We must never become complacent – Dick Smith
Younger people may not agree but are we reaching the end of an safety era?
The years since WW2 have seen a generation of pilots brought up in a system where flying the aeroplane was paramount. They have come to terms with the new era where they get to monitor the aeroplane and enjoy the automatic help they get to complete the constant intellectual exercises of flying, navigating, and communicating; but the intellectual exercise is still going on in their brains...
Furthermore the people they are training are required to meet these age-old standards or they don't get to sit in the left hand seat.
Are the less well developed areas of the world, where flying was never the seat of the pants job, showing us a new failure mode?
Why does a flight instrument failure (yet to be confirmed) put a brand new aircraft into the ocean? How do two aircraft recently end up in the water short of their respective runways?
Can we, in Australia, hang onto those "master pilot" skills when the industry wants the equivalent of the unmanned ore trains in West Australia?
We may have reached a point on the airliner evolutionary stage when the aeroplane can do just enough to make everyone complacent, but not enough to not require a human to intervene when the FMS runs out of (pre-programmed) ideas.
The car industry is facing similar issues with driverless cars, how long before we start to see - I thought the car was driving itself - accidents?
Sorry I don't have the answers but I also don't think it is anything to do with CASA. We are the custodians of the standards, we should ensure we do not cut corners, we should report anybody that does.
In the end the buck stops with everyone of us who is in a position of accountability in the industry.
If you are young remember what an old man once told me "we have to teach the old blokes to trust the automation, and the young blokes not to trust it"
The years since WW2 have seen a generation of pilots brought up in a system where flying the aeroplane was paramount. They have come to terms with the new era where they get to monitor the aeroplane and enjoy the automatic help they get to complete the constant intellectual exercises of flying, navigating, and communicating; but the intellectual exercise is still going on in their brains...
Furthermore the people they are training are required to meet these age-old standards or they don't get to sit in the left hand seat.
Are the less well developed areas of the world, where flying was never the seat of the pants job, showing us a new failure mode?
Why does a flight instrument failure (yet to be confirmed) put a brand new aircraft into the ocean? How do two aircraft recently end up in the water short of their respective runways?
Can we, in Australia, hang onto those "master pilot" skills when the industry wants the equivalent of the unmanned ore trains in West Australia?
We may have reached a point on the airliner evolutionary stage when the aeroplane can do just enough to make everyone complacent, but not enough to not require a human to intervene when the FMS runs out of (pre-programmed) ideas.
The car industry is facing similar issues with driverless cars, how long before we start to see - I thought the car was driving itself - accidents?
Sorry I don't have the answers but I also don't think it is anything to do with CASA. We are the custodians of the standards, we should ensure we do not cut corners, we should report anybody that does.
In the end the buck stops with everyone of us who is in a position of accountability in the industry.
If you are young remember what an old man once told me "we have to teach the old blokes to trust the automation, and the young blokes not to trust it"
are we reaching the end of an safety era?
You only need to read Tech Log to see confusion that reigns on certain system aspects, currently the 737 STS.
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Dick...professionals earn their living by embedding "Chronic Unease" into their daily lives. Not as a one stop shop for safety because training, SOPs, discipline, readiness, rehearsing of "what-ifs", listening, continuous learning, experience, culture, prudence etc etc etc are all foundation stones too.
First flight at Royal Vic 1966, Victa 100.....I remember the instructors words so well. "Always check the fuel in the tanks by looking, even if your own mother swears she's checked it for you". It all builds from there. And there's much more than just that in professional airmanship.
Reminding professionals of the blindingly obvious troubles me Dick because it makes me wonder just how much deeper than skin deep is your own knowledge of how real safety works.
First flight at Royal Vic 1966, Victa 100.....I remember the instructors words so well. "Always check the fuel in the tanks by looking, even if your own mother swears she's checked it for you". It all builds from there. And there's much more than just that in professional airmanship.
Reminding professionals of the blindingly obvious troubles me Dick because it makes me wonder just how much deeper than skin deep is your own knowledge of how real safety works.
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Good grief. Normalization of deviance? Based on what???What evidence do you have? What do you actually know about airline training? You are getting close to being libelous Dick.Are you really calling into question the check and training infrastructure of Australia's major carriers? I dont think you have any idea of what you are talking about.Why other posts on this thread think you have credibility is a mystery.
George Glass Libelous? Here you go then, JETSTAR ARE UNSAFE! QANTAS ARE UNSAFE! TIGER ARE UNSAFE! VIRGIN ARE UNSAFE! SOAR AVIATION ARE UNSAFE! REX ARE ******* RIPOFF MERCHANTS WHO TREAT THEIR CREW AS SCUM! GO YER HARDEST MUTHERF#CKER!
