60 Minutes Boeing Tonight
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Boeing need a serious wake up call, their denial responses and stonewalling to date are appalling.
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Mostly seemed a good summary except that there was no mention of the Stab Trim Cut-off switches. As far the public are aware from this story, the aircraft becomes totally out of control. Not quite true, with the ability to kill the electric stab trim!
Furthermore it didn't mention that in the Ethiopian event, if I understood correctly, the crew re-connected the stab trim in the final moments, upon which the MCAS started trimming nose down again. This differentiates the Ethiopian accident from Lion Air.
Disappointing that the manufacturer stepped outside the norm of the 737 philosophy and added some software that essentially took the aircraft out of "direct law", with what seems to be a patch to fix an undesired characteristic.
Just some observations.
Furthermore it didn't mention that in the Ethiopian event, if I understood correctly, the crew re-connected the stab trim in the final moments, upon which the MCAS started trimming nose down again. This differentiates the Ethiopian accident from Lion Air.
Disappointing that the manufacturer stepped outside the norm of the 737 philosophy and added some software that essentially took the aircraft out of "direct law", with what seems to be a patch to fix an undesired characteristic.
Just some observations.
It makes me wonder if this airframe, if it were a new stand alone flying machine, would have been certified in the first place. It seems to me that it lacks the ability to fly without significant input from MCAS, I can’t think of any other commercial jet that has such adverse handling characteristics.
Airbus, way of the future
Aviator777 - thank you. Before we indulge in a total orgy of Boeing bashing I'd suggest that the crew performance, or lack thereof, in both situations deserves close scrutiny too.
Aviator - It was not an episode of Aircrash Investigation, so going into details about stab trim cut offs etc would have be way too much for the general public.
I thought it was an ok summary for the general public. It dealt with the issues of rushed certification, single system critical failure points and Boeing self certifying off behalf of the FAA.
I thought it was an ok summary for the general public. It dealt with the issues of rushed certification, single system critical failure points and Boeing self certifying off behalf of the FAA.
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It was not an episode of Aircrash Investigation, so going into details about stab trim cut offs etc would have be way too much for the general public
As it stands the story implied that the aircraft was totally out of control.
Otherwise, agreed the story was a good summary.
I didn’t watch 60 minutes and wont bother in the future.....
But from what you’ve said here, they didn’t mention the stab trim cutout switches at all?? Not ever??? You are kidding me!!!
They are central in the NNC for handling this problem and weren’t mentioned at all or demonstrated in the interests of balanced in biased reporting?
Boeing addressed this issue and reminded Max crews about it AFTER the Lion crash. Did 60 minutes mention Boeing’s response after the Lion air crash?
Now tell me 60 seconds aren’t biased and trying to win a Logie award!!
I’d place a bet that it was mentioned and demonstrated by the Pilot BUT 60 minutes edited it out to make their case against Boeing look better..........
pleased I didn’t bother to watch such crap.
But from what you’ve said here, they didn’t mention the stab trim cutout switches at all?? Not ever??? You are kidding me!!!
They are central in the NNC for handling this problem and weren’t mentioned at all or demonstrated in the interests of balanced in biased reporting?
Boeing addressed this issue and reminded Max crews about it AFTER the Lion crash. Did 60 minutes mention Boeing’s response after the Lion air crash?
Now tell me 60 seconds aren’t biased and trying to win a Logie award!!
I’d place a bet that it was mentioned and demonstrated by the Pilot BUT 60 minutes edited it out to make their case against Boeing look better..........
pleased I didn’t bother to watch such crap.
How about the bit when the 737 Airline Pilot wearing full uniform in the sim fumbles through the checklist to show how long it takes to find the runaway stabiliser checklist. Not a single mention of it being a MEMORY item.
There’s no doubt the MCAS system and it’s implementation was less than ideal but ignoring all the facts that led to the Lion crash and pretending that Runaway Stabiliser isn’t a memory item is worthy of a letter from the Boeing legal team.
There’s no doubt the MCAS system and it’s implementation was less than ideal but ignoring all the facts that led to the Lion crash and pretending that Runaway Stabiliser isn’t a memory item is worthy of a letter from the Boeing legal team.
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Found this article interesting.
Any comments from 737 guys and girls?
Ethiopian MAX Crash Simulator Scenario Stuns Pilots
May 10, 2019
Sean BroderickAviation Daily
WASHINGTON—A simulator session flown by a U.S.-based Boeing 737MAX crew that mimicked a key portion of the Ethiopian AirlinesFlight 302 (ET302) accident sequence suggests that the Ethiopian crew faced a near-impossible task of getting their 737 MAX 8 back under control, and underscores the importance of pilots understanding severe runaway trim recovery procedures.
