Virgin ATR grounded in Canberra
KRUSTY. I am also old school GA, but also had the privilege of extensive airline and charter ops here and OS. I have a lot of empathy for our GA brethren in their inexorable climb up the greasy pole.
I firmly believe that give or take a bit, most candidates start out equal, regardless of background or ethnicity. The outcome is largely dependent of proper selection and resourcing of mentors. All too often it seems that gongs are awarded on the basis of mateship, history and compatibility, rather that practical teaching skills. All too often we hear tales of desperately unsuited tutors. This aspect is important in all areas of our industry but perhaps more so in respect of cadet training. Unfortunately in some cases the guys calling the shots with regard to training, don't know what they don't know, and with the incestuous approach of some departments, will never have the opportunity to expand their knowledge base.
Maui
I firmly believe that give or take a bit, most candidates start out equal, regardless of background or ethnicity. The outcome is largely dependent of proper selection and resourcing of mentors. All too often it seems that gongs are awarded on the basis of mateship, history and compatibility, rather that practical teaching skills. All too often we hear tales of desperately unsuited tutors. This aspect is important in all areas of our industry but perhaps more so in respect of cadet training. Unfortunately in some cases the guys calling the shots with regard to training, don't know what they don't know, and with the incestuous approach of some departments, will never have the opportunity to expand their knowledge base.
Maui
Last edited by maui; 26th Jan 2018 at 08:12. Reason: expansion
Strange how this has become a debate about the skills deficiencies of fellow pilots. I do wish Ppruners would 'Play the Ball, and not the Man'.
The real reason behind the heavy landing was because of windshear, caused by turbulence from buildings on the airfield site. The approach speed was correctly maintained, but the aircraft got caught in wind rotor.
We should be looking to test that airfield site, with wind gauges, to see if any preventative methods can be put into place. My nearest airfield has similar problems, caused by its huge buildings. This has been recognised in the various publications. Even back in the 1930s, they had the presence of mind to make all hangars with curved roofs.
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The real reason behind the heavy landing was because of windshear, caused by turbulence from buildings on the airfield site. The approach speed was correctly maintained, but the aircraft got caught in wind rotor.
We should be looking to test that airfield site, with wind gauges, to see if any preventative methods can be put into place. My nearest airfield has similar problems, caused by its huge buildings. This has been recognised in the various publications. Even back in the 1930s, they had the presence of mind to make all hangars with curved roofs.
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scifi
Your interpretation of the events differs from what was reported in the ATSB initial report:
I bolded the airspeeds, as well as the FO's response. Further along the report
So at 107' AGL the speed was Vapp+14, and the aircraft landed at Vapp-8; a speed reduction of 22 knots. NOT what I'd call a correctly maintained approach speed.
Also look to the first ATSB quote where the Captain twice called for an increase in power before calling for a go-around.
So perhaps debating skills deficiencies isn't that much of a stretch.
With a 10-15 Knot Easterly, the mechanical turbulence and "rotors" from the buildings don't occur, as the buildings that cause all the grief are on the Western side of the runway.
Having said that, I've flown that approach in a Q300 and Q400 more times than I care to remember, and as I wrote in an earlier quote on this thread, the approach to runway 35 will bite you in the arse if you're not careful.
I don't know if you've ever flown a large Turboprop. If you have, you should know that reducing the power levers to "near flight idle" at 107' AGL is going to guarantee you a heavy landing unless you re-apply most or all of that power as soon as your speed gets back to your desired range.
DIVOSH!
Strange how this has become a debate about the skills deficiencies of fellow pilots. I do wish Ppruners would 'Play the Ball, and not the Man'.
The real reason behind the heavy landing was because of windshear, caused by turbulence from buildings on the airfield site. The approach speed was correctly maintained, but the aircraft got caught in wind rotor.
The real reason behind the heavy landing was because of windshear, caused by turbulence from buildings on the airfield site. The approach speed was correctly maintained, but the aircraft got caught in wind rotor.
At about 1320 Eastern Daylight-saving Time (EDT),[2] the flight crew were conducting a visual approach to runway 35 at Canberra. The calculated approach speed was 113 kt. At 1320:52, nine seconds prior to touch down, the aircraft approached the runway at a height of about 107 ft, slightly above the desired approach path. The flight crew reported that at about this time, there was turbulence and changing wind conditions. Flight data showed that at this time, speed had increased to 127 kt. In response to the increasing speed, the first officer reduced power to near flight idle.
Over the next five seconds, the descent rate increased significantly and the speed reduced.
During the last 50 ft of descent, the captain twice called for an increase in power and then called for a go-around. The first officer responded by increasing the power at about the same time as the aircraft touched down.
At 1321:01, the aircraft touched down heavily on the main landing gear and rear fuselage. Assessing that2 the aircraft was under control, the captain immediately called to the first officer to cancel the go-around and then took control of the aircraft. The flight crew completed the landing roll and taxied to the gate without further incident.
