Sydney Airport problems again
Thread Starter
Sydney Airport problems again
From the ABC news web site.
Sydney domestic departure flights delayed reportedly due to air traffic control system
Updated 5 minutes ago
Some flights out of Sydney's domestic terminal are being delayed reportedly due to a problem with air traffic control systems.
All airlines have been affected, including Qantas, Jetstar and Virgin.
Hundreds of passengers are facing delays, including families heading out of Sydney for the start of the school holidays.
Arrivals have been able to land but departures have been delayed.
More to come.
First posted 25 minutes ago
Sydney domestic departure flights delayed reportedly due to air traffic control system
Updated 5 minutes ago
Some flights out of Sydney's domestic terminal are being delayed reportedly due to a problem with air traffic control systems.
All airlines have been affected, including Qantas, Jetstar and Virgin.
Hundreds of passengers are facing delays, including families heading out of Sydney for the start of the school holidays.
Arrivals have been able to land but departures have been delayed.
More to come.
First posted 25 minutes ago
Last edited by RodH; 25th Sep 2017 at 20:57. Reason: Typo
Thread Starter
Air Services Australia said there has been a "system software failure".
Follow
Sydney Airport ✈️ ✔ @SydneyAirport
Flights are delayed due to an @AirservicesNews system issue. Please check with your airline for flight status. Thanks for your patience.
7:24 AM - Sep 25, 2017
The ABC understands the fault relates to the flight planning system. This feeds into the radar picture and without it, controllers cannot see which plane is which.
It is also believed the data connection between Sydney and Melbourne is down.
The Qantas departure board lists flights to Melbourne, Brisbane and Adelaide "delayed due ATC Radar Failure".
Follow
Sydney Airport ✈️ ✔ @SydneyAirport
Flights are delayed due to an @AirservicesNews system issue. Please check with your airline for flight status. Thanks for your patience.
7:24 AM - Sep 25, 2017
The ABC understands the fault relates to the flight planning system. This feeds into the radar picture and without it, controllers cannot see which plane is which.
It is also believed the data connection between Sydney and Melbourne is down.
The Qantas departure board lists flights to Melbourne, Brisbane and Adelaide "delayed due ATC Radar Failure".
Last edited by RodH; 24th Sep 2017 at 22:41. Reason: Unnecessary data
IF an incident like this were to be properly investigated, a number of systemic faults would be revealed.
The whole reason for using radar is that you can "move" more aircraft in a given airspace with radar than you can do without it; you can reduce the separation standards to 3 miles because you can "see" the aircraft on the screen.
BUT precisely because you are reducing the separation standards, the safety case of the use of radar must have a whole raft of safety mitigations built in so that no single failure can make aircraft less safe.
Hence SYD is served by at least two different radar sensors which normally feed a common radar display processor but can also feed directly to each separate ATC console.
Duplicated power supplies, duplicated communications paths etc etc exist to protect against failure.
Airservices is supposed to maintain a safety case that demonstrates how safety is maintained in the event of the inevitable failures of component parts of the system. CASA are supposed to audit Airservices to ensure compliance.
It follows that this "incident" demonstrates a failure of the safety system and of its oversight.
But will ATSB, under the leadership of an Ex-ATC safety manager, truly get to the bottom of this foul up?
The whole reason for using radar is that you can "move" more aircraft in a given airspace with radar than you can do without it; you can reduce the separation standards to 3 miles because you can "see" the aircraft on the screen.
BUT precisely because you are reducing the separation standards, the safety case of the use of radar must have a whole raft of safety mitigations built in so that no single failure can make aircraft less safe.
Hence SYD is served by at least two different radar sensors which normally feed a common radar display processor but can also feed directly to each separate ATC console.
Duplicated power supplies, duplicated communications paths etc etc exist to protect against failure.
Airservices is supposed to maintain a safety case that demonstrates how safety is maintained in the event of the inevitable failures of component parts of the system. CASA are supposed to audit Airservices to ensure compliance.
It follows that this "incident" demonstrates a failure of the safety system and of its oversight.
But will ATSB, under the leadership of an Ex-ATC safety manager, truly get to the bottom of this foul up?
IF an incident like this were to be properly investigated, a number of systemic faults would be revealed.
The whole reason for using radar is that you can "move" more aircraft in a given airspace with radar than you can do without it; you can reduce the separation standards to 3 miles because you can "see" the aircraft on the screen.
BUT precisely because you are reducing the separation standards, the safety case of the use of radar must have a whole raft of safety mitigations built in so that no single failure can make aircraft less safe.
