Truss: Aviation Safety Regulation Review

[Cactusjack]

Pony Poohshan

Indeed, Poohshan's self confidence and espousing himself in such a manner is a direct reflection of years of receiving CAsArisation from other proud like individuals in Canberra.
As for the AAT, jeez, what a shock, another crap decision that of course falls in favour of CAsA.
Dr Cameron made the physical examination, his assessment is as close to accurate as you will get.

Despite the fact that the statement does contain the declaration of duty required by the Guidelines it could not be plainer that Dr Navathe is an advocate for his own decision. I do not propose to have any regard to his opinions. For the future I would trust that CASA’s Legal Branch would exercise independent judgement in deciding what witnesses ought be relied upon and the content of their statements. They ought, obviously enough, be confined to matters that are relevant and witnesses ought be those who can truly provide an independent opinion.

I think you should think twice about placing any trust in their LSD

[brissypilot]

As for the AAT, jeez, what a shock, another crap decision that of course falls in favour of CAsA.

It appears the AAT's decision was in favour of the applicant...

32. I will then set aside the decision to cancel and substitute a decision that Mr Bolton’s medical certificates not be cancelled.

[Cactusjack]

Correct, I retract that part of my statement, not used to seeing the AAT do the right thing

[Creampuff]

Yes Cactus, your blind prejudice is sometimes embarassingly obvious.

[Cactusjack]

Creamie, very true sir! Now, feel free to punish me with a wet lettuce leaf
I am man enough to admit mistake and accept said flogging.

[Paragraph377]

For whom the bell tolls

Let's explore this nugget a little further;

Quote:
"CASA is and I, as the Director of Aviation Safety, am, and all our employees are fully accountable for our words and actions, including our regular appearances before this committee,".

Really? From the lack or responses and arrogant misuse of QON's I would say that this public quote is quite simply bulls#it. The word 'accountable' should not be used by CASA under any circumstance, as it simply doesn't fit. The Senators, particularly Xenophon were very much trying to explore this supposed 'accountable' side of CASA, and where did that get to?
And of course, the Minuscule made no mention of being 'accountable' for aviation safety did he?

Now there were many many interesting tidbits, revelations, exposures and uncovering of mischievous and questionable acts made during the inquiry, to be sure. The dark side is truly an evil force where sinister motives, devious acts, abhorrent manifestations and murky Machiavellian sins are committed.
However I am still awaiting CASA's robust and forthright answer to the Sky Sentinel questions, which of course were predominately taken on notice.
Has any of the following information been requested by anybody;

• Who signed off on the program/software purchase?
• Who was the program/softwares owner at the time of sale?
• Where, how, why and to whom exactly did the additional $2 million dollars for post purchase software/work go to?
• Where are the tender documents, CAPEX documents, business case documents associated with all of this?
• Did the software creator, seller, developer work at CASA or have blood ties, friendship ties or business ties to anybody on the CASA payroll?

I think that this is just one example of an interesting point raised at the inquiry that has been completely pooh poohed by those who were subject of the inquiry.

Oh Mr Truss, what a mess

You Tube

What does one do with pesky QON's?

You Tube

I eagerly anticipate the outcome of this 'wet lettuce review' to see if such items are addressed.

[aroa]

ding dong...the bell

McComic is a comic..the accountability statement just shows that as das, just keep churning ****e for long enough and maybe some people will believe it as well.

Look at any CAsA list of definitions and acronyms and you will not find "accountability " there...simply because they dont have any.

A few further Qs.

1 Who decided that allegations of criminality should be changed to just breaches of the 'code"?...a joke doc if ever there was one. That gets them off the hook.

2. Who decided that the findings of the ICC Hart that certain CAsA persons should be dealt with by the AFP, should be sidetracked.?

Who signed off on the expenditure of a very costly external investigation with terms of reference to code breaches only?

AND knowing full well from a much earlier minute from N Tredrea, "manager" compliance and enforcement ( god help us!) to J Bromley "safety (sic) oversight" that the sworn evidence tendered for a criminal case against the intended victim was totally false and unbelievable bollocks.

Never let truth get in the way of a good "hit" when there .."are people in Canberra who think they can make this stick"...to quote( not yet a legal) "investigator" (sic)S Cremerius, who as a CAsA 'newbie' knew jack sh*t about anything related to aviation, but everything about "verballing"

Show me some accountabilty from CAsA and I'll show you where Jesus is really buried.

[Kharon]

Of Ministers, mandarins;

the road to hell and good intentions. How often in daily life do we see 'an identified problem' being seemingly resolved in one area only to create a bigger headache, somewhere else. In other words the problem was never 'resolved' but simply moved on, passed on to someone's desk; who then promptly sets about getting the problem 'moved on'. The original 'problem' of course becomes a monster created by the process, rules get changed to suit the 'fixers' needs, while the 'problem', like Creampuffs oft mentioned Frankenstein, just develops a life of it's own.

