Malindo tries a flapless takeoff, Perth
Well it could have been worse; they could have completely ignored the take-off config warnings like this mob did!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s8ptLtYt7wk
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s8ptLtYt7wk
Well it could have been worse; they could have completely ignored the take-off config warnings like this mob did!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s8ptLtYt7wk
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s8ptLtYt7wk
As the previous poster said - the flaps were down. At least to 1. There would have been no takeoff Config warning.
The QRH says "apply reverse thrust up to the maximum consistent with conditions"
I'm a big believer of doing the SAME actions ALWAYS - the AMOUNT of braking and reverse is up to the PF given the conditions at the time.
IE an abort commenced at 45 KIAS on runway 34L at YSSY doesn't need max braking, spoilers (if you fly a type that requires they be manually extended), and max reverse - but I'll at least apply/select all of them - so it's the same process every time... Hopefully it means I'm ready when it happens at V1-5 on a balanced field!
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On arrival at dest, pax will leave aircraft convinced that their lives had been in pro hands at all times.
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Most pilots have made boo boo's sometime in their career but what's probably most concerning here is that there are two drivers in the cockpit & for good reasons, they both didn't pick this up? Still the system worked to break the accident chain, did they learn from this? That's another story!
Anyone knows about the cockpit authority gradient in that outfit?
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There but for the grace of ...... convenient how we forget. At least these guys stopped after the config warning - more than can be said for the skippy B737 out of BNE a few years ago. They continued and raced the extending flaps on the roll. Mistakes happen, dealing with them is the hard part.
the AMOUNT of braking and reverse is up to the PF given the conditions at the time.
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There but for the grace of ...... convenient how we forget. At least these guys stopped after the config warning - more than can be said for the skippy B737 out of BNE a few years ago. They continued and raced the extending flaps on the roll. Mistakes happen, dealing with them is the hard part.
As for the rest of the discussion, none of us are immune to errors, as rrramjet said it can happen to any one, and whilst experience levels may be an issue it's not always the case. We used to do the before take-off check list as soon as we got cabin secure, then someone decided they wanted us to do it at the holding point, because they said we shouldn't have the radar on so early during the taxi out. So shortly afterwards at some Sh*te hole in darkest Africa we were taxying out with all the normal distractions of mad bush pilots, mad Russian helicopters, pissing rain and incomprehensible ATC and only realised as we lined up that we hadn't done the before take-off checks (although the aircraft was at least correctly configured). that day on the flight deck I had twelve years experience on the 73 and the F/O had ten, and 29,000 hours logged between us, but we still got it wrong.
As for some of the other issues being raised, the Boeing on board performance tool doesn't require a 90 degree turn to line up, like we used to do, an allowance is built in depending if the runway entrance point is at 90 or 30 degrees or a 180 degree turn after a back track. And using the Boeing OPT for a max weight 800 at sea level, standard pressure and ISA plus 15 then calculations using optimum flap settings will give flap 1 for take-off for runways as short as 2000m if there are no obstacles, so as was suggested, the second video clip was almost certainly an early rotation or the aircraft wildly out of trim rather than an incorrect flap setting.
As was said earlier, there but for the grace of God....
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I admit I have no idea how the 737 works not having flown one. On the Ejet however, having the wrong flap setting to what is set in the box would trigger the take-off config warning. I didn't realize the 73 was not that smart. :-)
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The 320 will give you a takeoff config warning with no flap set. With the wrong flap it won’t.
I believe though with the new software upgrade it will give you a warning with the wrong takeoff flap similar to the bigger buses?
Anyone know if this is true?
I believe though with the new software upgrade it will give you a warning with the wrong takeoff flap similar to the bigger buses?
Anyone know if this is true?
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Probably cause you can T/Off with flaps 1, 2 or 3 set (not full) so 3 out of 4 flap settings are avail to launch in the 320?
Try taking off with flap 3 or 2 figures and setting flap 1.
It’ll ruin your day.
So it’s not because of flap1/2/3 takeoffs, its just the software was never upgraded to give you a warning.
The 330 had it from day dot. I’m pretty sure though with the step 2 upgrade it’s got an incorrect flap setting warning. I remember reading it somewhere obscure.
It’ll ruin your day.
So it’s not because of flap1/2/3 takeoffs, its just the software was never upgraded to give you a warning.
The 330 had it from day dot. I’m pretty sure though with the step 2 upgrade it’s got an incorrect flap setting warning. I remember reading it somewhere obscure.
Can't speak for the 737 but the A320 SOP's infers that we do not disconnect the ramp engineer following our start up until the PM has completed their duties, right down to confirming the doors are armed. A number of the items in the after start scan could get you grounded, so even if it were not a requirement, seems sensible to me, especially when you consider that it only takes about 8 seconds to watch the PM complete their duties including set the flaps correctly. Of course it is in the checklist but that should be a last line of defence not the primary means. I beleive the 330 may not give you 'no blue' for takeoff if they're in the wrong position but I could be wrong.
I hate to say it but these guys are not the first to commence a takeoff with the wrong/no flaps set, nor will likely not be the last.
I hate to say it but these guys are not the first to commence a takeoff with the wrong/no flaps set, nor will likely not be the last.
Willie, I would have to disagree a little with your sentiment about the Airbus inference you refer to, if we look a little closer the PF has his own duties while the PM conducts theirs. If you focus on their job rather than yours, or task switch in HUman Factors lingo, you will lead yourself open to additional slips and lapses.
As for disconnecting ground personnel, your brain allows you speak and watch action, two seperate single channel processes for the brain. I would argue that you can disconnect him while monitoring PM duties. Just do not get distracted by looking out the window until the PM has finished, otherwise the previous paragraph applies.
Forgetting or running over the dispatcher is also one of those items that will quickly have you grounded. In my humble opinion, get rid of them as part of your flow. A deliberate inaction, Not disconnecting the dispatcher, while awaiting another action, Status Review from the PM, increases the chances exponentially that the intended action will be forgotten. Complete your sequences in their entirety, or start from the beginning.
As for disconnecting ground personnel, your brain allows you speak and watch action, two seperate single channel processes for the brain. I would argue that you can disconnect him while monitoring PM duties. Just do not get distracted by looking out the window until the PM has finished, otherwise the previous paragraph applies.
Forgetting or running over the dispatcher is also one of those items that will quickly have you grounded. In my humble opinion, get rid of them as part of your flow. A deliberate inaction, Not disconnecting the dispatcher, while awaiting another action, Status Review from the PM, increases the chances exponentially that the intended action will be forgotten. Complete your sequences in their entirety, or start from the beginning.
Last edited by Bula; 10th Jan 2019 at 09:37.
Previous operator had a fool-proof method for making sure the correct take-off flap setting was made before departure. As part of the after-start checklist the Flap check was the last item and was a prompt, the response was SET FLAP ____. The flaps were then checked again as part of the before take-off checklist both before line-up and after line-up (above and below the line). As I say, fool-proof, there were at least 2 or 3 mis-set flap occurances a month in the Flight Data Monitoring program highlights, the joke was everytime a manager flew and forgot to set the flaps another check was added...
PF/PM conflict? I use a “Flaps, trims, pin” silent review before taxi, great until i’m tired/distracted and we’re both in the same boat.....
PF/PM conflict? I use a “Flaps, trims, pin” silent review before taxi, great until i’m tired/distracted and we’re both in the same boat.....