Channel 9 Under Investigation MAX Promo
I've seen the wiring diagrams for MCAS courtesy of Peter Lemme along with the explanations as to how it is manifestly different from STS but thanks for offer.
Here’s a comment on R&N about the incident. Looks like there was confusion about the naming of the airport, the new airport had just been renamed to the old airport’s name before the incident. The crews safely landed at the airport they were told to land at by Dispatch. Because there was more than one incident on the same day then that says to me it was a dispatcher fault rather than pilot stupidity.
Posters on that thread who’ve operated with ET crews also have good comments about the Ethiopian pilots they’ve worked with, one saying they put many “US and Euro crews to shame”.
And again, if they’ve genuinely mis-identified the landing airport they join the ranks of Boeing’s Dreamlifter pilots, the USAF, Delta Airlines, Northwest Airlines and lo and behold Southwest who’ve made the same mistake recently too.
Posters on that thread who’ve operated with ET crews also have good comments about the Ethiopian pilots they’ve worked with, one saying they put many “US and Euro crews to shame”.
And again, if they’ve genuinely mis-identified the landing airport they join the ranks of Boeing’s Dreamlifter pilots, the USAF, Delta Airlines, Northwest Airlines and lo and behold Southwest who’ve made the same mistake recently too.
Anyway, Byron gets paid to pontificate, whereas we pprune posters do it for nothing, so who’s the bigger fool?
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Anyway, Byron gets paid to pontificate, whereas we PPRuNe posters do it for nothing, so who’s the bigger fool?
Who would you rather hear commenting upon Aviation Incidents; Byron...or GT?
Here’s a comment on R&N about the incident. Looks like there was confusion about the naming of the airport, the new airport had just been renamed to the old airport’s name before the incident. The crews safely landed at the airport they were told to land at by Dispatch. Because there was more than one incident on the same day then that says to me it was a dispatcher fault rather than pilot stupidity.
And again, if they’ve genuinely mis-identified the landing airport they join the ranks of Boeing’s Dreamlifter pilots, the USAF, Delta Airlines, Northwest Airlines and lo and behold Southwest who’ve made the same mistake recently too.
And again, if they’ve genuinely mis-identified the landing airport they join the ranks of Boeing’s Dreamlifter pilots, the USAF, Delta Airlines, Northwest Airlines and lo and behold Southwest who’ve made the same mistake recently too.
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The Boeing Quick Reference Handbook (QRH), Chapter 9, page 9.1 "Runaway Stabilizer". That is/was all the Pilots needed to know to deal with the Abnormal situation. Disconnect the Autopilot. It may require both Pilots to hold the Control Column/Yoke. The Stab Trim Cutout Switches should both be immediately moved to CUTOUT (Off) and leave them in CUTOUT, but the Pilot(s) in the accident aircraft switched them back to NORMAL (On).
With the STAB TRIM to CUTOFF, don't experiment by turning it back to NORMAL.
With the STAB TRIM to CUTOFF, don't experiment by turning it back to NORMAL.
In the original design of this system, before MCAS, this may have been feasible with early intervention, but with the additional and repeated input of MCAS it would quickly become impractical. This is why the Stab Trim switches were put back to Normal, to try and recover some trim control, not knowing of course that the MCAS was still adding nose down trim.
So the crux of the problem was that the pilots were applying an outdated response to a problem that they didn't, and couldn't understand.
And therein lies the whole problem. If you had read the complete accident report, it was found that the procedure using the cutoff switches was found to be ineffective because of the aerodynamic loads put on the stab in the out of trim condition, which meant that a manual re-trimming of the aircraft was physically impossible. The only way to re-trim was to to relax the pressure on the controls and then madly try manually re-trimming. This would be a daunting proposition with the nose pointing at the ground.
In the original design of this system, before MCAS, this may have been feasible with early intervention, but with the additional and repeated input of MCAS it would quickly become impractical. This is why the Stab Trim switches were put back to Normal, to try and recover some trim control, not knowing of course that the MCAS was still adding nose down trim.
So the crux of the problem was that the pilots were applying an outdated response to a problem that they didn't, and couldn't understand.