Expediency and human nature only hasten the growth. "The Minister cannot be held responsible", first heard that during the Seaview mess; Lockhart was a watershed and Whyalla a major milestone along the 'safety' road, which has now been patched and repaired so often, by so many that it may no longer be rightfully called a road. Many of the patches were hastily made in various attempts to protect the Minister, the original intention being bastardised in the game of ambition, power, budget, power, ego, power, money, power and being able to run the gamut of any inquiry with impunity. It has all become such a nonsense, time to start again.

We had a good start with the Air Navigation Act, but from about 1999 the white ants got in; slowly but surely from the inside the structural integrity of the Act was eaten away until finally, with the removal of 2A, ties, responsibilities and obligations were so weakened that a progression to the TSI could be forced through. This did not dilute the power of the ANA, just made it easier to circumvent. The architect of the TSI has much to answer for; leaving the gate open for a series of MOU between CASA and ATSB which make a mockery of today's 'system'. You wouldn't let your kids play with a chain saw; give Jack the Ripper a dark alley and a sharp knife; no more than you'd hire a paedophile as a baby sitter. But we have allowed through indifference, ignorance, apathy and not wishing to rock the boat a nest of voracious white ants to infest the building and they are breeding.

You may, of course check for yourself, take a look at the Pel Air example. No Joyce! a real long hard look. Don't think about the incident; look under the covers, look at the unanswered questions, look at the wool being pulled and who's doing the pulling, look at the unbelievable manipulation of law, the disrespect for parliament and those in it; the arrogant dismissal of Senators questions, the breathtaking smugness in self sustaining protection and the presumption that no matter what comes, all will be well. Always has been and nothing has; or, will be changed.

What has happened to Dom James in the aftermath typifies how little real power (or interest) the Minister has to control the watchdog. It's not just James who is being slowly roasted over the flames by men of no honour, less integrity and no good will whatsoever; there are a several. All trying to beat a rotten, self protecting system which actively encourages outrageous, life destroying acts and dares to defy even constitutional and human rights tenets. Ironically, it's your money paying for the defence of that system; great ain't it.

Today the chook shed, tomorrow the barn and the miniscule is going to stop the infestation with one insignificant review. As Pel Air and the Senate inquiry are slowly digested, passing through the belly of the beast until being deposited in some remote place, never to be seen again, we can all live in hope that the WLR will come to the rescue. Tick tock says the ever patient clock.

From the press: Mt Vernon, Texas. Headline.

WHOREHOUSE SUES LOCAL CHURCH OVER LIGHTNING STRIKE!

The crusty old judge read through the plaintiff's complaint and the defendant's reply, and at the opening hearing he commented:

"I don't know how the hell I'm going to decide this case, but it appears from the paperwork that we now have a whorehouse owner who staunchly believes in the power of prayer, and an entire church congregation that thinks it's all bull****."

There, I feel much better now.

Selah.

[Sarcs]

Selleys spack filler: Before and after the TSI Act 2003

Ah yes the oft forgotten ANA 1920, some would say the true head of power in the regulation of air safety here in Oz :

