Truss: Aviation Safety Regulation Review
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Oh well,
boy I'm glad I'm at the end of my career, I feel so sad for those young people just starting out its going to be harder and harder to find meaningful employment in Australia.
On a brighter note, as aviation winds down in Australia it should wind up in NZ. We've already pretty much handed them flying training, maintenance will follow as our workshops here close down. NZ is a beautiful country, and the "Rule of the regulator" has not infected the place to the incredible extent it has in Australia.
My goodness my grandkids could end up as boat people desperately trying to escape Australia in leaky Australian fishing boats, looking for a better life.
boy I'm glad I'm at the end of my career, I feel so sad for those young people just starting out its going to be harder and harder to find meaningful employment in Australia.
On a brighter note, as aviation winds down in Australia it should wind up in NZ. We've already pretty much handed them flying training, maintenance will follow as our workshops here close down. NZ is a beautiful country, and the "Rule of the regulator" has not infected the place to the incredible extent it has in Australia.
My goodness my grandkids could end up as boat people desperately trying to escape Australia in leaky Australian fishing boats, looking for a better life.
upfronter
I see in the press that the Trussed review is overseen by .."leading international aviation experts" Wow great moniker, guys.
SO,,it will be VERY interesting to read the REPORT...then we can sit back and be showered by weasel words, BS and spin !!
SO,,it will be VERY interesting to read the REPORT...then we can sit back and be showered by weasel words, BS and spin !!
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Smooth End Of The Pineapple - WLR the sequel!!
An upcoming event not to be missed; “The Smooth End Of The Pineapple”!
Could this be the sequel to the WLR?
The Smooth End of the Pineapple | 2014 Anywhere Theatre Festival
The bit I like is this; “In which the sets and costumes are only limited by the audiences imagination”.
Yes, imaginations, fairytale endings, costumes and audible nonsense seems to best describe the WLR and everything else that emanates form Truss’s mouth. The only difference is that they deserve the rough end of the pineapple, inserted sideways, much to the delight of the tendentious IOS! The Beaker and his hierarchy as well as McSkull and friends have indeed made a mockery out of Australian aviation. Their oversight best be described as ‘the Toto effect’ - where they click their heels and pretend that everything is ok and wish themselves away to a luxury office in Can’tberra where all the ‘real people’ don’t exist. These and ‘other’ long serving bureaucrats like the Kingcrat have exceeded their use by date. Unless the entire system is tipped on its head and shaken vigorously until all the bits of ingrown dross are removed nothing will change.
Martin Luther King had a dream, and so do I. Wanna know what it is? That one day our aviation sector will be fortified by an actual underpinning safety framework which actually has the pillars of Government, CAsA, ATSB and AsA supporting it. Naturally the strongest pillar is us - the frontline aviators who actually support and form a workable, safe, compliant system.
Could this be the sequel to the WLR?
The Smooth End of the Pineapple | 2014 Anywhere Theatre Festival
The bit I like is this; “In which the sets and costumes are only limited by the audiences imagination”.
Yes, imaginations, fairytale endings, costumes and audible nonsense seems to best describe the WLR and everything else that emanates form Truss’s mouth. The only difference is that they deserve the rough end of the pineapple, inserted sideways, much to the delight of the tendentious IOS! The Beaker and his hierarchy as well as McSkull and friends have indeed made a mockery out of Australian aviation. Their oversight best be described as ‘the Toto effect’ - where they click their heels and pretend that everything is ok and wish themselves away to a luxury office in Can’tberra where all the ‘real people’ don’t exist. These and ‘other’ long serving bureaucrats like the Kingcrat have exceeded their use by date. Unless the entire system is tipped on its head and shaken vigorously until all the bits of ingrown dross are removed nothing will change.
Martin Luther King had a dream, and so do I. Wanna know what it is? That one day our aviation sector will be fortified by an actual underpinning safety framework which actually has the pillars of Government, CAsA, ATSB and AsA supporting it. Naturally the strongest pillar is us - the frontline aviators who actually support and form a workable, safe, compliant system.
AMROBA response to Truss WLResponse to AAI report.
The following copied (hopefully accurately) version of AMROBA Newsletter Volume 11 Issue 4 (0314) is worth taking the ten minutes to read. IMO it is reflective, without being dramatic, of industry concerns (besides Truss response to Recommendation 1 covered in Senate thread) in regards to the Govt response to the PelAir report..
The Fear of Retribution
The recently released Senate report into the ATSB/CASA Pel-Air accident near Norfolk Island has clearly stated that CASA did not meet its obligations to ATSB and, more concerning, has created a fear of retribution with many participants in industry who no longer have confidence/trust in CASA.
This report does not paint Australia’s safety system in a good light. Safety requires all sectors to actively work together to maintain safety, let alone improve safety standards, and this can only be done if all involved are confident that by being honest there will be no retribution.
What this Senate Inquiry has identified that the trust in CASA to be a fair regulator has deteriorated to such a level that, to bring the truth to the notice of this inquiry, many did so “in-camera” so that their identities were protected. Why?
To prevent retribution by CASA. CASA’s next CEO has a challenge to resurrect a “Just Culture”.
The situation is so bad that the Inquiry Executive Summary stated:
“Witnesses—whether public or in camera—should suffer no adverse consequences from providing evidence to the committee. Given the numerous concerns expressed, the committee will be monitoring this situation carefully.”
The following are relevant extracts from the Report’s Executive Summary.
“The committee also focuses on the appropriateness and effectiveness of the interaction between the ATSB and CASA. The committee notes that a systemic approach to the investigation was initially pursued, but that systemic issues were scoped out of the investigation early in the process. This led the committee to ask whether CASA exerted undue influence on the ATSB process. What is clear is that CASA's failure to provide the ATSB with critical documents, including the Chambers Report and CASA’s Special Audit of Pel-Air, which both demonstrated CASA’s failure to properly oversee the Pel-Air operations, contravened the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in place between the two agencies and may have breached the terms of the Transport Safety Investigations Act 2003 (Chapter 7). The committee takes a dim view of CASA's actions in this regard.
It also emerged in the course of the inquiry that the previous system of mandatory and confidential incident reporting to the ATSB has been altered. Pilots have expressed concern that CASA now appears to have access to identifying information, which may inhibit pilots reporting incidents and will therefore undermine the important principle of just culture within the aviation industry (Chapter 10).
Finally, the committee notes that many submitters and witnesses provided evidence in camera due to fear of retribution, particularly from CASA, were they to go public with their concerns. Many who chose to give in camera evidence did so in the knowledge of protections provided by parliamentary privilege. The committee also notes that this reticence to speak in public has been apparent for each inquiry this committee has conducted in this area over several years, and finds this deeply worrying. Given the positive statements made about the inquiry by CASA Director of Aviation Safety, Mr John McCormick, the committee trusts that concerns about retribution are unwarranted. There is an obligation on CASA to allay these concerns that retribution could follow speaking out, which appear to be widespread within the aviation industry.
The committee stresses that it takes the protection of witnesses under parliamentary privilege very seriously.
Witnesses—whether public or in camera—should suffer no adverse consequences from providing evidence to the committee. Given the numerous concerns expressed, the committee will be monitoring this situation carefully.
The committee also focuses on the appropriateness and effectiveness of the interaction between the ATSB and CASA. The committee notes that a systemic approach to the investigation was initially pursued, but that systemic issues were scoped out of the investigation early in the process. This led the committee to ask whether CASA exerted undue influence on the ATSB process. What is clear is that CASA's failure to provide the ATSB with critical documents, including the Chambers Report and CASA’s Special Audit of Pel-Air, which both demonstrated CASA’s failure to properly oversee the Pel-Air operations, contravened the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in place between the two agencies and may have breached the terms of the Transport Safety Investigations Act 2003 (Chapter 7). The committee takes a dim view of CASA's actions in this regard.”
