So you need a new fleet Leigh?
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Nah probably meant 330neo/350 to keep the flt decks more similar
Nunc est bibendum
Lol. Sadly I’m not up to speed on the Boeing fleet capabilities so much these days. Can you do common fleet flying between the 787 and the 777X? Is that on the table as an option from Boeing? I know they’re the same endorsement on the license but not sure beyond that.
i know the CX crew are flying the ‘classic’ A330 and the A350 as part of a common fleet. Not sure if they can do that in the same tour of duty though.
Either way, some interesting efficiencies for Qantas if they can CFF for both the 777X and the A350 with aircraft types already in their fleet.
i know the CX crew are flying the ‘classic’ A330 and the A350 as part of a common fleet. Not sure if they can do that in the same tour of duty though.
Either way, some interesting efficiencies for Qantas if they can CFF for both the 777X and the A350 with aircraft types already in their fleet.
[QUOTE]
i know the CX crew are flying the ‘classic’ A330 and the A350 as part of a common fleet. Not sure if they can do that in the same tour of duty though/QUOTE]
No restrictions on flying both types in a single duty. Rarely happens in practice though.
i know the CX crew are flying the ‘classic’ A330 and the A350 as part of a common fleet. Not sure if they can do that in the same tour of duty though/QUOTE]
No restrictions on flying both types in a single duty. Rarely happens in practice though.
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No worries covered with the 'A' licence.
[QUOTE=Veruka Salt;10137700]
How does it go? Same fundamentals I guess but the 350 is pretty different.
i know the CX crew are flying the ‘classic’ A330 and the A350 as part of a common fleet. Not sure if they can do that in the same tour of duty though/QUOTE]
No restrictions on flying both types in a single duty. Rarely happens in practice though.
No restrictions on flying both types in a single duty. Rarely happens in practice though.
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Although I’ve never flown a 777 they are procedurally identical, apparently. As an example, on the 787 the hydraulic pumps are turned on in a particular sequence. For the 787 it makes no difference and they could be turned on in any sequence, but the sequence is mandated to comply with the common endorsement as it matters in the 777 which order they’re switched on.
Yes same endorsement. I’ve been led to believe both can be flown, just like the Airbus types.
Although I’ve never flown a 777 they are procedurally identical, apparently. As an example, on the 787 the hydraulic pumps are turned on in a particular sequence. For the 787 it makes no difference and they could be turned on in any sequence, but the sequence is mandated to comply with the common endorsement as it matters in the 777 which order they’re switched on.
That’s not actually correct, it’s something that “became a thing” after someone in the check department, that hadn’t flown a 777, read the FCOM and decided the leave his mark.
Hydraulic pumps....R, C1,C2, L...All ON.
So then rather than start on the right and turn all pumps on in a Right to Left motion, the Atom was split and we had to go R, C1, C2 ,L. The logic of the system chose which Centre pump it wanted to use.
The reason given for this was that “it caused a fault on the 777”, but none of the 777 experienced pilots or the Boeing instructors that did our endorsement had ever heard of this.
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That’s not actually correct, it’s something that “became a thing” after someone in the check department, that hadn’t flown a 777, read the FCOM and decided the leave his mark.
Hydraulic pumps....R, C1,C2, L...All ON.
So then rather than start on the right and turn all pumps on in a Right to Left motion, the Atom was split and we had to go R, C1, C2 ,L. The logic of the system chose which Centre pump it wanted to use.
The reason given for this was that “it caused a fault on the 777”, but none of the 777 experienced pilots or the Boeing instructors that did our endorsement had ever heard of this.
Hydraulic pumps....R, C1,C2, L...All ON.
So then rather than start on the right and turn all pumps on in a Right to Left motion, the Atom was split and we had to go R, C1, C2 ,L. The logic of the system chose which Centre pump it wanted to use.
The reason given for this was that “it caused a fault on the 777”, but none of the 777 experienced pilots or the Boeing instructors that did our endorsement had ever heard of this.
As I said I’d never flown the 777 and just going by what I was told during conversion by those that had probably not flown the 777 either.
Some of our colleagues like to make things more difficult than they need to be.
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Can you shed light on the Hydraulic pump thing? Is there a fault if you go R, C2, C1, L when turning on?
on the 767, if one does not turn the hyd pumps on in this specific order, there is a chance that hyd fluid is transferred from one hyd system to another. I think the 777 is the same, hence the specific order. The 787 hyd pumps (electric) are inhibited until after engine start, so the switch sequence is irrelevant.
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Another article from the SMH
https://www.smh.com.au/politics/fede...04-p4zdg0.html
I'll quote the important section, one that I think the QF board should consider:
"This report, commissioned by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, was quite separate and apart from the banking royal commission. It sheets home blame to the Commonwealth Bank's highest level - its board of directors.
They were guilty of "inadequate oversight" in an institution with a "widespread tendency towards complacency". APRA ruled that the bank must set aside $1 billion in extra capital to deal with contingencies arising from its findings.
Treasurer Scott Morrison seized on the report for its implications not just for the banks but for all of corporate Australia. It was "a wake-up call for every director", he said, "not just bank boards. There are boards sitting around the country who need to read it very closely and ask themselves the hard questions at the next meeting. I expect them to do so.""
https://www.smh.com.au/politics/fede...04-p4zdg0.html
I'll quote the important section, one that I think the QF board should consider:
"This report, commissioned by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, was quite separate and apart from the banking royal commission. It sheets home blame to the Commonwealth Bank's highest level - its board of directors.
