Air Niugini 737 overun at Guam
Join Date: May 2007
Location: Western Pacific
Posts: 721
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Depending on how high it was initially floating in the water, I'm amazed they managed to get that door open against the pressure of the water outside.
I was not intimating that doing an RNAV without approval in anyway contributed to this accident but it certainly opens up a legal can of worms.
A bit like the PX Boeing fleet office giving tasid approval to conduct Autolands in POM below the CAT 1 minima in preference to diverting.
As we all know conducting LVO operations involves far more than just aircraft capability. Not withstanding the POM ILS is only CAT 1.
All in the name of getting the job done.
And yes I agree time will tell.
A bit like the PX Boeing fleet office giving tasid approval to conduct Autolands in POM below the CAT 1 minima in preference to diverting.
As we all know conducting LVO operations involves far more than just aircraft capability. Not withstanding the POM ILS is only CAT 1.
All in the name of getting the job done.
And yes I agree time will tell.
Autolands in POM in sub Cat 1 conditions? Yikes.Now that is a seriously stupid way to try and save the cost of a diversion.
So according the PX press release, so it looks like it was an undershoot and a near perfect water landing that even Sully would have been proud of.🤪
Zanzibar - Thanks. I am aware of that 4WD (or any vehicle in water) tip. If however, that door is the only way for the water to get in, the water coming in will not level until it reaches the top of the door, given that the aircraft is sinking, not sitting on the bottom semi submerged) thus trying to push it open against any further resulting inrush as it opens further will be very difficult. I reckon it had to be opened prior to the sill going under.
Join Date: Feb 2009
Location: Oz
Posts: 12
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hi Pastor of Muppets
I'm all for the use of automation to reduce pilot workload, however its limitations must be clearly understood and its performance monitored closely.
May I humbly suggest you read the reports of Asiana Airlines into SFO and Turkish Airlines into Amsterdam. Both which highlight the over reliance of crew that the auto throttle will protect them and the failure to monitor both it and the aircraft.
As to the use or lack there of of automation in this particular accident I'm not going to speculate.
I'm all for the use of automation to reduce pilot workload, however its limitations must be clearly understood and its performance monitored closely.
May I humbly suggest you read the reports of Asiana Airlines into SFO and Turkish Airlines into Amsterdam. Both which highlight the over reliance of crew that the auto throttle will protect them and the failure to monitor both it and the aircraft.
As to the use or lack there of of automation in this particular accident I'm not going to speculate.
Does anyone know if the CVR and FDR have been recovered.?
Will they go to an independent laboratory for analysis?
Do the PX crew and aircraft have GNSS/P-RNAV/RNP App, etc, or are they reliant on ground based Navaids?
Will they go to an independent laboratory for analysis?
Do the PX crew and aircraft have GNSS/P-RNAV/RNP App, etc, or are they reliant on ground based Navaids?
Join Date: Oct 2006
Location: Suit Case
Posts: 107
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The FAA assists the administration of Aviation Activities in the FSM. Therefore the NTSB will be the lead investigative authority.
But PNG AIC have their own Download Capability
AIC have had their own FDR / CVR download capability for a couple of years now. Not sure of how efficient they are at producing the reports, though I imagine that with the interest in this one - given the "APEC2018" on the side of the aircraft there might be a few attending nations that will want to find out what actually happened - before they start letting their staffers fly them....
gulliBell,
This would be simple task for the US Navy Team with a gas axe and a pair of pliers. A 100' dive is nothing and a Google search will tell them where the devices are located.
It's more about PNG AIC getting hold of both these devices and "accidently" rendering them unreadable.... this is PNG and it's the land of the unexpected!
This would be simple task for the US Navy Team with a gas axe and a pair of pliers. A 100' dive is nothing and a Google search will tell them where the devices are located.
It's more about PNG AIC getting hold of both these devices and "accidently" rendering them unreadable.... this is PNG and it's the land of the unexpected!
Join Date: Oct 2006
Location: Suit Case
Posts: 107
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
gulliBell,
This would be simple task for the US Navy Team with a gas axe and a pair of pliers. A 100' dive is nothing and a Google search will tell them where the devices are located.
