Virgin ATR grounded in Albury
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Double standards.
Seems obvious to me who the ATSB are trying to pin the blame for this on, both engineers still suspended from duty, but both pilots back flying again, unbeleivable! They had to be told to go back to the A/C and put an entry in the tech log, even after a 3g load, a pitch disconnect and a broken leg. And as for the turbulance report, BS if you ask me. An over reaction to correcting a possible overspeed more like. There is more than one failure going on here, but appears the crew flying it are not one of them.
LOL!
On the bureau tabloid article: Flight control event involving an ATR72, VH-FVR, 47 km WSW Sydney Airport, NSW on 20 February 2014
"K" in regard to your comments – Fluff and nonsense - on the latest ATsB press release being worthy of a tabloid journalist; one of the IOS (an editor of such..
) has suggested some minor amendments :
The editor also suggests providing a more punchy headline starting with something like..."Seconds from disaster..etc" or "Plummeting to Earth uncontrollably..etc"...
Will fwd the final suggested edit prior to the next print (Final Report) deadline...
"K" in regard to your comments – Fluff and nonsense - on the latest ATsB press release being worthy of a tabloid journalist; one of the IOS (an editor of such..
) has suggested some minor amendments :
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau, an equal opportunity employer, has revealed that at 1640 and about 8,500 ft, the crew noticed the airspeed going up quickly and the speed trend excessively high. Beads of sweat poured off the first officer as she clawed at the throttles to reduce engine power and use touch control steering to temporarily disconnect the shattered autopilot before straining desperately to lift the leaden nose and prevent the doomed plane and its terrified passengers plummeting to disaster.
The aircraft felt ‘heavy’, requiring the first officer’s two hands on the controls to move from the then -4° pitch angle (aircraft nose-up/down). The first officer gambled that the pitch correction would be sufficient to prevent the mortally damaged plane from smashing through the dreaded sound barrier.
The aircraft felt ‘heavy’, requiring the first officer’s two hands on the controls to move from the then -4° pitch angle (aircraft nose-up/down). The first officer gambled that the pitch correction would be sufficient to prevent the mortally damaged plane from smashing through the dreaded sound barrier.
Will fwd the final suggested edit prior to the next print (Final Report) deadline...
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it is possibly alleged...
the reaction to the atsb report from the lawyer boss is interesting.
paraphrasing "now guys the report is coming out, we all need to stand shoulder to shoulder on this, don't impugn the company reputation. remember it was some body else's fault"
apart from fits of laughter my thoughts are, lady you own the aircraft, you schedule the aircraft, you employ the staff. it isn't someone else fault.
bad luck happens as they say, but duckie YOU need to sort out the company so that it doesn't happen again.
....of course I'm easily ignored. I don't work for you and I don't fly with you.
the reaction to the atsb report from the lawyer boss is interesting.
paraphrasing "now guys the report is coming out, we all need to stand shoulder to shoulder on this, don't impugn the company reputation. remember it was some body else's fault"
apart from fits of laughter my thoughts are, lady you own the aircraft, you schedule the aircraft, you employ the staff. it isn't someone else fault.
bad luck happens as they say, but duckie YOU need to sort out the company so that it doesn't happen again.
....of course I'm easily ignored. I don't work for you and I don't fly with you.
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The inspection that would have had to be carried out would due to the aircraft being in class A come from the maintenance controller. They would have had to issue the correct paper work. One can not say if the damage was there or not when the initial inspection was carried out. But it seams like a lot of cover up has taken place.
Cheers
Cheers
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but duckie YOU need to sort out the company so that it doesn't happen again.
But it seams like a lot of cover up has taken place.
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no hoper a manager who creates a culture of "it wasn't me it was someone else" is incompetent.
the buck stops here as they say.
I'll say it again. Lady you are the big kazoola. it is YOUR job as big kazoola to ensure that the company gets its act together and this never happens again.
yr right there was no cover up. the maintenance people followed the ATR maintenance and repair schedule. trouble is that ATR expect descents to be about 180 knots in turbulence and not Vmo of 230 knots. ATR did not expect that the damage to the rudder would occur so the maint schedule doesn't fully inspect to the level that was needed.
VARA have been caught and ATR have been caught. in the regulated environment of atpl flying something occurred that none expected.
they'd better sort out the cause of the problem hadn't they.
a severed tail gets the attention of people who cannot be ignored. ...and a lot of teary irate families as well.
(I'll just add that the chief pilot of alligator airways had the same someone else's fault attitude it seems. or he was dopey. alligator was shut down.)
the buck stops here as they say.
I'll say it again. Lady you are the big kazoola. it is YOUR job as big kazoola to ensure that the company gets its act together and this never happens again.
yr right there was no cover up. the maintenance people followed the ATR maintenance and repair schedule. trouble is that ATR expect descents to be about 180 knots in turbulence and not Vmo of 230 knots. ATR did not expect that the damage to the rudder would occur so the maint schedule doesn't fully inspect to the level that was needed.