Contents of repealed part 2A of ANA

Part 2A—Investigation of accidents etc. 32
Division 1—Preliminary 32
19AA Meaning of accident.................................................... .....................32
19AB Meaning of serious incident.................................................... .........33
19AC Meaning of incident ............................................................ .............33
19AD Meaning of safety deficiency.................................................. ..........33
19AE Meaning of responsible person ........................................................33
19AF Meaning of cockpit voice recording.................................................34
19AG General definitions................................................. ..........................34
Division 2—Reporting of accidents etc. 38
19BA Reporting of accidents and serious incidents....................................38
19BB Notification to Contracting State......................................................4 0
19BC Reporting of incidents................................................... ...................41
Division 3—Investigation of accidents, serious incidents,
incidents and safety deficiencies 44
19CA Object of Division.................................................... ........................44
19CB Director’s power to investigate accidents etc. ..................................44
19CC Director’s power to obtain information etc. .....................................45
19CD Powers of entry to premises ............................................................ .47
19CE Search warrants.................................................... ............................48
19CF The things that are authorised by search warrant .............................49
19CG Specific powers available to investigators executing warrants.........49
19CH Use of equipment to examine or process things ...............................50
19CJ Use of electronic equipment at premises..........................................51
19CK Retention of things which are seized................................................53
19CL Court of summary jurisdiction may permit a thing to be
retained ............................................................ ................................53
19CM Announcement before entry ............................................................ .54
19CN Availability of assistance and use of force in executing a
warrant ............................................................ .................................54
19CP Details of warrant to be given to occupier........................................54
19CQ Copies of seized things to be provided.............................................54
19CR Compensation for damage to electronic equipment..........................55
19CS Offence of making false statements in applications for
warrant ............................................................ .................................55
19CT Report of investigation............................................... ......................56
19CU Publication of report etc. ............................................................ ......
Division 4—Australian investigations in which other
Contracting States have an interest 57
19DA Accredited representatives of Contracting States .............................57
19DB Delegation of conduct of investigation.............................................58
19DC Participation in investigation by advisers.........................................58
19DD Provision of investigation reports to certain Contracting
States...................................................... ..........................................59
19DE Provision of information to Contracting State that conducts
investigation............................................... ......................................60
19DF Further investigation of accident etc. ...............................................60
Division 5—Accidents and serious incidents outside Australian
territory 62
19EA Investigation of accidents and serious incidents that occur to
Australian aircraft outside Australian territory.................................62
19EB Investigation of accidents etc. that occur outside Australian
territory to which section 19EA does not apply ...............................62
19EC Investigation of incidents occurring outside Australian
territory ............................................................ ................................63
19ED Powers of investigators ............................................................ ........63
19EE Provision of information to Contracting State that conducts
investigation............................................... ......................................64
Division 6—Powers in relation to accident sites 65
19FA General definitions................................................. ..........................65
19FB Accident site ............................................................ ........................65
19FC Accident site premises ............................................................ .........65
19FD Accident site powers ............................................................ ............65
19FE Power of entry to accident site .........................................................66
19FF Announcement before entry ............................................................ .67
19FG Availability of assistance and use of force in entering
accident site premises.................................................... ...................67
19FH Offence of entering etc. an accident site without permission ...........67
Division 7—Custody, protection and removal of aircraft 68
19FJ Removal of or interference with aircraft ..........................................68
19FK Protection of Director etc. from liability in certain cases .................69
19FL Aircraft etc. of Contracting State to remain undisturbed on
request..................................................... .........................................69
19FM Release of aircraft etc. from custody of Director .............................70
Division 8—Administration 72
19GA Director of Air Safety Investigation............................................... ..72
19GB Functions of Director ............................................................ ...........72
19GC Investigators............................................... ......................................72
19GD Identity cards....................................................... .............................72
19GE Delegation by Director.................................................... .................73
Division 9—Miscellaneous 74
19HA Disclosure of information by Director for aviation safety
purposes ............................................................ ...............................74
19HB Powers in relation to aircraft accidents, serious incidents and
incidents................................................... ........................................74
19HC Disclosure of air safety records to a court or person ........................74
19HD Compliance with subpoenas etc. ......................................................76
19HE Evidence of cockpit voice recordings—criminal proceedings..........76
19HF Evidence of cockpit voice recordings—civil proceedings................76
19HG Examination by a court of a cockpit voice recording under
subsection 19HF(3) ............................................................ ..............77
19HH Where a court makes an order under subsection 19HF(3)................78
19HJ Cockpit voice recording etc. not to be ground for disciplinary
action ............................................................ ...................................79
19HK Disclosure of cockpit voice recordings ............................................79
19HL Sections 19HE and 19HF not to affect admissibility of other
evidence ............................................................ ...............................79
19HM Determination of standards ............................................................ ..80
19HN Day of effect of standards ............................................................ ....80
19HP Standards to be disallowable instruments.........................................80
19HQ Arrangements with States, Australian Capital Territory,
Northern Territory and Norfolk Island.............................................80
19HR Compensation for acquisition of property ........................................80

In regards to the BASI/ATSB the omitted/repealed part 2A basically outlined the State's international obligations as a signatory to the Chicago Convention i.e. ICAO. Perhaps the perfect example was contained within the 1999 MOU between Fort Fumble and BASI.."... 5.14 Under section 19HB (Part 2A) of the Air Navigation Act, the Director's(BASI) powers of investigation into any matters related to an aircraft occurrence take precedence over the investigation of all other Commonwealth agencies with the exception of the Australian Federal Police.After the 1999 MOU we then had the 2001 between ATsB & CAsA, then the 2004 and finally the 2010 MOU. Slowly but surely the honourable intent plus the veracity of our international obligations as stated in the 1999 MOU and ANA Part 2A were watered down until 2003 when we adopted the TSI Act, and that is when things really went south with the balance of power in aviation safety administration here in Oz.
Perhaps the following will provide a context with the detrimental effects of the TSI adoption to the further downfall of our AAI:

Affect of the TSI 2003 on the CAA 1988

before May 2003

(3) CASA also has the following functions:
(a) co-operating with the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation in
relation to the investigation of aircraft accidents and
incidents;
(b) any functions conferred on CASA under the Civil Aviation
(Carriers’ Liability) Act 1959, or under a corresponding law
of a State or Territory;
(c) any functions conferred on CASA under the Air Navigation
Act 1920;
(d) any other functions prescribed by the regulations, being
functions relating to any matters referred to in this section;
(e) promoting the development of Australia’s civil aviation
safety capabilities, skills and services, for the benefit of the
Australian community and for export;
(f) providing consultancy and management services relating to
any of the matters referred to in this section, both within and
outside Australian territory;

11 Functions to be performed in accordance with international
agreements
CASA shall perform its functions in a manner consistent with the
obligations of Australia under the Chicago Convention and any
other agreement between Australia and any other country or
countries relating to the safety of air navigation.

