15 injured in ‘serious’ stall alert incident on Qantas flight
There was an ek 380 in the betty hold the other day
But as others have alluded to it doesn't need to be a super, sometimes you just get nailed. If that's even what happened
But as others have alluded to it doesn't need to be a super, sometimes you just get nailed. If that's even what happened
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not quite right
"Say nothing lessons" What???
So, Alan Joyce fronting media and being broadcast all over the world within an hour of the QF32 incident (once the aircraft had landed safety) and grounding the entire A380 fleet was 'saying nothing'. Further, after the whole thing had been dealt with Qantas allowed crew to speak openly about the incident to Four Corners, as did Joyce and senior engineering people.
Again, how is that 'say nothing'.
I believe the Qantas reaction to QF32 was lauded as an excellent example of how a company should respond and the Rolls-Royce reaction was used as an example of the complete opposite.
On top of that, the media glossed over the fact that another prominent and supposedly 'untouchable' carrier based in Asia had their A380s back in the air within days in circumstances that couldn't possibly have provided enough time for the proper inspections to be done but as they are a media darling and don't have a kangaroo on the tail, this was completely ignored by the media at the time.
So, Alan Joyce fronting media and being broadcast all over the world within an hour of the QF32 incident (once the aircraft had landed safety) and grounding the entire A380 fleet was 'saying nothing'. Further, after the whole thing had been dealt with Qantas allowed crew to speak openly about the incident to Four Corners, as did Joyce and senior engineering people.
Again, how is that 'say nothing'.
I believe the Qantas reaction to QF32 was lauded as an excellent example of how a company should respond and the Rolls-Royce reaction was used as an example of the complete opposite.
On top of that, the media glossed over the fact that another prominent and supposedly 'untouchable' carrier based in Asia had their A380s back in the air within days in circumstances that couldn't possibly have provided enough time for the proper inspections to be done but as they are a media darling and don't have a kangaroo on the tail, this was completely ignored by the media at the time.
Joyce was MIA for a considerable period (it was more than hour BTW) with the exec focus being one eye on the IOC the other on the ASX - I can tell you authoritatively that the initial media requests were met with an absolute fob off. (that's one of the reasons why so many journos write crap because airlines don't get proactive)
As for your reference to the open access given to 4 corners etc... two well connected experienced journos had the RR link and evidence absolutely nailed on the day as they were already working on the RR story with a lot of evidence from local and OS insiders. Prior to Joyce appearing they were asked (begged) to 'hold it' on the promise of an absolute exclusive and that no one else would get given this 'access' - they honoured the request in good faith and didn't slam Joyce with it at the presser; but they were later ripped off when they objected to the Q requested, highly massaged production approach that 4 corners and 9 eventually agreed to. (In fact one of them was lied to about crew not being avail for a pre-arranged interview....said journo then saw a camo from another network at Syd Dom on his way to shoot them beside the 380 parked in the hangar)
Regarding last Friday's incident - it was denied with the standard "we are not aware of any incident" last weekend. The CC debrief and follow up in HKG was (I'm told) far from best practice - the CC were not even told the truth and I hear that their union was kept in the dark and had to extract info.
The current anecdotal reporting, pax quotes coupled with the brush off 'it was just unexpected severe turbulence line' only has escalated the scare factor in this story eroding public faith.
Baseline: in a crisis an organisation has 3 minutes at best to set the agenda present the facts or if the facts are unknown, take control. Like with 32, it didn't happen.
Had QF acted last Friday with a proactive factual statement immediately after receiving the info in the IOC, they could have opened up the issue and closed it back down - the net outcome would have been appropriate recognition of the operating crew rather than the mish mash of out of context tech facts.
Such prompt action also eliminates the speculation and (less than responsible often uninformed) 'suspicions' that are now being circulated in some areas.
I do however agree with you 100% that RR in the 32 incident acted arrogantly and was wilfully misleading and deceptive.
I'll will wait for the investigation report - as we all should!
AT
Just to clarify QF32 was far an ideal example of proactive crisis communications - it is used by several comms professionals to demonstrate what not to do. As a reminder: QF initially denied the event - in fact there's a grab from Sky where Olivia is denying outright saying words similar to: "there is no evidence whatsoever to suggest the aircraft is a Qantas plane" vision cuts to twitter pic of villager holding up panel with logo - then to grab of ATC comms recorded by planespotter and posted to soc media.
