CSIRO says it knows where MH370 is

[Tankengine]

Originally Posted by Captain Nomad

Is it? Do we know that with certainty?

OK, possibly not.

The wreckage found on the beaches would indicate that as the most likely cause.
Conspiracy theories aside.

[Capt Kremin]

Originally Posted by MickG0105

There is no evidence to suggest that MH370's track on its final leg south into the Southern Indian Ocean had to have been a straight line. In fact, Dr Bobby Ulich recently published a paper Interpretation of MH370 18:25–18:41 Satellite Data that demonstrates that the curving path generated by having the final leg flown on a constant heading of 180T from near waypoint ANOKO at Best Holding speed produces an excellent fit to the BTO and BFO data. The flight path produced initially curves to the west and then to the east under the influence of the prevailing winds.

The evidence for a straight line is that the ATSB's best guess as to where the flight ended is at a position that would have required a straight line to achieve due to the fuel considerations. Any other track to that point would have needed more fuel than was aboard.

Therefore, if the wreckage is ever found near this area, we can safely rule anything but deliberate action by a person knowledgeable in the navigation systems.

Speaking of which, Dr Ulrich's paper is deficient in such system knowledge.

A B777 reaching an End of Offset or End of Route point in LNAV would have reverted to the default AFDS modes of Magnetic heading hold and SPEED mode.

Airliners dont fly enroute in TRACK mode or with TRUE reference set (polar operations excepted), yet these are the selections that would have to have been made if the AFDS was flying the aircraft, to achieve that straight line as the default magnetic heading mode would have turned the aircraft in a gentle turn towards the Australian coast due to large changes in magnetic variation as the aircraft headed south

The only other way to do it is LNAV with a waypoint entered into the FMC. Either way it must be done via someone who knows what they are doing.

Mick I have read your scenario and consider that the series of cascading and coincidental events to be far-fetched. You really lost me when your scenario had a crew, still with some semblance of control, abandoning all hope and looking for somewhere to crash. To my knowledge no crew in history has ever done this.

With regards to the SDU, have you considered that perhaps the one reason to de-power the LH AC Bus was to deny the use of SATCOM communication to the Flight attendants for the period of time required to take them out of the equation?

Panasonic IFE systems retain the ability to make such calls even if the IFE has been switched off.

[GBO]

Contrary to what the Malaysians have said, the transponder was not "turned off" in the cockpit, nor did it climb to 44,700 feet (too heavy) or descend to 5000 feet (groundspeed would be too low).
Mode S was dropped from the radar (but when was it coasted?) around the time the aircraft was turning at Igari, then 37 seconds later, the secondary radar symbol disappeared. How can you just turn off Mode S from the cockpit? Even turning the selector to ALT RPTG OFF still transmits Mode S. It is more likely that the transponder had lost air data from the LEFT AIMS cabinet in the MEC.

Interestingly when the satcom did log on again at 18:25 the flight ID was missing. The flight ID is sent to the SDU only from the LEFT AIMS.

So, if the LEFT AIMS is damaged, that's a major problem, since it interacts with over 100 LRUs, switches and sensors! It's the left electronic brain.

The Audio Management Unit must be operational to make any radio call. The AMU uses the LEFT systems ARINC 629 bus.

The aircraft satcom had unique dual side mounted Ball Aerospace high gain antennas (HGA). If the LEFT AIMS is damaged, then there is no IRS data for the Left HGA mounted on the left side of the fuselage. However the right HGA would be operational since IRS data is from the Right AIMS. Amazingly at 1825, around the time when the right hga is first exposed to the satellite, as the aircraft rolls left at Nilam (but still heading northwest), for a diversion to Banda Aceh via Nilam-Sanob, the satcom logs on again! The Crew could have been incapacitated well before this time.

Then if the aircraft continues on over Banda Aceh it hits all the BTO arcs, meets the BFO requirements and ends at the Bayesian approach hotspot in the southern Indian Ocean. However, if it is still at FL350, then there is still fuel in the tanks at 0017:30. So, either the APU was on (meaning the aircraft is south of the hotspot beyond 40 nautical miles), or the left engine was still operating (Left GCU and backup converter inop) when the APU auto started and repowered the Satcom via the Left Mains AC bus.