Note: theoretically at (a) means that FF didn't recognise the authority of the ATSB....says a lot really!

after July 2003

(3) CASA also has the following functions:
(a) co-operating with the Executive Director of Transport Safety
Investigation in relation to investigations under the Transport
Safety Investigation Act 2003 that relate to aircraft;
(b) any functions conferred on CASA under the Civil Aviation
(Carriers’ Liability) Act 1959, or under a corresponding law
of a State or Territory;
(c) any functions conferred on CASA under the Air Navigation
Act 1920;
(d) any other functions prescribed by the regulations, being
functions relating to any matters referred to in this section;
(e) promoting the development of Australia’s civil aviation
safety capabilities, skills and services, for the benefit of the
Australian community and for export;
(f) providing consultancy and management services relating to
any of the matters referred to in this section, both within and
outside Australian territory;

11 Functions to be performed in accordance with international
agreements
CASA shall perform its functions in a manner consistent with the
obligations of Australia under the Chicago Convention and any
other agreement between Australia and any other country or
countries relating to the safety of air navigation.

More to follow...Sarcs (K2)

[Cactusjack]

AND knowing full well from a much earlier minute from N Tredrea, "manager" compliance and enforcement ( god help us!) to J Bromley "safety (sic) oversight" that the sworn evidence tendered for a criminal case against the intended victim was totally false and unbelievable bollocks.

How is Sargent Shultz Bromley going at the CAA PNG anyway? His mate R D Collins is up there also
Is there some rule that ex CAsA go and join CAA PNG? Mind you the Screamer did send Quinn up there for a mission and that didn't end well

So many stories, so little time! Anyway, someone sent me a CAsA FOI training video, with the Screamer at his best! No wonder those guys act the way they do;

You Tube

[Kharon]

Derring do - on thin ice?

A little Saturday drift here, but it begs the question will the WLR under paragraph (d) 'Other matters" tackle these issues, or roll off the top and drop it all back on the ample miniscule lap?.

Objectives

The principal objectives of the review are to investigate:

• the structures, effectiveness and processes of all agencies involved in aviation safety;

• the relationship and interaction of those agencies with each other, as well as with the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development (Infrastructure);

• the outcomes and direction of the regulatory reform process being undertaken by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA);

• the suitability of Australia’s aviation safety related regulations when benchmarked against comparable overseas jurisdictions; and

• any other safety related matters.

Sarcs post brings to mind a 'tricky' little passage of play in the Pel Air story which has always puzzled me. Was the 2010 MOU used actually in play at the time of the incident? Did the AILU manager start a parallel investigation assuming that ?, he certainly cited it; but wouldn't the active 2004 MOU prohibited this ?. If so, then they seem to have run very close to the 'legal' wind there. I wonder what the AAT would make of the procedural integrity in that.

You see, I have also wondered if Hood wasn't conned by this, he sure distanced himself from the following debacle quick smart; I wonder? did CASA jump the gun and get the Nadi radio transcript before ATSB ?, but not mention it to Hood before he 'signed off'. It would go some way to explaining the strategic withdrawal. Under 2004 MOU CASA would have second dibs on that transcript and have to 'ask'; but under the 2010 issue, they could get first dibs. The mystery of the missing MOU pages still haunts this story.

Aye well, it's puzzle to which we may get an answer this century, once they all decide which version of the CASA response to the Senate will best suit current needs, all the QON are answered, the WLR staggers, exhausted to the finish line and the AFP eventually complete their tasks. February is fast approaching, is being 'detained at the minuscule pleasure' even legal these days?

Heigh ho - I wonder if Chair has worked out yet who handed him the poisoned chalice?.

[Sarcs]

Sundy cogitation on ANA’s, MoU’s, DJ’s, TASRR & any other safety related matters.

Heard a rumour that the Feds investigation into PelAirgate has been stalled while various DIPs get all their ducks in a row & before the WLR panel start sniffing around....just a rumour but most disturbing if true…

Anyway moving on..
Part One: On watering potplants and MOUs

Kharon:

Was the 2010 MOU used actually in play at the time of the incident? Did the AILU manager start a parallel investigation assuming that ?, he certainly cited it; but wouldn't the active 2004 MOU prohibited this ?. If so, then they seem to have run very close to the 'legal' wind there. I wonder what the AAT would make of the procedural integrity in that.

A gentle reminder that the 2010 MOU was officially commissioned/signed off on the 9th February 2010, however the MALIU states in the, now infamous hidden report, CAIR 09/3 synopsis…

It is well worth perusing parts of the various MOUs that were kindly submitted, but then mi..mi..minimised, by FF in their original PelAir inquiry submission.

In the 1999 version we had the following paragraph…



.. in 2001…



..and in 2004..




All good stuff clearly outlining the rules of engagement between FF & the bureau and also indicating that bureau investigations will look at the big picture in a holistic, systemic manner, whereas FF’s emphasis will be solely on matters of possible non-compliance.

The 2010 version however does away with (deletes) all that palaver and cuts straight to the chase with their newly headed section, which the MALIU dutifully refers to in the CAIR 09/3 synopsis, ‘Parallel Investigations’…



Gone are the good old days where the bureau held the ultimate trump card, where the singular objective was to learn from accidents/incidents to help mitigate safety risk and where we met our international obligations under the articles of the Chicago Convention.