VARA have been caught and ATR have been caught. in the regulated environment of atpl flying something occurred that none expected.
they'd better sort out the cause of the problem hadn't they.
a severed tail gets the attention of people who cannot be ignored. ...and a lot of teary irate families as well.
(I'll just add that the chief pilot of alligator airways had the same someone else's fault attitude it seems. or he was dopey. alligator was shut down.)
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a manager who creates a culture of "it wasn't me it was someone else" is incompetent. the buck stops here as they say.
What affect did the culture have on the maintenance performed?
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Untitled - irrelevant
Big smile – thanks Sarcs (I think) – just goes to show how easily the 'prose' in the - press release - can be readily adapted. As this is a significant incident, was some BRB interest in deconstructing the entire thing to try distilling some sense, or useful information. But, to be Frank, it's not worth the effort. We tried, but finished up rolling about the floor, laughing. Some of the more inane comments in the ATSB 'press release' were just too risible and proved irresistible. We gave up in the end and spent the evening with Mickey Bliss, damning Beaker and mourning the loss of the real ATSB.
The Canucks must have finished their 'audit', no way that 'report' could be released while they were here and on the job. We have sent a TSBC (BRB) colleague a copy though, just for more laughs.
Anyway, to contribute anything sensible to this thread, based on the press release would be a waste of time and effort. Best we can all do is ask the minister for our ATSB back, or give the job to AMSA; or, better yet get shut of it altogether and save the dollars.
The Canucks must have finished their 'audit', no way that 'report' could be released while they were here and on the job. We have sent a TSBC (BRB) colleague a copy though, just for more laughs.
Anyway, to contribute anything sensible to this thread, based on the press release would be a waste of time and effort. Best we can all do is ask the minister for our ATSB back, or give the job to AMSA; or, better yet get shut of it altogether and save the dollars.
Last edited by Kharon; 11th Jun 2014 at 20:12. Reason: Maple syrup - on porridge; disgusting.
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From the report:
Consider the height of wing and then height of tailplane upper surfaces
he engineer borrowed a nearby stand to provide a platform at about wing height.While on the stand positioned behind the left wing near the fuselage, the engineer inspected the upper surface of the wing, rear fuselage and tail by torchlight.
Last edited by No Hoper; 11th Jun 2014 at 21:11. Reason: clarity
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Whilst the cause of damage to the empennage was pilot "error", the reason for the aircraft flying with the damage was a maintenance error.
I fully agree.Who is doing the maintenance?Metro,737,ATR ???
I fully agree.Who is doing the maintenance?Metro,737,ATR ???
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am i reading this correctly,
so, each yoke/stick or whatever they use on the ATR can independantly control both sides of the elevator? 1 stick forward, and one aft, means one elevator moving up and the other side down? i have only ever seen such control movements in millitary aircraft, with the computer doing the work...
something doesnt make sence..
The ATSB says its initial examination showed that “differential force on the control column that resulted from the captain and first officer applying an opposing force exceeded the differential force required to generate a pitch disconnect”.
“Each pilot was then controlling the elevator on their side of the aircraft in opposite directions for a brief period before the first officer released his control column.” The ATSB investigation is ongoing.
“Each pilot was then controlling the elevator on their side of the aircraft in opposite directions for a brief period before the first officer released his control column.” The ATSB investigation is ongoing.
something doesnt make sence..
so, each yoke/stick or whatever they use on the ATR can independantly (sic) control both sides of the elevator? 1 stick forward, and one aft, means one elevator moving up and the other side down? i have only ever seen such control movements in millitary (sic)aircraft, with the computer doing the work...
something doesnt make sence (sic)..
something doesnt make sence (sic)..
Many, if not all, transport aircraft can separate control surfaces with sufficient force, as a design feature to deal with jammed controls/surfaces. Some (Dash 8 IIRC) can be reconnected in flight, some can't (Brasilia IIRC). It takes considerable force, so it doesn't (shouldn't) happen inadvertently.
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On a slightly broader topic.
After more than ten years teaching punters how to fly, including aerobatics, I learned that snatching at the yoke to prevent an over speed condition was a bad idea. Even if the PF was someone I didn't fully trust (student, FO, whoever.)
My current employer asks us to descend at Vmo-10. Occasionally, we get close to over speed. Anecdotally, the control column gets pulled if it looks really close.
I think an over speed buzzer, with paperwork, is preferable to snatching at the yoke at Vmo.
Thoughts?
After more than ten years teaching punters how to fly, including aerobatics, I learned that snatching at the yoke to prevent an over speed condition was a bad idea. Even if the PF was someone I didn't fully trust (student, FO, whoever.)