In the original design of this system, before MCAS, this may have been feasible with early intervention, but with the additional and repeated input of MCAS it would quickly become impractical. This is why the Stab Trim switches were put back to Normal, to try and recover some trim control, not knowing of course that the MCAS was still adding nose down trim.
So the crux of the problem was that the pilots were applying an outdated response to a problem that they didn't, and couldn't understand.
If the pilots had followed QRH when the issue became apparent the aerodynamic loads would have been manageable.
Once left to develop, the problem became overwhelming.
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The way I read it was because they didn’t act soon enough, the “outdated method” became untenable.
If the pilots had followed QRH when the issue became apparent the aerodynamic loads would have been manageable.
Once left to develop, the problem became overwhelming.
If the pilots had followed QRH when the issue became apparent the aerodynamic loads would have been manageable.
Once left to develop, the problem became overwhelming.
The stall warning system had activated and possibly distracted both pilots.
I don’t mean to be blunt but after years of flying, both accidents could have been avoided in my humble opinion and pilot error was a major contributing factor in both accidents.
Last edited by SRM; 6th Apr 2021 at 22:56.
You can argue chicken and the egg, producer/consumer again till the cows come home but the 6 second 'grab', the 2-3 minute news 'story' and the 22 minute episode are all most assuredly products of the media's preferences.
As to who's the greater fool, good question.
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And, therein lies the problem
And therein lies the whole problem. If you had read the complete accident report, it was found that the procedure using the cutoff switches was found to be ineffective because of the aerodynamic loads put on the stab in the out of trim condition, which meant that a manual re-trimming of the aircraft was physically impossible. The only way to re-trim was to to relax the pressure on the controls and then madly try manually re-trimming. This would be a daunting proposition with the nose pointing at the ground.
In the original design of this system, before MCAS, this may have been feasible with early intervention, but with the additional and repeated input of MCAS it would quickly become impractical. This is why the Stab Trim switches were put back to Normal, to try and recover some trim control, not knowing of course that the MCAS was still adding nose down trim.
So the crux of the problem was that the pilots were applying an outdated response to a problem that they didn't, and couldn't understand.
In the original design of this system, before MCAS, this may have been feasible with early intervention, but with the additional and repeated input of MCAS it would quickly become impractical. This is why the Stab Trim switches were put back to Normal, to try and recover some trim control, not knowing of course that the MCAS was still adding nose down trim.
So the crux of the problem was that the pilots were applying an outdated response to a problem that they didn't, and couldn't understand.
If the STAB TRIM is running away one direction or the other, what do you do? Sit there with your thumb up and locked and say, "Gee, will ya look at that!" Or, run the only QRH checklist that offers the slightest possible solution.
Pilot Error! That was all it was.
I won't debate this further.
SRM & ScepticalOptimist: You are spot on.
Lastly, for all those quick to bash Boeing, as in Gordonfvckingramay above, who wrote, "This is the first time that an aircraft manufacturer knew about a potentially deadly issue and still said “fvck it, release as is”" Complete rubbish! I will repeat for emphasis, Complete rubbish!
Would you be at all aware that airlines send their golden-haired boys, often senior Check Airmen, Chief Pilots, senior First Officers to Boeing to take delivery of a new aeroplane? Those who make that trip plan a little shopping before they go, but they tend to be top Pilots with an airline. They will go through every Aircraft Logbook page, every Boeing Airplane Flight Manual, systems, FMCs, thorough preflight inspection with Boeings best at hand to answer any questions, may even go to the Simulator, then they go for a at least one Test Flight with Boeing Test Pilots to put the aircraft through its paces. No stone gets unturned. All that and more, before the aircraft is accepted for delivery by the airline's designated acceptance crew, then they will fly that aircraft to their home country.
Do yas thinks the MCAS might have been an issue then or show some odd or unexpected behavior, then?
So, may I offer a wee bit of advice, after 36 years flying? Please give Pilot reports, in flight. Please write up even suspected defects or faults. Try to meet the Crew taking the aircraft from you and word up the Captain, "this is what I discovered". I have had crew experience a lightning strike and just walk away from the aeroplane -and, much worse.
Try to look after one another.
When you are required to do CBT on aircraft systems, try to stay awake and pay attention and try to understand the systems and how they inter-relate.
