Channel 9 Under Investigation MAX Promo
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Actually it's 60s Tech. Design first started in 1964 and it first flew in 1967.
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As you can see by the date MCAS information was included in the Engineering training. So it was not a complete cover up.
like I say, the 737 Max may now be a perfectly good aircraft. The real story hear is the usual tale of various staff members throughout Boing and the FAA who voiced concerns throughout the certification and design process who were ignored and silenced in the interest of commercial expediency. The coverup was complete when Boing elected to not put any technical information in the manuals about this system despite the concerns voiced stating that it could be potentially catastrophic if MCAS malfunctioned and wasn’t dealt with appropriately. Boeing have now done what they should have done originally, for the lives lost Boeing should take responsibility, the Max will more than likely go on to be very successful but it’s name is forever tarnished and the media will always dramatise things. To be honest I won’t be flying on one for a few years, I just don’t trust Boeing and the FAA, there was a lot of commercial pressure to get this aircraft back in the air, it may prove to be a very successful aircraft but I for one will not be putting my family on one for a couple of years. That is the beauty of choice.
Good morning Ollie.
I, like you couldn't care less what happens to the Boeing managers who made a conscious decision to hide the faults of the MAX aircraft. They can rot in hell as far as i am concerned.
But can I ask you to take a momentary leap of faith and assume the aircraft are now safe to fly.
Airlines are ordering and have ordered this aircraft.
The aviation industry is going through enough of a clusterF##k with airlines around the world trying their hardest to get back on their feet.
The last thing they need is crap stories like this presented by imbeciles scaring passengers away and taking their flying dollars with them.
As I said if the aircraft is not up to snuff then by all means call it out, I have no problem with that. There is no doubt it has had dire shortcomings in the past.
I just want to see as many airlines and their employees back to as near normal, what ever normal is these days, as quickly as possible.
Anyway I think I just heard the Easter bunny at the back door so time for a choccy egg or two.
Fly safe and plan hard.
Happy Easter to all.
Cheers Hoss58
Is it not true that had the pilots followed the STAB TRIM Runaway checklist it would have prevented the loss of control in both accidents?
I see the issue not so much as covering up the MCAS, but a poor failure risk assessment - the single point of failure of the AOA sensor - that's the root cause. A sign of rushed certification and commercial pressure I think.
I see the issue not so much as covering up the MCAS, but a poor failure risk assessment - the single point of failure of the AOA sensor - that's the root cause. A sign of rushed certification and commercial pressure I think.
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Is it not true that had the pilots followed the STAB TRIM Runaway checklist it would have prevented the loss of control in both accidents?
I see the issue not so much as covering up the MCAS, but a poor failure risk assessment - the single point of failure of the AOA sensor - that's the root cause. A sign of rushed certification and commercial pressure I think.
I see the issue not so much as covering up the MCAS, but a poor failure risk assessment - the single point of failure of the AOA sensor - that's the root cause. A sign of rushed certification and commercial pressure I think.
Like many others I have practiced the Runaway Trim scenario in the simulator many times.
I would appear that in both accidents the pilots did carry out the Runaway Trim procedure however reinstated the Stab Cutoff switches when they could not control the aircraft,bearing in mind there where multiple cockpit warnings including the Speed trim and Stall Warning.
The Ethiopian accident report says the aircraft crashed at a speed of 460kts due to the pilots not reducing thrust after takeoff.
I believe that many errors occurred in both accidents, however in my experience the pilots I have flown with in the past would have been able to handle the situation.
As a Jetstar cadet once said "In my experience experience doesn't count." Passenger jets have to be designed so that the average airline pilot can fly it not just the ace of the base. If the MAX has been grounded for 2 years then there is something fundamentally wrong with the design.
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As a Jetstar cadet once said "In my experience experience doesn't count." Passenger jets have to be designed so that the average airline pilot can fly it not just the ace of the base. If the MAX has been grounded for 2 years then there is something fundamentally wrong with the design.
From what I read in both accident reports had the pilots known about MCAS unfortunately it would have had the same result.
Like many others I have practiced the Runaway Trim scenario in the simulator many times.