IMO this disconnection with the real world perception of AAI best practice is quite well highlighted in paragraphs 5.16-5.20 of the 1999 MOU..

Oh what a conundrum.... for the miniscule and his WLR panel…

Here’s and idea just scrap the 2010 MOU, go back to the drawing board and use the 1999 MOU as a blueprint for a new MOU…my 2 bob’s worth..


Q/ Hasn't the 2010 MOU now time expired?? Hmm..perfect opportunity perhaps..

[LeadSled]

Cactus,
Last time I heard from CASA PNG, the contract of one J. Bromley was not renewed.Maybe somebody can update us on what he is doing now??
Tootle pip!!

[Kharon]

One for the Toshers.

Wiki –"A tosher is someone who scavenges in the sewers, especially in London during the Victorian era. The word tosher was also used to describe the thieves who stripped valuable copper from the hulls of ships moored along the Thames. The related slang term 'Tosh' referred to valuables thus collected, both are of unknown origin.

Brother Sarcs has just placed the WLR on the road to a veritable minefield, a large one. At first the road is deceptively easy to tread. But the business of ICAO Annexe 13, Chicago 26, the Air Navigation Act, the Transport Safety Act and the CASA – ATSB Memorandum of Understanding are all harbingers of the rocky, dangerous path toward presenting an acceptable report to industry. So, as it's straight down to business on Monday and, it's what we are paying for: If you would care to consult your agenda:-

ToR. • the structures, effectiveness and processes of all agencies involved in aviation safety;

Item 1 - the infamous Pel Air CAIR 09/3 synopsis.

This document, (IMO) standing alone, is worthy of 'proper' inquiry. The WLR won't even get close to an 'in-depth' analysis of the twists, turns, embuggerance or legally manufactured smoke and mirrors resulting in the unholy TSI/ MOU shenanigans. Thank the heavens, that it is still part of the Senates remit, unanswered and unsullied.

Just to actually find in the original CAIR 09/3 in the first iteration of the 'attachment package' was a feat of investigative dexterity. The first tabled version was 'withdrawn', only to be returned with some 20 (30 by some counts) pages less in the second incarnation (interesting word count by the way): granted the 1999 and 2001 MOU had been removed; but, the page/word count still don't tally. The entire 'package' was large and CAIR 09/3 was buried deep within piles of tedious bumf. The official tale will be that the 99/01 MOU had 'no relevance', and rightly so until you start to unwrap the history of the CASA take over of the ATSB heart, mind and soul. What was it Nixon said?; "When you have a man by the balls, his heart and mind will follow"; - something along those lines.

Here, for the curious a puzzle; is it administratively improper to 'use' a MOU which is 'coming', but has not yet arrived?; sure it's academic, but isn't the AAT is required to notice such things, perhaps as being a signpost toward the intent to be mischievous. Then, there is this:-

The CASA Manager Accident Liaison and Investigative group (MALIU) was tasked with CONDUCTING a parallel investigation for CASA purposes. An investigation was commenced the next day". etc.. my bold and caps.

As a Federal enforcement agency CASA must (in no uncertain terms) comply with the ‘Australian Government Investigative Standard 2003’. (AGIS 2003). The issuing of a Form 333 ‘Request for Investigation' or 'Recommendation for AIN’ must be completed, submitted and approved to officially refer an investigator to the case. Strict protocols and procedures are required to be completed. There was no Hansard evidence presented which justifies or proves that the Pel Air "Investigation" was initiated according to the terms and conditions prescribed within the CASA document Investigators Manual (AGIS 2003).

A CASA investigation team must comprise at least one Part IIIA delegated investigator. No public evidence was provided (in Hansard) to support Mr. White (MALIU) being qualified as a IIIA in order to 'conduct' the investigation, indeed, no nominated IIIA investigator or investigation running sheets or logs were publicly provided to the Senate. Perhaps they were given 'in camera', benefit of doubt and all that.

But it would be of some interest to define who was the delegated the Part IIIA investigator 'conducting' and to sight a copy of the form '333', justifying the cost benefit analysis, both authorising and approving the investigation; as well as appointing the IIIA investigator. It is believed that Mr White was appointed to a new position created as a consequence of the Miller review and the 2010 Memorandum Of Understanding. In this position, one could reasonably expect White would have been totally cognisant of both the 2004 and 2010 MOU and the TSI Act 2003. Is it therefore reasonable to assume that White would also have understood all CASA obligations in relation to an ATSB accident investigation under the then effective 2004 MOU and the obligations to ICAO under the ANA.

Item 2 next time, this tale is not as long as Galsworthy's Forsyte Saga, but it has nearly as many twists and turns, the ending ?, Ah well children we'll just have to wait and see.

Selah.

[Kharon]

Item 2. - Means, motive and opportunity.