Hence SYD is served by at least two different radar sensors which normally feed a common radar display processor but can also feed directly to each separate ATC console.
Duplicated power supplies, duplicated communications paths etc etc exist to protect against failure.
Airservices is supposed to maintain a safety case that demonstrates how safety is maintained in the event of the inevitable failures of component parts of the system. CASA are supposed to audit Airservices to ensure compliance.
It follows that this "incident" demonstrates a failure of the safety system and of its oversight.
But will ATSB, under the leadership of an Ex-ATC safety manager, truly get to the bottom of this foul up?
The whole reason for using radar is that you can "move" more aircraft in a given airspace with radar than you can do without it; you can reduce the separation standards to 3 miles because you can "see" the aircraft on the screen.
BUT precisely because you are reducing the separation standards, the safety case of the use of radar must have a whole raft of safety mitigations built in so that no single failure can make aircraft less safe.
Hence SYD is served by at least two different radar sensors which normally feed a common radar display processor but can also feed directly to each separate ATC console.
Duplicated power supplies, duplicated communications paths etc etc exist to protect against failure.
Airservices is supposed to maintain a safety case that demonstrates how safety is maintained in the event of the inevitable failures of component parts of the system. CASA are supposed to audit Airservices to ensure compliance.
It follows that this "incident" demonstrates a failure of the safety system and of its oversight.
But will ATSB, under the leadership of an Ex-ATC safety manager, truly get to the bottom of this foul up?
The information provided so far does not necessarily suggest a failure of surveillance feeds, but is pointing to other factors. I can't see any safety failures here, ATC has prima facie responded to a reduction in system capability and capacity by moving traffic at rates that are safe commensurate with the status of the ATC system at any given point in time.
The safety management system and its oversight is intended to ensure that no single failure (or failure 'chain' consequent on a single failure) can prejudice the safety of any aircraft.
The very fact that traffic handling is now limited is proof that whatever fault did occur, so limited traffic handling that aircraft in the airspace between the time of failure and the time at which the traffic numbers were reduced suffered a reduction in safety assurance.
The safety system and its oversight is intended to preclude that situation.
Sir, you are missing the point. It does not matter in the slightest what actually failed. What matters is that a failure has occurred such the the system is so degraded that ongoing capacity is now limited - as you point out. But at the time of failure, there could have been more aircraft in the airspace around Sydney than could safely be managed without the radar. Had the failure happened at 0820 instead of 0520 for example?
The safety management system and its oversight is intended to ensure that no single failure (or failure 'chain' consequent on a single failure) can prejudice the safety of any aircraft.
The very fact that traffic handling is now limited is proof that whatever fault did occur, so limited traffic handling that aircraft in the airspace between the time of failure and the time at which the traffic numbers were reduced suffered a reduction in safety assurance.
The safety system and its oversight is intended to preclude that situation.
The safety management system and its oversight is intended to ensure that no single failure (or failure 'chain' consequent on a single failure) can prejudice the safety of any aircraft.
The very fact that traffic handling is now limited is proof that whatever fault did occur, so limited traffic handling that aircraft in the airspace between the time of failure and the time at which the traffic numbers were reduced suffered a reduction in safety assurance.
The safety system and its oversight is intended to preclude that situation.
Reduced traffic volumes do not mean a reduction in safety. In contrast, traffic volumes would be reduced as required to assure the maintenance of safety assurance in the absence of some element of ATC's technology.
As for time of day - please bear in mind that Sydney ATC only manages the traffic in the vicinity of Sydney itself and typically only deals with traffic in the flight phase that is within 15-odd minutes from Sydney. The overlying and surrounding airspace is controlled from Melbourne and Brisbane.
Last edited by parishiltons; 25th Sep 2017 at 00:22. Reason: Additional context
RodH - your question didnt get answered in the flurry of posts - sydney has not been ASSY for more than 20 years.
Australian airports are Y airports - YSSY - Sydney, YBBN - Brissie etc..
Australian airports are Y airports - YSSY - Sydney, YBBN - Brissie etc..
Perhaps I am not explaining the situation correctly.
(Another) system failure has occurred at Airservices Australia ATC to which the ATC response has been to reduce the amount of aircraft being handled so as to restore an appropriate level of safety.
Consider the situation that would exist with the ATC system operating normally in the morning peak period. Then "this" (whatever) failure happens.
If it is then necessary to reduce the amount of traffic in the air to restore a safe operation then by definition, in the time between failure and the actual traffic reduction, taking effect, there was more traffic in the air than could be managed with the requisite level of safety.
If that statement was not true, then why reduce traffic?
