QF near miss over Great Australian Bight
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The reason for a lateral offset is to avoid flying directly over traffic coming the other way.
One way routes do NOT have traffic coming the other way. The clue is in the name.
Therefore lateral offset on one way routes does not enhance separation, and may in fact reduce it.
One way routes do NOT have traffic coming the other way. The clue is in the name.
Therefore lateral offset on one way routes does not enhance separation, and may in fact reduce it.
Couldn't possibly happen right? I get the point BTW, but at the pointy end..I see more and more holes lining up in Oz airspace.
If we discount the possibility because we assume procedures and implementation are robust, then we have the potential to miss the last step that could prevent an incident/accident.
Im not saying an offset is a panacea, but it does add another layer..we do it all the time through far busier airspace on one-way airways in other parts of the world as a matter of course and common sense.
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haughtney1 one of us is missing something and maybe its me. If you offset right, and the same direction traffic offsets right, what have you gained?
ETA - Ok it was me. Hands up, I was wrong. Thats something we should probably implement. Presumably it would only involve moving en-route routes a further 2 miles apart, and defining start/end gates. Routes across the bight might be a good place to start.
ETA - Ok it was me. Hands up, I was wrong. Thats something we should probably implement. Presumably it would only involve moving en-route routes a further 2 miles apart, and defining start/end gates. Routes across the bight might be a good place to start.
Last edited by Nautilus Blue; 21st Sep 2013 at 18:28.
Nautilus,
Google SLOP for the NAT procedures. They have some good examples of incidents that highlight why SLOP (being either on track, 1nm right or 2 nm Right) is a good thing.
the Don
Google SLOP for the NAT procedures. They have some good examples of incidents that highlight why SLOP (being either on track, 1nm right or 2 nm Right) is a good thing.
the Don
Being 1 miles off track makes dick all difference inside radar.
However. outside radar we have procedural standards and there are certain criteria that each stand has.
For example. For a distance standard of 20miles, the preceeding aircraft must be flying directly to the point. Therefore if atc has cleared the aircraft to off set by 1 miles- they are not flying directly to the point and thus you can not run a distance standard.
However. outside radar we have procedural standards and there are certain criteria that each stand has.
For example. For a distance standard of 20miles, the preceeding aircraft must be flying directly to the point. Therefore if atc has cleared the aircraft to off set by 1 miles- they are not flying directly to the point and thus you can not run a distance standard.
And anyway, many of these problem would not have happened if like the rest of the world you have two pairs of eyes per sector.
It is unbelievable that in australia we use an atc system that only have a stca function (from memory 60 seconds before impact) that only works in radar coverage.
Most of you don't realize that out side radar, the only thing stopping a mistake is one person sitting watching. There is no conflict alarm. It is all done by one person watching the screen finding the conflicts by himself. The system does not point out any conflicts.
It is unbelievable that in australia we use an atc system that only have a stca function (from memory 60 seconds before impact) that only works in radar coverage.
Most of you don't realize that out side radar, the only thing stopping a mistake is one person sitting watching. There is no conflict alarm. It is all done by one person watching the screen finding the conflicts by himself. The system does not point out any conflicts.
Hey, it's completely possible that the controller was on his tenth shift in a row. I've done it. I've watched others do it.
I count on you guys to be on the ball and some pr1ck has signed off on you doing ten shifts in a row? How can that even be legal?
Are you serious?
Listen guys, there are 100's of pages on this site that you can read. You should not be shocked.
I am just waiting for the day when something really does go tits up in a big way. My guess it won't be a midair- it will be lockhart river situation where atc monitors some one into a hill or a foreign crew miss-understands the worlds best practice only in Australia procedure and ends up running into something in class g airspace because they were expecting a separation service as an IFR flight just like everywhere else in the world. It will be something like this.
tick tock
Holy ****.
I checked Pprune to see how inaccurate the media beat up of a near miss was (200m loss of separation - right, and how far horizontally?) and it seems for once, it really was as bad as is being reported.
