Jetstar Sydney Stuff up
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Jetstar Sydney Stuff up
27 months later the report is released.
Investigation: AO-2013-103 - Airspeed management occurrence involving Airbus A320, VH-JQG, Sydney Airport, NSW on 25 June 2013
Investigation: AO-2013-103 - Airspeed management occurrence involving Airbus A320, VH-JQG, Sydney Airport, NSW on 25 June 2013
It seems that there was a bit of verbal biffo in the cockpit of a Jetstar A320 approaching Sydney Airport more than two years ago between a ‘tough’ training captain and a rookie first officer.
In June 2013 the training captain conducted a partly unapproved exercise in instrument land system approaches with an inexperienced first officer during the final stages of a scheduled flight into Sydney in an A320 and things went unacceptably wrong.
The approach speed of the 177 or 180 seat jet fell to unsafe levels while the captain and the newbie first officer “discussed the requirements of the [Jetstar] handbook” until despite the captain’s last minute intervention an audible low speed, low energy warning SPEED, SPEED, SPEED sounded in the cockpit.
Outside it was apparent that the approach following the path that goes directly across the domestic terminals had become ‘unstable’. The captain performed a last minute high energy go-around, and the flight from Ballina was then landed safely after being put in a position no airliner should find itself in while dropping toward a runway at Australia’s busiest airport.
A referee pilot suggests that ‘discussion’ in the ATSB report was a euphemism for what was really going on in the cockpit between the tough school training captain who disagreed with the Jetstar company rules for this sort of exercise, and a first officer with only 125 hours experience in the single aisle Airbus.
But we’ll never know. The ATSB is good at code words, and quite rightly, in that the jet wasn’t actually destroyed, not likely to entertain us with excerpts from the cockpit voice recorder. There are some very guarded references to attitude of the training captain to Jetstar’s rules in the longer version on the report linked to on the ATSB web site.
Now that 27 months have passed since the incident the safety lapdog has published a final report that is nevertheless well worth careful if caffeinated study.
There are so many things the report steers us away from even in the full version, including (on advice) some important safety matters involving experienced captains and inexperienced first officers.
Such as, the safety implications of training captains that not only don’t follow company rules, but insisted on inputting false altitude values for the Sydney approach exercise that so exercised the first officer that they engaged in such an intense discussion that they lost track of where the ground was, and how dangerously slowly they were moving toward it.
Guys, if you are going to have an argument discussion in the cockpit, don’t do it while on final approach to Sydney!
Keep in mind, airlines must conduct some real life hands on flying training with their pilots. But the rules that a company sets for such training with real live passengers onboard must also be respected.
As the often and much criticized ATSB says on this occasion:
This occurrence demonstrates the risks associated with conducting training exercises during periods of high workload. Training pilots need to be cognisant of trainee experience and capability and ensure that the training exercise never compromises the primary task of monitoring/flying the aircraft.
http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalk...aching-sydney/
In June 2013 the training captain conducted a partly unapproved exercise in instrument land system approaches with an inexperienced first officer during the final stages of a scheduled flight into Sydney in an A320 and things went unacceptably wrong.
The approach speed of the 177 or 180 seat jet fell to unsafe levels while the captain and the newbie first officer “discussed the requirements of the [Jetstar] handbook” until despite the captain’s last minute intervention an audible low speed, low energy warning SPEED, SPEED, SPEED sounded in the cockpit.
Outside it was apparent that the approach following the path that goes directly across the domestic terminals had become ‘unstable’. The captain performed a last minute high energy go-around, and the flight from Ballina was then landed safely after being put in a position no airliner should find itself in while dropping toward a runway at Australia’s busiest airport.
A referee pilot suggests that ‘discussion’ in the ATSB report was a euphemism for what was really going on in the cockpit between the tough school training captain who disagreed with the Jetstar company rules for this sort of exercise, and a first officer with only 125 hours experience in the single aisle Airbus.
But we’ll never know. The ATSB is good at code words, and quite rightly, in that the jet wasn’t actually destroyed, not likely to entertain us with excerpts from the cockpit voice recorder. There are some very guarded references to attitude of the training captain to Jetstar’s rules in the longer version on the report linked to on the ATSB web site.
