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MH370 - "new" news

Old 24th Dec 2022, 08:13
  #241 (permalink)  
 
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I’m not certain the data really came from Inmarsat. It certainly hasn’t led us to the wreckage.

Maybe SBIRS rather than Inmarsat.
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Old 24th Dec 2022, 09:10
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Do you have any science or evidence to back it up?
Well you certainly donít.
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Old 24th Dec 2022, 21:36
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Originally Posted by slats11
Iím not certain the data really came from Inmarsat. It certainly hasnít led us to the wreckage.
because the data isn't conclusive and it was interpreted incorrectly (obv) based on false assumptions
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Old 24th Dec 2022, 22:54
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[QUOTE=GBO; the speed observed on primary radar from Penang to the last primary radar point at 1822:12, will equate to the aircraft being too far west of the 1825:27 BTO arc (satellite data).

Using THEIR thinking, then the only way around this is to disregard the 1825:27 BTO arc and use the 1828:06 BTO arc [/QUOTE]

This is an example of taking one bit of information and using it -- incorrectly -- to build a pillar for a preferred theory. To suggest that the "only way around" the speed observed on primary radar is to disregard the 1825.27 BTO arc divulges an ignorance of primary radar -- especially that particular primary radar.

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Old 25th Dec 2022, 22:45
  #245 (permalink)  
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Originally Posted by grizzled
This is an example of taking one bit of information and using it -- incorrectly -- to build a pillar for a preferred theory. To suggest that the "only way around" the speed observed on primary radar is to disregard the 1825.27 BTO arc divulges an ignorance of primary radar -- especially that particular primary radar.

Grizz
Exactly, trying to fit a flightpath continuing northwest at the same airspeed from MEKAR, does NOT meet all the evidence.
It ignores the 1825:27 BTO arc.

The flightpath that fits the evidence (primary radar, satellite data) is:
MEKAR-NILAM-SANOB-(ANSAX)-Banda Aceh, with a slow down at TOPD.
The slow down doesnít fly past the 1825:27 arc.

Those pesky facts!
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Old 25th Dec 2022, 23:40
  #246 (permalink)  
 
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GBO if the crew had the presence of mind to divert to Penang why did they not descend?

Why did they miss a master warning for cabin altitude?

Why did they overfly Penang and turn NW?

If flight modes changed from LNAV to HDG then who did this if the crew were unconscious?

Why did the aircraft then turn S?

Finally your thoughts on this track…




Last edited by Icarus2001; 25th Dec 2022 at 23:52. Reason: To add image.
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Old 26th Dec 2022, 07:03
  #247 (permalink)  
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Originally Posted by Icarus2001
GBO if the crew had the presence of mind to divert to Penang why did they not descend?
If the crew oxygen bottle has ruptured in the Main Equipment Center, and the P105 Left Wire Integration Panel & Left AIMS Cabinet are destroyed, the crew will be overwhelmed by failures.

The resultant failures, task complexity, mental overload and higher priorities can result in the descent being overlooked.


Originally Posted by Icarus2001
Why did they miss a master warning for cabin altitude?
Without the valid landing altitude data, the cabin altitude warning message shows at 15,000 feet, not 10,000 feet. Without 4 DUs, the PFD, ND, MFD and EICAS information are competing for space on the remaining 2 DUs. The crew may have selected the right inboard to MFD to run checklists, thus there is no EICAS information immediately visible, it requires the crew to switch the right inboard back to EICAS. Things can be overlooked in a stressful cockpit and mildly hypoxic.

Both pilots were smokers, as stated on their last medical renewals. They are more susceptible to hypoxia.

Originally Posted by Icarus2001
Why did they overfly Penang and turn NW?
If the crew should miss the GRADUAL decompression event, hypoxia will lead to mental confusion. Strange decisions will be made.

Originally Posted by Icarus2001
If flight modes changed from LNAV to HDG then who did this if the crew were unconscious?
At the end of route to Banda Aceh in LNAV, the autopilot mode remains in LNAV but reverts to maintaining the last magnetic heading. No crew input is required.


