ANZ Erebus crash 28 November 1979 - 34 years later.
I got your drift Oakape.
I was trying to explain the point that is argued and didn't mean for it to come across like I was directing it at you. I share your view point. The disappointment comes when people only want to acknowledge the mistakes made by one party or another and refuse to acknowledge that most parties involved made mistakes.
Cheers.
I was trying to explain the point that is argued and didn't mean for it to come across like I was directing it at you. I share your view point. The disappointment comes when people only want to acknowledge the mistakes made by one party or another and refuse to acknowledge that most parties involved made mistakes.
Cheers.
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In order to bring an end to the pathetic hand-wringing can I, on behalf of those who think that Peter Mahon was an old fool with a brain tumour, acknowledged that numerous Air New Zealand employees were negligent, including the captain - but the captain's negligence was by far the worst. To name a flight-safety award after that gentleman is a disgrace.
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An aspect that has always puzzled me is that with the reported viz at McMurdo when Captain Collins and crew were at low level why at least one didn't ponder why Erebus was invisible.
Am also aware there was at least one crew who had the spare F/O with a Topo continually plotting their position with ref to the Lat/Long display on the overhead panel.
Am also aware there was at least one crew who had the spare F/O with a Topo continually plotting their position with ref to the Lat/Long display on the overhead panel.
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This is not a forensic issue: Any intelligent person who who can be bothered spending a few hours examining the evidence will, if venturing an honest opinioin, ascibe a degree of fault to the crew and, in particular, to the captain.
This is nothing more than applied politics. NZALPA know that they got very very lucky with Mahon, so they continue to try to keep his conclusions embedded in stone – and it has worked, for 34 years.
The fact is that most NZers, if asked about the Eerebus disaster, would trot out a version of Mahon’s report. So congratulations, NZALPA. Well done.
This is nothing more than applied politics. NZALPA know that they got very very lucky with Mahon, so they continue to try to keep his conclusions embedded in stone – and it has worked, for 34 years.
The fact is that most NZers, if asked about the Eerebus disaster, would trot out a version of Mahon’s report. So congratulations, NZALPA. Well done.
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An opinion written by Macarthur Job, a former Senior Inspector with the Air Safety Branch of the then Department of Civil Aviation. An ex flying doctor, charter and aerial work pilot, who has been pre-eminent in his work as an aviation safety promoter and educator.
It's interesting that the NAT tracks have been suffering a series of gross navigational errors as a result of errors in the nav data bases in recent times. Air New Zealand nav department come to mind?
Notwithstanding the airline’s lamentable role in the many factors that contributed to the accident, and the enormous integrity with which the Royal Commissioner went about his searching Inquiry, did his findings go too far?
Did they overlook fundamental principles of air navigation? The basic terrain-clearance philosophy of IFR flight; and the concept, inherited from generations of seafaring experience, of command responsibility? Will they pose problems of precedent that could one day have far- reaching implications?
For example, how valid can be an opinion, no matter how eminent, whose entire basis and background is essentially legal, on operational judgements made in a highly technical environment? What are we to make of a situation where a professionally qualified government authority, with statutory powers for the safe ordering of air navigation, can have its rulings overturned by legal but technically "lay" arbiters who do not carry that statutory responsibility?
Minimum Safe Altitudes are prescribed for air routes throughout the world to ensure aircraft are not put at risk by descent into areas of high terrain. Both Air New Zealand and the NZ Civil Aviation Division agreed that the MSA for the last 33nm of the route to McMurdo was 16,000 feet.
With terminal conditions at McMurdo poor, the sound navigational procedure would have been to remain at this height until within range of the McMurdo radar, checking over the last portion of the flight that the distance to run on the AINS was of the same order as the DME distance from the McMurdo TACAN.
But, the captain, having spotted a break in the cloud, decided to descend from FL180 when still some 43nm out and not yet identified on McMurdo radar. At this stage the aircraft was only some seven minutes’ flying time from the destination waypoint, when the McMurdo aids could have been relied upon for a safe letdown.
The crew thus contravened the MSA requirement by undertaking a descent without corroboration of position from ground based aids. The fact that no VHF transmissions of any sort were being received from McMurdo also did not assume the relevance it might have.
Airline flight crews are constrained by regulatory requirements. If a crew member transgresses those regulations, he can expect to be disciplined. It was thus surprising that the Royal Commissioner condoned the breaking of MSA requirements on the basis of the conduct of previous Antarctic flights, and the perceived need to provide sightseeing passengers with "their money’s worth".
Even so, it was the Royal Commissioner who succeeded in uncovering the unpalatable facts about the airline’s internal deficiencies and conduct, evidently missed by the technical investigation, which progressively and inexorably painted this unfortunate crew into a corner.