My first airline job, my first Ground School, a crusty ol' former Navy Flight Engineer was trying to explain to the class how some electronic component worked. I raised my hand and told him that he was not correct. Of course, the immediate reaction was to make the new guy look like an idiot. I was an Army-trained Maintenance Officer and Maintenance Test Pilot + I had an Aircraft Mechanic License. I insisted. He replied that he would check, during break and get back to me. Of course, I was correct. The point is there is a whole lot of misinformation out there, based on a whole lot of misunderstanding or poor training in the first instance. Do not be afraid to ask if you do not know or if you do, don't be afraid to challenge conventional wisdom.
Once upon a time, I was a First Officer flying a Boeing 747-200 across the Pacific, when I barely caught a glimpse of a flashing GS-2 light on the Master Caution Panel. I asked the Captain and FE immediately, "Did you see that?" No they hadn't. It happened again along with a clacking sound beneath my seat. For whatever reason, I was reaching for my Oxygen Mask, when the Cabin suddenly depressurized. As a First Officer, you cannot be asleep over there in the Right Hand Seat. Speak up. The second moral of that story is inter-related systems. A Ground Proximity Switch failed, making the Boeing 747-200 think it was on the ground . . . all that systems stuff is inter-related. Study. Study more. Study until it makes sense and you have a lightbulb moment.
I definitely was not the best pilot out there, especially flying jet aircraft. After all, I started my career as an Army helicopter Pilot. I did not have the normal evolution in an airline to command. My first command of any transport-category jet was the Boeing 747-400. I wish I had flown fighters or transports in the Air Force, then DC-9s or 737s or 727s, before going onto the jumbo, but it was not my fate. I went straight from steam-power to a glass cockpit -as a Captain. You CAN do that in a Boeing.
Boeing designs beautiful, reliable, solid, pilot-friendly airplanes.
Lastly, once upon a time, before my airline career, I worked for a Defense Industrial giant who also built some very famous aircraft. Very early in my employment I was required to attend classes on corporate ethics and accountability and reporting any breaches. Boeing purchased many parts of my former employer and took on many of their employees.
I have absolute confidence in Boeing and the Federal Aviation Adminstration. I am a true believer.
The two Boeing 737 Max crashes were due to Pilot Error and only Pilot Error . . . I do not care what the Hudson hero opines. I preferred to fly over or under flocks of birds, rather than through them. A flock of geese is not 1000 feet deep (only 16 feet) and the Fan Diameter is roughly 5 feet. If you are paying attention, proactively scanning the horizon, using a proper scanning technique and not fixated on a bug on the windscreen or instrument panel, or sightseeing, then a slight push-over or pull back and you can miss a flock of birds. I am am full of it right? Check this out and tell me what the depth of a flock of geese is. https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdo...=rep1&type=pdf
Last edited by FWRWATPLX2; 8th Apr 2021 at 04:35. Reason: spelling
Justin, you can argue the ins and outs of human preference till the cows come home but there's plenty of evidence that there's no innate or strong overall preference for concise over detailed. Humans are story telling animals and since we started writing stuff down there have been as many popular long and complicated stories as there have been short and succinct ones; the Odyssey, Shakespeare, Dickens and God forbid the likes of Harry Potter and Lost all bear witness to that.
You can argue chicken and the egg, producer/consumer again till the cows come home but the 6 second 'grab', the 2-3 minute news 'story' and the 22 minute episode are all most assuredly products of the media's preferences.
As to who's the greater fool, good question.
You can argue chicken and the egg, producer/consumer again till the cows come home but the 6 second 'grab', the 2-3 minute news 'story' and the 22 minute episode are all most assuredly products of the media's preferences.
As to who's the greater fool, good question.
60 minutes and other tabloid TV is not my preferred source for accurate news either, but there's no denying its popularity.
Of course, tabloid TV is no place to discuss a complex issue such as the perceived failures in the MAX, but their job is to sell eyeballs to advertisers. Nothing has to be exactly and comprehensively true, just 'true enough'.
As to Byron Bailey, there's no denying he has some credibility in the public's eyed as an experienced pilot. Most importantly he is willing to be outspoken in public. Whether you agree with him or want to smash the screen when he is on, it does make for good TV, and sadly, that's what it's all about.