Originally Posted by Icarus2001
Why did the aircraft then turn S?
The aircraft was heading south because the autopilot was following the diversion route to Banda Aceh via VAMPI-MEKAR-NILAM-SANOB-(ANSAX)-Banda Aceh. Once it reaches Banda Aceh it is already heading south. It continues south on autopilot until fuel exhaustion. ie 34S 93E with inop left Autothrottle

Originally Posted by Icarus2001
Finally your thoughts on this trackÖ
It ignores the primary radar data through the Malacca Strait.
WSPR data is not accurate enough to plot a course.
The WSPR flight path is extremely complex, when compared to the simple diversion to Banda Aceh route via NILAM-SANOB.
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Old 26th Dec 2022, 07:39
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The resultant failures, task complexity, mental overload and higher priorities can result in the descent being overlooked.
Of course....

It all becomes clear now.
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Old 26th Dec 2022, 07:58
  #249 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by GBO
The crew may have selected the right inboard to MFD to run checklists, thus there is no EICAS information immediately visible, it requires the crew to switch the right inboard back to EICAS.
Rubbish. If the crew had lost the left and centre DUs, they would have needed the FO's inboard display selected to EICAS to assess the situation and to provide engine indications. Furthermore, in your scenario it would make sense for the FO in the right seat to fly the aircraft, because he has the only available PFD. That would leave the Capt to run the checklists from the left seat, using the QRH.

Again, you've made a gigantic assumption that ignores the way a crew would operate the aircraft in such an emergency, just to make your scenario work.
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Old 26th Dec 2022, 09:16
  #250 (permalink)  
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Originally Posted by BuzzBox
Rubbish. If the crew had lost the left and centre DUs, they would have needed the FO's inboard display selected to EICAS to assess the situation and to provide engine indications. Furthermore, in your scenario it would make sense for the FO in the right seat to fly the aircraft, because he has the only available PFD. That would leave the Capt to run the checklists from the left seat, using the QRH.
If the left and centre DUs are inoperative, only the 2 right DUs are available. The right outboard would be used for the PFD. So if the Captain wants to look at the Electrical Synoptic Display, he/she has to change the right inboard to MFD and select the electrical display, thus at that moment there ISNíT an EICAS display visible.
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Old 26th Dec 2022, 10:42
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Originally Posted by GBO
So if the Captain wants to look at the Electrical Synoptic Display, he/she has to change the right inboard to MFD and select the electrical display, thus at that moment there ISNíT an EICAS display visible.
So what? Once the pilot has had a look at whatever is needed, they would normally select the display back to something more useful, ESPECIALLY in a situation where the available DUs is extremely limited.
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Old 26th Dec 2022, 11:31
  #252 (permalink)  
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Originally Posted by BuzzBox
So what? Once the pilot has had a look at whatever is needed, they would normally select the display back to something more useful, ESPECIALLY in a situation where the available DUs is extremely limited.
And if the crew becomes TASK FIXATED on the electrical synoptic display due to a complex electrical problem, then they are not monitoring the EICAS, ND, or any other synoptic displays with only 2 serviceable DUs. They may miss the gradual decompression event and lose situational awareness. Itís called human factors.
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Old 26th Dec 2022, 12:16
  #253 (permalink)  
 
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Without the valid landing altitude data, the cabin altitude warning message shows at 15,000 feet, not 10,000 feet. Without 4 DUs, the PFD, ND, MFD and EICAS information are competing for space on the remaining 2 DUs. The crew may have selected the right inboard to MFD to run checklists, thus there is no EICAS information immediately visible, it requires the crew to switch the right inboard back to EICAS. Things can be overlooked in a stressful cockpit and mildly hypoxic.

Both pilots were smokers, as stated on their last medical renewals. They are more susceptible to hypoxia.
Do you know what a master warning sounds like? Feels like to hear in flight? No DUs are required for that.

​​​​​​​ At the end of route to Banda Aceh in LNAV, the autopilot mode remains in LNAV but reverts to maintaining the last magnetic heading. No crew input is required.
There are turns AFTER Banda Aceh.