Joyce was MIA for a considerable period (it was more than hour BTW) with the exec focus being one eye on the IOC the other on the ASX - I can tell you authoritatively that the initial media requests were met with an absolute fob off. (that's one of the reasons why so many journos write crap because airlines don't get proactive)
As for your reference to the open access given to 4 corners etc... two well connected experienced journos had the RR link and evidence absolutely nailed on the day as they were already working on the RR story with a lot of evidence from local and OS insiders. Prior to Joyce appearing they were asked (begged) to 'hold it' on the promise of an absolute exclusive and that no one else would get given this 'access' - they honoured the request in good faith and didn't slam Joyce with it at the presser; but they were later ripped off when they objected to the Q requested, highly massaged production approach that 4 corners and 9 eventually agreed to. (In fact one of them was lied to about crew not being avail for a pre-arranged interview....said journo then saw a camo from another network at Syd Dom on his way to shoot them beside the 380 parked in the hangar)
Regarding last Friday's incident - it was denied with the standard "we are not aware of any incident" last weekend. The CC debrief and follow up in HKG was (I'm told) far from best practice - the CC were not even told the truth and I hear that their union was kept in the dark and had to extract info.
The current anecdotal reporting, pax quotes coupled with the brush off 'it was just unexpected severe turbulence line' only has escalated the scare factor in this story eroding public faith.
Baseline: in a crisis an organisation has 3 minutes at best to set the agenda present the facts or if the facts are unknown, take control. Like with 32, it didn't happen.
Had QF acted last Friday with a proactive factual statement immediately after receiving the info in the IOC, they could have opened up the issue and closed it back down - the net outcome would have been appropriate recognition of the operating crew rather than the mish mash of out of context tech facts.
Such prompt action also eliminates the speculation and (less than responsible often uninformed) 'suspicions' that are now being circulated in some areas.
I do however agree with you 100% that RR in the 32 incident acted arrogantly and was wilfully misleading and deceptive.
I'll will wait for the investigation report - as we all should!
AT
Joyce was MIA for a considerable period (it was more than hour BTW) with the exec focus being one eye on the IOC the other on the ASX - I can tell you authoritatively that the initial media requests were met with an absolute fob off. (that's one of the reasons why so many journos write crap because airlines don't get proactive)
As for your reference to the open access given to 4 corners etc... two well connected experienced journos had the RR link and evidence absolutely nailed on the day as they were already working on the RR story with a lot of evidence from local and OS insiders. Prior to Joyce appearing they were asked (begged) to 'hold it' on the promise of an absolute exclusive and that no one else would get given this 'access' - they honoured the request in good faith and didn't slam Joyce with it at the presser; but they were later ripped off when they objected to the Q requested, highly massaged production approach that 4 corners and 9 eventually agreed to. (In fact one of them was lied to about crew not being avail for a pre-arranged interview....said journo then saw a camo from another network at Syd Dom on his way to shoot them beside the 380 parked in the hangar)
Regarding last Friday's incident - it was denied with the standard "we are not aware of any incident" last weekend. The CC debrief and follow up in HKG was (I'm told) far from best practice - the CC were not even told the truth and I hear that their union was kept in the dark and had to extract info.
The current anecdotal reporting, pax quotes coupled with the brush off 'it was just unexpected severe turbulence line' only has escalated the scare factor in this story eroding public faith.
Baseline: in a crisis an organisation has 3 minutes at best to set the agenda present the facts or if the facts are unknown, take control. Like with 32, it didn't happen.
Had QF acted last Friday with a proactive factual statement immediately after receiving the info in the IOC, they could have opened up the issue and closed it back down - the net outcome would have been appropriate recognition of the operating crew rather than the mish mash of out of context tech facts.
Such prompt action also eliminates the speculation and (less than responsible often uninformed) 'suspicions' that are now being circulated in some areas.
I do however agree with you 100% that RR in the 32 incident acted arrogantly and was wilfully misleading and deceptive.
I'll will wait for the investigation report - as we all should!
AT
I can't comment on the 4 corners info you've provided because I am not privy to that information. I have heard numerous corporate image consultants however, report that in their view the final analysis was that Qantas came out of this looking fairly professional whereas RR had a lot of work to do to restore their credibility. All companies will attempt at times to ensure a message is crafted in a way that is perceived in the right light and is not misconstrued and this can sometimes appear as evasive. I don't see here the type of action carried out by other operators in the past such as raiding a Pilot's house (allegedly) and seizing documents material to an investigation or practically perverting the course of justice to protect an image ("an orchestrated litany of lies...").