It's more about PNG AIC getting hold of both these devices and "accidently" rendering them unreadable.... this is PNG and it's the land of the unexpected!
This would be simple task for the US Navy Team with a gas axe and a pair of pliers. A 100' dive is nothing and a Google search will tell them where the devices are located.
It's more about PNG AIC getting hold of both these devices and "accidently" rendering them unreadable.... this is PNG and it's the land of the unexpected!
Same as what happens in Australia if an incident/accident occurs it does not matter the state of registration of the Aircraft the ATSB does the investigation and owns the DFDR and CVR. Have a look at the ICAO articles of which PNG is a contracting state.
But protocol demands that any release of information from the investigation should come from, or with the permission of, the responsible authority. AFAIK the report on the last accident in the FSM (a runway overrun at PTPN by an Asia Pacific AL B722 freighter in 2008) is still awaited, so don't hold your breath.
According to information from the other thread running on PPRuNe the missing pax has been found in the aeroplane.
Media reports now confirm this, terrible outcome.
Media reports now confirm this, terrible outcome.
Last edited by Duck Pilot; 1st Oct 2018 at 20:56.
It will be a long time before the full circumstances of this accident will be made public by the relevant State authorities. That said, reports appear to confirm the crew pressed on below the MDA in poor forward visibility caused by heavy rain showers. The circumstances were similar to the Lion Air crash into the water on short final at Bali. No doubt there have been countless similar accidents. One of which was at Kai Tak Airport Hong Kong on 31 August 1988 where CAAC Flight 301, a Hawker Siddeley Trident, crashed on short final for Runway 31 while landing in poor visibility. See:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CAAC_Flight_301
That report stated in summary that the cause of the accident was a combination of pilot error and bad visibility; A cause common to so many similar accidents.
In the 1950's the USAF Instrument Flying School conducted a series of trials using a North American Sabreliner See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_American_Sabreliner . The purpose was to observe the pilots conduct in very low visibility approach and landings manually flown. It was found that in many earlier accidents involving poor forward visibility, both pilots went heads up approaching the DH and because both were staring through the windscreen trying to spot the runway, they not only failed to detect the aircraft going below the glide slope but also failed to detect a high sink rate caused sometimes by inappropriate power reduction by the PF .
The reason for both pilots going heads up seeking visual cues at low altitude was put down to a survival instinct syndrome. It takes discipline for the PM to stay heads down while the PF is looking ahead hoping to see enough to land safely. The PF is subject to visual illusions especially if heavy rain impinges on the windscreen and a false horizon is seen but not realised until too late. If the PM tries to sneak a glance up through the windscreen in an attempt to spot the runway when he should have the discipline to stay heads down to catch any unwanted descent below a glide slope or inadvertent increase in sink rate, the chances of both pilots being subject to a false horizon is very high. It becomes a case of who is minding the shop, so to speak
Many years ago, the former Ansett Airlines had a SOP where the PM was required to make a call at 500 feet on all approaches (visual or IMC) of the current height, airspeed and VSI (sink rate) reading. Hence a typical call could be: "500 feet - Bug plus five - Sink 800" Of course things could go awry below 500 feet and hopefully one of the two pilots would pick this up. But what that call did was to force the PM to go heads down to read the current state of the flight instruments. The PF would also be aware of his own instrument indications of course.
Having extensive experience at landing in heavy rain at several Pacific atolls, and aware of the insidious effect caused by false horizons in heavy rain, this writer had a personal SOP when approaching to land in heavy rain or poor forward visibility and that was a request for the PM to give an additional call-out at 200 feet agl of height, speed and sink rate. That was because by then as well as flying on instruments, I would be glancing up peering ahead looking for visual cues possibly through a rain affected windscreen and thus be subject to visual illusions. If the PM called an out of tolerance reading of his instruments at 200 feet, there would be enough reaction time and energy to make a go-around. While admittedly pure speculation, the precaution of a 200 feet agl call by the PM may have gone some way to preventing the Air Nuigini accident at Truk. As it was, its a good bet that both pilots were heads up looking for the runway in blinding rain at the time of impact with the water.
That report stated in summary that the cause of the accident was a combination of pilot error and bad visibility; A cause common to so many similar accidents.
