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Byron Bailey, The Australian, MCAS

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Byron Bailey, The Australian, MCAS

Old 15th Oct 2019, 17:40
  #61 (permalink)  
 
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Mr Macintosh,

This is a thread for transport jet pilots discussing transport jet issues.

This is not a thread for you to attempt to settle scores from a previous thread.

This is also not a 'I misplaced my RV-10 at Bacchus Marsh, had anyone seen it?' thread.

Please go away.

j3
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Old 15th Oct 2019, 18:07
  #62 (permalink)  
 
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So JPJP, I am pretty sure the crew did not disconnect the A/T in the ET accident? They left it auto? Anyone who has flown a 73 knows that almost all the memory items consist of either disconnecting AP and AT or the opposite. So why didn't they?
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Old 15th Oct 2019, 19:20
  #63 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by LeadSled View Post

PS2: If the B707 was to be certified today, it would need something like the MCAS, to prevent the pitch UP in the stall on Flap 50. "Back in the day", we coped.
Back in the day, I don't think the 707 was designed to have the same handling characteristics as the aircraft it replaced. You coped because you knew the aircraft would handle in a certain way and trained for it.

The problem with the MAX is Southwest's insistance that the aircraft be 'similar' to the 737 NG. So similar in fact that minimal training was required on type.
Perhaps the best solution is to remove the MCAS completely and just accept that the MAX has different handling characteristics to the NG. Southwest won't be happy though.
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Old 15th Oct 2019, 20:46
  #64 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by j3pipercub View Post
So JPJP, I am pretty sure the crew did not disconnect the A/T in the ET accident? They left it auto? Anyone who has flown a 73 knows that almost all the memory items consist of either disconnecting AP and AT or the opposite. So why didn't they?
I don’t know if they left the A/T on. I suspect you’re correct. You’re also correct that the UAS and STR items all call for both to be off.

As to the ‘why ?’ The NTSB will give us the best answer. My guess is task saturation and loss of situational awareness. The PF had an ASI reading that was wildly incorrect, a stick shaker and a clacker going off (stall and over speed). Incorrect altitude, etc. Without a cross check he may not have an awareness of his speed. As we know; they had two separate and serious conditions with multiple alerts.

The irony is this; if the PF has asked for ‘Flap 1’ and said “your airplane”. It would have been over - No more MCAS event. The right side of the cockpit was operating normally and they would have had full access to trim. I’m not advocating this as a solution, or a procedure. However, it does starkly emphasize the difference between a secret system, with no training or understanding versus an understood system. And hindsight being 20/20.
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Old 16th Oct 2019, 00:31
  #65 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by JPJP View Post


I think the issue you’re having is this; you’re using terminology that you don’t understand. Amusing, given the lashing you’ve attempted to deal out
Fair point, I'm shoehorning Airbus terminology where it doesn't belong. Correct the term, my point remains the same.
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Old 16th Oct 2019, 00:58
  #66 (permalink)  
 
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I’m not qualified technically to discuss MCAS or cockpit procedures but I strongly object to the “badly trained brown skinned pilot” excuse shamefully advanced by Boeing’s friends in the New York Times and elsewhere.

My objection is based on the reverse of the “badly trained browns” theory. If anything, third world people (except the Vietnamese) accept the idea subliminally that Western (American) technology and training is superior to their own skills and as a result, trusted Boeing and the training system, manuals, etc. far more than westerners do. I suggest that as a result, the pilots in both Indonesia and Ethiopia are starting to try to resolve the problem from behind the eight ball in that the thought of a rogue system would have been furthest from their minds.

To put that another way, they did not perhaps have the healthy skepticism of automation that they should have - for cultural as well as political and marketing reasons. I believe one crew were still looking in the manual for a solution when they crashed. Their trust in Boeing was pathetic.
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Old 16th Oct 2019, 02:20
  #67 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Sunfish View Post
I’m not qualified technically to discuss MCAS or cockpit procedures but I strongly object to the “badly trained brown skinned pilot” excuse shamefully advanced by Boeing’s friends in the New York Times and elsewhere.

