Positive rate....gear up
In most airlines it's a joint responsibility between the pilot and the engineer to ensure the pins are removed before departure. However I would suggest that very few pilots would actually physically pull the pins out as this would (arguably) be a breach of an SoPs that prevent the pins being pulled by other than an engineer when they are actually required to be installed (eg. for maintenance action).
I haven't read the report closely, but I'm sure fatigue would be considered as a factor. It doesn't have to be the middle of the night to be fatigued…...
I haven't read the report closely, but I'm sure fatigue would be considered as a factor. It doesn't have to be the middle of the night to be fatigued…...
It has 5 gear pins instead of the usual 3, there have been a few instances of the 2 upper ones on the main gear still in place on a walk around, or later.
They are stored in the Avionics bay, not the cockpit, so you can’t confirm by any visual means.
The 2 holes next to each other on the nose gear that seems to be the cause of the BA 787 nose gear collapse.
It is always the PIC’s responsibility that the gear pins are removed, unfortunately there is the odd case were the system fails.
I learnt in the early days in the left, not to rely on the FO to help me through a GA. I sit next to a mix however largely very young and inexperienced, too many times has startle effect come into play and it just becomes a mess. I sort of plan if it happens or I see the GA coming, I’m on my own. I do get worried when some of these people who cannot manage a GA with me in the past are now sitting in the same seat as me.
It goes both ways though. You have those in the left who are constantly carried (ffs just retire) by those poor people in the right. That played out in my mob, was a major screwup on departure. Going forward we will see more FOs gaining employment that had been ex left with significant experience, usually more than the person they sit next to. Things become too relaxed and things get missed. Tiger demonstrated that quite well out of Sydney once.
It goes both ways though. You have those in the left who are constantly carried (ffs just retire) by those poor people in the right. That played out in my mob, was a major screwup on departure. Going forward we will see more FOs gaining employment that had been ex left with significant experience, usually more than the person they sit next to. Things become too relaxed and things get missed. Tiger demonstrated that quite well out of Sydney once.
The PIC was one of the most experienced in the company, and an all round good operator. I think the serious mental stress the current situation is putting on all pilots must be considered.
Something I've learnt is to never miss an opportunity to run your eyes over the flight deck. Even in busier times such as below transition, there's always 5 or 10 seconds to have a glance over switches or items that you may have missed even if those things have just been covered in a checklist.
The other thing I do for some items is a form of the Japanese practice of Pointing and Calling
Gear, flap, Auto feather, passenger signs and other critical items, I'll always point at and call out what I see.
Those two things have picked up a few missed items over the years.
Poor bastards though. These days it could've been any of us.
Poor bastards though. These days it could've been any of us.
Something I've learnt is to never miss an opportunity to run your eyes over the flight deck. Even in busier times such as below transition, there's always 5 or 10 seconds to have a glance over switches or items that you may have missed even if those things have just been covered in a checklist.
I’ve done it from a GA. Strong tailwind on the approach, so had the gear out with an intermediate flap setting. ATC told us to break off at about 2,500’ so gentle climb back up to the MAA of 3,000’. There was heavy rain so it had been relatively noisy on the FD, and it wasn’t until after we levelled off we noticed the gear was still out.
Contributory factors were probably a) not using TO/GA but V/S, which didn’t put us mentally in GA mode, and b) discontinuing the approach rather than saying “go-around”, which would have primed subsequent responses and actions. Also, we were at an unusual height and configuration for a GA, so there wasn’t much learnt behaviour to fall back on. No harm done and something else to go in the experience bucket...
Contributory factors were probably a) not using TO/GA but V/S, which didn’t put us mentally in GA mode, and b) discontinuing the approach rather than saying “go-around”, which would have primed subsequent responses and actions. Also, we were at an unusual height and configuration for a GA, so there wasn’t much learnt behaviour to fall back on. No harm done and something else to go in the experience bucket...
NASA made a study of errors made on the flight decks of airline operations. Of 60 flights observed eight hundred ninety-nine deviations were observed (194 in checklist use, 391 in monitoring, and 314 in primary procedures).
The captain was flying on 37 of the 60 flights and the first officer on the other 23.
The executive summary.
https://human-factors.arc.nasa.gov/p...010-216396.pdf
Had a personal issue with the gear during training, instructor had me demonstrate slow flight (gear, flaps, speed brake) and then asked for a penetration. Nosed over for the penetration and wondered why the aircraft wouldn't accelerate to penetration speed with the aircraft in a seemingly vertical dive. Yes, things left hanging in the breeze, didn't even get to exceed any flap or gear limit speeds.
The captain was flying on 37 of the 60 flights and the first officer on the other 23.
The executive summary.
Checklists and monitoring are two essential defenses against equipment failures and pilot errors. Problems with checklist use and pilots’ failures to monitor adequately have a long history in aviation accidents.
A typical airline flight requires a great number of routine flight control inputs and switch actions and frequent reading and verification of visual displays. Many of these actions are governed by formal procedures specifying the sequence and manner of execution, after which checklists are used to bolster reliability. Throughout the flight, pilots are required to monitor many functions, the state of aircraft systems, aircraft configuration, flight path, and the actions of the other pilot in the cockpit. Thus, the number of opportunities for error is enormous, especially on challenging flights, and many of those opportunities are associated with checklists and monitoring—themselves safeguards designed to protect against error.
