANOB.
The resultant failures, task complexity, mental overload and higher priorities can result in the descent being overlooked.
It all becomes clear now.
Again, you've made a gigantic assumption that ignores the way a crew would operate the aircraft in such an emergency, just to make your scenario work.
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Rubbish. If the crew had lost the left and centre DUs, they would have needed the FO's inboard display selected to EICAS to assess the situation and to provide engine indications. Furthermore, in your scenario it would make sense for the FO in the right seat to fly the aircraft, because he has the only available PFD. That would leave the Capt to run the checklists from the left seat, using the QRH.
So what? Once the pilot has had a look at whatever is needed, they would normally select the display back to something more useful, ESPECIALLY in a situation where the available DUs is extremely limited.
Without the valid landing altitude data, the cabin altitude warning message shows at 15,000 feet, not 10,000 feet. Without 4 DUs, the PFD, ND, MFD and EICAS information are competing for space on the remaining 2 DUs. The crew may have selected the right inboard to MFD to run checklists, thus there is no EICAS information immediately visible, it requires the crew to switch the right inboard back to EICAS. Things can be overlooked in a stressful cockpit and mildly hypoxic.
Both pilots were smokers, as stated on their last medical renewals. They are more susceptible to hypoxia.
Both pilots were smokers, as stated on their last medical renewals. They are more susceptible to hypoxia.
At the end of route to Banda Aceh in LNAV, the autopilot mode remains in LNAV but reverts to maintaining the last magnetic heading. No crew input is required.
You simply do not understand two crew jet operations, that is obvious from the way you use terminology and misunderstand fundamental principles.
Please tell us what jet types you have flown.
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hypoxia doesn't make people turn around the jet, fly exactly along the border and turn exactly around Indonesia...the probability for that just randomly happening would be around 1 in a billion
Please tell us what jet types you have flown.
Which turns are you referring to? A constant magnetic heading from Banda Aceh with an inoperative left autothrottle, satisfies the satellite BTO/BFO data. The only turning that would occur is at fuel exhaustion of the second engine, when the autopilot is lost.
A diversion from IGARI to Penang (nearest suitable airport) would fly along the Malaysian/Thai border momentarily. How would you divert to Penang from IGARI in an emergency?
The flightpath NILAM-SANOB-(ANSAX)-Banda Aceh airport does not go around Indonesia, it goes over the top. It satisfies the primary radar and satellite data. What flightpath and endpoint do you calculate?
oh yeah, hypoxia made him turn off transponder, skirt the border and then go around Indonesia (confirmed by Indonesian officials that he didn't enter their airspace)
sorry, but you are clutching at straws here
sorry, but you are clutching at straws here
Sorry, I might have missed it, but how did you propose to fly from IGARI to Penang airport?
Indonesian airspace covers an area west of Banda Aceh, out to the 92E longitude.
There is not a flightpath possible that can go around Indonesian airspace and still meet satellite data. Do you have one?
And who is this “Indonesian Official” you speak of?
Have they seen the withheld Indonesian primary radar recordings?
It beggars belief the crew was so overwhelmed or hypoxic they couldn't descend when the CABIN ALTITUDE warning occurred, yet had the wherewithal to subsequently program a route to Banda Aceh via MEKAR-NILAM-SANOB, including the airport identifier WITT. How could they possibly do such a thing by 'mistake'?
It satisfies the...satellite data.