‘Communication between CASA and the ATSB’
Some of the reasons why the gulf between CASA and many in industry is described in the Senate Report where they dissect the relationship between ATSB and CASA. It basically states that CASA selectively provided information to ATSB. During the Senate’s investigation they uncovered an internal CASA report on CASA/Pel-Air relationship and this report (Chamber’s Report) was damning on CASA and their oversight of Pel-Air.
It clearly identified CASA and Pel-Air organisational issues.
7.11 Given evidence on the lack of analysis of systemic issues in the ATSB investigation report, as outlined in previous chapters, the committee questions the plausibility of the statement above. On the weight of evidence reviewed, the committee questions CASA's motivation in withholding the Chambers Report from the ATSB.
7.12 This leads the committee to conclude that CASA may have breached section 24 of the TSI Act by withholding the document. To ensure that any appropriate action is taken, the committee will write to the Australian Federal Police, providing a copy of this report and supporting evidence for review.
7.13 Irrespective of how highly either agency head is inclined to speak on the public record when describing the ATSB/CASA relationship, this inquiry exposed not only a predilection by CASA to withhold information when it suited them, but also a willingness to engage the ATSB both formally and informally in ways that have not always been transparent. In both regards, CASA's actions have influenced the conduct of the ATSB investigation to the detriment of aviation safety. Based on the documentation available to the committee, it appears that the two agencies have placed maintaining the veneer of a productive working relationship ahead of public safety.
7.14 The committee is of the view that CASA has adopted a rather self-serving interpretation of the MoU, which allows the agency to laud the spirit of the document whilst simultaneously failing to adhere to its contents when convenient. Whilst aware that the MoU between the ATSB and CASA is not a legally binding document, it nonetheless has an intended aim, and therefore fails to serve its purpose if not adhered to. The committee concludes that CASA's decision to withhold important documents from the ATSB has, as outlined in Chapter 6, had a severe impact on the ATSB's investigative process.”
The worrying concern is that it demonstrates that CASA selectively uses data. This has been an issue from many industry participants in their not to friendly dealings with CASA. It also demonstrates that this government agency, who has no security responsibilities, is very guarded in what they hold and their lack of transparency.
CASA has not cultivated or maintained harmonious relationships with all of the aviation industry, especially in implementing a “just culture” for the aviation industry. Until CASA accepts that every participant shares a responsibility for safety and information can be shared both ways without the fear of retribution, a safe and “just culture” will not exist. CASA does not oversee every flight. Aviation organisations, pilots, engineers, air traffic controllers and aircraft owners are each responsible for meeting the statutory safety and security standards. The Regulations should set the minimum standards for entering, and operating within, the system. It is in the best interests of all aviation participants to perform to a standard above the minimum.
CASA’s next CEO has a massive challenge to address generations of fear of retribution.
Morris Report May 1995
3.12 There are two ways to amend the object clause.
The first is as follows:
3A. The main object of this Act is to establish a regulatory framework for maintaining, enhancing and promoting the safety of civil aviation in an effective and economical way,, with particular emphasis on preventing aviation accidents and incidents whilst recognising the need for more people to benefit from civil aviation,
3.14 The second option provides for greater detail in the object clause and is as follows:
3A. The main object of this Act is to establish a regulatory framework for maintaining, enhancing and promoting the safety of civil aviation, with particular emphasis on preventing accidents and incidents whilst recognising the need for more people to benefit from civil aviation by means that include the following:
(a) the development and maintenance of effective safety regulations;
(b) the encouragement of greater responsibility for aviation safety by industry;
(c) the promotion of effective consultation, effective decision-making and the efficient and effective use of resources; and
(d) the promotion of Australia's civil aviation safety capabilities.
Report Questions CASA Compliance
Breach of the Transport Safety Investigation Act?
7.9 The committee remains very concerned by CASA's actions in this regard, and has cause to ask whether the agency is in fact also in breach of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (TSI Act). Section 24 of the Act clearly states that it is an offence to hinder an investigation:
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if:
(a) the person engages in conduct; and
(b) the person is reckless as to whether the conduct will adversely affect an investigation:
(i) that is being conducted at that time; or
(ii) that could be conducted at a later time into an immediately reportable matter; and
(c) the conduct has the result of adversely affecting such an investigation (whether or not the investigation had commenced at the time of the conduct); and
(d) the conduct is not authorised by the Chief Commissioner.
7.11 Given evidence on the lack of analysis of systemic issues in the ATSB investigation report, as outlined in previous chapters, the committee questions the plausibility of the statement above. On the weight of evidence reviewed, the committee questions CASA's motivation in withholding the Chambers Report from the ATSB.
7.12 This leads the committee to conclude that CASA may have breached section 24 of the TSI Act by withholding the document. To ensure that any appropriate action is taken, the committee will write to the Australian Federal Police, providing a copy of this report and supporting evidence for review.
[Senate] Committee view
7.13 Irrespective of how highly either agency head is inclined to speak on the public record when describing the ATSB/CASA relationship, this inquiry exposed not only a predilection by CASA to withhold information when it suited them, but also a willingness to engage the ATSB both formally and informally in ways that have not always been transparent. In both regards, CASA's actions have influenced the conduct of the ATSB investigation to the detriment of aviation safety. Based on the documentation available to the committee, it appears that the two agencies have placed maintaining the veneer of a productive working relationship ahead of public safety.
7.14 The committee is of the view that CASA has adopted a rather self-serving interpretation of the MoU, which allows the agency to laud the spirit of the document whilst simultaneously failing to adhere to its contents when convenient. Whilst aware that the MoU between the ATSB and CASA is not a legally binding document, it nonetheless has an intended aim, and therefore fails to serve its purpose if not adhered to. The committee concludes that CASA's decision to withhold important documents from the ATSB has, as outlined in Chapter 6, had a severe impact on the ATSB's investigative process.
Searle’s Report—September 2008
The Senate’s Searle Report , Administration of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) and related Matters also made recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The committee recommends the Australian Government strengthen CASA’s governance framework and administrative capability by:
Recommendation 3: 2.165 The committee recommends that the Australian National Audit Office audit CASA’s implementation and administration of its Safety Management Systems approach.
When will the Civil Aviation Act be re-written to address recommendations and findings? Regulatory changes can be completed within 2 (two) years. Past recommendations have failed to fix.
Senate Report Summary
If the recommendations and findings of this latest Senate Report and previous government and judicial recommendations and findings are reviewed, it is obvious that nothing has been achieved to create an aviation regulatory authority that is transparent and encourages safe growth of aviation.
Why is there a Memorandum of Understanding between two government agencies? Why aren’t their roles specified in legislation?
All of these recommendations and findings from all of the inquiries sadly reflects on the Acts and Regulations that govern these two agencies. How the ATSB and CASA work with each other should be in the applicable Act and/or Regulations.
If ATSB and CASA were correctly empowered under their respective Acts and Regulations then there would be no need for any MoU between the two agencies.
The Civil Aviation Act needs to be re-written so that it correctly empowers CASA to be a respected ICAO regulatory authority that provides a “just culture” environment for participants of this industry.
The Morris report (see page 2), May 1995 stated:
2.14 Second, the abolition of the CAA and the establishment of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) are to be achieved by a series of amendments to the existing Civil Aviation Act 1988 (the CA Act). Many of the provisions which are considered adequate to the regulatory functions will remain unchanged. This is better than creating a brand new act.
In hindsight, a new Civil Aviation Act, based on the New Zealand Act, would have addressed many points raised by this latest report.