Details of the session, shared with Aviation Week, were flown voluntarily as part of routine, recurrent training. Its purpose: practice recovering from a scenario in which the aircraft was out of trim and wanting to descend while flying at a high rate of speed. This is what the ET302 crew faced when it toggled cutout switches to de-power the MAX’s automatic stabilizer trim motor, disabling the maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) that was erroneously trimming the horizontal stabilizer nose-down.
In such a scenario, once the trim motor is de-powered, the pilots must use the hand-operated manual trim wheels to adjust the stabilizers. But they also must keep the aircraft from descending by pulling back on the control columns to deflect the elevator portions of the stabilizer upward. Aerodynamic forces from the nose-up elevator deflection make the entire stabilizer more difficult to move, and higher airspeed exacerbates the issue.
The U.S. crew tested this by setting up a 737-Next Generation simulator at 10,000 ft., 250 kt. and 2 deg. nose up stabilizer trim. This is slightly higher altitude but otherwise similar to what the ET302 crew faced as it de-powered the trim motors 3 min. into the 6 min. flight, and about 1 min. after the first uncommanded MCAS input. Leading up to the scenario, the Ethiopian crew used column-mounted manual electric trim to counter some of the MCAS inputs, but did not get the aircraft back to level trim, as the 737 manual instructs before de-powering the stabilizer trim motor. The crew also did not reduce their unusually high speed.
What the U.S. crew found was eye-opening. Keeping the aircraft level required significant aft-column pressure by the captain, and aerodynamic forces prevented the first officer from moving the trim wheel a full turn. They resorted to a little-known procedure to regain control.
The crew repeatedly executed a three-step process known as the roller coaster. First, let the aircraft’s nose drop, removing elevator nose-down force. Second, crank the trim wheel, inputting nose-up stabilizer, as the aircraft descends. Third, pull back on the yokes to raise the nose and slow the descent. The excessive descent rates during the first two steps meant the crew got as low as 2,000 ft. during the recovery.
The Ethiopian Ministry of Transport preliminary report on the Mar. 10 ET302 accident suggests the crew attempted to use manual trim after de-powering the stabilizer motors, but determined it “was not working,” the report said. A constant trust setting at 94% N1meant ET302’s airspeed increased to the 737 MAX’s maximum (Vmo), 340 kt., soon after the stabilizer trim motors were cut off, and did not drop below that level for the remainder of the flight. The pilots, struggling to keep the aircraft from descending, also maintained steady to strong aft control-column inputs from the time MCAS first fired through the end of the flight.
The U.S. crew’s session and a video posted recently by YouTube’s Mentour Pilot that shows a similar scenario inside a simulator suggest that the resulting forces on ET302’s stabilizer would have made it nearly impossible to move by hand.
Neither the current 737 flight manual nor any MCAS-related guidance issued by Boeingin the wake of the October 2018 crash of Lion Air Flight 610 (JT610), when MCAS first came to light for most pilots, discuss the roller-coaster procedure for recovering from severe out-of-trim conditions. The 737 manual explains that “effort required to manually rotate the stabilizer trim wheels may be higher under certain flight conditions,” but does not provide details.
The pilot who shared the scenario said he learned the roller coaster procedure from excerpts of a 737-200 manual posted in an online pilot forum in the wake of the MAX accidents. It is not taught at his airline.
Boeing’s assumption was that erroneous stabilizer nose-down inputs by MCAS, such as those experienced by both the JT610 and ET302 crews, would be diagnosed as runaway stabilizer. The checklist to counter runaway stabilizer includes using the cutout switches to de-power the stabilizer trim motor. The ET302 crew followed this, but not until the aircraft was severely out of trim following the MCAS inputs triggered by faulty angle-of-attack (AOA) data that told the system the aircraft’s nose was too high.
Unable to move the stabilizer manually, the ET302 crew moved the cutout switches to power the stabilizer trim motors—something the runaway stabilizer checklist states should not be done. While this enabled their column-mounted electric trim input switches, it also re-activated MCAS, which again received the faulty AOA data and trimmed the stabilizer nose down, leading to a fatal dive.
The simulator session underscored the importance of reacting quickly to uncommanded stabilizer movements and avoiding a severe out-of-trim condition, one of the pilots involved said. “I don’t think the situation would be survivable at 350 kt. and below 5,000 ft,” this pilot noted.
The ET302 crew climbed through 5,000 ft. shortly after de-powering the trim motors, and got to about 8,000 ft.—the same amount of altitude the U.S. crew used up during the roller-coaster maneuvers—before the final dive. A second pilot not involved in the session but who reviewed the scenario’s details said it highlighted several training opportunities.
“This is the sort of simulator experience airline crews need to gain an understanding of how runaway trim can make the aircraft very difficult to control, and how important it is to rehearse use of manual trim inputs,” this pilot said.