(Another) system failure has occurred at Airservices Australia ATC to which the ATC response has been to reduce the amount of aircraft being handled so as to restore an appropriate level of safety.
Consider the situation that would exist with the ATC system operating normally in the morning peak period. Then "this" (whatever) failure happens.
If it is then necessary to reduce the amount of traffic in the air to restore a safe operation then by definition, in the time between failure and the actual traffic reduction, taking effect, there was more traffic in the air than could be managed with the requisite level of safety.
If that statement was not true, then why reduce traffic?
Perhaps I am not explaining the situation correctly.
(Another) system failure has occurred at Airservices Australia ATC to which the ATC response has been to reduce the amount of aircraft being handled so as to restore an appropriate level of safety.
Consider the situation that would exist with the ATC system operating normally in the morning peak period. Then "this" (whatever) failure happens.
If it is then necessary to reduce the amount of traffic in the air to restore a safe operation then by definition, in the time between failure and the actual traffic reduction, taking effect, there was more traffic in the air than could be managed with the requisite level of safety.
If that statement was not true, then why reduce traffic?
(Another) system failure has occurred at Airservices Australia ATC to which the ATC response has been to reduce the amount of aircraft being handled so as to restore an appropriate level of safety.
Consider the situation that would exist with the ATC system operating normally in the morning peak period. Then "this" (whatever) failure happens.
If it is then necessary to reduce the amount of traffic in the air to restore a safe operation then by definition, in the time between failure and the actual traffic reduction, taking effect, there was more traffic in the air than could be managed with the requisite level of safety.
If that statement was not true, then why reduce traffic?
Last edited by parishiltons; 25th Sep 2017 at 00:37. Reason: typo
ParisHiltons, perhaps I have not explained my point clearly?
The Sydney ATC system has, this morning, suffered (another) failure to which the ATC response has been to reduce the volume of traffic so as to restore a level of safety.
Now consider the situation that had the fault (whatever it was) happened at 0820 instead of 0520, with maximum aircraft in the airspace.
By definition, in the period between failure and the reduction in traffic being achieved, there would be more traffic in the air than could be safely handled with the reduced functionality available to ATC.
IF THIS STATEMENT IS NOT TRUE, WHY REDUCE TRAFFIC NUMBERS?
Airervices are meant to maintain a safety management system that precludes this happening and CASA are meant to oversee the validity of that system.
The Sydney ATC system has, this morning, suffered (another) failure to which the ATC response has been to reduce the volume of traffic so as to restore a level of safety.
Now consider the situation that had the fault (whatever it was) happened at 0820 instead of 0520, with maximum aircraft in the airspace.
By definition, in the period between failure and the reduction in traffic being achieved, there would be more traffic in the air than could be safely handled with the reduced functionality available to ATC.
IF THIS STATEMENT IS NOT TRUE, WHY REDUCE TRAFFIC NUMBERS?
Airervices are meant to maintain a safety management system that precludes this happening and CASA are meant to oversee the validity of that system.
Thread Starter
Anyway what is the reply from checklist charlie? Or was he alluding to my typo?
Join Date: Oct 2009
Location: N/A
Posts: 45
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
ParisHiltons, perhaps I have not explained my point clearly?
The Sydney ATC system has, this morning, suffered (another) failure to which the ATC response has been to reduce the volume of traffic so as to restore a level of safety.
Now consider the situation that had the fault (whatever it was) happened at 0820 instead of 0520, with maximum aircraft in the airspace.
By definition, in the period between failure and the reduction in traffic being achieved, there would be more traffic in the air than could be safely handled with the reduced functionality available to ATC.
IF THIS STATEMENT IS NOT TRUE, WHY REDUCE TRAFFIC NUMBERS?
Airervices are meant to maintain a safety management system that precludes this happening and CASA are meant to oversee the validity of that system.
The Sydney ATC system has, this morning, suffered (another) failure to which the ATC response has been to reduce the volume of traffic so as to restore a level of safety.
Now consider the situation that had the fault (whatever it was) happened at 0820 instead of 0520, with maximum aircraft in the airspace.
By definition, in the period between failure and the reduction in traffic being achieved, there would be more traffic in the air than could be safely handled with the reduced functionality available to ATC.
IF THIS STATEMENT IS NOT TRUE, WHY REDUCE TRAFFIC NUMBERS?
Airervices are meant to maintain a safety management system that precludes this happening and CASA are meant to oversee the validity of that system.
That just isn't possible to achieve without the delays you saw today. The entire point of radar and taaats is to allow more aircraft to be controlled than without... so clearly when something breaks, the capacity reduces dramatically and delays occur.