These inquiries and reports into CASA will continue until there are Acts and Regulations that clearly explain the responsibilities of both these very important aviation agencies. Industry trade, both domestically and globally, depends to a high level on CASA domestically, and globally on agreements between CASA and the NAA of possible and probable trading nations.
The Minister has stated in his response “Finally, consistent with this Government’s Aviation Policy we have announced the establishment of an Aviation Safety Regulation Review to investigate the structures and processes of all aviation agencies involved in aviation safety.
Recommendation 13: That a short inquiry be conducted by the Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport into the current status of aviation regulatory reform to assess the direction, progress and resources expended to date to ensure greater visibility of the processes.”
[Minister supports recommendation in-principle]
Cheers Ken..
The Fear of Retribution
The recently released Senate report into the ATSB/CASA Pel-Air accident near Norfolk Island has clearly stated that CASA did not meet its obligations to ATSB and, more concerning, has created a fear of retribution with many participants in industry who no longer have confidence/trust in CASA.
This report does not paint Australia’s safety system in a good light. Safety requires all sectors to actively work together to maintain safety, let alone improve safety standards, and this can only be done if all involved are confident that by being honest there will be no retribution.
What this Senate Inquiry has identified that the trust in CASA to be a fair regulator has deteriorated to such a level that, to bring the truth to the notice of this inquiry, many did so “in-camera” so that their identities were protected. Why?
To prevent retribution by CASA. CASA’s next CEO has a challenge to resurrect a “Just Culture”.
The situation is so bad that the Inquiry Executive Summary stated:
“Witnesses—whether public or in camera—should suffer no adverse consequences from providing evidence to the committee. Given the numerous concerns expressed, the committee will be monitoring this situation carefully.”
The following are relevant extracts from the Report’s Executive Summary.
“The committee also focuses on the appropriateness and effectiveness of the interaction between the ATSB and CASA. The committee notes that a systemic approach to the investigation was initially pursued, but that systemic issues were scoped out of the investigation early in the process. This led the committee to ask whether CASA exerted undue influence on the ATSB process. What is clear is that CASA's failure to provide the ATSB with critical documents, including the Chambers Report and CASA’s Special Audit of Pel-Air, which both demonstrated CASA’s failure to properly oversee the Pel-Air operations, contravened the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in place between the two agencies and may have breached the terms of the Transport Safety Investigations Act 2003 (Chapter 7). The committee takes a dim view of CASA's actions in this regard.
It also emerged in the course of the inquiry that the previous system of mandatory and confidential incident reporting to the ATSB has been altered. Pilots have expressed concern that CASA now appears to have access to identifying information, which may inhibit pilots reporting incidents and will therefore undermine the important principle of just culture within the aviation industry (Chapter 10).
Finally, the committee notes that many submitters and witnesses provided evidence in camera due to fear of retribution, particularly from CASA, were they to go public with their concerns. Many who chose to give in camera evidence did so in the knowledge of protections provided by parliamentary privilege. The committee also notes that this reticence to speak in public has been apparent for each inquiry this committee has conducted in this area over several years, and finds this deeply worrying. Given the positive statements made about the inquiry by CASA Director of Aviation Safety, Mr John McCormick, the committee trusts that concerns about retribution are unwarranted. There is an obligation on CASA to allay these concerns that retribution could follow speaking out, which appear to be widespread within the aviation industry.
The committee stresses that it takes the protection of witnesses under parliamentary privilege very seriously.
Witnesses—whether public or in camera—should suffer no adverse consequences from providing evidence to the committee. Given the numerous concerns expressed, the committee will be monitoring this situation carefully.
The committee also focuses on the appropriateness and effectiveness of the interaction between the ATSB and CASA. The committee notes that a systemic approach to the investigation was initially pursued, but that systemic issues were scoped out of the investigation early in the process. This led the committee to ask whether CASA exerted undue influence on the ATSB process. What is clear is that CASA's failure to provide the ATSB with critical documents, including the Chambers Report and CASA’s Special Audit of Pel-Air, which both demonstrated CASA’s failure to properly oversee the Pel-Air operations, contravened the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in place between the two agencies and may have breached the terms of the Transport Safety Investigations Act 2003 (Chapter 7). The committee takes a dim view of CASA's actions in this regard.”
‘Communication between CASA and the ATSB’
Some of the reasons why the gulf between CASA and many in industry is described in the Senate Report where they dissect the relationship between ATSB and CASA. It basically states that CASA selectively provided information to ATSB. During the Senate’s investigation they uncovered an internal CASA report on CASA/Pel-Air relationship and this report (Chamber’s Report) was damning on CASA and their oversight of Pel-Air.
It clearly identified CASA and Pel-Air organisational issues.
7.11 Given evidence on the lack of analysis of systemic issues in the ATSB investigation report, as outlined in previous chapters, the committee questions the plausibility of the statement above. On the weight of evidence reviewed, the committee questions CASA's motivation in withholding the Chambers Report from the ATSB.
7.12 This leads the committee to conclude that CASA may have breached section 24 of the TSI Act by withholding the document. To ensure that any appropriate action is taken, the committee will write to the Australian Federal Police, providing a copy of this report and supporting evidence for review.
7.13 Irrespective of how highly either agency head is inclined to speak on the public record when describing the ATSB/CASA relationship, this inquiry exposed not only a predilection by CASA to withhold information when it suited them, but also a willingness to engage the ATSB both formally and informally in ways that have not always been transparent. In both regards, CASA's actions have influenced the conduct of the ATSB investigation to the detriment of aviation safety. Based on the documentation available to the committee, it appears that the two agencies have placed maintaining the veneer of a productive working relationship ahead of public safety.
7.14 The committee is of the view that CASA has adopted a rather self-serving interpretation of the MoU, which allows the agency to laud the spirit of the document whilst simultaneously failing to adhere to its contents when convenient. Whilst aware that the MoU between the ATSB and CASA is not a legally binding document, it nonetheless has an intended aim, and therefore fails to serve its purpose if not adhered to. The committee concludes that CASA's decision to withhold important documents from the ATSB has, as outlined in Chapter 6, had a severe impact on the ATSB's investigative process.”
The worrying concern is that it demonstrates that CASA selectively uses data. This has been an issue from many industry participants in their not to friendly dealings with CASA. It also demonstrates that this government agency, who has no security responsibilities, is very guarded in what they hold and their lack of transparency.
CASA has not cultivated or maintained harmonious relationships with all of the aviation industry, especially in implementing a “just culture” for the aviation industry. Until CASA accepts that every participant shares a responsibility for safety and information can be shared both ways without the fear of retribution, a safe and “just culture” will not exist. CASA does not oversee every flight. Aviation organisations, pilots, engineers, air traffic controllers and aircraft owners are each responsible for meeting the statutory safety and security standards. The Regulations should set the minimum standards for entering, and operating within, the system. It is in the best interests of all aviation participants to perform to a standard above the minimum.
CASA’s next CEO has a massive challenge to address generations of fear of retribution.
Morris Report May 1995
3.12 There are two ways to amend the object clause.
The first is as follows:
3A. The main object of this Act is to establish a regulatory framework for maintaining, enhancing and promoting the safety of civil aviation in an effective and economical way,, with particular emphasis on preventing aviation accidents and incidents whilst recognising the need for more people to benefit from civil aviation,
3.14 The second option provides for greater detail in the object clause and is as follows:
3A. The main object of this Act is to establish a regulatory framework for maintaining, enhancing and promoting the safety of civil aviation, with particular emphasis on preventing accidents and incidents whilst recognising the need for more people to benefit from civil aviation by means that include the following:
(a) the development and maintenance of effective safety regulations;
(b) the encouragement of greater responsibility for aviation safety by industry;
(c) the promotion of effective consultation, effective decision-making and the efficient and effective use of resources; and
(d) the promotion of Australia's civil aviation safety capabilities.
