Qantas crew injured after autopilot cut out
Join Date: Aug 2006
Location: Oz
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A complicating factor is that there are two types of mode control panels on the QF737 fleet from different manufacturers. The change to the CWS reversion only applied to one of the models and even then only to the aircraft that had had the update applied.
So some behave one way and some behave the other.
So some behave one way and some behave the other.
How often are pilots reacting similarly based on actual fear of danger to the aircraft vs not wanting paperwork/questions asked due to the overspeed?
I’ve always had the feeling that too often pilots are doing something that actually complicates the situation in order to avoid the latter. This is a classic example imho.
I’ve always had the feeling that too often pilots are doing something that actually complicates the situation in order to avoid the latter. This is a classic example imho.
How often are pilots reacting similarly based on actual fear of danger to the aircraft vs not wanting paperwork/questions asked due to the overspeed?
I’ve always had the feeling that too often pilots are doing something that actually complicates the situation in order to avoid the latter. This is a classic example imho.
I’ve always had the feeling that too often pilots are doing something that actually complicates the situation in order to avoid the latter. This is a classic example imho.
But I'd say in my time on the 737 it's was pretty normal to gently respond that way (with CWS), really no dramas and smooth.
Exactly
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At the other large 737 operator in OZ we were told well in advance about the change and its implications. Don’t get me wrong, I too used to do the old gentle back pressure into CWS when approaching Vmo, but haven’t since for this exact reason......but having said that, we too have had a similar event as well.
They did tell the pilots as the update to autopilot logic was rolled out. Not all of them appreciated the implications though and some to this day still don’t.
I read on ATSB site the exact same thing happened n a Virgin 737 into Adelaide on the 13th Sept 17.
If two crews from two seperate Airlines in this fairly small aviation community have seriously injured cabin crew as a result of a software change to the aircraft, will the ATSB find the reason the crews were not aware of the risks? The ball has obviously been dropped somewhere and the fact that seperate crews from seperate airlines have been caught out suggests that the mistake was made further up the food chain than operational crew.
Training Departments? Airline Ops management? CASA?
If two crews from two seperate Airlines in this fairly small aviation community have seriously injured cabin crew as a result of a software change to the aircraft, will the ATSB find the reason the crews were not aware of the risks? The ball has obviously been dropped somewhere and the fact that seperate crews from seperate airlines have been caught out suggests that the mistake was made further up the food chain than operational crew.
Training Departments? Airline Ops management? CASA?
I read on ATSB site the exact same thing happened n a Virgin 737 into Adelaide on the 13th Sept 17.
If two crews from two seperate Airlines in this fairly small aviation community have seriously injured cabin crew as a result of a software change to the aircraft, will the ATSB find the reason the crews were not aware of the risks? The ball has obviously been dropped somewhere and the fact that seperate crews from seperate airlines have been caught out suggests that the mistake was made further up the food chain than operational crew.
Training Departments? Airline Ops management? CASA?
If two crews from two seperate Airlines in this fairly small aviation community have seriously injured cabin crew as a result of a software change to the aircraft, will the ATSB find the reason the crews were not aware of the risks? The ball has obviously been dropped somewhere and the fact that seperate crews from seperate airlines have been caught out suggests that the mistake was made further up the food chain than operational crew.
Training Departments? Airline Ops management? CASA?
And why the change at all?
Dash 8 doesnt have CWS, it has a sync button which when pressed and held disengages the vertical mode allowing the pilot to re-datum the target IAS or VS. When the sync button is released the vertical mode reengages. It also works with just the flight director engaged.