ToR. • the structures, effectiveness and processes of all agencies involved in aviation safety;

Having established under, the 2010 MOU, the means for direct involvement in the Pel Air investigation, one must next consider the motivation for the extraordinary series of events which were to immediately (the next day) follow. The chronology of events is 'interesting' from both an audit and operational perspective, but the really interesting parts don't stand out until much later; up front it seems that CASA have now elected to conduct an audit, 'special audit and IIIA investigation (got busy didn't they).

From the 'special audit', starting Thursday 26/11/09 to being operational again Friday 18/12/09. (Arithmetical interlude 17 working days + 6 weekend; travel time not included) to being able to satisfy all the CASA audit findings is remarkable. Just a quick look at the issue dates on the RCA (as were) refines and trims the time line even further. Not wanting to bore everyone with 'detailed' analysis, consider this; how long does a 'special' audit take to do, how long does it take to compose and produce the 'report', raise the RCA and findings and get the whole shebang back to the manager and out to the operator – usually (ish)?.

Then consider the number of RCA (as were) issued that needed to be acquitted; the last issued 23-24 December 2009: CASA FOI issues 14 RCA and a number of AO. Now these and the previous RCA need to be acquitted by 28/01/2010.

18 December 2009: Pel-Air successfully completed Phase 1 items and were able to recommence domestic operations.

Then consider the operator actions, RCA to be addressed, reading, meeting, discussions, ops manual amendments, publish and present to CASA. Then to have the operational parts 'accepted' and the Check/Train parts 'approved' and returned to the operator for distribution and acknowledged receipt. Remember some CAR 217 'bits' required evidence to prove that 'everyone' was up to speed.

24 December 2009: Pel-Air successfully completed Phase 2 items and were able to recommence international operations.

8 January 2010: CASA issue 7 more RCA and several more AO, some of which the manager (acting) as the Audit Coordinator signed off; on behalf of several SAR team members.

Pretty damn slick, no wonder CASA hired the PA chief pilot. It all points an inquiring mind in one direction, a two tier approach. Lots of glad handing and 'attaboys' up front, but a 'rock solid' pilot error case being built up for an AAT hearing; just in case. What a shame the files seemed to have 'co-mingled' (as they do when unattended). Don't forget the 'Chambers report' was in the works at about the same time: some say it was aimed at denigrating the 'opposition' within the Bankstown putsch; McComic swears blind it was commissioned for the betterment of aviation; cynics say it was used to con DoIT into parting with more money. Buggered if I know – you pick one, or invent your own (everyone else has).

While all this was going dear Greg (aka Robin) Hood was digesting the mountains of information being provided by the manager (acting) and his off sider (MAILU); Greg had the juice to sign the paper work you see, but of course he expected 'just the facts ma'am' on which to base his weighty decisions, CAIR 09/3 included. Must have been a shock when the R/T transcript and CAIR 09/3 revelation of indiscretions were closely followed by a letter from DJ's lawyers, along with a brisk, stiff little 'note' (redacted) following on their heels from he-who-do-voodoo, all went off with a quiet, just audible bang.

The Notice has been issued prior to a draft report into the ditching of Pei-Air flight VH-NGA off Norfolk Island being finalised by CASA. In these circumstances, the Notice is not appropriate. lt represents a denial of procedural fairness and natural justice that findings have been made regarding my client without him being given right of reply or without a report or even a draft report being finalised.

Here endeth the Monday lesson. Well Vicar, what's it to be, meat and three veg or wet salad sandwiches ?; the troops are hungry.

Selah.

[Cactusjack]

3+3=8

From the 'special audit', starting Thursday 26/11/09 to being operational again Friday 18/12/09. (Arithmetical interlude 17 working days + 6 weekend; travel time not included) to being able to satisfy all the CASA audit findings is remarkable. Just a quick look at the issue dates on the RCA (as were) refines and trims the time line even further. Not wanting to bore everyone with 'detailed' analysis, consider this; how long does a 'special' audit take to do, how long does it take to compose and produce the 'report', raise the RCA and findings and get the whole shebang back to the manager and out to the operator – usually (ish)?.

Kharon, back then, at the conclusion of the audit the Inspectors go their separate ways and write their individual analysis per their field of expertise or discipline. This information is fed back to the Lead Auditor of the group. Often he has to wait for the data because the other inspectors have other tasks to do, sometimes annual leave, trips to Montreal etc, before giving the Lead Auditor the information. He then collates the information and drafts a full report and executive summary as well as a breakdown of the NCN's and Observations individually. Then it goes to the Field Office Manager for sign-off/approval before being sent to the airlines key person. However, if there is some kind of spotlight or attention on the audit there may be a requirement for the Field Office Manager to pass the audit report on to the GM Operations (in Pel Air's case Hoody was in that role at the time) for further scrutiny before the operator receives the report. Occasionally Team Mrdak, even the Minister will be advised in advance, just incase some bad publicity is likely (of course it is all about self preservation and protecting their pathetic sorry asses).

Deep breath. So, how long does it take, as per Kharons question for the report to be finalised? Well how long is a piece of wet lettuce?? The average timeframe used to be around 6 weeks, perhaps a week sooner, sometimes 2 to 3 months, depends. Now there are risk review groups and the lame Sky Sentinel that are meant to cut the down the time it takes.