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When 'commercial considerations' are often emphasised in both simulator and line operations and company manuals rather than regulatory documents are more readily recalled than regulatory limits, there is a problem. This is apparent in most airlines, not just those north of Australia.
When 'management' set the regulatory limit as a KPI target, be it minimum rest period or maximum duty time or where 'efficiency' relies on pilots accepting to exceed maximum TOD there is a problem. Where 'over nighting' in a hotel due TOD limits results in a loss of income (hence most push on) the system is broken. CASA are as duplicitous as airline management, safe in their beds, with teams of lawyers protecting the company and the institution.
It isn't complacency that is the problem, the normalisation of deviance has been a result of regulators looking the other way, all in the interest of 'commercial viability' Eventually pilots notice and they focus on the commercial too. After all they usually have big debt to service.
When 'management' set the regulatory limit as a KPI target, be it minimum rest period or maximum duty time or where 'efficiency' relies on pilots accepting to exceed maximum TOD there is a problem. Where 'over nighting' in a hotel due TOD limits results in a loss of income (hence most push on) the system is broken. CASA are as duplicitous as airline management, safe in their beds, with teams of lawyers protecting the company and the institution.
It isn't complacency that is the problem, the normalisation of deviance has been a result of regulators looking the other way, all in the interest of 'commercial viability' Eventually pilots notice and they focus on the commercial too. After all they usually have big debt to service.
Just wondering, how often do we get unreliable/disagreeing IAS indications in air-transport operations in Australia?
That statistic might help us determine whether it is training or good maintenance that makes our airline ops "safe".
It shouldn't be too hard to get that statistic, it should be available in the maintenance documentation and incident reports.
That statistic might help us determine whether it is training or good maintenance that makes our airline ops "safe".
It shouldn't be too hard to get that statistic, it should be available in the maintenance documentation and incident reports.
Good grief. Normalization of deviance? Based on what???What evidence do you have? What do you actually know about airline training? You are getting close to being libelous Dick.Are you really calling into question the check and training infrastructure of Australia's major carriers? I dont think you have any idea of what you are talking about.Why other posts on this thread think you have credibility is a mystery.
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Arthur D, it is almost as if you believe that if all the regulations are followed that aviation will be “safe”. Nothing could be further from the truth.
For example, look at ETOPS operations. Under ETOPS there can be an engine failure and the aircraft can keep flying as a single engine aircraft for many hours to landing. Is there a chance that the second engine could fail? Of course there is. If this is over a remote ocean at night, the consequences will be serious.
One day it will probably happen because the ETOPS equation is based on probability.
For example, look at ETOPS operations. Under ETOPS there can be an engine failure and the aircraft can keep flying as a single engine aircraft for many hours to landing. Is there a chance that the second engine could fail? Of course there is. If this is over a remote ocean at night, the consequences will be serious.
One day it will probably happen because the ETOPS equation is based on probability.
An effective SMS being the very key to safe operations. Being a system, an effective SMS should never stand still in striving for continuous improvement. That system should manage Risk to an acceptable standard. If the standard is trending in the wrong direction, then action should be taken.
Ultimately the Board are the owners of the system and accountable as such.
In the case of CASA, the chairman owns the system which oversee’s the aviation industry’s SMS’s. I would hate to think that post an accident the Chairman of CASA stated that he/she expected that any day........
You are quite right with respect to ETOPS, probability is a key factor, as it is in any risk equation. Having said that, reflecting on recent accidents / serious events ie QF 32, AF 447, MH17, US Airways 1549, in all cases the number of engines was irrelevant. In all cases the flight crew played a pivotal role in the outcome, in success and otherwise. For me the debate is whether the results were a product of the airlines systems or outlying individuals (ie Sully).
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safe entry into BK circuit, Swan Airship incident
As a retired RFDS pilot, I still have the jeebies re entry into BK circuit in a B350 avoiding bug smashers ie come in high and descend steeply, to avoid low speed ga a/c
Or how about this one , flying Swan Airship as a Captain, and caught over the harbour bridge, doing scenic flight in a howling southerly. I had to declare a fuel emergency and crept up Parramatta river via helicopter lane, at a very low altitude, to return to BK. Could have ended up somewhat offshore in retrospect!
Or how about this one , flying Swan Airship as a Captain, and caught over the harbour bridge, doing scenic flight in a howling southerly. I had to declare a fuel emergency and crept up Parramatta river via helicopter lane, at a very low altitude, to return to BK. Could have ended up somewhat offshore in retrospect!