If they want to find MH370 they should search the full 100 nautical mile radius from the Bayesian hotspot (approx 38S88E), not just to 40 nautical miles along the seventh arc.

If they want evidence, just ask them to release the withheld information: playback of secondary radar, Vietnamese ATC transcript of call with MH88, the FOs phone connection logs with Penang and Banda Aceh, playback of the multiple Indonesian Primary radars, Malaysian 10 sec primary radar, fuel report, etc

So what damaged the LEFT AIMS Cabinet? Most likely, the adjacent Crew oxygen bottle ruptured - it was topped up immediately prior to flight!

[MickG0105]

Originally Posted by Capt Kremin

The evidence for a straight line is that the ATSB's best guess as to where the flight ended is at a position that would have required a straight line to achieve due to the fuel considerations. Any other track to that point would have needed more fuel than was aboard.

For fear of stating the blindingly obvious, the search of the area at the end of that straight line turned up bupkis. At least two curving flights path that terminate on the 7th arc to the north of the ATSB search area are both excellent fits for the BTO/BFO data and the fuel flow/exhaustion data.

Originally Posted by Capt Kremin

Speaking of which, Dr Ulrich's paper is deficient in such system knowledge.

A B777 reaching an End of Offset or End of Route point in LNAV would have reverted to the default AFDS modes of Magnetic heading hold and SPEED mode.

Subsequently corrected by Dr Ulich after his hypothesis was tested in a level D full flight sim. However, that technical error in no way impacts the fact that curving flight paths can be excellent fits for both the BTO/BFO data and the fuel flow/exhaustion data.

Originally Posted by Capt Kremin

Mick I have read your scenario and consider that the series of cascading and coincidental events to be far-fetched. You really lost me when your scenario had a crew, still with some semblance of control, abandoning all hope and looking for somewhere to crash. To my knowledge no crew in history has ever done this.

My research and hypothesis has no bearing on the fact that that curving flight paths can be excellent fits for both the BTO/BFO data and the fuel flow/exhaustion data, but since you raise it, it sounds like you may have read an early version of my work; I've made some changes to circumstances surrounding the final major turn relating to the exhaustion of the portable walk around oxygen supply.

In any event, I'm the first to admit that my hypothesis is purely speculative. In fact, I introduce it as exactly that by saying;

The following is entirely speculation on my part but it is guided to a large degree by research and precedent accidents. It provides an internally consistent narrative that offers possible and plausible explanations for all observed events; it explains the evidence but that does not mean that it is supported by the evidence.

To the extent that you think that the hypothesised sequence of events is far fetched, well, that's the way many aviation accidents have unfolded; a series of individually unlikely events coming together to bring down an airplane in an unexpected fashion.

While the chain of hypothesised events may strike you as unrealistically improbable, the hypothesised initiating event, a windshield heater fire, was most assuredly not unrealistically improbable. To the contrary, it is an indisputable fact that 9M-MRO belonged to a cohort of B777s that were statistically significantly over-represented in windshield heater related incidents. When adjusted for years of service, the rate of incidence of windshield heater fires/failures for B777s produced in 2002 was nearly 17 times higher than the incidence rate for the entire B777 fleet as at March 2014 and more than 100 times higher when compared to the remainder of the B777 fleet (ie the fleet excluding the 2002 sub-group).

Now, if I had produced some sort of psychological analysis that demonstrated that a flight crew member was more than 100 times more suicidal than the rest of his colleagues the rogue pilot theorists would have been all over that like Clive Mensink on cruise ship buffet breakfast.

Originally Posted by Capt Kremin

With regards to the SDU, have you considered that perhaps the one reason to de-power the LH AC Bus was to deny the use of SATCOM communication to the Flight attendants for the period of time required to take them out of the equation?

Panasonic IFE systems retain the ability to make such calls even if the IFE has been switched off.