While Boeing’s runaway stabilizer checklist does not specify it, the second pilot recommended a maximum thrust of 75% N1and a 4 deg. nose-up pitch to keep airspeed under control.
Boeing is developing modifications to MCAS, as well as additional training. Simulator sessions are expected to be integrated into recurrent training, and may be required by some regulators, and opted for by some airlines, before pilots are cleared to fly MAXs again. The MAX fleet has been grounded since mid-March, a direct result of the two accidents.
Any comments from 737 guys and girls?
Ethiopian MAX Crash Simulator Scenario Stuns Pilots
May 10, 2019
Sean BroderickAviation Daily
WASHINGTON—A simulator session flown by a U.S.-based Boeing 737MAX crew that mimicked a key portion of the Ethiopian AirlinesFlight 302 (ET302) accident sequence suggests that the Ethiopian crew faced a near-impossible task of getting their 737 MAX 8 back under control, and underscores the importance of pilots understanding severe runaway trim recovery procedures.
Details of the session, shared with Aviation Week, were flown voluntarily as part of routine, recurrent training. Its purpose: practice recovering from a scenario in which the aircraft was out of trim and wanting to descend while flying at a high rate of speed. This is what the ET302 crew faced when it toggled cutout switches to de-power the MAX’s automatic stabilizer trim motor, disabling the maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) that was erroneously trimming the horizontal stabilizer nose-down.
In such a scenario, once the trim motor is de-powered, the pilots must use the hand-operated manual trim wheels to adjust the stabilizers. But they also must keep the aircraft from descending by pulling back on the control columns to deflect the elevator portions of the stabilizer upward. Aerodynamic forces from the nose-up elevator deflection make the entire stabilizer more difficult to move, and higher airspeed exacerbates the issue.
The U.S. crew tested this by setting up a 737-Next Generation simulator at 10,000 ft., 250 kt. and 2 deg. nose up stabilizer trim. This is slightly higher altitude but otherwise similar to what the ET302 crew faced as it de-powered the trim motors 3 min. into the 6 min. flight, and about 1 min. after the first uncommanded MCAS input. Leading up to the scenario, the Ethiopian crew used column-mounted manual electric trim to counter some of the MCAS inputs, but did not get the aircraft back to level trim, as the 737 manual instructs before de-powering the stabilizer trim motor. The crew also did not reduce their unusually high speed.
What the U.S. crew found was eye-opening. Keeping the aircraft level required significant aft-column pressure by the captain, and aerodynamic forces prevented the first officer from moving the trim wheel a full turn. They resorted to a little-known procedure to regain control.
The crew repeatedly executed a three-step process known as the roller coaster. First, let the aircraft’s nose drop, removing elevator nose-down force. Second, crank the trim wheel, inputting nose-up stabilizer, as the aircraft descends. Third, pull back on the yokes to raise the nose and slow the descent. The excessive descent rates during the first two steps meant the crew got as low as 2,000 ft. during the recovery.
The Ethiopian Ministry of Transport preliminary report on the Mar. 10 ET302 accident suggests the crew attempted to use manual trim after de-powering the stabilizer motors, but determined it “was not working,” the report said. A constant trust setting at 94% N1meant ET302’s airspeed increased to the 737 MAX’s maximum (Vmo), 340 kt., soon after the stabilizer trim motors were cut off, and did not drop below that level for the remainder of the flight. The pilots, struggling to keep the aircraft from descending, also maintained steady to strong aft control-column inputs from the time MCAS first fired through the end of the flight.
The U.S. crew’s session and a video posted recently by YouTube’s Mentour Pilot that shows a similar scenario inside a simulator suggest that the resulting forces on ET302’s stabilizer would have made it nearly impossible to move by hand.
Neither the current 737 flight manual nor any MCAS-related guidance issued by Boeingin the wake of the October 2018 crash of Lion Air Flight 610 (JT610), when MCAS first came to light for most pilots, discuss the roller-coaster procedure for recovering from severe out-of-trim conditions. The 737 manual explains that “effort required to manually rotate the stabilizer trim wheels may be higher under certain flight conditions,” but does not provide details.
The pilot who shared the scenario said he learned the roller coaster procedure from excerpts of a 737-200 manual posted in an online pilot forum in the wake of the MAX accidents. It is not taught at his airline.
Boeing’s assumption was that erroneous stabilizer nose-down inputs by MCAS, such as those experienced by both the JT610 and ET302 crews, would be diagnosed as runaway stabilizer. The checklist to counter runaway stabilizer includes using the cutout switches to de-power the stabilizer trim motor. The ET302 crew followed this, but not until the aircraft was severely out of trim following the MCAS inputs triggered by faulty angle-of-attack (AOA) data that told the system the aircraft’s nose was too high.