But one thing is certain, the Pel Air 'timeline' is odd, very odd indeed, and it is, in my opinion very short. Obviously such an in-depth query would be best not being answered by a mere armchair critic and spectator such as myself, but by a commission of inquiry by say someone like some independent senators. Or perhaps a Xenophon/Fawcett style duo, but not likely as they lack the necessary muscle. They are astute enough, even ballsy, it's just that their balls are held tightly by the governments robust hands.
Things really just don't add up do they? Anyhoo, perhaps if we can carve through the Pel Air crock of **** we can revisit the travesty called Transair/Lockhart before opening the next big can of worms - Canley Vale?

Leadie, interesting. I wasn't aware that Sergeant Shultz was possibly no longer employed with the CAA. Perhaps he will come back to Australia and take up the DAS role once the Angry Man has been sacrificed by the WLR?


TICK TOCK

[Prince Niccolo M]

Terms of reference

Kharon,

We couldn't wait to see the ex-Minister for Transport front the Senate and explain from his perspective as the Chairman and a very well remunerated aviation consultant how Pel-Air got to be the way that it was and indeed how they proved to be so agile as to rehabilitate themselves in what clearly was unusual haste - but they were nowhere to be seen.

Now, as I understand it, the leader of the Forsythe saga has made it clear that the terms of reference do not extend to revisiting the Pel-Air Inquiry and that the usual subjects who raise similar issues will be dispensed with as tendentious and vexatious whingers.

So what are the chances that the script already writ will be that Australian aviation regulation is not unreasonably different from the reference nations and we can all relax for the life of the 44th Parliament?

[halfmanhalfbiscuit]

Trim

Looking at the various versions of the report in trim might be fun. Sounds very efficient how quickly the report and ncn's processed.

Leadie, interesting. I wasn't aware that Sergeant Shultz was possibly no longer employed with the CAA. Perhaps he will come back to Australia and take up the DAS role once the Angry Man has been sacrificed by the WLR?

Somehow I think he'll have a few years more to wait yet. Hoody could then be ready?

The one question that needs answering is how come casa is taking so long. Easa has created one set of rules across Europe.

[Kharon]

Item 3: Crime and punishment.

Caution – long post. So, having quite happily given the Pel Air operation a gold star, a donkey on which to pin the tail became a requirement; as the pilot error scenario was writ and it very handily provided the least line of resistance the process was, with indecent haste, put in train. Dom James was a sitting duck, the whole thing was managed with extraordinary ease. I expect DJ had guilt, shame, shock, horror, disappointment, a certain amount of denial must have been mingled amongst the sheets of self doubt. This, combined with being isolated would (IMO) not be conducive to adequately boiling a kettle, let alone take on the might of CASA, on a mission – however; he stuck in and tried.

Having copped the humiliating suspension, (furry muff most would say); he soldiered on and passed the required exams. We all know how tough the ATPL exams are, particularly flight planning, but pass he did. A reasonable man would accept this as proof that an adequate knowledge was demonstrated – because if not, then every man jack here with an ATPL is operating on a false premise. The DJ exam results were examined and it was decided that a pass was not enough, having the requisite hours was not enough, in fact nothing else would do but:

Assessment of the ATPL KDRs conducted through an oral examination subsequent and separate to the flight test component. This assessment would include a complex scenario to assess the items from the Flight Planning Examination (Determine Sector Fuel Burn, Determine TOPD, Determine PNR/DP). This assessment would use the aircraft type from the ATPL Flight Planning exam (B727). The difficulty with this is finding an FOI with suitable 727 experience and recent knowledge of the performance aspects of the aircraft.

A suitable and preferable alternative is to base the assessment on the Westwind. Len Veger is very familiar with the
performance aspects of this aircraft as a result of his input to the investigation and AAT process. James is also suitably
familiar with the type.

The above is winnowed from the 200 odd pages I have ploughed through related to what was done, why and how to DJ. DJ is not an isolated case and it is important to us all that the flaws, (or loopholes if you like) that allow double and even triple jeopardy to become a weapon in the hands of ambitious, self aggrandising folk with no conscience whatsoever, is stopped; right here, right now.

It is interesting to note that the (acting) manager of this squalid affair selected three of the least qualified FOI to dream up the DJ re qualification scheme. None have ever flown 'serious' line operations, certainly not 'on international', in jet aircraft under multi crew operating rules. There are qualified, good men who could, conceivably, have dreamed up a scheme, but they were more likely to say - "well, he's passed ATPL, he's passed MECIR, give him a proficiency check under his CAR 217 system; if he passes that, what else is there we can or need to do. He's legal, turn him loose with a note to the HOTAC requesting a report on every check or training flight he undertakes". A reasonable response may even add a caveat – "should the pilot not be employed under a CAR 217, the ATPL may be deemed 'frozen' until such time as a proficiency check under a CAR 217 system is satisfactorily completed".

