C130 down NE Cooma
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Originally Posted by J.O.
Those fires were not very far apart and the conditions were virtually identical.
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The recently released Interim Report report suggests that the CVR may have been inadvertently deactivated in the past (The previous May) by having tripped the inertial switch perhaps on a hard landing. And that this did not come to anyone's attention as a check of the CVR function is not on the checklist used so the CVR remained switched off.
What law says that incidents have to be reported to CASA?
The template supply agreement for the provision of aviation services to the NSW Rural Fire Service does not restrict the supplier from making reports to CASA. The agreement requires that the supplier, inter alia,
The NSW Interagency Aviation Standard Operating Procedures include section 2.7 Accident, Incident, Occurrence and Near Miss Reporting. It quite clearly and specifically states that:
The SAD is the State Air Desk, the state level multi agency team responsible for coordination of aircraft operations.
While there is a requirement in the NSW RFS agreement for the supplier to
there is no restriction on the supplier from complying with legislative requirements or the requirements of the NSW Interagency Aviation SOP.
It's the old story that when you read something posted on pprune.org that sounds like nonsense, it probably is.
- demonstrates that it has a suitable CASA issued AOC,
- maintains a Safety Management System that meets both the NSW RFS and CASA standards, and
- complies with the NSW Interagency Aviation Standard Operating Procedures.
The NSW Interagency Aviation Standard Operating Procedures include section 2.7 Accident, Incident, Occurrence and Near Miss Reporting. It quite clearly and specifically states that:
The pilot, aircraft owner or operator are responsible for ensuring the reporting of an accident, incident, occurrence or near miss to the ATSB. Agency personnel shall report to the SAD and dispatching Agency, for the reporting of an accident, incident, occurrence or near miss.
While there is a requirement in the NSW RFS agreement for the supplier to
report accidents, incidents or near misses to NSW RFS whether or not they occur during the supply of the Services in relation to maintenance/management of NSW RFS Owned Aircraft, or during a time the Supplier was performing non-NSW RFS work.
It's the old story that when you read something posted on pprune.org that sounds like nonsense, it probably is.
Were both areas mountainous and under the influence of a strong flow due to the local airmass at the time? I'd find that very hard to believe.
Some operations manual parts are ‘accepted’ by CASA, while some are ‘approved’ by CASA. The operations manual part C, the training and checking manual, which contained the incorrect procedure for simulating an engine failure in a turboprop aircraft (see the section titled Engine failure simulation), was an example of a part that must be approved by CASA.
...
Despite the operator’s procedure being approved by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), reducing the power to flight idle on a turboprop aircraft is not representative of the drag associated with a real engine failure as it does not take account of the beneficial effect of auto-feather/negative torque sensing systems. Consequently, had flight idle been selected it would have created significantly more drag on the ‘failed’ engine, making it more difficult to control the aircraft and achieve the expected OEI performance. While the operator’s procedure only required use of this power setting during the initial ‘phase one’ checks (which would be expected to be completed in less than 30 seconds), it has been a contributing factor to previous asymmetric loss of control accidents (for example AO-2010-019 in the section titled Related occurrences).
The ATSB sought information from CASA regarding the circumstances under which the incorrect procedure was approved for use by the operator. Despite this request, no information was provided by CASA. Consequently, the ATSB was unable to determine whether the approval of incorrect information was an isolated human error or symptomatic of a systemic deficiency with the approval process.
Despite the operator’s procedure being approved by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), reducing the power to flight idle on a turboprop aircraft is not representative of the drag associated with a real engine failure as it does not take account of the beneficial effect of auto-feather/negative torque sensing systems. Consequently, had flight idle been selected it would have created significantly more drag on the ‘failed’ engine, making it more difficult to control the aircraft and achieve the expected OEI performance. While the operator’s procedure only required use of this power setting during the initial ‘phase one’ checks (which would be expected to be completed in less than 30 seconds), it has been a contributing factor to previous asymmetric loss of control accidents (for example AO-2010-019 in the section titled Related occurrences).
The ATSB sought information from CASA regarding the circumstances under which the incorrect procedure was approved for use by the operator. Despite this request, no information was provided by CASA. Consequently, the ATSB was unable to determine whether the approval of incorrect information was an isolated human error or symptomatic of a systemic deficiency with the approval process.
the ATSB was unable to determine whether the approval of incorrect information was an isolated human error or symptomatic of a systemic deficiency with the approval process
This is all but irrelevant. The videos taken by fire crew on the ground were a clear indicator that the winds were strong and gusting. The ATSB interim report says same.
Last edited by J.O.; 29th Sep 2020 at 18:51.
The video taken by fire crew on the ground were a clear indicator that the winds were strong and gusting
Looking at the agenda for the ISASI conference in Brisbane this week looks as if there will be a presentation on some of the investigation on Wednesday afternoon.
1315 – 1355 Keynote Address Greg Hood Airservices Australia Australia An onsite investigation in a hostile environment Australia on Fire 2020 (C-130) Moderator: Alister Buckingham President NZSASI
Gne
1315 – 1355 Keynote Address Greg Hood Airservices Australia Australia An onsite investigation in a hostile environment Australia on Fire 2020 (C-130) Moderator: Alister Buckingham President NZSASI
Gne
Final report is out. Sobering reading for those involved.
My understanding from talking to one of the single engine bomber operators that there is a requirement for a minimum of 1000 hours ag ops before they can fly fire. Don’t know if that’s an operator requirement, Fire service, or CASA requirement ?
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