Report Questions CASA Compliance
Breach of the Transport Safety Investigation Act?
7.9 The committee remains very concerned by CASA's actions in this regard, and has cause to ask whether the agency is in fact also in breach of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (TSI Act). Section 24 of the Act clearly states that it is an offence to hinder an investigation:
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if:
(a) the person engages in conduct; and
(b) the person is reckless as to whether the conduct will adversely affect an investigation:
(i) that is being conducted at that time; or
(ii) that could be conducted at a later time into an immediately reportable matter; and
(c) the conduct has the result of adversely affecting such an investigation (whether or not the investigation had commenced at the time of the conduct); and
(d) the conduct is not authorised by the Chief Commissioner.
7.11 Given evidence on the lack of analysis of systemic issues in the ATSB investigation report, as outlined in previous chapters, the committee questions the plausibility of the statement above. On the weight of evidence reviewed, the committee questions CASA's motivation in withholding the Chambers Report from the ATSB.
7.12 This leads the committee to conclude that CASA may have breached section 24 of the TSI Act by withholding the document. To ensure that any appropriate action is taken, the committee will write to the Australian Federal Police, providing a copy of this report and supporting evidence for review.
[Senate] Committee view
7.13 Irrespective of how highly either agency head is inclined to speak on the public record when describing the ATSB/CASA relationship, this inquiry exposed not only a predilection by CASA to withhold information when it suited them, but also a willingness to engage the ATSB both formally and informally in ways that have not always been transparent. In both regards, CASA's actions have influenced the conduct of the ATSB investigation to the detriment of aviation safety. Based on the documentation available to the committee, it appears that the two agencies have placed maintaining the veneer of a productive working relationship ahead of public safety.
7.14 The committee is of the view that CASA has adopted a rather self-serving interpretation of the MoU, which allows the agency to laud the spirit of the document whilst simultaneously failing to adhere to its contents when convenient. Whilst aware that the MoU between the ATSB and CASA is not a legally binding document, it nonetheless has an intended aim, and therefore fails to serve its purpose if not adhered to. The committee concludes that CASA's decision to withhold important documents from the ATSB has, as outlined in Chapter 6, had a severe impact on the ATSB's investigative process.
Searle’s Report—September 2008
The Senate’s Searle Report , Administration of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) and related Matters also made recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The committee recommends the Australian Government strengthen CASA’s governance framework and administrative capability by:
- introducing a small board of up to five members to provide enhanced oversight and strategic direction for CASA; and
- undertaking a review of CASA’s funding arrangements to ensure CASA is equipped to deal with new regulatory challenges.
Recommendation 3: 2.165 The committee recommends that the Australian National Audit Office audit CASA’s implementation and administration of its Safety Management Systems approach.
When will the Civil Aviation Act be re-written to address recommendations and findings? Regulatory changes can be completed within 2 (two) years. Past recommendations have failed to fix.
Senate Report Summary
If the recommendations and findings of this latest Senate Report and previous government and judicial recommendations and findings are reviewed, it is obvious that nothing has been achieved to create an aviation regulatory authority that is transparent and encourages safe growth of aviation.
Why is there a Memorandum of Understanding between two government agencies? Why aren’t their roles specified in legislation?
All of these recommendations and findings from all of the inquiries sadly reflects on the Acts and Regulations that govern these two agencies. How the ATSB and CASA work with each other should be in the applicable Act and/or Regulations.
If ATSB and CASA were correctly empowered under their respective Acts and Regulations then there would be no need for any MoU between the two agencies.
The Civil Aviation Act needs to be re-written so that it correctly empowers CASA to be a respected ICAO regulatory authority that provides a “just culture” environment for participants of this industry.
The Morris report (see page 2), May 1995 stated:
2.14 Second, the abolition of the CAA and the establishment of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) are to be achieved by a series of amendments to the existing Civil Aviation Act 1988 (the CA Act). Many of the provisions which are considered adequate to the regulatory functions will remain unchanged. This is better than creating a brand new act.
In hindsight, a new Civil Aviation Act, based on the New Zealand Act, would have addressed many points raised by this latest report.
These inquiries and reports into CASA will continue until there are Acts and Regulations that clearly explain the responsibilities of both these very important aviation agencies. Industry trade, both domestically and globally, depends to a high level on CASA domestically, and globally on agreements between CASA and the NAA of possible and probable trading nations.
The Minister has stated in his response “Finally, consistent with this Government’s Aviation Policy we have announced the establishment of an Aviation Safety Regulation Review to investigate the structures and processes of all aviation agencies involved in aviation safety.
Recommendation 13: That a short inquiry be conducted by the Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport into the current status of aviation regulatory reform to assess the direction, progress and resources expended to date to ensure greater visibility of the processes.”
[Minister supports recommendation in-principle]
Cheers Ken..
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Estimates Hansard, 29 May 2013, p. 148 Committee met at 9:00.
Great post sarcs and the following is straight from Hansard:
Why do you think this is the case?
Why is there that perception?
Full download from Hansard.
Senator XENOPHON: This committee has now completed several inquiries into the aviation sector, the most recent last week. One of the common threads in each inquiry, which was raised specifically in the most recent report, is a prevailing fear of retribution from CASA for speaking out, particularly in the most recent inquiry.
The committee continually heard that people did not want to criticise CASA or its operations because they truly believed that there would be some sort of negative reprisal for them.
The fears seem to be directed to you [mccormick] and some of your senior managers.
The committee continually heard that people did not want to criticise CASA or its operations because they truly believed that there would be some sort of negative reprisal for them.
The fears seem to be directed to you [mccormick] and some of your senior managers.
Why do you think this is the case?
Why is there that perception?
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Why do you think this is the case?
Why is there that perception?
Why is there that perception?
Next questions please
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I got a bit confused there paragraph.
Had to re-read your post, for a second , I thought I was on the "Alan's still not happy" thread.
Then I realised you could interchange everything you posted about CASA with Qantas and it still makes sense, in an obscene sort of way.
Had to re-read your post, for a second , I thought I was on the "Alan's still not happy" thread.
Then I realised you could interchange everything you posted about CASA with Qantas and it still makes sense, in an obscene sort of way.
Sick...
Para 377 Q Is MComic ill? Or is that just an unwarranted perception from one of the IOS.
Why do I ask?. Just read his memo in the latest CASA Briefing Spewsletter.
Needs a dose of Ipecac or ICAC..suffering from severe projectile verbal vomiting.
Not sure if a copy is sent to Trussy as a wind up ....
Just read it ...hullo? Planet CAsA, which orbit are you in
FFS is this for real !!!
Why do I ask?. Just read his memo in the latest CASA Briefing Spewsletter.
Needs a dose of Ipecac or ICAC..suffering from severe projectile verbal vomiting.
Not sure if a copy is sent to Trussy as a wind up ....
Just read it ...hullo? Planet CAsA, which orbit are you in
FFS is this for real !!!
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You are quite correct gasket! It would appear that many of these individuals went to the same school? Scary stuff.
One only needs to understand the mystique of the Screaming Skull and his infamy within the CX Star Chamber to get a feel for why CASA is the way it is
(Well the last 5 years anyway, and prior to his tenure and throughout it there have been several members of the Iron Ring who have ensured the organisations palpable culture has continued)
One only needs to understand the mystique of the Screaming Skull and his infamy within the CX Star Chamber to get a feel for why CASA is the way it is
(Well the last 5 years anyway, and prior to his tenure and throughout it there have been several members of the Iron Ring who have ensured the organisations palpable culture has continued)
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just read the casa briefing that aroa mentioned . Apparently the rest of the world respects casa. Again no mention of the senate inquiry, Truss report and iOS senators.
