QZ8501: Telling it how it is
Good question waren. I reckon it's heavily influenced by organisational culture. A good culture and it's early on. A poor culture and it may be too late!
You would want to have a really strong argument and know exactly what you are on about.
QantasLink had that memorable incident where the engineers refused the sign out aircraft because they could prove that the door locks were faulty. Yet the airline and the regulator disagreed.
Chimbu,
I agree with the reset culture as you say. Most of our ginger beers are pretty good hands, we have all seen the guys who are perhaps a bit too quick to call it a one off reset without any reference to the history.
Warren 9, I agree with the idea of not accepting the aircraft if it's obvious that there has been no troubleshooting going on for repetitive faults but many cases are not as black and white as the Air Asia and there is a legitimate issue of not going too far in to second guessing the often very detailed and highly informed job of the engineers.
I would suggest that the vast majority of our engineers do a stand up job. Perhaps one issue could be resolved by providing more information to us on how many resets are permissible for one, and I would certainly advocate a thorough going over the tech log history pre flight but certainly after any particular ECAM pops up as all good operators will.
I agree with the reset culture as you say. Most of our ginger beers are pretty good hands, we have all seen the guys who are perhaps a bit too quick to call it a one off reset without any reference to the history.
Warren 9, I agree with the idea of not accepting the aircraft if it's obvious that there has been no troubleshooting going on for repetitive faults but many cases are not as black and white as the Air Asia and there is a legitimate issue of not going too far in to second guessing the often very detailed and highly informed job of the engineers.
I would suggest that the vast majority of our engineers do a stand up job. Perhaps one issue could be resolved by providing more information to us on how many resets are permissible for one, and I would certainly advocate a thorough going over the tech log history pre flight but certainly after any particular ECAM pops up as all good operators will.
The reset culture isn't really a culture, the Airbus troubleshooting manual actually directs the engineer to perform a single reset per flight leg. If the fault reoccurs in the same leg more action is required. With that in mind and the tendency for Airbuses self report faults that dont exist, for example through power transfers, it may seem like the engineers are just making the message go away.. It's not quite true.
The thing about Airbuses though is it will travel many sectors after a reset before another reoccurrence happens of a previously reset fault but as latent fault in the computer itself will manifest itself as more frequently occurring faults as exactly was the case in this crash. A competent MOC will monitor a trending fault with tools provided by Airbus themselves and competent engineers won't keep penning off a fault which occurs each flight or with a regular occurrence, that's what the DDG is for.
The airline won't want to wear an unnecessary delay and they definitely don't want engineers replacing computers that would go to a repair shop and subsequently returned as no fault found. Trend reporting is important but only if it's acted upon, which in this case it's plainly obvious it wasn't.
The thing about Airbuses though is it will travel many sectors after a reset before another reoccurrence happens of a previously reset fault but as latent fault in the computer itself will manifest itself as more frequently occurring faults as exactly was the case in this crash. A competent MOC will monitor a trending fault with tools provided by Airbus themselves and competent engineers won't keep penning off a fault which occurs each flight or with a regular occurrence, that's what the DDG is for.
The airline won't want to wear an unnecessary delay and they definitely don't want engineers replacing computers that would go to a repair shop and subsequently returned as no fault found. Trend reporting is important but only if it's acted upon, which in this case it's plainly obvious it wasn't.
Fathom, you are obviously not employed in the current jet airline world...
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"The effectiveness of fly-by-wire architecture and the existence of control laws eliminate the need for upset recovery manoeuvres to be trained on protected Airbus aircraft,"
'Stall Stall Stall'
nose down pitch .... apply
Seems straight forward, but recent events prove otherwise!
Why is this so difficult?
nose down pitch .... apply
Seems straight forward, but recent events prove otherwise!
Why is this so difficult?
Regarding the "Stall Stall Stall" when forward airspeed is less than 60kts this warning is inhibited. Imagine dropping like a brick, forward speed less than 60kts, attempting a stall recovery and then activating "Stall Stall Stall" as you begin to recover.
Confused?? I would say most would be.
I am not saying this occurred in this instance, however the situation that crew can find themselves in can be very challenging.
As always it is not the actions of the pilots alone that lead to such tragedies.
Bottums Up
I think you would have a hard time in any airline avoiding disciplinary action if you refused to take an aircraft that was signed out as legal to fly.
I recall an incident many years ago under Mr Smith's Class E from FL245 to A045 (or similar) where an F/O left an aeroplane because "expediency" approved flight with a u/s TCAS, rather than fix it. That captain's position on the day was, "it can be MELd so I can't say no." This thought process overrode the Ops Manual that required repair in a location that repairs could be made, and the warning preamble.
The F/O in my opinion made the correct decision and whist asked to explain their actions there was no disciplinary action.