The Panasonic System 3000i IFE fitted to 9M-MRO did not have cabin voice telephony capability. Moreover, there were something like 90 spare drop down masks and 15 walk around bottles of oxygen in the cabin of 9M-MRO for a total of 36 hours and 45 minutes of oxygen after the initial drop of passenger oxygen was depleted after 22 minutes. Turning the comms back on after only an hour would have been dangerously precipitous for what was ostensibly such a meticulously planned operation, wouldn't it? On Helios 552 a cabin crew member managed to stay conscious for more than two hours after everyone else succumbed to hypoxia.

[Capt Kremin]

The Panasonic System 3000i IFE fitted to 9M-MRO did not have cabin voice telephony capability.

It did have the capability but it was disabled to the passenger seats. That does not mean that the SATCOM call capability from the Cabin Managers station was disabled. Qantas use a similar system and have the ability to make a SATCOM call from the CSM's station even though the seat capability is similarly disabled, even with the IFE switched off. In all probability so did MAS.

Re: the Oxygen. All the oxygen in the world will be useless at 35,000 feet if it is not delivered at a substantial pressure.

The oxygen generators supplying the drop down masks deliver 3.8 litres per minute for 7 minutes, after which the flow rate drops to 1.8 litres per minute till exhausted. These flow rates are not enough to maintain consciousness for any length of time at 35,000 feet.

In contrast the Flight deck system is required to deliver a minimum of 20 litres per minute, delivered at 100% with an emergency pressure if required. The cabin bottles have a maximum of 4 litres/min capacity, also not delivered with sufficient pressure to keep someone cogent and functioning.

Yes the Helios crew member survived at 34,000 feet but was unable to operate the radios despite being a CPL holder. Clearly the oxygen he was receiving was enough to keep him semi-conscious but he was he was not functioning. No-one else on the flight was able to remain conscious.

For fear of stating the blindingly obvious, the search of the area at the end of that straight line turned up bupkis.

The ATSB, for some unknown reason, models the "End of Flight" scenario on no-one being alive on the flight deck. If someone was, someone with the ability to balance the fuel difference and fly the aircraft in any manner they chose after both engines flamed out, then the area required to be searched widens considerably.

They chose that area for good reasons and discounted the curved flight paths. The straight flight path can only be achieved by someone with systems knowledge and deliberate intent.

However, that technical error in no way impacts the fact that curving flight paths can be excellent fits for both the BTO/BFO data and the fuel flow/exhaustion data

. Not if it went into Speed Mode. The curved flight paths require a reduction in speed. Speed mode holds the current speed at the end of the route.

[MickG0105]

Originally Posted by Capt Kremin

That does not mean that the SATCOM call capability from the Cabin Managers station was disabled. Qantas use a similar system and have the ability to make a SATCOM call from the CSM's station even though the seat capability is similarly disabled, even with the IFE switched off. In all probability so did MAS..

Okey doke, so just to be clear, based on how a different airline configured a different model Panasonic IFE on a different airplane type, you believe that "in all probability" 9M-MRO had a hitherto undisclosed and undocumented pax cabin SATCOM air-to-ground telephony capability? Seriously?

[maggot]

Alt.facts.wow

[Capt Kremin]

Originally Posted by MickG0105

Okey doke, so just to be clear, based on how a different airline configured a different model Panasonic IFE on a different airplane type, you believe that "in all probability" 9M-MRO had a hitherto undisclosed and undocumented pax cabin SATCOM air-to-ground telephony capability? Seriously?

Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

The Factual Report has two statements regarding the two SATCOM calls made from the MAS IOC to MH370 that states, "This call would have been routed to the cockpit and....".

These are redundant statements if the calls could only go to the Flight Deck and implies the calls could have been routed elsewhere on the aircraft.. Its not proof that the capability was there, but its hardly a revolutionary capability and certainly not type specific.

I have attempted to verify if the capability was present but am yet to receive an answer

The fact also is that we dont know what was omitted from the Factual Report. The report already contains at least one glaring error when it states that the fuel burn difference between the left and right engines was 1.5T per/hour instead of per flight.