Our study was conducted to explore why checklists and monitoring sometimes fail to catch errors and equipment malfunctions as intended. In particular, we wanted to: 1) collect data on monitoring and checklist use in cockpit operations in typical flight conditions; 2) provide a plausible cognitive account of why deviations from formal checklist and monitoring procedures sometimes occur; 3) lay a foundation for identifying ways to reduce vulnerability to inadvertent checklist and monitoring errors; 4) compare checklist and monitoring execution in normal flights with performance issues uncovered in accident investigations; and 5) suggest ways to improve the effectiveness of checklists and monitoring.
A typical airline flight requires a great number of routine flight control inputs and switch actions and frequent reading and verification of visual displays. Many of these actions are governed by formal procedures specifying the sequence and manner of execution, after which checklists are used to bolster reliability. Throughout the flight, pilots are required to monitor many functions, the state of aircraft systems, aircraft configuration, flight path, and the actions of the other pilot in the cockpit. Thus, the number of opportunities for error is enormous, especially on challenging flights, and many of those opportunities are associated with checklists and monitoring—themselves safeguards designed to protect against error.
Our study was conducted to explore why checklists and monitoring sometimes fail to catch errors and equipment malfunctions as intended. In particular, we wanted to: 1) collect data on monitoring and checklist use in cockpit operations in typical flight conditions; 2) provide a plausible cognitive account of why deviations from formal checklist and monitoring procedures sometimes occur; 3) lay a foundation for identifying ways to reduce vulnerability to inadvertent checklist and monitoring errors; 4) compare checklist and monitoring execution in normal flights with performance issues uncovered in accident investigations; and 5) suggest ways to improve the effectiveness of checklists and monitoring.
Had a personal issue with the gear during training, instructor had me demonstrate slow flight (gear, flaps, speed brake) and then asked for a penetration. Nosed over for the penetration and wondered why the aircraft wouldn't accelerate to penetration speed with the aircraft in a seemingly vertical dive. Yes, things left hanging in the breeze, didn't even get to exceed any flap or gear limit speeds.
I don't know about the 787 but Airbus (A330 at least) had a little storage area for the gear pins and their flags, perspex door allowed both pilots to screw their heads around and see them when the checklist called for "gear pins and covers" There were 3 slots so pilots could see them all individually when fitted as designed. More often than not the engineers would just wrap them together and force the wad into the box and so needed to be sorted by the pilots.
Never forgot to bring the gear up but........ I thought it would not be possible to forget to put it down as the slippery twin I was flying could not be slowed to approach speeds without gear.....wrong!
.
Never forgot to bring the gear up but........ I thought it would not be possible to forget to put it down as the slippery twin I was flying could not be slowed to approach speeds without gear.....wrong!
.
More often than not the engineers would just wrap them together and force the wad into the box and so needed to be sorted by the pilots.
I thought it would not be possible to forget to put it down as the slippery twin I was flying could not be slowed to approach speeds without gear.....wrong!
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Been there as well,
When on a check ride for my CPL, many, many moons ago, with an infamously pedantic scottish examiner, who was ex RAF javelins, I forgot to raise the gear on my missed approach from a PFL.
Said examiner was looking out of the window pointing out where his wife was born as I struggled to understand why the climb rate was so poor! A glance at the gear indicator revealed a smugly glowing set of three greens.
After raising the gear, dramatically improving the normally spectacularly poor climb performance of the Arrow, the infamously pedantic examiner looked over at me, smiled and winked!
Proper examiner, I learnt from that!
No one is perfect and we all make mistakes IMVHO.
ATB
When on a check ride for my CPL, many, many moons ago, with an infamously pedantic scottish examiner, who was ex RAF javelins, I forgot to raise the gear on my missed approach from a PFL.
Said examiner was looking out of the window pointing out where his wife was born as I struggled to understand why the climb rate was so poor! A glance at the gear indicator revealed a smugly glowing set of three greens.
After raising the gear, dramatically improving the normally spectacularly poor climb performance of the Arrow, the infamously pedantic examiner looked over at me, smiled and winked!
Proper examiner, I learnt from that!
No one is perfect and we all make mistakes IMVHO.
ATB
Not sure if this was relevant to the QF787, but the with the 787, Boeing departed from some tried and true setup with the gear pins.
It has 5 gear pins instead of the usual 3, there have been a few instances of the 2 upper ones on the main gear still in place on a walk around, or later.
They are stored in the Avionics bay, not the cockpit, so you can’t confirm by any visual means.
The 2 holes next to each other on the nose gear that seems to be the cause of the BA 787 nose gear collapse.
It is always the PIC’s responsibility that the gear pins are removed, unfortunately there is the odd case were the system fails.
It has 5 gear pins instead of the usual 3, there have been a few instances of the 2 upper ones on the main gear still in place on a walk around, or later.
They are stored in the Avionics bay, not the cockpit, so you can’t confirm by any visual means.
The 2 holes next to each other on the nose gear that seems to be the cause of the BA 787 nose gear collapse.
It is always the PIC’s responsibility that the gear pins are removed, unfortunately there is the odd case were the system fails.
The storage box for gear pins is a customer fit. Some in the flt deck, some in the fwd elec bay.
The practice of a log entry, mandated by some airlines, has alleviated the problem to some extent.
I too like the Japanese shiso kanko method.