In the 1950's the USAF Instrument Flying School conducted a series of trials using a North American Sabreliner See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_American_Sabreliner . The purpose was to observe the pilots conduct in very low visibility approach and landings manually flown. It was found that in many earlier accidents involving poor forward visibility, both pilots went heads up approaching the DH and because both were staring through the windscreen trying to spot the runway, they not only failed to detect the aircraft going below the glide slope but also failed to detect a high sink rate caused sometimes by inappropriate power reduction by the PF .
The reason for both pilots going heads up seeking visual cues at low altitude was put down to a survival instinct syndrome. It takes discipline for the PM to stay heads down while the PF is looking ahead hoping to see enough to land safely. The PF is subject to visual illusions especially if heavy rain impinges on the windscreen and a false horizon is seen but not realised until too late. If the PM tries to sneak a glance up through the windscreen in an attempt to spot the runway when he should have the discipline to stay heads down to catch any unwanted descent below a glide slope or inadvertent increase in sink rate, the chances of both pilots being subject to a false horizon is very high. It becomes a case of who is minding the shop, so to speak
Many years ago, the former Ansett Airlines had a SOP where the PM was required to make a call at 500 feet on all approaches (visual or IMC) of the current height, airspeed and VSI (sink rate) reading. Hence a typical call could be: "500 feet - Bug plus five - Sink 800" Of course things could go awry below 500 feet and hopefully one of the two pilots would pick this up. But what that call did was to force the PM to go heads down to read the current state of the flight instruments. The PF would also be aware of his own instrument indications of course.
Having extensive experience at landing in heavy rain at several Pacific atolls, and aware of the insidious effect caused by false horizons in heavy rain, this writer had a personal SOP when approaching to land in heavy rain or poor forward visibility and that was a request for the PM to give an additional call-out at 200 feet agl of height, speed and sink rate. That was because by then as well as flying on instruments, I would be glancing up peering ahead looking for visual cues possibly through a rain affected windscreen and thus be subject to visual illusions. If the PM called an out of tolerance reading of his instruments at 200 feet, there would be enough reaction time and energy to make a go-around. While admittedly pure speculation, the precaution of a 200 feet agl call by the PM may have gone some way to preventing the Air Nuigini accident at Truk. As it was, its a good bet that both pilots were heads up looking for the runway in blinding rain at the time of impact with the water.
Last edited by Centaurus; 2nd Oct 2018 at 02:32.
I hear what you say. But the bottom line is, you get to the MAPT and you either have the required visual reference or you don't. The guy who is monitoring the approach is responsible for that call. If you have the required visual reference you can see where you're going and what's ahead of you and presumably therefore you don't fly it into the brine. If you don't have the required visual reference it gets called at that point and you execute the published missed. This whole unfortunate situation should have been resolved at 2.2nm from the runway with one of two standard calls "Visual, continue" or "Not visual, go around". There is no 3rd choice. You don't resolve it with both guys looking out the window through the pouring rain in search of a runway that should have been visible from a point well behind you.
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: Cairns
Posts: 88
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It will be a long time before the full circumstances of this accident will be made public by the relevant State authorities. That said, reports appear to confirm the crew pressed on below the MDA in poor forward visibility caused by heavy rain showers. The circumstances were similar to the Lion Air crash into the water on short final at Bali. No doubt there have been countless similar accidents. One of which was at Kai Tak Airport Hong Kong on 31 August 1988 where CAAC Flight 301, a Hawker Siddeley Trident, crashed on short final for Runway 31 while landing in poor visibility. See:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CAAC_Flight_301
That report stated in summary that the cause of the accident was a combination of pilot error and bad visibility; A cause common to so many similar accidents.
In the 1950's the USAF Instrument Flying School conducted a series of trials using a North American Sabreliner See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_American_Sabreliner . The purpose was to observe the pilots conduct in very low visibility approach and landings manually flown. It was found that in many earlier accidents involving poor forward visibility, both pilots went heads up approaching the DH and because both were staring through the windscreen trying to spot the runway, they not only failed to detect the aircraft going below the glide slope but also failed to detect a high sink rate caused sometimes by inappropriate power reduction by the PF .