Finally, absolutely... we should always wait for the final report and last word would be there were probably several ways it could have been handled better but certainly the actions of the crew played very positively for Qantas.
Last edited by AerialPerspective; 14th Apr 2017 at 07:40. Reason: sp
Not uncommon during busy times.
Not sure if relevant but a friend was on the flight (in J Class) and they told me they were on their way back from the loo and the aircraft seemed to pitch nose up but not so that they lost their footing and flew off the floor but when it came down it was quite severe and this person said their legs felt like they were crumpling under them - also said it was not like described by other pax and the other thing was it was very, very smoggy outside similar to when there are lots of bushfires in Sydney or Melbourne and the friend was not sure if that was a factor in what might seem like severe turbulence. Alarm went off yes but was not fire related, no emergency of any kind in terms of landing and the aircraft did hold disembarkation at the gate for a while until one pax was taken in ambulance and others were attended to and released.
they told me they were on their way back from the loo and the aircraft seemed to pitch nose up but not so that they lost their footing and flew off the floor but when it came down it was quite severe and this person said their legs felt like they were crumpling under them
If you pitch up, you crumple to the floor as a walking pax.
When you pitch down, you float off the floor.
Has your friend got it right - did you read your own post?
Last edited by josephfeatherweight; 15th Apr 2017 at 11:26.
Fair comment, I just checked their message and you're right, my bad. Of course I know that is the wrong way around, just in a hurry and was heading out the door so I didn't re-read before I posted.
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This seems to be what we know:
1. The aircraft encountered severe turbulence approaching the hold at a low speed, and a low speed is normal approaching a hold.
2. A stick shaker activated.
3. Autoflight was disconnected.
4. Some passengers were injured.
What we don't know is what caused the severe turbulence - was it wake turbulence or was it pilot induced due to the stick shaker, in which case what caused the stick shaker?
Now, all professional jet pilots will know:
1. Intermittent stick shaker is not unusual when encountering severe turbulence (particularly when back at holding speed), whether it be caused by wake or other. As has been mentioned above, stick shaker is largely controlled by AoA vanes, which could easily be disrupted in a wake turbulence encounter. It doesn't mean the aircraft is about to stall out of the sky. On the other hand, a stick shaker caused by high level windshear which could also be accompanied by turbulence, may mean the aircraft is about to stall out of the sky.
2. The normal response to severe turbulence in a Boeing is to disconnect autoflight and maintain appropriate attitude and thrust (which would include increasing to turbulence penetration speed).
3. The normal response to a stick shaker in a Boeing is to disconnect autoflight and apply forward elevator.
Of course, 2 and 3 are mutually exclusive, so a pilot chooses to either employ 2 or 3. Or, in the event of both, they would employ 3 and then 2, once 3 is complete.
My money is on severe turbulence caused by wake, which also gave them a stick shaker, and they applied 3 then 2. Which would be completely approriate. Passengers may have been injured prior to, or during that process. Either is possible. I've encountered high level wake turbulence before, it's not fun and it's hard to predict (short of grossly increasing separation minimums).
1. The aircraft encountered severe turbulence approaching the hold at a low speed, and a low speed is normal approaching a hold.
2. A stick shaker activated.
3. Autoflight was disconnected.
4. Some passengers were injured.
What we don't know is what caused the severe turbulence - was it wake turbulence or was it pilot induced due to the stick shaker, in which case what caused the stick shaker?
Now, all professional jet pilots will know:
1. Intermittent stick shaker is not unusual when encountering severe turbulence (particularly when back at holding speed), whether it be caused by wake or other. As has been mentioned above, stick shaker is largely controlled by AoA vanes, which could easily be disrupted in a wake turbulence encounter. It doesn't mean the aircraft is about to stall out of the sky. On the other hand, a stick shaker caused by high level windshear which could also be accompanied by turbulence, may mean the aircraft is about to stall out of the sky.
2. The normal response to severe turbulence in a Boeing is to disconnect autoflight and maintain appropriate attitude and thrust (which would include increasing to turbulence penetration speed).
3. The normal response to a stick shaker in a Boeing is to disconnect autoflight and apply forward elevator.
Of course, 2 and 3 are mutually exclusive, so a pilot chooses to either employ 2 or 3. Or, in the event of both, they would employ 3 and then 2, once 3 is complete.