A major, technically complex investigation of this sort, where much hangs on the exact establishment of cause (and, inevitably, the apportioning of blame) is demanding in the extreme. Because of all that is at stake, it can also be subject to subtle but real commercial influences from various "interested parties". Political motives and media pressures for "instant answers" are also brought to bear.
For all these reasons it is plain that such an investigation requires both unfettered technical expertise and highly ethical "outside" objectivity — of the standard provided by Mr Justice Mahon’s Inquiry — if it is to arrive at the unbiased truth.
But could the Royal Commissioner’s findings in this particular case mean that the airline industry might eventually come to the point where the whole basis of command responsibility, as it has been traditionally understood, becomes outmoded? If so, who will then hold the ultimate responsibility for the safe conduct of an airline flight?
In an age when increasingly computerised operational technology is being imposed on the world airline industry — not without serious reservations in some cases — these questions still await answers.
Did they overlook fundamental principles of air navigation? The basic terrain-clearance philosophy of IFR flight; and the concept, inherited from generations of seafaring experience, of command responsibility? Will they pose problems of precedent that could one day have far- reaching implications?
For example, how valid can be an opinion, no matter how eminent, whose entire basis and background is essentially legal, on operational judgements made in a highly technical environment? What are we to make of a situation where a professionally qualified government authority, with statutory powers for the safe ordering of air navigation, can have its rulings overturned by legal but technically "lay" arbiters who do not carry that statutory responsibility?
Minimum Safe Altitudes are prescribed for air routes throughout the world to ensure aircraft are not put at risk by descent into areas of high terrain. Both Air New Zealand and the NZ Civil Aviation Division agreed that the MSA for the last 33nm of the route to McMurdo was 16,000 feet.
With terminal conditions at McMurdo poor, the sound navigational procedure would have been to remain at this height until within range of the McMurdo radar, checking over the last portion of the flight that the distance to run on the AINS was of the same order as the DME distance from the McMurdo TACAN.
But, the captain, having spotted a break in the cloud, decided to descend from FL180 when still some 43nm out and not yet identified on McMurdo radar. At this stage the aircraft was only some seven minutes’ flying time from the destination waypoint, when the McMurdo aids could have been relied upon for a safe letdown.
The crew thus contravened the MSA requirement by undertaking a descent without corroboration of position from ground based aids. The fact that no VHF transmissions of any sort were being received from McMurdo also did not assume the relevance it might have.
Airline flight crews are constrained by regulatory requirements. If a crew member transgresses those regulations, he can expect to be disciplined. It was thus surprising that the Royal Commissioner condoned the breaking of MSA requirements on the basis of the conduct of previous Antarctic flights, and the perceived need to provide sightseeing passengers with "their money’s worth".
Even so, it was the Royal Commissioner who succeeded in uncovering the unpalatable facts about the airline’s internal deficiencies and conduct, evidently missed by the technical investigation, which progressively and inexorably painted this unfortunate crew into a corner.
A major, technically complex investigation of this sort, where much hangs on the exact establishment of cause (and, inevitably, the apportioning of blame) is demanding in the extreme. Because of all that is at stake, it can also be subject to subtle but real commercial influences from various "interested parties". Political motives and media pressures for "instant answers" are also brought to bear.
For all these reasons it is plain that such an investigation requires both unfettered technical expertise and highly ethical "outside" objectivity — of the standard provided by Mr Justice Mahon’s Inquiry — if it is to arrive at the unbiased truth.
But could the Royal Commissioner’s findings in this particular case mean that the airline industry might eventually come to the point where the whole basis of command responsibility, as it has been traditionally understood, becomes outmoded? If so, who will then hold the ultimate responsibility for the safe conduct of an airline flight?
In an age when increasingly computerised operational technology is being imposed on the world airline industry — not without serious reservations in some cases — these questions still await answers.
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[Macarthur Job quoted by Brian Abraham.] What are we to make of a situation where a professionally qualified government authority, with statutory powers for the safe ordering of air navigation, can have its rulings overturned by legal but technically "lay" arbiters who do not carry that statutory responsibility?
FAQs The Mahon Report was originally shelved (unaccepted by Parliament) upon the report’s release in 1981. In 1999, Maurice Williamson tabled the Mahon Report in the NZ Parliament, which finally recognised the report as an official government report.
In science, something approaching the truth may be found in a statistical analysis of the data. Given exactly the same circumstances as Collins, how many pilots would do what he did?
Obviously we can only guess. What do you reckon, Brian?