But no, not DJ. As I read and study the information I have it becomes apparent that not only was James to be suspended, but on the insistence of one man and despite some pretty good legal advice from Messrs Aleck and Rule, supported by a fairly nifty 'dodge' from Hood preventing his signing of 'the' managers (acting) letter the point was to be pressed home with preposterous determination and totally decimate the career of what could be; potentially an asset to an operating company. I should add that Messrs Aleck, Anastasi and Rule where simply and probably honestly attempting to provide sound legal advice to a twisted operational matter; bit like a pilot trying to act as a Barrister in high court, or a Barrister trying to act as PIC of an international jet; when you think about it. Interesting, but is it really practical?.

Said it before, but I'll say it again; DJ is not the only one there, suffering for one mans notions of justice. But it gets worse, when you think of why was it done this way (apart from sheer ambition driven spite).

A study of Hansard seems to clearly indicate that at sometime during the CASA investigation it was decided to abandon the Section 20A line of possible enforcement action. If this is so, the abrupt change of tack should also be identified in the mandatory documentation, submitted by the 'investigation' team reporting to the (acting) branch manager. It would be of some interest to see who instigated this directional change and whether it was due to CASA realising that a Safety Recommendation was imminent.

It would be of considerable interest to evaluate the entire document trail related to this about face and where the aborted brief of evidence is. The audit team, investigating appear to have been initially tasked with examining the potential for prosecuting the Pilot under Section 20A of the Civil Aviation Act; a strict liability, criminal penalty offence.

Thus revealing possible adverse implications from the findings of the Special Audit Team and subsequent enforcement actions inflicted on the Pel-Air pilot. Consider that several of the issued RCA were directly relevant to the Company and pertinent to the Critical Safety Issue. CASA attachment to Mr White’s letter states:

“Section 20A of the Civil Aviation Act also makes it an offence to operate an aircraft being reckless as to whether the manner of operation could endanger the life of another person (or the pilot)

This appears to indicate that initially CASA were considering a line of enforcement action under Section 20A of the Civil Aviation Act.

There is seriously a lot of information to work through, the email chains require further, careful rearrangement in chronological order to extricate the story, entire; but based on the work so far, I'd say Dom and couple of other slightly less savoury cases have the wood on the wabbit.

The point of course is can the WLR handle the investigations required to 'see' through the smoke and mirrors to the fatally flawed areas of legislation where the vermin hides? That's a fair question I'd say, given the evidence so far.

A question then, to determine if the Vicar can cut the mustard?? What's wrong with following statements.

I spoke to Dominic James• regarding lifting the suspension on his CPL and CIR and the. conditions that CASA has a mind to apply to his licences. The summary of the conversation as follows:
• I asked James when he intended to address the complex flight planning, scenario and he indicated that he would
address in the near future however has not yet prepared for it.
• I asked if he then wished CASA to reconsider lifting the suspension on the CPL and CIR to which he said he did
want it lifted: •
• I asked that he send an email to that effect and he advised he would only do that if he considered CASA were
serious about lifting the suspension.
• I advised that CASA will seriously contemplate lifting the suspension.
• I also advised that CASA had a mind to attach the following conditions to his licence
o Requirement that CIR renewals to be conducted by CASA or a person approved by CASA
o Requirement to report to CASA his employment arrangements and any change in his employer within 7
days of that change. • • '
o These requirements would be in place for a period of 2 years following lifting of suspension.
• James expressed concern that this would prevent him being employed. I advised that these conditions were
necessary to enable CASA to conduct on-going surveillance In order to be satisfied that he maintained the
appropriate standards following lifting of the suspension.
• I explained he could consent to the conditions or CASA could take show cause action to vary his licence to add
the conditions.
• He asked I email the details as discussed. I will draft an emall and obtain review from XXX prior to dispatch.

Well, with any semblance of humour well and truly rendered nugatory, I'll go and see to Gobbledock's beloved Pachyderm (elephant), that never, ever fails to cheers me up.

Selah.

[Cactusjack]

Tick tick goes the aviation safety clock

Careful Kharon, references to Gobbledocks often end with threads confined to the tidy bin
However, the mystique of the Pel Air fiasco has more twists and turns than an inflamed Inspectors colon. There is no doubt that when a 'reasonable' person (watch CAsA try to define the word 'reasonable') examines the entire episode including Dom's statements, the Senate Inquiry revelations, the accident report, and the dubious timelines and prior oversight of Pel Air, one see's that Professor Reason's causation methodology of there being more than one contributing factor becomes easier to see than a 300 foot taxpayer trough sitting an inch away from a CAsA executives nose!!
Dom did screw up a tad, no doubt about that. Dom's actions are one aspect of the accident. The other aspect as we know, is the actions/inactions/reactions of those wily CAsArites and how they instantly scampered and dwucked down their wabbit buwwowes quicker than somebody could shout 'OINK'! Why would a robust safety upholder who claims transparency and accountability in most of its written rhetoric ( you know, glossy brochures, media releases and senate statements) act in such a manner?

Bring on Canley Vale!!

TICK TOCK