That is correct, in the case of the ET accident Thrust was not reduced after takeoff and the aircraft managed to increase speed to 460kts before it contacted the ground.
The stall warning system had activated and possibly distracted both pilots.
I don’t mean to be blunt but after years of flying, both accidents could have been avoided in my humble opinion and pilot error was a major contributing factor in both accidents.
The stall warning system had activated and possibly distracted both pilots.
I don’t mean to be blunt but after years of flying, both accidents could have been avoided in my humble opinion and pilot error was a major contributing factor in both accidents.
That may be startling, for a person of your experience. You have heard Captain Sully's opinion on this matter I assume.
Don't get me wrong both accidents could have been avoided, in fact I am yet to find an accident that could not have been avoided - more so with 20-20.
As a strictly non pilot, passenger only, I have no interest in flying on aircraft that due to their idiosyncrasy's have to be flown by hot shot, thousands of hours experience pilots. I thought aircraft design had evolved to make the process of flight safer and less dangerous? What I find really odious about Boeing is the inference that the Max is fine in the hands of 'real' pilots. If the aircraft is unsafe unless flown by hot shot pilots, then Boeing should be more careful who it sells the design to. Perhaps including ALL the relevant information in the training manuals might help as well.
The FAA and their lazy trust in the information Boeing was providing them with to achieve certification is equally abhorrent.
It is to be hoped that Boeing have done enough now to remedy the shortcomings of the Max design, just as the 787 finally seems to be delivering as a reasonable and safe aircraft, time will tell.
The FAA and their lazy trust in the information Boeing was providing them with to achieve certification is equally abhorrent.
It is to be hoped that Boeing have done enough now to remedy the shortcomings of the Max design, just as the 787 finally seems to be delivering as a reasonable and safe aircraft, time will tell.
FWR, you are a fool, pilot error and only pilot error? Why was the aircraft grounded then and massive amounts of money spent on a fix? Seems over the top for something so clearly as the result of pilot error.
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if you Ollie Onion where a Sim Instructor or Check Airman / Check Captain would you to happy to release the crew for line operations.
I await your answer and please keep it civil.
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Put the sole of your size 10˝ on the rubberized STAB TRIM wheel.
If the STAB TRIM is running away one direction or the other, what do you do? Sit there with your thumb up and locked and say, "Gee, will ya look at that!" Or, run the only QRH checklist that offers the slightest possible solution.
Pilot Error! That was all it was.
I won't debate this further.
SRM & ScepticalOptimist: You are spot on.
Lastly, for all those quick to bash Boeing, as in Gordonfvckingramay above, who wrote, "This is the first time that an aircraft manufacturer knew about a potentially deadly issue and still said “fvck it, release as is”" Complete rubbish! I will repeat for emphasis, Complete rubbish!
Would you be at all aware that airlines send their golden-haired boys, often senior Check Airmen, Chief Pilots, senior First Officers to Boeing to take delivery of a new aeroplane? Those who make that trip plan a little shopping before they go, but they tend to be top Pilots with an airline. They will go through every Aircraft Logbook page, every Boeing Airplane Flight Manual, systems, FMCs, thorough preflight inspection with Boeings best at hand to answer any questions, may even go to the Simulator, then they go for a at least one Test Flight with Boeing Test Pilots to put the aircraft through its paces. No stone gets unturned. All that and more, before the aircraft is accepted for delivery by the airline's designated acceptance crew, then they will fly that aircraft to their home country.
Do yas thinks the MCAS might have been an issue then or show some odd or unexpected behavior, then?
So, may I offer a wee bit of advice, after 36 years flying? Please give Pilot reports, in flight. Please write up even suspected defects or faults. Try to meet the Crew taking the aircraft from you and word up the Captain, "this is what I discovered". I have had crew experience a lightning strike and just walk away from the aeroplane -and, much worse.
Try to look after one another.
When you are required to do CBT on aircraft systems, try to stay awake and pay attention and try to understand the systems and how they inter-relate.