My current employer asks us to descend at Vmo-10. Occasionally, we get close to over speed. Anecdotally, the control column gets pulled if it looks really close.
I think an over speed buzzer, with paperwork, is preferable to snatching at the yoke at Vmo.
Thoughts?
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What he would have been looking for on the upper surfaces is wrinkling. This even at night via a touch would have been clearly evident if the surface was over stretched. Shame ful that the engineer cops it and yet the pilots didn't write it straight up.
Welcome to we will look after you engineering. When you turn around your all on your own. And you wonder why engineers are leaving the industry and not being replaced.
Cheers
Welcome to we will look after you engineering. When you turn around your all on your own. And you wonder why engineers are leaving the industry and not being replaced.
Cheers
I think an over speed buzzer, with paperwork, is preferable to snatching at the yoke at Vmo.
Agree though, if a good "lean into it" doesn't hold the speed, let it happen.
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How could this happen in Australia
They reckon it takes five mistake to have an accident.......this must have been close.
Imagine if Barrier Aviation had done this same thing.CASA would have shut them down...........hang on CASA did shut them down for a lot less!
Imagine if Barrier Aviation had done this same thing.CASA would have shut them down...........hang on CASA did shut them down for a lot less!
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Border Mail in Albury comes into story
This was published this morning:
Regional aviation - ATR report by ATSB released | Assistance to the Aviation Industry
Regional aviation - ATR report by ATSB released | Assistance to the Aviation Industry
Remember this?
NTSB summary of over controlling in American Airlines A300 accident:
Aircraft Accident Report
In-Flight Separation of Vertical Stabilizer
American Airlines Flight 587
Airbus Industrie A300-605R, N14053
Belle Harbor, New York
November 12, 2001
NTSB Number AAR-04/04
NTIS Number PB2004-910404
PDF
Executive Summary: On November 12, 2001, about 0916:15 eastern standard time, American Airlines flight 587, an Airbus Industrie A300-605R, N14053, crashed into a residential area of Belle Harbor, New York, shortly after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York. Flight 587 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Las Americas International Airport, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, with 2 flight crewmembers, 7 flight attendants, and 251 passengers aboard the airplane. The airplane’s vertical stabilizer and rudder separated in flight and were found in Jamaica Bay, about 1 mile north of the main wreckage site. The airplane’s engines subsequently separated in flight and were found several blocks north and east of the main wreckage site. All 260 people aboard the airplane and 5 people on the ground were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. Flight 587 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the in-flight separation of the vertical stabilizer as a result of the loads beyond ultimate design that were created by the first officer’s unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs. Contributing to these rudder pedal inputs were characteristics of the Airbus A300-600 rudder system design and elements of the American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program.
The safety issues discussed in this report focus on characteristics of the A300-600 rudder control system design, A300-600 rudder pedal inputs at high airspeeds, aircraft-pilot coupling, flight operations at or below an airplane’s design maneuvering speed, and upset recovery training programs. Safety recommendations concerning these issues are addressed to the Federal Aviation Administration and the Direction Général de l’Aviation Civile.
In-Flight Separation of Vertical Stabilizer
American Airlines Flight 587
Airbus Industrie A300-605R, N14053
Belle Harbor, New York
November 12, 2001
NTSB Number AAR-04/04
NTIS Number PB2004-910404
Executive Summary: On November 12, 2001, about 0916:15 eastern standard time, American Airlines flight 587, an Airbus Industrie A300-605R, N14053, crashed into a residential area of Belle Harbor, New York, shortly after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York. Flight 587 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Las Americas International Airport, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, with 2 flight crewmembers, 7 flight attendants, and 251 passengers aboard the airplane. The airplane’s vertical stabilizer and rudder separated in flight and were found in Jamaica Bay, about 1 mile north of the main wreckage site. The airplane’s engines subsequently separated in flight and were found several blocks north and east of the main wreckage site. All 260 people aboard the airplane and 5 people on the ground were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. Flight 587 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the in-flight separation of the vertical stabilizer as a result of the loads beyond ultimate design that were created by the first officer’s unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs. Contributing to these rudder pedal inputs were characteristics of the Airbus A300-600 rudder system design and elements of the American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program.
The safety issues discussed in this report focus on characteristics of the A300-600 rudder control system design, A300-600 rudder pedal inputs at high airspeeds, aircraft-pilot coupling, flight operations at or below an airplane’s design maneuvering speed, and upset recovery training programs. Safety recommendations concerning these issues are addressed to the Federal Aviation Administration and the Direction Général de l’Aviation Civile.
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UK newspaper has picked up the story. (Poorly written!) but this story is getting noticed.
First look at cracks on tail of Virgin plane which flew 13 times | Mail Online
First look at cracks on tail of Virgin plane which flew 13 times | Mail Online