[Ushuaia]

Originally Posted by Capt Kremin

..... and implies the calls could have been routed elsewhere on the aircraft..

You are grasping, Capt. It does NOT imply anything of the sort. It is a statement explaining to the reader where a call from the ground to the aircraft gets sent to, i.e. the cockpit.

Your argument is analogous to me telling you that if you turn a yoke to the left then the aircraft will roll to the left. And you then saying, well, it could also roll right because I didn't tell you it wouldn't roll right........

Read pg 49 of the report. It clearly explains what comms were available in the cabin, namely email and SMS only, through the IFE. The voice capability was seat-to-seat only on 9M-MRO. It's there in black & white unless you want to argue the report is presenting alternative facts; or that because the report doesn't explicitly exclude voice-out-of-aircraft capability that it might have been actually available?!

I'm not 100% sure but my understanding is that the cabin-crew station has the same capability as all the cabin, i.e. the IFE capability. I concede I am not sure of that, but again: the report does NOT state the ISM/CSM station had a voice-out capability so why do you suggest it might?

Yes - there was a SMS/email out capability and if you wanted to disable that then you disable the SATCOM system. But move on to pg 54. At 1825 there was a SATCOM logon from the aircraft. Normal SATCOM operation resumed, but with no data and no flight ID. The IFE also set up a connection for SMS/email. No data was ever sent, though, and another call from ground to aircraft went unanswered.

For what purpose would someone disable the SATCOM system around 1722Z and then about an hour later re-enable it but not use it at all?

Pg 53 also states that a GES would record a SATCOM log-off initiated from the cockpit. No such log-off was recorded, suggesting power interruption instead. Presumably that could be circuit-breakers... or something else. If someone pulled the CB's, they would have presumably had to reset them for the events at 1825Z to happen?

We simply don't know what happened. All this could be from nefarious actions OR a major technical problem. But distorting known facts and suggesting other "facts" by "implying" things to support your particular bias, when you really don't know, is just wrong.

[MickG0105]

Originally Posted by Capt Kremin

Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

Sure, so get back to us when you have some actual evidence then.

Originally Posted by Capt Kremin

The report already contains at least one glaring error when it states that the fuel burn difference between the left and right engines was 1.5T per/hour instead of per flight.

Okey dokey, for starters, the FI is simply quoting from what was written in 9M-MRO's Deferred Defect Log. The authors aren't stating anything, they're quoting what the MAS Maintenance Control Centre had in their records.

Second, do you really think that the right engine would use 1.5T more fuel than the left per flight!? Under what set of circumstances do you think 1.5T/flight could possibly make sense? It's not like a coin operated kiddies ride, the "flights" are all different durations.

It clearly didn't dawn on you that the MAS MCC made a typographical error and entered a "T" when the correct character should have been a "%"; the T (shift T) and % (shift 5) keys are adjacent to one another.

[Capt Kremin]

Sure, so get back to us when you have some actual evidence then.

Mick, you are clearly defensive of your hypothesis and why not, you put a lot of work into it.

However, considering the number of sweeping assumptions without evidence you made in your analysis, its a bit rich to make that statement.

Let me make one assumption akin to the many you made.

"The perpetrator, unsure if turning the IFE off from the flight deck would definitively eliminate all means of air-to-ground communications from the Cabin Managers station; de-powered the LH AC bus until such time as the effects of depressurising the aircraft could eliminate all possibility of such communication taking place."

Surely that is possible?

Note I said ""de-powered". Your constant reference to "isolating" the AC bus is in error. Isolating an AC bus doesn't de-power it, it simply removes it from the possibility of powering or interfering with other buses. All items powered by the bus remain powered.

[MickG0105]

Originally Posted by Capt Kremin

Mick, you are clearly defensive of your hypothesis and why not, you put a lot of work into it.