Over the next five seconds, the descent rate increased significantly and the speed reduced.
During the last 50 ft of descent, the captain twice called for an increase in power and then called for a go-around. The first officer responded by increasing the power at about the same time as the aircraft touched down.
At 1321:01, the aircraft touched down heavily on the main landing gear and rear fuselage. Assessing that2 the aircraft was under control, the captain immediately called to the first officer to cancel the go-around and then took control of the aircraft. The flight crew completed the landing roll and taxied to the gate without further incident.
At the time of the touchdown, the descent rate was 928 feet per minute, the speed was 105 kt
Also look to the first ATSB quote where the Captain twice called for an increase in power before calling for a go-around.
So perhaps debating skills deficiencies isn't that much of a stretch.
With a 10-15 Knot Easterly, the mechanical turbulence and "rotors" from the buildings don't occur, as the buildings that cause all the grief are on the Western side of the runway.
Having said that, I've flown that approach in a Q300 and Q400 more times than I care to remember, and as I wrote in an earlier quote on this thread, the approach to runway 35 will bite you in the arse if you're not careful.
I don't know if you've ever flown a large Turboprop. If you have, you should know that reducing the power levers to "near flight idle" at 107' AGL is going to guarantee you a heavy landing unless you re-apply most or all of that power as soon as your speed gets back to your desired range.
DIVOSH!
Hi Divosh, I think you have missed the part of the report that said... 'The flight crew reported that at about this time, there was turbulence and changing wind conditions'. That was 9 seconds before touch-down. In that time the speed dropped by 22 knots, which totally agrees with their statement.
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Hi Divosh, I think you have missed the part of the report that said... 'The flight crew reported that at about this time, there was turbulence and changing wind conditions'. That was 9 seconds before touch-down. In that time the speed dropped by 22 knots, which totally agrees with their statement.
The airspeed? Given the actual wind conditions in the report I’m afraid that sort of uncorrected reduction in airspeed is most likely a handling issue, hence why the conversation is focussing on the skills of a fellow pilot. I believe that this is actually playing the ball and not the man.
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scifi
I didn't miss it. If every time there was a heavy landing due
the worlds fleet of airliners would be grounded weekly.
As I've said (more than once) I've flown that approach a few times. There is ALWAYS "turbulence and changing wind conditions" on approach to Canberra, even on a day with light and variable winds. I can guarantee that a 16 knot NE wind will give a crew plenty of work on final, but it's not that unusual.
The METAR winds of the day do not support your theory of a 22 knot wind change, and I would suggest to you that if that kind of wind set was active in Canberra at the time (and it does) there would be NOTAMS for moderate/severe turbulence below 8000', and there would be turbulence and/or undershoot/overshoot shear advices on the ATIS, none of which appeared to be present on the day.
Have you flown a heavy turboprop? Are you aware of what happens to aircraft performance when the power levers are placed "near flight idle"? (God forbid when in the landing configuration)
The report states that the FO reacted to the increased airspeed and reduced the power levers to "near flight idle" approximately 9 seconds before landing and then didn't touch them for over five seconds.
That is a recipe for disaster!
DIVOSH!
I didn't miss it. If every time there was a heavy landing due
turbulence and changing wind conditions
As I've said (more than once) I've flown that approach a few times. There is ALWAYS "turbulence and changing wind conditions" on approach to Canberra, even on a day with light and variable winds. I can guarantee that a 16 knot NE wind will give a crew plenty of work on final, but it's not that unusual.
The METAR winds of the day do not support your theory of a 22 knot wind change, and I would suggest to you that if that kind of wind set was active in Canberra at the time (and it does) there would be NOTAMS for moderate/severe turbulence below 8000', and there would be turbulence and/or undershoot/overshoot shear advices on the ATIS, none of which appeared to be present on the day.
Have you flown a heavy turboprop? Are you aware of what happens to aircraft performance when the power levers are placed "near flight idle"? (God forbid when in the landing configuration)
The report states that the FO reacted to the increased airspeed and reduced the power levers to "near flight idle" approximately 9 seconds before landing and then didn't touch them for over five seconds.
That is a recipe for disaster!
DIVOSH!
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Also don't ignore the pressure of the "lets play checkride" situation where the Captain/PIC is supposed to allow the F/O to operate the sector so the checker can make his assessment.
This should never impact on the safety of the operation - however at times it will, appears maybe - maybe - this was one of those times.
Amazes me the number of Captains who, over time lose sight of their primary function: manage the safety of the operation, done properly this will also cover a secondary but personally significant aspect economically if for no other reason: maintain status as Captain in a world that at times will do nothing but try and drag you down and destroy you for their own purposes.
Just ask Sully!
Cheers.
This should never impact on the safety of the operation - however at times it will, appears maybe - maybe - this was one of those times.
Amazes me the number of Captains who, over time lose sight of their primary function: manage the safety of the operation, done properly this will also cover a secondary but personally significant aspect economically if for no other reason: maintain status as Captain in a world that at times will do nothing but try and drag you down and destroy you for their own purposes.