My first airline job, my first Ground School, a crusty ol' former Navy Flight Engineer was trying to explain to the class how some electronic component worked. I raised my hand and told him that he was not correct. Of course, the immediate reaction was to make the new guy look like an idiot. I was an Army-trained Maintenance Officer and Maintenance Test Pilot + I had an Aircraft Mechanic License. I insisted. He replied that he would check, during break and get back to me. Of course, I was correct. The point is there is a whole lot of misinformation out there, based on a whole lot of misunderstanding or poor training in the first instance. Do not be afraid to ask if you do not know or if you do, don't be afraid to challenge conventional wisdom.
Once upon a time, I was a First Officer flying a Boeing 747-200 across the Pacific, when I barely caught a glimpse of a flashing GS-2 light on the Master Caution Panel. I asked the Captain and FE immediately, "Did you see that?" No they hadn't. It happened again along with a clacking sound beneath my seat. For whatever reason, I was reaching for my Oxygen Mask, when the Cabin suddenly depressurized. As a First Officer, you cannot be asleep over there in the Right Hand Seat. Speak up. The second moral of that story is inter-related systems. A Ground Proximity Switch failed, making the Boeing 747-200 think it was on the ground . . . all that systems stuff is inter-related. Study. Study more. Study until it makes sense and you have a lightbulb moment.
I definitely was not the best pilot out there, especially flying jet aircraft. After all, I started my career as an Army helicopter Pilot. I did not have the normal evolution in an airline to command. My first command of any transport-category jet was the Boeing 747-400. I wish I had flown fighters or transports in the Air Force, then DC-9s or 737s or 727s, before going onto the jumbo, but it was not my fate. I went straight from steam-power to a glass cockpit -as a Captain. You CAN do that in a Boeing.
Boeing designs beautiful, reliable, solid, pilot-friendly airplanes.
Lastly, once upon a time, before my airline career, I worked for a Defense Industrial giant who also built some very famous aircraft. Very early in my employment I was required to attend classes on corporate ethics and accountability and reporting any breaches. Boeing purchased many parts of my former employer and took on many of their employees.
I have absolute confidence in Boeing and the Federal Aviation Adminstration. I am a true believer.
The two Boeing 737 Max crashes were due to Pilot Error and only Pilot Error . . . I do not care what the Hudson hero opines. I preferred to fly over or under flocks of birds, rather than through them. A flock of geese is not 1000 feet deep. If you are paying attention, proactively scanning the horizon, using a proper scanning technique and not fixated on a bug on the windscreen, or sightseeing, then a slight push-over or pull back and you can miss a flock of birds. I am am full of it right? Check this out and tell me what the depth of a flock of geese is. https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdo...=rep1&type=pdf
If the STAB TRIM is running away one direction or the other, what do you do? Sit there with your thumb up and locked and say, "Gee, will ya look at that!" Or, run the only QRH checklist that offers the slightest possible solution.
Pilot Error! That was all it was.
I won't debate this further.
SRM & ScepticalOptimist: You are spot on.
Lastly, for all those quick to bash Boeing, as in Gordonfvckingramay above, who wrote, "This is the first time that an aircraft manufacturer knew about a potentially deadly issue and still said “fvck it, release as is”" Complete rubbish! I will repeat for emphasis, Complete rubbish!
Would you be at all aware that airlines send their golden-haired boys, often senior Check Airmen, Chief Pilots, senior First Officers to Boeing to take delivery of a new aeroplane? Those who make that trip plan a little shopping before they go, but they tend to be top Pilots with an airline. They will go through every Aircraft Logbook page, every Boeing Airplane Flight Manual, systems, FMCs, thorough preflight inspection with Boeings best at hand to answer any questions, may even go to the Simulator, then they go for a at least one Test Flight with Boeing Test Pilots to put the aircraft through its paces. No stone gets unturned. All that and more, before the aircraft is accepted for delivery by the airline's designated acceptance crew, then they will fly that aircraft to their home country.
Do yas thinks the MCAS might have been an issue then or show some odd or unexpected behavior, then?
So, may I offer a wee bit of advice, after 36 years flying? Please give Pilot reports, in flight. Please write up even suspected defects or faults. Try to meet the Crew taking the aircraft from you and word up the Captain, "this is what I discovered". I have had crew experience a lightning strike and just walk away from the aeroplane -and, much worse.
Try to look after one another.