I would appear that in both accidents the pilots did carry out the Runaway Trim procedure however reinstated the Stab Cutoff switches when they could not control the aircraft,bearing in mind there where multiple cockpit warnings including the Speed trim and Stall Warning.
The Ethiopian accident report says the aircraft crashed at a speed of 460kts due to the pilots not reducing thrust after takeoff.
I believe that many errors occurred in both accidents, however in my experience the pilots I have flown with in the past would have been able to handle the situation.
Like many others I have practiced the Runaway Trim scenario in the simulator many times.
I would appear that in both accidents the pilots did carry out the Runaway Trim procedure however reinstated the Stab Cutoff switches when they could not control the aircraft,bearing in mind there where multiple cockpit warnings including the Speed trim and Stall Warning.
The Ethiopian accident report says the aircraft crashed at a speed of 460kts due to the pilots not reducing thrust after takeoff.
I believe that many errors occurred in both accidents, however in my experience the pilots I have flown with in the past would have been able to handle the situation.
The first time the MCAS activated for 5 seconds the crew then manually trimmed Nose Up again, the second time it happened it was the lower houred FO who suggested using the Stab Trim Cutout switches (all of this happened within 30 seconds). However with all of this going on the Aircraft was still trimmed nose down to the extent they needed significant backforce on the control column to maintain level flight. Boeing's method of using a "rollercoaster" technique to recover from this situation had been deleted from their manuals decades ago. The crew made an error here and allowed the speed to build up and further increase the forces required to maintain level flight, whether this was caused by distraction by other alerts or their struggle to pitch the aircraft up, who knows?
But it got to the point where they felt they had no option but to re-engage the Stab Trim to attempt to maintain flight and then the final MCAS activation occurred.
Could the pilots have done things differently that would have saved them? No doubt, but it's easy to sit back and read the report and think you'd be able to recover easily. It's easy as well in the sim when you know you're about to have that failure and that failure alone, and you know exactly what you need to do. But in real life when it's among a multitude of failures your reaction might be worse. I think that's called being a Monday Morning Quarterback.
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Having a look at ET302, there were several problems exacerbating this beyond a simple sim exercise. The damaged AoA sensors had caused a continuous stick shaker that had activated immediately after take off for the duration of the flight. Multiple warning system activations for related system and GPWS alerts. Easy to mask a spinning trim wheel.
The first time the MCAS activated for 5 seconds the crew then manually trimmed Nose Up again, the second time it happened it was the lower houred FO who suggested using the Stab Trim Cutout switches (all of this happened within 30 seconds). However with all of this going on the Aircraft was still trimmed nose down to the extent they needed significant backforce on the control column to maintain level flight. Boeing's method of using a "rollercoaster" technique to recover from this situation had been deleted from their manuals decades ago. The crew made an error here and allowed the speed to build up and further increase the forces required to maintain level flight, whether this was caused by distraction by other alerts or their struggle to pitch the aircraft up, who knows?
But it got to the point where they felt they had no option but to re-engage the Stab Trim to attempt to maintain flight and then the final MCAS activation occurred.
Could the pilots have done things differently that would have saved them? No doubt, but it's easy to sit back and read the report and think you'd be able to recover easily. It's easy as well in the sim when you know you're about to have that failure and that failure alone, and you know exactly what you need to do. But in real life when it's among a multitude of failures your reaction might be worse. I think that's called being a Monday Morning Quarterback.
The first time the MCAS activated for 5 seconds the crew then manually trimmed Nose Up again, the second time it happened it was the lower houred FO who suggested using the Stab Trim Cutout switches (all of this happened within 30 seconds). However with all of this going on the Aircraft was still trimmed nose down to the extent they needed significant backforce on the control column to maintain level flight. Boeing's method of using a "rollercoaster" technique to recover from this situation had been deleted from their manuals decades ago. The crew made an error here and allowed the speed to build up and further increase the forces required to maintain level flight, whether this was caused by distraction by other alerts or their struggle to pitch the aircraft up, who knows?
But it got to the point where they felt they had no option but to re-engage the Stab Trim to attempt to maintain flight and then the final MCAS activation occurred.