Just ask Sully!
Cheers.
ATC there are very aware of the problems caused by the hangar adjacent to the TDZ and if there is a hint of turbulence or shear it will be notified on the ATIS. I have not read the report but am guessing that there was no such comment on the ATIS. Did the crew report the turbulence at the time or to the investigators at some point down the the track?? I did see a pic of the damage and it ain't pretty.
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Depends on what marks he got for that sector ?
Right on the money onedot, hopefully he won’t be training anymore due to other recent failings!
SHVC = that will depend on what " THE NOSER " marked the crews efforts at, as he was in the Jumpseat at the time.
" THE NOSER " is off to the B738 FYI shortly > great things happen to great aircrew
What will happen to VH-FVZ now = will the ATR Frogs rebuild another V ATR at HUGE EXPENSE
SHVC = that will depend on what " THE NOSER " marked the crews efforts at, as he was in the Jumpseat at the time.
" THE NOSER " is off to the B738 FYI shortly > great things happen to great aircrew
What will happen to VH-FVZ now = will the ATR Frogs rebuild another V ATR at HUGE EXPENSE
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There's obviously a second theme running here, as evidenced by people who appear to be VARA pilots posting about possible "issues" within their own C&T system.
Fair enough.
I would like to put my P.O.V. re: Cadets vs. experienced pilots in the RHS.
I spent around 25 years in the Army. Mainly reserves, but also went on the odd operational deployment. I've been staff on countless training courses, ranging from recruit courses, through to training Ares and ARA soldiers in all kinds of Green army and SF courses. My last deployment was being part of a team where we trained Coalition forces (U.S. and Iraqi) in various aspects of Counter Insurgency warfare.
There is a saying in the military:
"There is no such thing as a bad soldier. There are only bad trainers, NCO's and officers."
What that means is that a pilot in an airline is a product of his or her C&T system. There is NO REASON why a 300 hour pilot shouldn't be in the RHS of an ATR, Dash, 737 or A320. Provided that they are trained correctly.
This happens all around the world, particularly in places like Europe and Asia where there isn't a GA industry to supply large volumes of high time applicants.
If the training that a pilot receives at VARA focusses more on procedures, being "word perfect" in checklist responses, etc. rather than on FLYING THE AIRCRAFT you will continue to see incidents and accidents like this happen.
My 2c.
DIVOSH!
Fair enough.
I would like to put my P.O.V. re: Cadets vs. experienced pilots in the RHS.
I spent around 25 years in the Army. Mainly reserves, but also went on the odd operational deployment. I've been staff on countless training courses, ranging from recruit courses, through to training Ares and ARA soldiers in all kinds of Green army and SF courses. My last deployment was being part of a team where we trained Coalition forces (U.S. and Iraqi) in various aspects of Counter Insurgency warfare.
There is a saying in the military:
"There is no such thing as a bad soldier. There are only bad trainers, NCO's and officers."
What that means is that a pilot in an airline is a product of his or her C&T system. There is NO REASON why a 300 hour pilot shouldn't be in the RHS of an ATR, Dash, 737 or A320. Provided that they are trained correctly.
This happens all around the world, particularly in places like Europe and Asia where there isn't a GA industry to supply large volumes of high time applicants.
If the training that a pilot receives at VARA focusses more on procedures, being "word perfect" in checklist responses, etc. rather than on FLYING THE AIRCRAFT you will continue to see incidents and accidents like this happen.
My 2c.
DIVOSH!
Di_Vosh I agree with what you’re saying but I’m sure the folks at VARA all of whom are located in Perth would take issue with being blamed for a VA incident.
Cheers,
Greaser.
Cheers,
Greaser.
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Dutyofcare spot on with your analysis of “the noser” as you put it for the check capt. in the jumpseat. What I hope is not true is the information now NONE of the crew, in particular the Jumpseat Check Capt., conducted a post flight after a 2.97g landing @5.5ish degrees nose up, particularly with the attributes and history of the atr (apparently found out the next day).
Some of you guys need to pull your heads in. Pretty unprofessional stuff in my opinion. Regardless of ones personal opinions of those involved, do you think they would appreciate being referred to in such ways? While no names or initials have been used, its pretty obvious to those who work or used to work at the company who you are talking about.
It ****s me that VA/VARA threads degenerate into this sort of behaviour - you rarely see it with incidents in other airlines.
Discuss the incident itself by all means.....
It ****s me that VA/VARA threads degenerate into this sort of behaviour - you rarely see it with incidents in other airlines.
Discuss the incident itself by all means.....
Hullo Chaps!
I fully agree with the Chadzat! I sincerely hope some of you are posting using a proxy server. Because if I were the company or the checkie, I'd be out to find you.
Straight home, don't spare the horses.
I fully agree with the Chadzat! I sincerely hope some of you are posting using a proxy server. Because if I were the company or the checkie, I'd be out to find you.
Straight home, don't spare the horses.