Now that 27 months have passed since the incident the safety lapdog has published a final report that is nevertheless well worth careful if caffeinated study.
There are so many things the report steers us away from even in the full version, including (on advice) some important safety matters involving experienced captains and inexperienced first officers.
Such as, the safety implications of training captains that not only don’t follow company rules, but insisted on inputting false altitude values for the Sydney approach exercise that so exercised the first officer that they engaged in such an intense discussion that they lost track of where the ground was, and how dangerously slowly they were moving toward it.
Guys, if you are going to have an argument discussion in the cockpit, don’t do it while on final approach to Sydney!
Keep in mind, airlines must conduct some real life hands on flying training with their pilots. But the rules that a company sets for such training with real live passengers onboard must also be respected.
As the often and much criticized ATSB says on this occasion:
This occurrence demonstrates the risks associated with conducting training exercises during periods of high workload. Training pilots need to be cognisant of trainee experience and capability and ensure that the training exercise never compromises the primary task of monitoring/flying the aircraft.
http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalk...aching-sydney/
Is it only me or is Ben Sandiland's writing tedious to read? So many clauses stuffed into each sentence, it's a chore to try and make sense of his blog posts sometimes.
This is bullsh*t training, final approach is not the place to be doing this, they could have used any cruise segment to discuss these sorts of scenarios. Unfortunately OZ aviation seems to be full of these astronaut style training and check Captains who are hell bent on sweating the small stuff.
I had to tell one a few line checks ago that he was going to have to be quiet as I was trying to brief the approach and he kept interrupting me with questions like 'what oil pressure do you get an advisory warning?' and 'what would be the normal tire pressure for the nose wheel??'. He gave me a piss poor report after I told him that it was pointless asking me asking obscure limitations like that as I am not the type of person who can memorise and regurgitate ALL limits in this detail, he thought I was trying to be cheeky but I was actually being honest, I can recall major limitations and limits to not kill yourself but can not remember stuff like tire pressures.
If I had been this trainee my response would have been, 'well at 1,500' on the approach with a downgrade failure in less than CAT 1 conditions I would go around fuel permitting?' I can't possibly accurately read and interpret a table in the QRH and make a decision by 1,000' while also configuring and completing the landing checklist!;
I had to tell one a few line checks ago that he was going to have to be quiet as I was trying to brief the approach and he kept interrupting me with questions like 'what oil pressure do you get an advisory warning?' and 'what would be the normal tire pressure for the nose wheel??'. He gave me a piss poor report after I told him that it was pointless asking me asking obscure limitations like that as I am not the type of person who can memorise and regurgitate ALL limits in this detail, he thought I was trying to be cheeky but I was actually being honest, I can recall major limitations and limits to not kill yourself but can not remember stuff like tire pressures.
If I had been this trainee my response would have been, 'well at 1,500' on the approach with a downgrade failure in less than CAT 1 conditions I would go around fuel permitting?' I can't possibly accurately read and interpret a table in the QRH and make a decision by 1,000' while also configuring and completing the landing checklist!;
This sort of thing is not unusual either.
Why is it that I needed a qualification to teach someone to fly a tomahawk, but to train a cadet with 200 odd hours to fly hundreds of paying passengers around, all I need is a tick in the box from my "training department"?
Training 101, train by the book and debrief at an appropriate time.
Why is it that I needed a qualification to teach someone to fly a tomahawk, but to train a cadet with 200 odd hours to fly hundreds of paying passengers around, all I need is a tick in the box from my "training department"?
Training 101, train by the book and debrief at an appropriate time.
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This so called training captain should be removed from training immediately for the following reasons.
Lack of teaching ability.
Lack of empathy.
Lack of understanding of his student's ability and training needs.
This Captain should have his contract of employment terminated immediately for the following reasons.
Failure to operate the aircraft according to company SOP's.
Failure to operate the aircraft safely.
Failure to manage his crew in a safe and professional manner.
Managers who failed to carry out their responsibilities in this case should be found unacceptable to CASA and replaced by the company.
The trainee that defended his position knowing that the situation was unacceptable should be commended even though an unsafe situation was the result.
Taking on a captain in a dynamic threat environment takes lots of experience and very complex management process.