Wasn't that SMS stuff done by people prior to his tenure that have fled the coup?
Wasn't that SMS stuff done by people prior to his tenure that have fled the coup?
Chinese proverb
“When the winds of change blow, some people build walls and others build windmills.”
It would seem that rational well organised industry groups such as the Australian Airports Association (AAA), ably backed by ALGA & certain regional operators, may have kicked a goal recently which is reflective of the AAA WLR submission (Reference pg 11 AAA submission "UNNECESSARY AND INCONSISTENT REGULATION")...
Over the last six months or so, the AAA/ALGA etc have been heavily campaigning against certain parts of proposed rule changes by Fort Fumble (MOS Part 139), highlighting the detrimental effects these changes will have on rural/remote communities i.e. potential loss of regional air services. One of these rule change impositions was the runway width restrictions for RPT aircraft. On March 7th this matter was reported by Aunty: Runway changes could hamper regional aviation and force airlines including Rex to curtail outback services
So it was with interest that I noted the following article from Aviation Business:
Love the comment at the end (in bold)...
Bravo AAA & Co...
It would seem that rational well organised industry groups such as the Australian Airports Association (AAA), ably backed by ALGA & certain regional operators, may have kicked a goal recently which is reflective of the AAA WLR submission (Reference pg 11 AAA submission "UNNECESSARY AND INCONSISTENT REGULATION")...
Over the last six months or so, the AAA/ALGA etc have been heavily campaigning against certain parts of proposed rule changes by Fort Fumble (MOS Part 139), highlighting the detrimental effects these changes will have on rural/remote communities i.e. potential loss of regional air services. One of these rule change impositions was the runway width restrictions for RPT aircraft. On March 7th this matter was reported by Aunty: Runway changes could hamper regional aviation and force airlines including Rex to curtail outback services
Rex quote: "Regional airlines are doing it tough at the moment. The aviation industry's in crisis. We can do without these red tape issues, restricting services to remote regional communities that so heavily rely upon them," he said.
"If these regulations are promulgated and there are no changes made, we are not able to operate to Coober Pedy airport unless the runway is widened.
"If these regulations are promulgated and there are no changes made, we are not able to operate to Coober Pedy airport unless the runway is widened.
CASA proposes relaxed attitude to narrow runway operations25 Mar 2014
CASA has proposed a range of changes to the safety standards for operations of aircraft on so-called narrow runways.
CASA had previously adopted a policy requiring aerodrome operators to widen runways to accommodate aeroplanes operating at aerodromes with narrow runways.
This was to replace the current system of specific exemptions against the runway width requirements.
Following further consideration of aeroplane operational requirements, CASA is proposing to no longer mandate that aerodrome operators must widen runways to allow continued operations or for the introduction of a new larger aircraft type.
CASA intends that aerodrome upgrades will be based on a business decision made by the aerodrome operator.
And aircraft operators will need to assess aerodrome facilities and any risks associated with operating larger aircraft at an aerodrome with a narrow runway.
Aircraft operators would no longer need to apply for exemptions to operate aeroplanes into narrow runways.
Aeroplanes would be required to operate in accordance with an approved aeroplane flight manual narrow runway supplement or specified runway width limitation.
CASA is calling for comments on the new proposals by 5 May 2014.
Now there’s a common sense approach to a safety issue.
CASA has proposed a range of changes to the safety standards for operations of aircraft on so-called narrow runways.
CASA had previously adopted a policy requiring aerodrome operators to widen runways to accommodate aeroplanes operating at aerodromes with narrow runways.
This was to replace the current system of specific exemptions against the runway width requirements.
Following further consideration of aeroplane operational requirements, CASA is proposing to no longer mandate that aerodrome operators must widen runways to allow continued operations or for the introduction of a new larger aircraft type.
CASA intends that aerodrome upgrades will be based on a business decision made by the aerodrome operator.
And aircraft operators will need to assess aerodrome facilities and any risks associated with operating larger aircraft at an aerodrome with a narrow runway.
Aircraft operators would no longer need to apply for exemptions to operate aeroplanes into narrow runways.
Aeroplanes would be required to operate in accordance with an approved aeroplane flight manual narrow runway supplement or specified runway width limitation.
CASA is calling for comments on the new proposals by 5 May 2014.
Now there’s a common sense approach to a safety issue.
Bravo AAA & Co...
Last edited by Sarcs; 27th Mar 2014 at 01:20.
Folks,
Re. the almost complete reversal on Part 139, maybe we are seeing the results, already, of the announced departure of Mr. McCormick, who is now, in my opinion, a "lame duck" Director of Aviation Safety.
Of course, the heavy lobbying by all the major operators was a significant factor, it wasn't just Rex that had a problem.
Have a look at ERSA for the number of 30m wide runways, the "narrow runway supplement" is a face saving exercise.
Tootle pip!!
Re. the almost complete reversal on Part 139, maybe we are seeing the results, already, of the announced departure of Mr. McCormick, who is now, in my opinion, a "lame duck" Director of Aviation Safety.
Of course, the heavy lobbying by all the major operators was a significant factor, it wasn't just Rex that had a problem.
Have a look at ERSA for the number of 30m wide runways, the "narrow runway supplement" is a face saving exercise.
Tootle pip!!
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Tears for Malaysian but no tears for Lockhart
So an Australian PM is sad and moved at the death of those on the Malaysian aircraft? Bollocks. Crocodile tears and poor acting. He and his footstool sitting down behind him, wearing his little ribbon, couldn't give a flying you know what.
Where is their concern about Australian aviation? Was Abbott and every other politician moved to tears when a Metro went in at Lockhart? 7 years later these same politicians are still trying to hide the palpable state of our industry. To watch these deluded insincere grubs pretend to be empathetic or give a toss is absolutely nauseating, when you consider what occurred at Lockhart, what could have occurred with Pel Air, and what will occur in the near future on a bigger scale. Where is the compassion for the Lockhart victims? When will their justice be granted?
Where is their concern about Australian aviation? Was Abbott and every other politician moved to tears when a Metro went in at Lockhart? 7 years later these same politicians are still trying to hide the palpable state of our industry. To watch these deluded insincere grubs pretend to be empathetic or give a toss is absolutely nauseating, when you consider what occurred at Lockhart, what could have occurred with Pel Air, and what will occur in the near future on a bigger scale. Where is the compassion for the Lockhart victims? When will their justice be granted?
An academic concern!
Back at post #575 I drew attention to the fact that the UNSW IRRC team had apparently made a submission to the WLR panel. Well it just so happens that the UNSW Profs, Docs etc, also made a submission (sub No 6) to the RRAT committee's short inquiry into 'Qantas' future as a strong national carrier supporting jobs in Australia' the report of which was tabled yesterday (27/03/14), see here.
In that report the IRRC submission was referred to (page 18 paragraphs 2.45-2.53) but due to the nature of the inquiry and the unions vs Joyce bun fight the real significant safety issue (SSI) messages/warnings of the IRRC submission was somewhat lost..
However as an attachment to the IRRC submission the good academics provided a copy of their WLR submission...
From the outset I have to say that certain parts of the IRRC submission makes for some very disturbing reading, anyway here is the link: ASRR - Industrial Relations Research Centre, School of Management, Australian School of Business UNSW.
Somewhat surprising is the poor structure of the submission, which means that to a certain degree the disturbing safety risk warnings, now and projected into the future, highlighted by the research of the IRRC become diluted in impact. However the submission (IMO) should be essential reading for all industry stakeholders..