You simply do not understand two crew jet operations, that is obvious from the way you use terminology and misunderstand fundamental principles.

​​​​​​​Please tell us what jet types you have flown.

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Old 26th Dec 2022, 14:31
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hypoxia doesn't make people turn around the jet, fly exactly along the border and turn exactly around Indonesia...the probability for that just randomly happening would be around 1 in a billion
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Old 26th Dec 2022, 18:28
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Please tell us what jet types you have flown.
GBO's dogmatic refusal to answer this question, plus some of his rather naive assumptions about just how this crew WOULD have operated makes one assume that he really has NFI.
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Old 26th Dec 2022, 19:57
  #256 (permalink)  
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Originally Posted by Icarus2001
Do you know what a master warning sounds like? Feels like to hear in flight? No DUs are required for that.

​​
The master warning may sound, but that wonít actually tell you the exact nature of the problem. There are many accidents and incidents where the crew have heard the master warning sound, but have misidentified the cabin altitude warning when affected by hypoxia eg Helios 522, Payne Stewartís Lear Jet, Kalitta 66, etc.

Originally Posted by Icarus2001
There are turns AFTER Banda Aceh.​​
Which turns are you referring to? A constant magnetic heading from Banda Aceh with an inoperative left autothrottle, satisfies the satellite BTO/BFO data. The only turning that would occur is at fuel exhaustion of the second engine, when the autopilot is lost.
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Old 26th Dec 2022, 20:04
  #257 (permalink)  
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Originally Posted by AreOut
hypoxia doesn't make people turn around the jet, fly exactly along the border and turn exactly around Indonesia...the probability for that just randomly happening would be around 1 in a billion
In an emergency, many aircraft have been observed to conduct a 180 degree turn and divert to the nearest suitable airport eg QF1

A diversion from IGARI to Penang (nearest suitable airport) would fly along the Malaysian/Thai border momentarily. How would you divert to Penang from IGARI in an emergency?

The flightpath NILAM-SANOB-(ANSAX)-Banda Aceh airport does not go around Indonesia, it goes over the top. It satisfies the primary radar and satellite data. What flightpath and endpoint do you calculate?
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Old 26th Dec 2022, 21:41
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oh yeah, hypoxia made him turn off transponder, skirt the border and then go around Indonesia (confirmed by Indonesian officials that he didn't enter their airspace)

sorry, but you are clutching at straws here
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Old 26th Dec 2022, 22:03
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Originally Posted by AreOut
oh yeah, hypoxia made him turn off transponder, skirt the border and then go around Indonesia (confirmed by Indonesian officials that he didn't enter their airspace)

sorry, but you are clutching at straws here
The transponder will fail and cease transmitting if the P105/Left AIMS is destroyed.

Sorry, I might have missed it, but how did you propose to fly from IGARI to Penang airport?

Indonesian airspace covers an area west of Banda Aceh, out to the 92E longitude.
There is not a flightpath possible that can go around Indonesian airspace and still meet satellite data. Do you have one?
And who is this ďIndonesian OfficialĒ you speak of?
Have they seen the withheld Indonesian primary radar recordings?
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Old 27th Dec 2022, 00:52
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Originally Posted by GBO
The master warning may sound, but that wonít actually tell you the exact nature of the problem.
No, but the EICAS most definitely would, along with the pressurisation system indications, automatically displayed with the cabin altitude in RED. That's a different scenario to the cases you cited.

It beggars belief the crew was so overwhelmed or hypoxic they couldn't descend when the CABIN ALTITUDE warning occurred, yet had the wherewithal to subsequently program a route to Banda Aceh via MEKAR-NILAM-SANOB, including the airport identifier WITT. How could they possibly do such a thing by 'mistake'?

It satisfies the...satellite data.
You've made that claim a number of times, but have provided zero evidence. Others claim the satellite data does not support such a route. You were challenged to provide your calculations for independent analysis in another forum, but you failed to do so. Instead, you kept making unsubstantiated claims that were technically incorrect, and you were subsequently banned from that forum. If you are so sure of your theory, why won't you allow 'experts' to scrutinise your calculations?

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