My objection is based on the reverse of the “badly trained browns” theory. If anything, third world people (except the Vietnamese) accept the idea subliminally that Western (American) technology and training is superior to their own skills and as a result, trusted Boeing and the training system, manuals, etc. far more than westerners do. I suggest that as a result, the pilots in both Indonesia and Ethiopia are starting to try to resolve the problem from behind the eight ball in that the thought of a rogue system would have been furthest from their minds.

To put that another way, they did not perhaps have the healthy skepticism of automation that they should have - for cultural as well as political and marketing reasons. I believe one crew were still looking in the manual for a solution when they crashed. Their trust in Boeing was pathetic.
Sunfish,
In a previous post, somebody made the point that many of us are criticising the training of current pilots, and the very positive discouragement of any hand flying, and the results. Not making "racial" criticisms.

Ethiopian, in particular, has long had a reputation for very high standards of both operations and maintenance, as their long term record shows ---- but in recent years they have had loss of control accidents that many of us suggest would have been far less likely in the G.O.Ds when every pilot did lots of hand flying.

Indonesia has all the usual problems, plus some individual local problems, that have been publicly acknowledged by the local aviation authority

"Lack (or loss) of piloting skills" (aka hand flying) has long been in the top three of FAA's concerns.

Tootle pip!!

PS: These concerns are not "old codgers" pining the good old days, they are well found concerns, based not only on the headline accident record, but the far more extensive incident record, most of which is not public.
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Old 16th Oct 2019, 09:46
  #68 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by LeadSled View Post
Megan,
Whilst I don'r have the quotes to hand, several articles in Aviation Week and Space Technology, which have been exhaustively covering the issue, have mentioned same. They never received any publicity at the time, because the crews involved just ran the uncommended stab trim checklist, as did the lost Indonesian aeroplane's crew the night before, Bali to Djakarta.
I don't always agree with Byron Bailey, but, on this occasion, I do.
Tootle pip!!
It would be nice if you could quote those articles. The only mentions I've seen in the past were to issues that were clearly not MCAS due to the fact they were occurring with A/P engaged. They were bought up by journalists breathlessly trying to connect dots that shouldn't be connected.
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Old 17th Oct 2019, 00:26
  #69 (permalink)  
 
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Sunfish the problem with the 737 MAX is that no pilots, Western or otherwise, were told about the MCAS system. The 737 is not a FBW aircraft. It has traditional control cables connecting the control columns and rudder pedals to the flight controls with hydraulic systems to assist. The MCAS is a digital solution with connections to the stab to counter an aerodynamic issue. So the idea that they trusted the Boeing manuals and training system more than Western pilots is wrong as even the Western pilots would have been overwhelmed by all the warnings and noises activating if they had encountered an MCAS responding to false information from a single damaged AofA vane. Boeing did not want pilots , airlines or the FAA to know about MCAS as it would have required additional sim training as a minimum and re certification as the WCS. If you want an example of how Western pilots from a legacy carrier have coped with conflicting systems warnings which resulted in a hull loss then check out all the discussion on AF447. To head off any idea that it was all an Airbus problem also checkout the EK777 hull loss in Dubai.
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Old 17th Oct 2019, 08:10
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Originally Posted by LeadSled View Post
Megan,
Whilst I don'r have the quotes to hand, several articles in Aviation Week and Space Technology, which have been exhaustively covering the issue, have mentioned same. They never received any publicity at the time, because the crews involved just ran the uncommended stab trim checklist, ...


Having had some time to work through your claim I can now say pretty much unequivocally that your recollection is most assuredly mistaken.

First, I systematically worked through every Aviation Week and Space Technology article on the B737 MAX MCAS saga. None of them mentioned a US crew ever having dealt with an erroneous MCAS activation, much less having dealt with same by running the Boeing recommended Runaway Stabilizer NNC.