An impartial observer may have said that the original approval to operate was designed solely to avoid a delay.
In Australia, CASA issues a foreign air operators certificate to all foreign airlines flying to and from the country, ensuring the airline's safety standards meet the minimum safety standards established by the International Civil Aviation Organisation as does the regulatory system of the carrier's home nation.
Certificates have the effect of ensuring compliance with standards? Of what are they made? Unicorn poop?
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My major gripe with this mob is the volume of low hour, and very young pilots they pump out. They basically crew every delivery off cadets. Most reputable carriers have solid check and training standards that back these programs up (think Easy/Ryan). These guys do not.
This mob has at least a dozen "Senior First Officer's" on its A330 fleet younger than 25. Can't say I'd be too crash hot going from a 172 to an A330.
Now everyone can fly..
This mob has at least a dozen "Senior First Officer's" on its A330 fleet younger than 25. Can't say I'd be too crash hot going from a 172 to an A330.
Now everyone can fly..
Last edited by wheels_down; 13th Dec 2015 at 05:38.
Thread Starter
They were advertising for captains for the A330 recently.
"Minimum Age 26"
Quite simple I said, just hire one of your 26yr old A320 Captains..
"Minimum Age 26"
Quite simple I said, just hire one of your 26yr old A320 Captains..
has at least a dozen "Senior First Officer's" on its A330 fleet younger than 25. Can't say I'd be too crash hot going from a 172 to an A330.
British Airways hands 21-year-old dream job as a pilot | Daily Mail Online
Age doesn't matter, its the basic training that counts.
British Airways put many new entrants in their early 20s from their training Academy into the RH seat of B737/A320/B757 with 200 + hours. After 50 sectors under supervision released to line, initially for some months with experienced Capt.
Many are now retiring as Capts after after many years of safe accident free operation.
I have a friend in the RAF, she was a Capt. on the TriStar Tanker/transport, in her late 20s, with 2000 hours total. Flew into many 'In Theatre' airfields in various recent war zones safely and competently.
Its the quality of the person and training that counts.
British Airways put many new entrants in their early 20s from their training Academy into the RH seat of B737/A320/B757 with 200 + hours. After 50 sectors under supervision released to line, initially for some months with experienced Capt.
Many are now retiring as Capts after after many years of safe accident free operation.
I have a friend in the RAF, she was a Capt. on the TriStar Tanker/transport, in her late 20s, with 2000 hours total. Flew into many 'In Theatre' airfields in various recent war zones safely and competently.
Its the quality of the person and training that counts.
Last edited by cessnapete; 13th Dec 2015 at 16:35.
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One simple solution regarding system resets:
Make a log entry for every defect.
Too often Engineers are called to the aircraft with a defect just prior to departure. A simple reset rectifies the defect and no Maintenance Log entry is made.
Every Maintenance Log entry has to be rectified / cleared IAW approved data.
No log entry means no record.
Make a log entry for every defect.
Too often Engineers are called to the aircraft with a defect just prior to departure. A simple reset rectifies the defect and no Maintenance Log entry is made.
Every Maintenance Log entry has to be rectified / cleared IAW approved data.
No log entry means no record.
Yes. I have seen some disturbing incidents of this myself.
I was given an airbus for dispatch, on which the previous sector the recirc fan has overtemped and stopped, triggering the overhead fault light on. The previous crew had started the smoke/fume checklist before the recirc fan managed to stop itself. Fumes were evident in the cabin, as per the cabin log.
The engineers solution was to simply reset the recirc fan, as per the fault/pushbutton.
At no point did they express any intention to inspect, or replace, the fan. They simply reset an overtemped recirc, and signed it off as [test satis].
Needless to say, we were not happy with this, and the engineers grumbled and carried on when we told them to track down a spare from another carrier. Took 2 hours, but who cares.
I was given an airbus for dispatch, on which the previous sector the recirc fan has overtemped and stopped, triggering the overhead fault light on. The previous crew had started the smoke/fume checklist before the recirc fan managed to stop itself. Fumes were evident in the cabin, as per the cabin log.
The engineers solution was to simply reset the recirc fan, as per the fault/pushbutton.
At no point did they express any intention to inspect, or replace, the fan. They simply reset an overtemped recirc, and signed it off as [test satis].
Needless to say, we were not happy with this, and the engineers grumbled and carried on when we told them to track down a spare from another carrier. Took 2 hours, but who cares.
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A few (maybe 7 ) years ago I got to an aerobridge about 730 am . Smoke was coming out of the plane onto the aerobridge . The CSS insisted I come onboard and start safety checks etc . I didn't . WTF. The tech crew arrived shortly after and got everyone (crew only - bar me ) off . Sometimes get there itis is very dangerous. There had been multiple write ups about the "issue" in the tech log I think .