The ToR that the IRRC cover with their submission:
While trolling through the Senate Qantas inquiry pages I came across a tabled doc from FedSec Steve, and although he has a rather large axe to grind with AJ & Co in the interest of his members, this particular AQON should be read in context of the IRRC submission: Additional information from Australian Licenced Aircraft Engineers Association, received 20 March 2014.
Happy reading... Hmm...on second thoughts perhaps not!
In that report the IRRC submission was referred to (page 18 paragraphs 2.45-2.53) but due to the nature of the inquiry and the unions vs Joyce bun fight the real significant safety issue (SSI) messages/warnings of the IRRC submission was somewhat lost..
However as an attachment to the IRRC submission the good academics provided a copy of their WLR submission..
. From the outset I have to say that certain parts of the IRRC submission makes for some very disturbing reading, anyway here is the link: ASRR - Industrial Relations Research Centre, School of Management, Australian School of Business UNSW.
Somewhat surprising is the poor structure of the submission, which means that to a certain degree the disturbing safety risk warnings, now and projected into the future, highlighted by the research of the IRRC become diluted in impact. However the submission (IMO) should be essential reading for all industry stakeholders..
The ToR that the IRRC cover with their submission:
We propose to comment on the first, third, fourth and fifth of these terms of reference. Our main concerns under each of these TORs can be summarised in these terms:
TOR 1: We have observed a climate of mistrust, ill-feeling and misunderstanding among many of the interest groups that make up the industry, and between several of these groups and CASA, which we believe has impeded resolution of many of the practical difficulties which arose in the implementation of the new air safety regulatory framework. Leaving aside the obvious factors of competitive strains on the industry and escalating industrial conflict, we think it likely that the way the EASA-based model was introduced quite suddenly, and with little prior explanation or consultation, disconcerted many stakeholders who had been adjusting over a decade or longer to the previous policy of working towards closer alignment with the US Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), and contributed to this loss of trust. In any event, it suggests a need for CASA to work harder on its stakeholder relations.
TOR 3: Much of this submission focuses on the implementation and philosophical underpinnings of the new scheme, since this is a topic on which our research arguably has most to offer to the Review. We will work in considerable detail through three key concerns:
i. The implementation of the reforms has been uneven and beset by problems of transition, which we attribute once again to the speed with which the program was introduced and developed, and to lack of stakeholder buy-in arising, in part, from the general perception that it represented an unexplained reversal of previous CAA/CASA and Australian government policy. Largely on account of these adjustment problems, the program has so far failed to live up to any of the justifications which were made for its introduction;
ii. Underlying the implementation problems are a number of significant philosophical and conceptual departures from the traditional Australian scheme, and possibly the accepted ICAO framework. Chief among these are:
• the emergence of uncertainty about the role, authority and standing of the LAME
• the dilution and fragmentation of responsibility that accompanied the introduction of the A licence
• consequential uncertainties about the compliance of the new scheme with the continuing ICAO regulatory framework.
iii. We analyse the conflicts that necessarily exist between the underlying prudential focus of the ICAO safety framework and the rules governing Australia's market-based vocational training system, to which much of the former responsibility of CASA is being shifted (especially as regards the all-important basic examination for the grant of an AME licence).
TOR 4: We focus on the contrast between Australia's relaxed approach to the supervision of overseas repair shops handling Australian work, and the stringent regulatory approach which public concern in the US has obliged Congress and the FAA to apply to offshore providers.
TOR 5: We draw attention to the current crisis of Australia's civilian training in aircraft maintenance skills, the inadequacy of the current supply to meet future Australian needs even in circumstances of maximum offshoring, and the predicted shortfall of skilled labour supply in most regions of the world which is likely not only to negate much of the cost advantage of offshore maintenance, but to affect the viability of relying on it as a primary means of meeting Australia’s airworthiness requirements beyond the short term.
TOR 1: We have observed a climate of mistrust, ill-feeling and misunderstanding among many of the interest groups that make up the industry, and between several of these groups and CASA, which we believe has impeded resolution of many of the practical difficulties which arose in the implementation of the new air safety regulatory framework. Leaving aside the obvious factors of competitive strains on the industry and escalating industrial conflict, we think it likely that the way the EASA-based model was introduced quite suddenly, and with little prior explanation or consultation, disconcerted many stakeholders who had been adjusting over a decade or longer to the previous policy of working towards closer alignment with the US Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), and contributed to this loss of trust. In any event, it suggests a need for CASA to work harder on its stakeholder relations.
TOR 3: Much of this submission focuses on the implementation and philosophical underpinnings of the new scheme, since this is a topic on which our research arguably has most to offer to the Review. We will work in considerable detail through three key concerns:
i. The implementation of the reforms has been uneven and beset by problems of transition, which we attribute once again to the speed with which the program was introduced and developed, and to lack of stakeholder buy-in arising, in part, from the general perception that it represented an unexplained reversal of previous CAA/CASA and Australian government policy. Largely on account of these adjustment problems, the program has so far failed to live up to any of the justifications which were made for its introduction;
ii. Underlying the implementation problems are a number of significant philosophical and conceptual departures from the traditional Australian scheme, and possibly the accepted ICAO framework. Chief among these are:
• the emergence of uncertainty about the role, authority and standing of the LAME
• the dilution and fragmentation of responsibility that accompanied the introduction of the A licence
• consequential uncertainties about the compliance of the new scheme with the continuing ICAO regulatory framework.
iii. We analyse the conflicts that necessarily exist between the underlying prudential focus of the ICAO safety framework and the rules governing Australia's market-based vocational training system, to which much of the former responsibility of CASA is being shifted (especially as regards the all-important basic examination for the grant of an AME licence).
TOR 4: We focus on the contrast between Australia's relaxed approach to the supervision of overseas repair shops handling Australian work, and the stringent regulatory approach which public concern in the US has obliged Congress and the FAA to apply to offshore providers.
TOR 5: We draw attention to the current crisis of Australia's civilian training in aircraft maintenance skills, the inadequacy of the current supply to meet future Australian needs even in circumstances of maximum offshoring, and the predicted shortfall of skilled labour supply in most regions of the world which is likely not only to negate much of the cost advantage of offshore maintenance, but to affect the viability of relying on it as a primary means of meeting Australia’s airworthiness requirements beyond the short term.
Happy reading...
Hmm...on second thoughts perhaps not!
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Look what the Beaker, I mean cat dragged in?
And yet another 'caring, concerned, knowledgeable' bureaucrat sticks its ugly head up into the spotlight. Why don't these guys just stick their heads back where they belong - up each other's a#ses and in some trough in Montreal.
Herr Beaker: (Warning!! This news clip contains much mi mi mi and some Beakerish eye movements)
http://news.ninemsn.com.au/national/...-missing-mh370
Total folly. I would suggest that the Malaysians and counterparts not allow this Muppet anywhere near the investigation, he couldn't investigate a missing Comcar receipt let alone an accident on this scale. Besides he doesn't have the cash to fund the removal of a Blackbox from a couple of meters let alone 4000 metres.
Beaker, leave the task to the real experts which excludes you!
AMSA and their international partners are doing a stellar job. Good on ya boys and girls
Herr Beaker: (Warning!! This news clip contains much mi mi mi and some Beakerish eye movements)
http://news.ninemsn.com.au/national/...-missing-mh370
Total folly. I would suggest that the Malaysians and counterparts not allow this Muppet anywhere near the investigation, he couldn't investigate a missing Comcar receipt let alone an accident on this scale. Besides he doesn't have the cash to fund the removal of a Blackbox from a couple of meters let alone 4000 metres.
Beaker, leave the task to the real experts which excludes you!
AMSA and their international partners are doing a stellar job. Good on ya boys and girls
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377 # 659 "AMSA and their international partners are doing a stellar job'. etc.
Sundy Qogitation: Maybe the penny has dropped??