When you are required to do CBT on aircraft systems, try to stay awake and pay attention and try to understand the systems and how they inter-relate.
My first airline job, my first Ground School, a crusty ol' former Navy Flight Engineer was trying to explain to the class how some electronic component worked. I raised my hand and told him that he was not correct. Of course, the immediate reaction was to make the new guy look like an idiot. I was an Army-trained Maintenance Officer and Maintenance Test Pilot + I had an Aircraft Mechanic License. I insisted. He replied that he would check, during break and get back to me. Of course, I was correct. The point is there is a whole lot of misinformation out there, based on a whole lot of misunderstanding or poor training in the first instance. Do not be afraid to ask if you do not know or if you do, don't be afraid to challenge conventional wisdom.
Once upon a time, I was a First Officer flying a Boeing 747-200 across the Pacific, when I barely caught a glimpse of a flashing GS-2 light on the Master Caution Panel. I asked the Captain and FE immediately, "Did you see that?" No they hadn't. It happened again along with a clacking sound beneath my seat. For whatever reason, I was reaching for my Oxygen Mask, when the Cabin suddenly depressurized. As a First Officer, you cannot be asleep over there in the Right Hand Seat. Speak up. The second moral of that story is inter-related systems. A Ground Proximity Switch failed, making the Boeing 747-200 think it was on the ground . . . all that systems stuff is inter-related. Study. Study more. Study until it makes sense and you have a lightbulb moment.
I definitely was not the best pilot out there, especially flying jet aircraft. After all, I started my career as an Army helicopter Pilot. I did not have the normal evolution in an airline to command. My first command of any transport-category jet was the Boeing 747-400. I wish I had flown fighters or transports in the Air Force, then DC-9s or 737s or 727s, before going onto the jumbo, but it was not my fate. I went straight from steam-power to a glass cockpit -as a Captain. You CAN do that in a Boeing.
Boeing designs beautiful, reliable, solid, pilot-friendly airplanes.
Lastly, once upon a time, before my airline career, I worked for a Defense Industrial giant who also built some very famous aircraft. Very early in my employment I was required to attend classes on corporate ethics and accountability and reporting any breaches. Boeing purchased many parts of my former employer and took on many of their employees.
I have absolute confidence in Boeing and the Federal Aviation Adminstration. I am a true believer.
The two Boeing 737 Max crashes were due to Pilot Error and only Pilot Error . . . I do not care what the Hudson hero opines. I preferred to fly over or under flocks of birds, rather than through them. A flock of geese is not 1000 feet deep. If you are paying attention, proactively scanning the horizon, using a proper scanning technique and not fixated on a bug on the windscreen, or sightseeing, then a slight push-over or pull back and you can miss a flock of birds. I am am full of it right? Check this out and tell me what the depth of a flock of geese is. https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdo...=rep1&type=pdf
We will never know what would happen if you were the captain on those doomed flights. You are certain of a different outcome...
However... the truth is, you and we will never know the result if faced with the same set of circumstances and information (if you have indeed flown an actual non simulator Max 8)
Feel free to promote your legendary status to those you consider beneath you. Those poor buggers saved a good many more lives by exposing **the absolute confidence in Boeing** than the scorn you heap upon them
Coming from purely a software design team perspective. Software in this type of application is intended to prevent a limitation being exceeded, not recover from one once it has occurred. I can't imagine anyone from the design team would be all that keen to put their name to the MCAS system, given it's very purpose is flawed.
Further, If the manufacturer/regulator allows a system that overrides pilot authority, then we are in the zone where there's no need for a pilot at all.
Further, If the manufacturer/regulator allows a system that overrides pilot authority, then we are in the zone where there's no need for a pilot at all.
Last edited by Xeptu; 8th Apr 2021 at 00:06. Reason: Extended
Any pilot who publicly criticises and condemns another pilot, about matters aviation, is many things. "Professional" is not one of them.
Any pilot who publicly attributes an aviation accident or incident to another pilot's error, alone, is many things. "Wise" is not one them.
Any pilot who publicly attributes an aviation accident or incident to another pilot's error, alone, is many things. "Wise" is not one them.
Put the sole of your size 10˝ on the rubberized STAB TRIM wheel.