The way I see it is, no matter how many systematic errors are made by the Company prior to the flight they could have ALL been rendered null and void by a crew that didn't descend below MSA. This suggests to me some level of responsibilty on part of the crew and particulary the Captain. The argument that others have broken the rules so it is OK for me to brake the rules is not valid now anymore than it was then. Sure the investigation / Company and Government actions were acdisgrace. But we must all acknowledge that ANY well run researced report would have also placed blame, atleast partially, at the feet of the crew. Saying the plane was doomed when it took off may be valid with something like TWA or Pan Am but is an insult to other crews who wouldn't have flown a passenger jet in such a wreckless manner.
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It was thus surprising that the Royal Commissioner condoned the breaking of MSA requirements on the basis of the conduct of previous Antarctic flights, and the perceived need to provide sightseeing passengers with "their money’s worth".
He had to say "surprising", would not have been PC to say "stupid"
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Given exactly the same circumstances as Collins, how many pilots would do what he did?
Obviously we can only guess. What do you reckon, Brian?
Obviously we can only guess. What do you reckon, Brian?
It would seem ANZ was imbued with a "get the job done" ethos, and remember that NZers have been at the forefront in their history for innovation. A rightly proud nation with credits in many fields. But when "getting the job done" is a feature of corporate culture it can be a slippery slope. Read up on Prof. Diane Vaughan and her "normalisation of deviance". The failure of previous flights to comply with SOPs was very much a "normalisation of deviance". And everyone new of the deviance, for it was made a feature in the airlines advertising.
My own experience, is that where "normalisation of deviance" is a corporate feature, new comers wonder what in the world is going on at first, but readily adopt the culture. A Pprune poster, Sunfish, knows full well the company of which I speak, and is one of the few who saw the light and said it was not for him.
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Blah, blah, blah.
What point, "Brian", are you attempting to make?
To get straight to the point, were the crew of TE901 in any way to blame?
If "no", you're deranged.
If "yes", what's the point of your continued contributions and lengthy irrelevant quotations?
What point, "Brian", are you attempting to make?
To get straight to the point, were the crew of TE901 in any way to blame?
If "no", you're deranged.
If "yes", what's the point of your continued contributions and lengthy irrelevant quotations?
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Brian, thanks. We can all understand how and why Collins crashed, and we can forgive. What we can't say is he was without fault.
The shambles at AirNZ was systemic and less forgivable. Nevertheless, most pilots at AirNZ at the time felt Collins must take some blame, according to my contacts.
This constant picking at a sore hoping it can be made to heal without a scar is absurd. It's not going to happen.
The shambles at AirNZ was systemic and less forgivable. Nevertheless, most pilots at AirNZ at the time felt Collins must take some blame, according to my contacts.
This constant picking at a sore hoping it can be made to heal without a scar is absurd. It's not going to happen.
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Hempy, if you read Chippendales report he gives a good insight into the phenomena.
Of course he does Ornis, but the need is to understand why he did what he did.
Read my previous that threads on this subject never end well.
most pilots at AirNZ at the time felt Collins must take some blame
This constant picking at a sore hoping it can be made to heal without a scar is absurd. It's not going to happen.
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Had Collins not broken the rules, he would have been safe. Surely that is incontestable?
Had Collins been down before he might have been more aware of the dangers - whiteout - he might have behaved differently; not broken the rules. Can we agree on that?
The divergence seems to be: Factors most people accept contributed and help explain what happened, some people feel excuse Collin's decisions - a few even to the point he was blameless. Is that a fair assessment?
I think Collins left NZ determined to see Erebus. As circumstances changed he didn't, for whatever reasons: mindset. He made shocking error. That's what humans do, sometimes.
I don't understand the NZALPA mania - keeping the matter alive. It's pathetic.
Had Collins been down before he might have been more aware of the dangers - whiteout - he might have behaved differently; not broken the rules. Can we agree on that?
The divergence seems to be: Factors most people accept contributed and help explain what happened, some people feel excuse Collin's decisions - a few even to the point he was blameless. Is that a fair assessment?
I think Collins left NZ determined to see Erebus. As circumstances changed he didn't, for whatever reasons: mindset. He made shocking error. That's what humans do, sometimes.
I don't understand the NZALPA mania - keeping the matter alive. It's pathetic.
Brian, thanks. We can all understand how and why Collins crashed, and we can forgive. What we can't say is he was without fault.
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Yeah I've read it. I know they didn't see Erebus until they hit it. I've seen the photos they took in the helicopter down there as well showing the phenomena in action. I still don't know how it's relevant to this accident...it's like saying a speeding drunk driver hit a tree because it was raining.
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Hempy: it's like saying a speeding drunk driver hit a tree because it was raining.
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I'll concede that, adding that the fact was known that the woman was a slut and a liar before going to bed with her.
'd say it's more like spending the night with a woman who says she's on the pill, doing what you want to do, then finding you've got an accident on your hands.