In order to validate my review I contacted the editorial staff at Aviation Week and Space Technology and I was placed in touch with the MAX coverage leader at the magazine. He stated in unequivocal fashion,

'I can tell you with certainty that I have no knowledge of any other erroneous MCAS activation in line operations anywhere in the world besides the two fatal accident sequences, and certainly have not written about one.'

I also contacted lead writers from a number of other US publications to see if they were aware of any reporting of any US crews having dealt with any erroneous MCAS activations. The response was uniformly negative. A typical response was as follows,

'The author is mistaken. There have been no activations of MCAS except on Lion Air (both on the flight before the crash flight and the crash flight) and on Ethiopian Airlines.'

I suggest (once again) that you are confusing reporting of one US MAX crew that had experienced an unusual nose down movement during the climb out and another that had experienced a climb performance degradation during the climb out. Neither of those incidents was MCAS-related; the former occurred with the autopilot engaged and the latter was an autothrottle issue. In neither case was any NNC actioned.
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Old 17th Oct 2019, 09:14
  #71 (permalink)  
 
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Nice work Mick!.Looks like Leadsled might have Tootled his Pip with that assertion!
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Old 17th Oct 2019, 10:25
  #72 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by ZFT View Post
leadSled

Pardon my ignorance. What is a B737NG D+ simulator?

Thanks
ZFT,
The + is an FAA Level D with a few added enhancements, as I recall, live ATC is one. Hence known in the trade as D+.
See also ICAO Level 7.
Tootle pip!!

PS: MickGo105,
Looks like you have made Lookleft's day.
I thought what I had made clear was references in the body of articles to occurrences that, in retrospect, could have been MCAS activations. I assume that those have now been determined to not be MCAS related. What AW&ST has now stated in not really in conflict with what I have said.
One poster says that the MCAS runs the stab at twice the rate of the main electric activation ----- or the autopilot rate ----- is this really correct.

Last edited by LeadSled; 17th Oct 2019 at 10:37.
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Old 17th Oct 2019, 10:36
  #73 (permalink)  
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Originally Posted by LeadSled View Post
ZFT,
The + is a FAA Level D with a few added enhancements, as I recall, live ATC is one.
See also ICAO Level 7.
Tootle pip!!
There is nothing in FAA part 60, EASA CS FSTD (A) or any other NAA regs that I can find which describes a level D+ qualification, hence my query. ICAO level 7 did indeed add a more immersive ATC environment but the technology isn't quite there yet
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Old 17th Oct 2019, 10:45
  #74 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by ZFT View Post
There is nothing in FAA part 60, EASA CS FSTD (A) or any other NAA regs that I can find which describes a level D+ qualification, hence my query. ICAO level 7 did indeed add a more immersive ATC environment but the technology isn't quite there yet
ZFT,
Quite correct, but it is common (informal) terminology, has been for quite a while, probably close to ten years, takes the regulations a while to catch up.
Personally, I think it would be much easier if we all used the ICAO definitions, FAR 60 is lagging badly.
Tootle pip!!
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Old 17th Oct 2019, 10:47
  #75 (permalink)  
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Originally Posted by LeadSled View Post
ZFT,
Quite correct, but it is common (informal) terminology, has been for quite a while, takes the regulations a while to catch up.
Personally, I think it would be much easier if we all used the ICAO definitions, FAR 60 is lagging badly.
Tootle pip!!
Noted and in total agreement. Thanks
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Old 17th Oct 2019, 12:11
  #76 (permalink)  
 
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So to keep on track!

The agreement is OR is not

Never has a MCAS (non testing) ever been had by a US operated 737 MAX crew - again NEVER happened .

Any that say it has happened need to supply a creditable source.
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Old 17th Oct 2019, 12:50
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Originally Posted by LeadSled View Post
Looks like you have made Lookleft's day.
I'm not out to make anyone's day, I'm simply keen on ensuring any discussion that I'm involved in stays facts-based.