They were guilty of "inadequate oversight" in an institution with a "widespread tendency towards complacency". APRA ruled that the bank must set aside $1 billion in extra capital to deal with contingencies arising from its findings.
Treasurer Scott Morrison seized on the report for its implications not just for the banks but for all of corporate Australia. It was "a wake-up call for every director", he said, "not just bank boards. There are boards sitting around the country who need to read it very closely and ask themselves the hard questions at the next meeting. I expect them to do so.""
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Why we should blame incentive pay for bad behaviour in fin services
The incentive pay culture that is rampant across the financial services sector is the main cause of bad behaviour.
by Amanda WilsonThose outraged about the bad behaviour inside our financial institutions have largely focused on individuals and paid scant attention to the real culprit plaguing our companies: a rampant incentive culture.
Having led the performance and reward function of a big four bank, and subsequently as CEO of an investment research and shareholder advocacy firm, I know there are voices in the investment and human resource communities who plead with companies to implement more sustainable approaches to remuneration and managing human capital generally.
Those voices are drowned out by the more vociferous and powerful – super funds, asset managers and their advisors, and the metrics-obsessives within companies – who want to see more pay "at risk" for senior executives because, in their left-brained view of the world, that is the only way those executives will "perform".
Once entrenched for senior executives, at-risk reward, by necessity, is cascaded throughout the organisation, with pre-ordained KPIs attracting a certain percentage of one's annual, or longer term, target incentive, supplemented by a plethora of bespoke sales-based plans at customer-facing levels. (It should be noted that incentives refer specifically to rewards linked to defined outcomes, in contrast to after-the-fact bonuses).
Following the GFC and various financial scandals, the backlash against excessive executive pay (even though the equity-based incentive plans endorsed by investors had often delivered those excesses), and the growth of the sustainable investment movement, executive performance metrics were changed. Long-term incentive performance periods were lengthened from 3 to 4 or 5 years (as if executive tenure and performance can neatly map to investment time horizons) and score cards gave increased weight to factors like customer satisfaction, employee engagement and workplace health and safety.
Some of us, although welcoming a more holistic view of performance, were sceptical about this approach. Firstly, financial thresholds usually had to be met before any incentives are payable, thus privileging the hard stuff over the soft. Secondly, we were starting to ask what the still-hefty base pay was for? Several of us went further and mused that the main incentive for keeping a company financially healthy, with satisfied customers and healthy staff, ought to be getting to keep your job – but we were dismissed as dinosaurs. Directors, most of whom have little expertise in human capital theory and psychology of incentives, remained convinced that incentives were critical in the so-called war for executive talent.
The ramifications of using incentives as the primary, if not only, tool in the management box, are blindingly clear. Here are six reasons why.
Firstly, they encourage an unrealistically linear view of the world, wherein it is possible to predict the impact an executive will have on corporate performance, with clumsy "after-the-fact" tweaks to account for unforeseen variables.
Secondly, they lead to a close-mindedness. New opportunities are ignored and risks downplayed because a reward that visibly marks you as a winner or a loser is at risk.
The third argument against an over-reliance on incentives is they encourage rent-seeking behaviour: uncertain pay outcomes are like fertiliser for rent-seeking. They nurture a sort of insecurity that encourages a tactical hoarding mentality - for example not taking long-term investment decisions - because you never know, really, how this nebulous thing called "performance" will pan out.
The fourth reason is one we are all aware of: incentives lead to the gaming of results. All the accounting tricks in the book are utilised to deliver the payload. This often provokes a nerdy numbers battle as proxy advisors and companies fight it out to make their macho financial – and severely limited - case.
My fifth point is that incentives lead to a "what I earn defines me" mentality. All the other benefits and challenges of leadership tend to be sublimated beneath a final, annual number. Factors like the pride in leading an iconic Australian institution, of providing a happy, productive workplace, of genuinely meeting or exceeding customers' needs (not manufactured wants) are in perennial support roles to the main act.
Finally, they encourage an almost deliberate blindness regarding overall pay quantum and the relativities therein – with even our regulators saying that quantum is not their focus.
And yet the incentive mindset is now so intractable a part of corporate leadership in Australia that its "rats in a lab" type philosophy has swamped HR practices. This has had a corrosive effect on corporate culture, as so clearly shown in the royal banking commission outcomes to date (and detailed in the APRA report into CBA released this week). There is voluminous and compelling research that demonstrates incentives actually diminish intrinsic motivation and frequently have unintended consequences.
None of this is to say there is no place for incentives in listed companies. They can be very effective for short-term, clearly defined objectives. And there is no doubt executives owning equity can provide alignment with at least the cohort of shareholders who own the stock for exactly the same time period. But to avoid future scandals in our financial services industry (and other sectors) the true impact of incentives at every level and function should be evaluated. They should be removed altogether from central/compliance functions so these can deliver frank and fearless advice without penalty.
And as for the "war for talent"? The executive labour market remains rife with artificial barriers to entry, as evidenced by the still-startling lack of diversity. Maybe if more leaders and staff were selected based on their demonstrated intrinsic motivation – and a lack of interest in incentives – we'd get sustainable growth in value rather than incentive-driven highs and their inevitable hangovers.
Amanda Wilson was CEO at the investment research and shareholder advocacy firm Regnan from 2010 -2017 and before that held various executive roles in the banking sector.
AFR Contributor
APRA CBA report