Unable to move the stabilizer manually, the ET302 crew moved the cutout switches to power the stabilizer trim motors—something the runaway stabilizer checklist states should not be done. While this enabled their column-mounted electric trim input switches, it also re-activated MCAS, which again received the faulty AOA data and trimmed the stabilizer nose down, leading to a fatal dive.
The simulator session underscored the importance of reacting quickly to uncommanded stabilizer movements and avoiding a severe out-of-trim condition, one of the pilots involved said. “I don’t think the situation would be survivable at 350 kt. and below 5,000 ft,” this pilot noted.
The ET302 crew climbed through 5,000 ft. shortly after de-powering the trim motors, and got to about 8,000 ft.—the same amount of altitude the U.S. crew used up during the roller-coaster maneuvers—before the final dive. A second pilot not involved in the session but who reviewed the scenario’s details said it highlighted several training opportunities.
“This is the sort of simulator experience airline crews need to gain an understanding of how runaway trim can make the aircraft very difficult to control, and how important it is to rehearse use of manual trim inputs,” this pilot said.
While Boeing’s runaway stabilizer checklist does not specify it, the second pilot recommended a maximum thrust of 75% N1and a 4 deg. nose-up pitch to keep airspeed under control.
Boeing is developing modifications to MCAS, as well as additional training. Simulator sessions are expected to be integrated into recurrent training, and may be required by some regulators, and opted for by some airlines, before pilots are cleared to fly MAXs again. The MAX fleet has been grounded since mid-March, a direct result of the two accidents.
How about the bit when the 737 Airline Pilot wearing full uniform in the sim fumbles through the checklist to show how long it takes to find the runaway stabiliser checklist. Not a single mention of it being a MEMORY item.
Not a pilot, well here goes, I would have no problem flying in the Max8 when it returns to service, you see I don't fly with 3rd world airlines so I reckon I'm safe. I wouldn't mind a 10 second chat with the pilot beforehand, though.
Netherlands + United States = 583, still to be exceeded by a Third World airline/s.
Nobody here is saying MCAS was a great ideal that was well implemented.
Some are saying it’s hard to judge until the reports are out. Others are also adding that the trash that 60 minutes rolled out deliberately left out the fact that Runaway Stabiliser is a memory item.
If you don’t know the memory item you should at least know what the page number is!
Where I work if you don’t know a memory item you fail the sim session or line check. Some clown fumbling a checklist isn’t an accurate representation of what I would see in my workplace and suspect the same for the opposition.
Some on the forum will in the near future be flying a max so have more than a passing interest in the matter. To us it’s pretty real.
Some are saying it’s hard to judge until the reports are out. Others are also adding that the trash that 60 minutes rolled out deliberately left out the fact that Runaway Stabiliser is a memory item.
If you don’t know the memory item you should at least know what the page number is!
Where I work if you don’t know a memory item you fail the sim session or line check. Some clown fumbling a checklist isn’t an accurate representation of what I would see in my workplace and suspect the same for the opposition.
Some on the forum will in the near future be flying a max so have more than a passing interest in the matter. To us it’s pretty real.
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For so many to keep complaining that this situation was straightforward and instantly recognisable trim runaway, thus just a matter of applying standard memory item...
is a bit disingenuous when post after post and pilot after pilot here have acknowledged it doesn't necessarily manifest as such. And certainly not at altitudes and flight regimes one might have the time to see it for what it was... or in fact, for what it wasn't !
is a bit disingenuous when post after post and pilot after pilot here have acknowledged it doesn't necessarily manifest as such. And certainly not at altitudes and flight regimes one might have the time to see it for what it was... or in fact, for what it wasn't !
Cash for Comments on "60 minutes" therefore hardly reputable.
Wait for the final reports.
A far more interesting story might be researched on the fatal Air Niugini B737 ending up in the Lagoon, with accurate analysis in regards to crew training and checking. A follow up on the Air Niugini B737 doing Singapore to POM week before last and apparently doing an auto land after six attempts to land. instead of going to Cairns. Final reports still required.
According to Cairns Post newspaper Air Niugini are seeking to replace Cathay on the Hong Kong to Cairns route, when Cathay withdraw in October.
Wait for the final reports.
A far more interesting story might be researched on the fatal Air Niugini B737 ending up in the Lagoon, with accurate analysis in regards to crew training and checking. A follow up on the Air Niugini B737 doing Singapore to POM week before last and apparently doing an auto land after six attempts to land. instead of going to Cairns. Final reports still required.
According to Cairns Post newspaper Air Niugini are seeking to replace Cathay on the Hong Kong to Cairns route, when Cathay withdraw in October.