The reason for both pilots going heads up seeking visual cues at low altitude was put down to a survival instinct syndrome. It takes discipline for the PM to stay heads down while the PF is looking ahead hoping to see enough to land safely. The PF is subject to visual illusions especially if heavy rain impinges on the windscreen and a false horizon is seen but not realised until too late. If the PM tries to sneak a glance up through the windscreen in an attempt to spot the runway when he should have the discipline to stay heads down to catch any unwanted descent below a glide slope or inadvertent increase in sink rate, the chances of both pilots being subject to a false horizon is very high. It becomes a case of who is minding the shop, so to speak
Many years ago, the former Ansett Airlines had a SOP where the PM was required to make a call at 500 feet on all approaches (visual or IMC) of the current height, airspeed and VSI (sink rate) reading. Hence a typical call could be: "500 feet - Bug plus five - Sink 800" Of course things could go awry below 500 feet and hopefully one of the two pilots would pick this up. But what that call did was to force the PM to go heads down to read the current state of the flight instruments. The PF would also be aware of his own instrument indications of course.
Having extensive experience at landing in heavy rain at several Pacific atolls, and aware of the insidious effect caused by false horizons in heavy rain, this writer had a personal SOP when approaching to land in heavy rain or poor forward visibility and that was a request for the PM to give an additional call-out at 200 feet agl of height, speed and sink rate. That was because by then as well as flying on instruments, I would be glancing up peering ahead looking for visual cues possibly through a rain affected windscreen and thus be subject to visual illusions. If the PM called an out of tolerance reading of his instruments at 200 feet, there would be enough reaction time and energy to make a go-around. While admittedly pure speculation, the precaution of a 200 feet agl call by the PM may have gone some way to preventing the Air Nuigini accident at Truk. As it was, its a good bet that both pilots were heads up looking for the runway in blinding rain at the time of impact with the water.
That report stated in summary that the cause of the accident was a combination of pilot error and bad visibility; A cause common to so many similar accidents.
In the 1950's the USAF Instrument Flying School conducted a series of trials using a North American Sabreliner See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_American_Sabreliner . The purpose was to observe the pilots conduct in very low visibility approach and landings manually flown. It was found that in many earlier accidents involving poor forward visibility, both pilots went heads up approaching the DH and because both were staring through the windscreen trying to spot the runway, they not only failed to detect the aircraft going below the glide slope but also failed to detect a high sink rate caused sometimes by inappropriate power reduction by the PF .
The reason for both pilots going heads up seeking visual cues at low altitude was put down to a survival instinct syndrome. It takes discipline for the PM to stay heads down while the PF is looking ahead hoping to see enough to land safely. The PF is subject to visual illusions especially if heavy rain impinges on the windscreen and a false horizon is seen but not realised until too late. If the PM tries to sneak a glance up through the windscreen in an attempt to spot the runway when he should have the discipline to stay heads down to catch any unwanted descent below a glide slope or inadvertent increase in sink rate, the chances of both pilots being subject to a false horizon is very high. It becomes a case of who is minding the shop, so to speak
Many years ago, the former Ansett Airlines had a SOP where the PM was required to make a call at 500 feet on all approaches (visual or IMC) of the current height, airspeed and VSI (sink rate) reading. Hence a typical call could be: "500 feet - Bug plus five - Sink 800" Of course things could go awry below 500 feet and hopefully one of the two pilots would pick this up. But what that call did was to force the PM to go heads down to read the current state of the flight instruments. The PF would also be aware of his own instrument indications of course.
Having extensive experience at landing in heavy rain at several Pacific atolls, and aware of the insidious effect caused by false horizons in heavy rain, this writer had a personal SOP when approaching to land in heavy rain or poor forward visibility and that was a request for the PM to give an additional call-out at 200 feet agl of height, speed and sink rate. That was because by then as well as flying on instruments, I would be glancing up peering ahead looking for visual cues possibly through a rain affected windscreen and thus be subject to visual illusions. If the PM called an out of tolerance reading of his instruments at 200 feet, there would be enough reaction time and energy to make a go-around. While admittedly pure speculation, the precaution of a 200 feet agl call by the PM may have gone some way to preventing the Air Nuigini accident at Truk. As it was, its a good bet that both pilots were heads up looking for the runway in blinding rain at the time of impact with the water.