My money is on severe turbulence caused by wake, which also gave them a stick shaker, and they applied 3 then 2. Which would be completely approriate. Passengers may have been injured prior to, or during that process. Either is possible. I've encountered high level wake turbulence before, it's not fun and it's hard to predict (short of grossly increasing separation minimums).
Last edited by Derfred; 15th Apr 2017 at 17:33.
In reality, a severe turbulence encounter may result in an inappropriate attitude which would validate disengaging the autopilot. You then set an attitude as per Derfred's explanation. (Which is also what the book says... right?... or is it just the first sentence in the manuals which is important?)
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Maybe a very simple"Cancel hold continue right turn heading 240".....grabbed the speed knob instead of heading..Wouldn't be the first airline that had done that.
We will just have to wait and see.
We will just have to wait and see.
This is what was actually stated:
When did it turn into an encounter with severe turbulence? Lets rewrite Derfred's statement of fact with the real facts and take a different point of view.
1. The stick shaker activated and theaircraft encountered airframe buffeting while in the hold at FL220.
2. A .
3. Autoflight was disconnected.
4. Some passengers were injured.
While holding at flight level 220, the flight crew received a stick shaker activation and detected airframe buffeting.
1. The stick shaker activated and theaircraft encountered airframe buffeting while in the hold at FL220.
2. A .
3. Autoflight was disconnected.
4. Some passengers were injured.
This is what was actually stated:
When did it turn into an encounter with severe turbulence? Lets rewrite Derfred's statement of fact with the real facts and take a different point of view.
1. The stick shaker activated and the aircraft encountered airframe buffeting while in the hold at FL220.
2. The autopilott was disconnected and the flight crew maneuvered the aircraft in response.
3. Passengers were injured.
Now for the conjecture. The hold speed for a 747 is approx. 230-240kts at a rough guess. That's not slow! If you were coming into land at that speed it would be frighteningly fast. The stick shaker activates approx.10kts before the stall which would be possibly around the 120-130kt range. What was the A/T doing during this time? I would hazard a guess that it was not armed but the crew thought it was, not unusual in a Boeing if recent history is anything to go by. It would not take long for a 747 in level flight to have its speed decrease to the point of stick shaker activation. Something was distracting the crew so the speed was not being monitored. Why the speed wasn't being monitored and why the A/T didn't maintain the holding speed will come out in due course.
While holding at flight level 220, the flight crew received a stick shaker activation and detected airframe buffeting.
1. The stick shaker activated and the aircraft encountered airframe buffeting while in the hold at FL220.
2. The autopilott was disconnected and the flight crew maneuvered the aircraft in response.
3. Passengers were injured.
Now for the conjecture. The hold speed for a 747 is approx. 230-240kts at a rough guess. That's not slow! If you were coming into land at that speed it would be frighteningly fast. The stick shaker activates approx.10kts before the stall which would be possibly around the 120-130kt range. What was the A/T doing during this time? I would hazard a guess that it was not armed but the crew thought it was, not unusual in a Boeing if recent history is anything to go by. It would not take long for a 747 in level flight to have its speed decrease to the point of stick shaker activation. Something was distracting the crew so the speed was not being monitored. Why the speed wasn't being monitored and why the A/T didn't maintain the holding speed will come out in due course.
120 to 130 kt range?
It's been a while since I flew the Queen but I can easily tell you that clean at FL220 at their weight the Vs would have been a lot higher than that, up around 180 to 190 KIAS. And that's wings level......in a 25 deg AOB a fair bit higher.
It's been a while since I flew the Queen but I can easily tell you that clean at FL220 at their weight the Vs would have been a lot higher than that, up around 180 to 190 KIAS. And that's wings level......in a 25 deg AOB a fair bit higher.
Look left, you may be surprised to hear that holding at fl220 is not in the approach config.
It is close to min drag speed clean( holding at min fuel flow is prudent)
At this speed a/c is vulnerable to stickshaker through turb from whatever source. Crew response will be dictated by their perception of the reason for this. For that information ask the crew.
It is close to min drag speed clean( holding at min fuel flow is prudent)
At this speed a/c is vulnerable to stickshaker through turb from whatever source. Crew response will be dictated by their perception of the reason for this. For that information ask the crew.
VS mode would make no difference. In level flight thrust controls speed in both VS and other level flight autopilot modes.