This discussion has got nothing to do with my defending my research and hypothesis; your contention about an unknown, undocumented comms capability really has no bearing on my hypothesis. And at the end of the day, it's just a hypothesis for goodness sake, it's not my first born son. It'll either be right, wrong or somewhere in between; as the Zen Master said, "We'll see."

In order to explain a crucially pivotal event you've suggested that 9M-MRO had a pax cabin SATCOM air-to-ground telephony capability and there is not a scintilla of evidence to support that contention. Is it possible that you are thinking of later versions of Panasonic IFEs such as the Panasonic eX2 IFE system?

That said, IF the airplane had this hitherto undocumented capability and IF turning off the IFE didn't shut it down completely then yes, shutting down the SATCOM at the SDU would make sense. Having done that though, why would you turn it back on after only an hour? Or even turn it back on at all?

Originally Posted by Capt Kremin

Your constant reference to "isolating" the AC bus is in error. Isolating an AC bus doesn't de-power it, it simply removes it from the possibility of powering or interfering with other buses. All items powered by the bus remain powered.

Thanks, fair call. I'll look to amend that in the next version.

[Capt Kremin]

Having done that though, why would you turn it back on after only an hour? Or even turn it back on at all?

Because flying with the LH AC bus off is not something you want to do if you dont have to.

In my view de-powering the bus may have been gold-plating the denial of comms scenario. Not to put to fine a point on it, an hour, maybe 80 minutes of depressurisation should have ensured it was no longer required to be un-powered.

As with you, the scenario is pure speculation on my part but this scenario is probably the simplest to explain technically. As to motive... I really can't explain it on the information available.

[MickG0105]

Originally Posted by Capt Kremin

I have attempted to verify if the capability was present but am yet to receive an answer

Mon Capitaine, I wasn't able to turn up much beyond some promotional material on the Panasonic IFE but someone smarter than me found Boeing Service Bulletin 777-24-0075 (Original Issue: August 21, 2003) ELECTRICAL POWER - General - Install the Passenger Compartment Electrical Power Isolation Switches (Complete). The reason for the SB is as follows;

The change described in this service bulletin will provide new switches on the flight deck than can remove power from the cabin systems if smoke or flames occur. Smoke and flames in the passenger cabin can cause injury to the passenger and damage the safety critical cabin equipments.

We have received numerous reports of smoke or flames in the passenger cabin related to the wiring for the passenger cabin in-flight entertainment system, cabin lighting and passenger seats. It is not easy to remove the electrical power to these systems to stop the smoke or flames. Two switches can be installed to remove power from some of the passenger cabin electrical systems.

When selected OFF, the IFE/PASS SEATS switch will remove power from all the components of the IFE (in-flight entertainment) system and the passenger seats (seat motor power, personal computer power outlets and telephones).
...

Among the IFE components that are to be depowered when the IFE/PASS SEATS switch is selected OFF are the Cabin Telecommunication Unit, the M1/M2 Galley Handsets and all the telephones, both seat and wall mounted.

Bearing in mind the timing, a couple of years after the final report on Swissair Flight 111 was handed down, you get the sense that this SB is meant to ensure, inter alia, that the IFE/PASS SEATS switch removes power from all IFE components including the phones. To that end the test procedure includes the following:

f. Do this test of the IFE/PASS SEATS switch.
(1) On the P5 panel, select the IFE/PASS SEATS switch to OFF.
(2) Make sure that all the IFE equipment in the purser work station or video control center
no longer has electrical power. Some components may have battery backup units. For
these components it may take several minutes before the electrical power is removed.
...
(7) For airplanes with wall mounted telephones, make sure that the telephone does not
operate. ...

I wouldn't necessarily call this slam-dunk definitive but it certainly strongly suggests that the IFE/PASS SEATS switch takes down all passenger cabin telecommunications.

[Capt Kremin]

it certainly strongly suggests that the IFE/PASS SEATS switch takes down all passenger cabin telecommunications.

I agree, however the aircraft I fly has the same switch and it doesn't cut off the Cabin SATCOM link.

The FI references the CPMU; the Cabin Passenger Management Unit, which provides an interface between the Panasonic IFE and the SDU, for any Data-3 SMS/e-mail messages.