Could the pilots have done things differently that would have saved them? No doubt, but it's easy to sit back and read the report and think you'd be able to recover easily. It's easy as well in the sim when you know you're about to have that failure and that failure alone, and you know exactly what you need to do. But in real life when it's among a multitude of failures your reaction might be worse. I think that's called being a Monday Morning Quarterback.
I don’t make statements unless I can back it up with fact.
In both accidents the pilots failed to fly the aircraft IAW NON NORMAL procedures, they did not work as a crew to try and resolve the issue at hand and got too distracted by the stall warning system.
A runaway stabilzer is a non event if the procedure is carried in full and the aircraft flown correctly.
But I suppose most pilots I flew with where very well trained.
In both accidents the pilots failed to fly the aircraft IAW NON NORMAL procedures, they did not work as a crew to try and resolve the issue at hand and got too distracted by the stall warning system.
A runaway stabilzer is a non event if the procedure is carried in full and the aircraft flown correctly.
But I suppose most pilots I flew with where very well trained.
A runaway stabilzer is a non event if the procedure is carried in full and the aircraft flown correctly.
But I suppose most pilots I flew with where very well trained.
Hard to fly the aircraft in accordance with non normal procedures that would allow you to control the aircraft if those procedures are not in your training manuals. I think the grounding of the type for two years until the necessary rectifications were made is a sign this is primarily a design fault and lack of correct information passed to pilots rather than pilot incompetence.
Let’s hope Boeing and Airbus end the MAX and NEO at this design and be done with it.
Airbus has started playing with the 321 recently which is already at its max capability in my book let alone adding all sorts of bits and pieces to it, to try and push it harder and harder.
Boeing would be better off keeping the MAX fairly short term and get a leg up on Airbus planning the next generation narrowbody. I’ve got a feeling they will get sidetracked again with the 777X. The A321 is great but its pushing the barriers as it is, needs a bigger wing which means a whole new design across all variants. They should be going after that 250 pax narrow body machine before Airbus brings in the market the replacement.
Airbus has started playing with the 321 recently which is already at its max capability in my book let alone adding all sorts of bits and pieces to it, to try and push it harder and harder.
Boeing would be better off keeping the MAX fairly short term and get a leg up on Airbus planning the next generation narrowbody. I’ve got a feeling they will get sidetracked again with the 777X. The A321 is great but its pushing the barriers as it is, needs a bigger wing which means a whole new design across all variants. They should be going after that 250 pax narrow body machine before Airbus brings in the market the replacement.
Have you ever a an Engine Failure on Takeoff, Engine Fire or a Runaway Stabilizer on final,these events can be backed up with ATSB reports.
I don’t make statements unless I can back it up with fact.
In both accidents the pilots failed to fly the aircraft IAW NON NORMAL procedures, they did not work as a crew to try and resolve the issue at hand and got too distracted by the stall warning system.
A runaway stabilzer is a non event if the procedure is carried in full and the aircraft flown correctly.
But I suppose most pilots I flew with where very well trained.
I don’t make statements unless I can back it up with fact.
In both accidents the pilots failed to fly the aircraft IAW NON NORMAL procedures, they did not work as a crew to try and resolve the issue at hand and got too distracted by the stall warning system.
A runaway stabilzer is a non event if the procedure is carried in full and the aircraft flown correctly.
But I suppose most pilots I flew with where very well trained.
LOL - so for no reason after the first crash they changed to NON NORMAL procedure!
Because it (continuously) was not normal for a NON NORMAL procedure.
And event #1 by the "Super 3 Crew" snagged it a Speed Trim running in reverse.
Legends in Lunch Boxes.
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Why not? It worked for Boeing with the BUFF. Generations of guys have happily dropped bombs on enemies of freedom around the globe in the same airframes their pappies flew.
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It seems that we still have people out there who are not MAX rated in any shape or form willing to express an opinion on an aircraft that has been modified, test flown and certified by every Aviation Safety Authority in the world.
My case rests and I will continue to release the 737 Max safely back into Airline operation.
My case rests and I will continue to release the 737 Max safely back into Airline operation.