Originally Posted by LeadSled View Post
I thought what I had made clear was references in the body of articles to occurrences that, in retrospect, could have been MCAS activations. I assume that those have now been determined to not be MCAS related. What AW&ST has now stated in not really in conflict with what I have said.
Well, it is now quite difficult to know exactly what you made clear or what you said as it appears that some of your relevant posts have strangely now been deleted.

But you did say;
The reports in AW&ST (in the bodies of technical articles, not headline news) were in the context of occurrences that were logged for maintenance to look at, but were only realised to be MCAS related in retrospect.
The reporting of the two incidents that I referred to were very promptly shown at the time they were reported (not now) to be unrelated to MCAS - so, you're mistaken there.

And you also previously wrote;
Originally Posted by LeadSled View Post
Megan,
Whilst I don'r have the quotes to hand, several articles in Aviation Week and Space Technology, which have been exhaustively covering the issue, have mentioned same. They never received any publicity at the time, because the crews involved just ran the uncommended stab trim checklist ...

The crews involved did not run the Runaway Stabilizer checklist, neither incident required an NNC, so you were most assuredly also mistaken on that count.

Originally Posted by LeadSled View Post
One poster says that the MCAS runs the stab at twice the rate of the main electric activation ----- or the autopilot rate ----- is this really correct.
Regarding MCAS trimming speed, Boeing gave it maximum authority so, even though it operates only flaps retracted, it trims at the maximum flaps extended trimming rate of 0.27 degrees per second (about 50% faster than the Main Electric Trim speed for flaps retraced) and it can run the trim all the way to the flaps extended Main Electric Trim limit of 0.05 units.



Last edited by MickG0105; 17th Oct 2019 at 12:56. Reason: Typo
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Old 18th Oct 2019, 00:55
  #78 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by MickG0105 View Post
Well, it is now quite difficult to know exactly what you made clear or what you said as it appears that some of your relevant posts have strangely now been deleted.
MickGO105,
I have not deleted anything, so I can't quote my original post, either.

But the gist of what I said, my interpretation of what I read in AW&ST, was that, in retrospect, in US, there has been several cases of stab problems that were being considered as possible MCAS incidents, although they were written up originally as stab or autopilot malfunctions.

I certainly did not state, or intend to imply, that whichever ones the article was talking about, had been confirmed as MCAS incidents in US.

What I have said, all along, is that it is my view, that treating the malfunction as a runaway stab should allow the aircraft to be hand flown, as was the case Bali - Djakarta the night before the Lion Air loss. That seems to have been the Boeing assumption at the original certification, that no special training was required because of MCAS. Simply, an MCAS malfunction should not have caused the loss of the aircraft.

I am also quite certain that, in hindsight, Boeing would have not treated the certification of MCAS as they did, as a minor enhancement ---- but I also don't understand why this one system addition should require a whole separate type endorsement --- see various comments about the alleged South West influence.

And I certainly don't agree with the view of a "very very well known North American based former airline Captain" that the whole aircraft is fatally flawed.

Tootle pip!!

Last edited by LeadSled; 18th Oct 2019 at 01:01. Reason: minor edit
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Old 18th Oct 2019, 01:28
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Byron walks it all back.

From Byron's article this week,

Last week I wrote, as told to me several weeks ago by US pilots, about several instances of supposed MCAS events and recovery from the nose-down pitching by experienced US pilots. It now appears the events were not MCAS-related, ...
​​Of course, it only now appears to Captain Bailey that said events weren't MCAS-related because he failed to do any fact-checking. It was apparent to any other informed observer that neither of the two US B737 MAX climb out events were MCAS-related way back at the time that they were first reported.
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Old 18th Oct 2019, 01:34
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BB wrong... again... At least he kinda admits it...

Now why is max still grounded?

Seriously even a non aviation person could understand the fact that there is a major problem if aircraft are being flown to long term storage!
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