It would be very interesting to find out more about the CPMU to ascertain if it is de-powered by the IFE switch.

I can see good reasons why it would not be, particularly if it also controls cabin lighting, cabin comms and PA functions. Unfortunately I cannot source a reference for what it does.

If it still works after the IFE is de-powered, and you can send SMS/Emails via the SATCOM with it, then that would be a reason to de-power the LH AC Bus.

[.Scott]

Malaysia has posted their analysis of MH370 debris - including structural notes on how the aircraft pieces were separated from the aircraft.

http://www.mh370.gov.my/phocadownloa...n%20300417.pdf

None of the debris had been crushed or punctured during separation. A vertical tail piece suffered damage consistent with an overload of dynamic air pressure. A wing piece was pulled and twisted off. All other pieces were separated by being simply pulled from the aircraft.

The report itself provides analysis of each piece of debris, but provides no summary conclusions.

There is one piece, a plastic frame to a back-of-seat video screen which non-Malaysian analyst claim is more consistent with being torn from the seat by water flow than by the force of air flow.

Overall, it is 100% consistent with the aircraft breaking up in uncontrolled flight. I particularly noted bending damage to a vertical tail section.

Easy to imagine continued rapid acceleration downward with small sections of the craft tearing free from the heavier ones. And easy to imaging that this could be a problem for discovering the debris on the ocean floor. The most identifiable pieces, the engines and other heavy equipment, could have been stripped of lighter materials, thus impacted at very high terminal velocity.
This could have streamlined them for their watery descent and to partially bury themselves in silt on the ocean floor.

Of course, this is very consistent with the best satellite-based estimate of what happened in the final moments. That is, a very high rate of descent towards the ocean.

[BuzzBox]

Capt Kremin:

I agree, however the aircraft I fly has the same switch and it doesn't cut off the Cabin SATCOM link.

What type of aircraft is that; B777, or something else?

That does not mean that the SATCOM call capability from the Cabin Managers station was disabled. Qantas use a similar system and have the ability to make a SATCOM call from the CSM's station even though the seat capability is similarly disabled, even with the IFE switched off.

Again, which aircraft type?

It would be very interesting to find out more about the CPMU to ascertain if it is de-powered by the IFE switch.

I can see good reasons why it would not be, particularly if it also controls cabin lighting, cabin comms and PA functions.

The CPMU is part of the Cabin Passenger Management System (CPMS) that is used to manage cabin-related data such as audio/video program libraries, passenger lists, destination information, cabin crew flight reports, connecting flight information, flight arrival information, 'Airshow' information, etc. The CPMU is the main controller that transmits data to other CPMS components and also acts as an interface to other aircraft systems. Based on the description of the CPMU in the FI, it provides an interface between the IFE system and the SDU for SMS and e-mail messages.

The CPMU does not control functions such as cabin lighting, cabin interphone, PA, etc, which are all controlled by the Cabin Services System.

The Boeing Service Bulletin that MickG referred to in an earlier post required the engineers to check that power was available to the CPMU with the IFE/PASS SEAT switch selected ON. There was no associated check with the switch selected OFF, but it seems that the switch position might affect the supply of power to the CPMU.

[Capt Kremin]

Again, which aircraft type?

The SATCOM remains available in the cabin with the IFE switched off, on all Panasonic IFE systems fitted to the three QF longhaul types.

It's obviously a safety feature.

Therefore there may be good reason to believe the same thing happens on Panasonic systems on the B777

[BuzzBox]

Therefore there may be good reason to believe the same thing happens on Panasonic systems on the B777

Nope. We operate a large fleet of B777s with the Panasonic IFE. ALL telephone handsets in the cabin are disabled by the IFE/PASS SEATS switch.

[Capt Kremin]

Originally Posted by BuzzBox

Nope. We operate a large fleet of B777s with the Panasonic IFE. ALL telephone handsets in the cabin are disabled by the IFE/PASS SEATS switch.

So that's includes the Cabin managers station?