Although this was brought up on the 'Skygods'..AJ's not Happy..thread it is worth regurgitating here.. Friday's Oz (Note: Not Steve Creedy, must be on hols..
):
Surprisingly, for a MMSM publication, this article is not quite so pro-RedRat....
Also surprising is the fact that the reporter appears to have not quoted from the Laborial sections of the RRAT report but from Nick X's dissenting section, see here (page 39-45).
(Comment: Funny how aviation bi-bartisanship doesn't stretch to the big Q..
)
Nick's recommendations:
Maybe the penny has finally dropped, within the boffins in MMSM land and Laborial land, that in the comparatively small insular world of Oz aviation that all paths are intrinsically linked to the big Q... I might add that the good Senator X would appear to have worked this out quite some time ago..
Nick X quote: “Jack Lang used to say ‘In politics, if you nurse a mug for long enough, he’s bound to die in your arms,’” Nick said. “It’s time for the Government to take a step back from Qantas and consider the bigger picture, or they’ll be the biggest mugs of all.”
TICK TOCK!
Addendum: FNQ Wazza speaks out against Irish bomber bombing Q's Cairns Base..
Mr ENTSCH (Leichhardt) (10:22): I rise today to speak on behalf of the members of the Qantas crew base in Cairns, who received the shattering news four weeks ago that their base will be closed. One hundred and ten crew and their families were given just two weeks to decide whether they would relocate to another base, or resign and take a redundancy. Staff members have contacted me telling me how the closure would impact on them. One said—and this is typical of the comments:
As a family we love living in Cairns and we are not planning to relocate anywhere in the future. Qantas has forced us to uproot our lives, take our kids out of day care, forced my husband to leave his job, and made major changes regarding our financial stability.
We have been challenged and distressed by Qantas's decision. Our family enjoys living and working in Cairns. We share a sense of passion and engagement amongst the community and the diverse environment.
As locals on flights, we give great advice on what to see and do in Far North Queensland. We recommend locally owned operators and businesses. No other port in Australia has a crew so dedicated to promotion of their area.
Our outstanding commitment and performance has been overlooked by the upper echelon of corporate Qantas.
These comments are backed by the fact that Cairns consistently rates high in its customer service scores, as voted by the passengers, coming first in Australia in January, December and November. This is adding to Qantas's bottom line as a fantastic customer service. It has economy and value and encourages repeat and referral bookings.
I wrote to the CEO of Qantas, Alan Joyce, on 4 March and asked him to reconsider his decision, allowing the base to remain, with a reduction in staff size if absolutely necessary, or to phase out the base over an extended period of time, with a review in 12 months.
To date, unsurprisingly, I have received no response. Today I have learnt that some crew have accepted redundancies because they are unable to relocate to a major city. They finish on 4 May. Those crews that are in a position where they have to uproot and move to Brisbane, Sydney, Adelaide, Melbourne and Perth will be gone by 30 June. This is very disappointing news. Consider that the Qantas board of directors had a choice of three people to take on the CEO. Their choice took a world-class, full-service airline and transformed it to a low-cost, no-frills carrier. On the other hand, one of the unsuccessful candidates moved to a low-cost, no-frills carrier and turned it into an outstanding full-service carrier. One ponders on who got the best deal: Qantas or Virgin. I would suggest many of Qantas's woes could be addressed if the board were to revisit that decision.
Qantas is a great airline with great staff and a great future. What it needs is a leader with comprehensive knowledge and the commitment to rebuilding and maintaining a full-service airline. (Time expired)
Friday's Oz (Note: Not Steve Creedy, must be on hols..):
Call to probe health of Qantas
A SENATE inquiry into Qantas has said a repeal of the Qantas Sale Act to allow more foreign ownership was an inadequate solution for the airline and has called for an “urgent” review of the national aviation sector.
A Senate committee says Qantas, led by chief executive Alan Joyce, has ‘no clear and consistent policy in terms of its future direction’ The rural, regional and transport affairs references committee, dominated by ALP members, said the government should first determine the “current financial situation” of Qantas beyond public reports before deciding on the type of parliamentary action required to help the airline. “The ‘Qantas problem’ cannot be fixed with a band-aid solution such as the Qantas Sale Amendment Bill 2014 proposed by the government or the debt guarantee proposed by the opposition,” the committee reported.
It called for a review of the “broader aviation sector in Australia” and the “challenges faced by Australian Airlines on a geographical and regulatory basis”.
“(We recommend) that the government take no further action on legislative or other reform and provide no assistance or guarantee to Qantas until an independent audit of the company has been completed,” the committee wrote.
“(That audit) should also seek to establish the level of any costshifting between Jetstar and Qantas.”
The transport unions — in claims pushed by committee member and independent senator Nick Xenophon — allege Qantas has shifted some of the costs of its Jetstar International expansion on to Qantas International operations.
The unions argue the Jetstar foray into Asia, a key aspect of Qantas chief executive Alan Joyce’s tenure, has been a disaster and the failures are being masked to some degree by “cost sharing”.
Qantas has repeatedly and strenuously denied those claims.
The committee called for the Air Navigation Act 1920 to be amended to “address the apparent loophole that allows the foreign investment cap to be obviated” as was “demonstrated by the restructure of Virgin Australia”.
The government “as a matter of urgency” should consult with industry and other relevant bodies to formulate terms of reference for a “comprehensive review of Australia’s aviation sector”, the committee said.
That review should include examination of the Open Skies policy and its impact on operators and consumers and should be undertaken by the productivity commission, the committee said.
It criticised Qantas as having “no clear and consistent policy in terms of its future direction” or at least not one “they are willing to discuss in the public sphere”.
“Legislative changes made by the government or other measures, including a debt guarantee, may not have the intended impact if there is not the ability or the will within Qantas to take advantage of them”.
The committee said Qantas had not stated a “strong position: on what specific changes it needed to recover, “other than insisting it is operating on an ‘unlevel playing-field’ compared to Virgin Australia”.
“It would perhaps be more useful and inspire greater confidence on the part of employees and consumers if Qantas were to have a clear strategic plan and a ‘wish list’ of actions for the government. This would demonstrate an engagement on the part of Qantas and assist the parliament in ensuring any action taken has the desired outcome.”
Committee member and Greens senator Lee Rhiannon accused the ALP of siding with Qantas via the committee.
“This inquiry was set up to investigate options available to the government to financially assist Qantas in the interests of protecting jobs and the national carrier,” Ms Rhiannon said.
“It’s clear Labor has caved to the pressure from Alan Joyce and senior Qantas management.
“They are willing to sell off the heart and lungs of the airline while trying to dud us into believing they want an Australian owned Qantas,” she said.
A SENATE inquiry into Qantas has said a repeal of the Qantas Sale Act to allow more foreign ownership was an inadequate solution for the airline and has called for an “urgent” review of the national aviation sector.
A Senate committee says Qantas, led by chief executive Alan Joyce, has ‘no clear and consistent policy in terms of its future direction’ The rural, regional and transport affairs references committee, dominated by ALP members, said the government should first determine the “current financial situation” of Qantas beyond public reports before deciding on the type of parliamentary action required to help the airline. “The ‘Qantas problem’ cannot be fixed with a band-aid solution such as the Qantas Sale Amendment Bill 2014 proposed by the government or the debt guarantee proposed by the opposition,” the committee reported.
It called for a review of the “broader aviation sector in Australia” and the “challenges faced by Australian Airlines on a geographical and regulatory basis”.
“(We recommend) that the government take no further action on legislative or other reform and provide no assistance or guarantee to Qantas until an independent audit of the company has been completed,” the committee wrote.
“(That audit) should also seek to establish the level of any costshifting between Jetstar and Qantas.”