Go public! Those closer to the issue need to get this training captain as far away from aviation as is possible !
Lack of teaching ability.
Lack of empathy.
Lack of understanding of his student's ability and training needs.
This Captain should have his contract of employment terminated immediately for the following reasons.
Failure to operate the aircraft according to company SOP's.
Failure to operate the aircraft safely.
Failure to manage his crew in a safe and professional manner.
Managers who failed to carry out their responsibilities in this case should be found unacceptable to CASA and replaced by the company.
The trainee that defended his position knowing that the situation was unacceptable should be commended even though an unsafe situation was the result.
Taking on a captain in a dynamic threat environment takes lots of experience and very complex management process.
Go public! Those closer to the issue need to get this training captain as far away from aviation as is possible !
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Unfortunately OZ aviation seems to be full of these astronaut style training and check Captains who are hell bent on sweating the small stuff.
Reading between the lines, I'd be very surprised to find out if this character was any different, and knowing some of the senior Jet * training community I'm sure they would would be at the least, rather embarrassed and bemused.
The trainee that defended his position knowing that the situation was unacceptable should be commended even though an unsafe situation was the result.
Taking on a captain in a dynamic threat environment takes lots of experience and very complex management process.
Taking on a captain in a dynamic threat environment takes lots of experience and very complex management process.
By the way, I'm not defending the captain here - scenarios like that should be discussed during a quiet time in the cruise or in the simulator.
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Unfortunately OZ aviation seems to be full of these astronaut style training and check Captains who are hell bent on sweating the small stuff.
PG
And the new Part 61 is going to "fix" this? And the complaisant ATSB is going to report what really happened? And CASA is going to require the Qantas Group to change its practices?
Not till there is a major crash with hundreds of lives lost.
Not till there is a major crash with hundreds of lives lost.
Unfortunate
A national badge of dishonour unfortunately...something we're known for the world over.
In years gone by* there were many for whom the word training was unknown, but these days I find most of our trainers are there to impart knowledge and offer alternatives where necessary.
The training system has evolved into just that; especially in the sim where the environment is far more conducive to training and learning.
Yes, we still have a few "trainers" with some work to do on their skill set and manner but generally the trainers have embraced this with the same enthusiasm as the trainees.
(* admittedly from a sample of one airline!)
many were ex AN,
It wasn't of an astronaut standard, it was highly efficient and practical, as were domestic jet operations of the time prior to QF International coming onto the scene as well as with the advent of more rigid airspace procedures.
Flying the Airbus conventionally ( we'd joke 727 like ) and building up toward the full armor of automatic systems was a superb counter to mode confusion and general handling was well above what I have seen since. Snippets suggest Airbus has started to look toward a style of training similar which AN stumbled upon accidentally as the technology was a mystery 20 years ago.
There are good and bad trainers that have evolved out of the AN system just like anywhere else. There are two sides to every story and having seen the low cost Aussie product abroad it can be embarrassing.
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Why is it that I needed a qualification to teach someone to fly a tomahawk, but to train a cadet with 200 odd hours to fly hundreds of paying passengers around, all I need is a tick in the box from my "training department"?
Nunc est bibendum
I don't know about other airlines but I suspect there is a bit more to it than a 'tick in the box' from the respective airlines to become a trainer. 
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you read a text message on approach in singapore and go around: lose your job.
but if you're training, get it slow and alpha floor it: the boss writes a memo.
got it
i hope its a lesson to this astronaut thats he's human too. 1 job at a time.
but if you're training, get it slow and alpha floor it: the boss writes a memo.
got it
i hope its a lesson to this astronaut thats he's human too. 1 job at a time.
you read a text message on approach in singapore and go around: lose your job.but if you're training, get it slow and alpha floor it: the boss writes a memo.
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youre right but i'm still a bit confused.
dereliction of duty is ok if its handled right and maybe used to wear a blue shirt?
f me. one young new capt got soc'd and retrained for checking on smoke out of a galley oven. possible distraction from a terrorist was the reason.
dereliction of duty is ok if its handled right and maybe used to wear a blue shirt?
f me. one young new capt got soc'd and retrained for checking on smoke out of a galley oven. possible distraction from a terrorist was the reason.