The transport unions — in claims pushed by committee member and independent senator Nick Xenophon — allege Qantas has shifted some of the costs of its Jetstar International expansion on to Qantas International operations.
The unions argue the Jetstar foray into Asia, a key aspect of Qantas chief executive Alan Joyce’s tenure, has been a disaster and the failures are being masked to some degree by “cost sharing”.
Qantas has repeatedly and strenuously denied those claims.
The committee called for the Air Navigation Act 1920 to be amended to “address the apparent loophole that allows the foreign investment cap to be obviated” as was “demonstrated by the restructure of Virgin Australia”.
The government “as a matter of urgency” should consult with industry and other relevant bodies to formulate terms of reference for a “comprehensive review of Australia’s aviation sector”, the committee said.
That review should include examination of the Open Skies policy and its impact on operators and consumers and should be undertaken by the productivity commission, the committee said.
It criticised Qantas as having “no clear and consistent policy in terms of its future direction” or at least not one “they are willing to discuss in the public sphere”.
“Legislative changes made by the government or other measures, including a debt guarantee, may not have the intended impact if there is not the ability or the will within Qantas to take advantage of them”.
The committee said Qantas had not stated a “strong position: on what specific changes it needed to recover, “other than insisting it is operating on an ‘unlevel playing-field’ compared to Virgin Australia”.
“It would perhaps be more useful and inspire greater confidence on the part of employees and consumers if Qantas were to have a clear strategic plan and a ‘wish list’ of actions for the government. This would demonstrate an engagement on the part of Qantas and assist the parliament in ensuring any action taken has the desired outcome.”
Committee member and Greens senator Lee Rhiannon accused the ALP of siding with Qantas via the committee.
“This inquiry was set up to investigate options available to the government to financially assist Qantas in the interests of protecting jobs and the national carrier,” Ms Rhiannon said.
“It’s clear Labor has caved to the pressure from Alan Joyce and senior Qantas management.
“They are willing to sell off the heart and lungs of the airline while trying to dud us into believing they want an Australian owned Qantas,” she said.
.Also surprising is the fact that the reporter appears to have not quoted from the Laborial sections of the RRAT report but from Nick X's dissenting section, see here (page 39-45).
(Comment: Funny how aviation bi-bartisanship doesn't stretch to the big Q..
)Nick's recommendations:
Recommendation 1
That the Government, as a matter of urgency, consult with industry and relevant bodies to formulate terms of reference for a comprehensive review of Australia’s aviation sector, including the Open Skies policy, and its impact on operators and consumers, to be undertaken by the Productivity Commission.
Recommendation 2
That the Government take no further action on legislative or other reform and provide no assistance or guarantee to Qantas until an independent audit of the company has been completed, which should also seek to establish the level of any cost-shifting between Jetstar and Qantas.
Recommendation 3
Subject to Recommendation 1, that the Air Navigation Act 1920 be amended to address the apparent loophole that allows the foreign investment cap to be obviated, as demonstrated in the restructure of Virgin Australia.
That the Government, as a matter of urgency, consult with industry and relevant bodies to formulate terms of reference for a comprehensive review of Australia’s aviation sector, including the Open Skies policy, and its impact on operators and consumers, to be undertaken by the Productivity Commission.
Recommendation 2
That the Government take no further action on legislative or other reform and provide no assistance or guarantee to Qantas until an independent audit of the company has been completed, which should also seek to establish the level of any cost-shifting between Jetstar and Qantas.
Recommendation 3
Subject to Recommendation 1, that the Air Navigation Act 1920 be amended to address the apparent loophole that allows the foreign investment cap to be obviated, as demonstrated in the restructure of Virgin Australia.
I might add that the good Senator X would appear to have worked this out quite some time ago..Nick X quote: “Jack Lang used to say ‘In politics, if you nurse a mug for long enough, he’s bound to die in your arms,’” Nick said. “It’s time for the Government to take a step back from Qantas and consider the bigger picture, or they’ll be the biggest mugs of all.”
TICK TOCK!
Addendum: FNQ Wazza speaks out against Irish bomber bombing Q's Cairns Base..
Mr ENTSCH (Leichhardt) (10:22): I rise today to speak on behalf of the members of the Qantas crew base in Cairns, who received the shattering news four weeks ago that their base will be closed. One hundred and ten crew and their families were given just two weeks to decide whether they would relocate to another base, or resign and take a redundancy. Staff members have contacted me telling me how the closure would impact on them. One said—and this is typical of the comments:
As a family we love living in Cairns and we are not planning to relocate anywhere in the future. Qantas has forced us to uproot our lives, take our kids out of day care, forced my husband to leave his job, and made major changes regarding our financial stability.
We have been challenged and distressed by Qantas's decision. Our family enjoys living and working in Cairns. We share a sense of passion and engagement amongst the community and the diverse environment.
As locals on flights, we give great advice on what to see and do in Far North Queensland. We recommend locally owned operators and businesses. No other port in Australia has a crew so dedicated to promotion of their area.
Our outstanding commitment and performance has been overlooked by the upper echelon of corporate Qantas.
These comments are backed by the fact that Cairns consistently rates high in its customer service scores, as voted by the passengers, coming first in Australia in January, December and November. This is adding to Qantas's bottom line as a fantastic customer service. It has economy and value and encourages repeat and referral bookings.
I wrote to the CEO of Qantas, Alan Joyce, on 4 March and asked him to reconsider his decision, allowing the base to remain, with a reduction in staff size if absolutely necessary, or to phase out the base over an extended period of time, with a review in 12 months.
To date, unsurprisingly, I have received no response. Today I have learnt that some crew have accepted redundancies because they are unable to relocate to a major city. They finish on 4 May. Those crews that are in a position where they have to uproot and move to Brisbane, Sydney, Adelaide, Melbourne and Perth will be gone by 30 June. This is very disappointing news. Consider that the Qantas board of directors had a choice of three people to take on the CEO. Their choice took a world-class, full-service airline and transformed it to a low-cost, no-frills carrier. On the other hand, one of the unsuccessful candidates moved to a low-cost, no-frills carrier and turned it into an outstanding full-service carrier. One ponders on who got the best deal: Qantas or Virgin. I would suggest many of Qantas's woes could be addressed if the board were to revisit that decision.
Qantas is a great airline with great staff and a great future. What it needs is a leader with comprehensive knowledge and the commitment to rebuilding and maintaining a full-service airline. (Time expired)
Last edited by Sarcs; 30th Mar 2014 at 05:45.
Join Date: Oct 2013
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A friend in need is a friend indeed!
I would like to know exactly what view CASA are taking about the Qantas unrest? Considering CASA make everybody else jump through hoops, submit safety cases, have a robust safety management system and a mature change management process when it comes to major organisational change, are CASA engaged with what is going on?
Mass changes in the airline, redundancies, key management personnel coming and going, changes within processes and procedures, changes to org structures, the list is endless...... Does this make QF rank highly on CASA's internal risk register?
Mass changes in the airline, redundancies, key management personnel coming and going, changes within processes and procedures, changes to org structures, the list is endless...... Does this make QF rank highly on CASA's internal risk register?
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Off topic - but
Para - I expect they are sternly, robustly even 'monitoring' the situation and staying well out the way Qantas legal. Beating up a little Tiger is one thing; but a tangle with Big Q legal is an entirely different matter. Oh, BTW the Big Q now has a new meaning – big queue at the dole office. What a bloody shambles.
On topic – from Phelan and Proaviation, the following just published:-
Regulatory reform.
Crisis point.
777 POV.
On topic – from Phelan and Proaviation, the following just published:-
Regulatory reform.
Crisis point.
777 POV.
Last edited by Kharon; 1st Apr 2014 at 21:30. Reason: Late mail.