Wow... serious pucker factor.
I checked Pprune to see how inaccurate the media beat up of a near miss was (200m loss of separation - right, and how far horizontally?) and it seems for once, it really was as bad as is being reported.
Wow... serious pucker factor.
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I've made the same observation as Capt Bloggs on more than one occasion. The ability to put .1NM right in (or have it automatically fed in) above 20,000' would be enough to stop the head on case - the GPSs are that accurate. (I know it doesn't fix the crossing problem, but if you knew someone was going to fire a bullet over your head on a fixed line, would you be happy to stay on that line and rely on his aim to fire it over your head, or, being a 'belts and graces' man (as most would hope all airline pilots are), would you take one step to the side as well, 'just in case'?
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Talk about swiss cheese though....
Aircraft dispatched with unserviceable TCAS (or TCAS failed at some point on EBO)
Aircraft requests climb in vicinity of other traffic
Climb request approved (obviously incorrectly)
By the time the climb commences after approval (or near enough to) crossing traffic is in the exact spot to cause a mid air....
Luckily TCAS was serviceable on one of the 330's!
Aircraft dispatched with unserviceable TCAS (or TCAS failed at some point on EBO)
Aircraft requests climb in vicinity of other traffic
Climb request approved (obviously incorrectly)
By the time the climb commences after approval (or near enough to) crossing traffic is in the exact spot to cause a mid air....
Luckily TCAS was serviceable on one of the 330's!
Given that on the western side of AD the aircraft are on diverging one-way routes, offsetting to the right of track would have made the situation worse. Don't have the chart to give the angle of the track split.
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Originally Posted by blueloo
Aircraft dispatched with unserviceable TCAS (or TCAS failed at some point on EBO)
tartare
....... and how far horizontally?.....
....... and how far horizontally?.....
malroy
Given that on the western side of AD the aircraft are on diverging one-way routes, offsetting to the right of track would have made the situation worse. Don't have the chart to give the angle of the track split.
Given that on the western side of AD the aircraft are on diverging one-way routes, offsetting to the right of track would have made the situation worse. Don't have the chart to give the angle of the track split.
Last edited by kookaburra; 22nd Sep 2013 at 05:43. Reason: typo
I think one possibility as to why only 1 aircraft acted on the RA is the fact that the controller picked up their mistake pretty quickly and cancelled the climb/started the descent.. Not entirely sure how pilots are trained (yes I'm the other side of the radar), but I suspect if you had just been issued climb, then as you were leaving the level you got told "safety alert, cancel climb, maintain FL380, traffic 3 miles 12 o'clock 800ft above" and then you got a RA telling you to descend you might not feel the need to tell the controller that TCAS was telling you to do what they had just told you to do..?
Anyway just a thought.
Also seems to me that the media seems to be glossing over the fact that the controller realised the mistake and acted to fix it immediately. Not sure if it was before or after a STCA. Still a huge mistake, but it would be nice for some balanced reporting.. But I guess "controller makes mistake then rectifies it, and along with the added safety net, crises averted" doesn't strike the fear into the flying public as much as making out that an (overworked, undertrained, reckless) air traffic controller pointed 2 at each other and if not for TCAS/quick acting pilots we would of lost 600 lives.
May be wrong, but I'll make my mind up when some more facts are made available. For all we know it was an experienced, well trained, well respected controller who made their first major error in a lengthy career..
Anyway just a thought.
Also seems to me that the media seems to be glossing over the fact that the controller realised the mistake and acted to fix it immediately. Not sure if it was before or after a STCA. Still a huge mistake, but it would be nice for some balanced reporting.. But I guess "controller makes mistake then rectifies it, and along with the added safety net, crises averted" doesn't strike the fear into the flying public as much as making out that an (overworked, undertrained, reckless) air traffic controller pointed 2 at each other and if not for TCAS/quick acting pilots we would of lost 600 lives.
May be wrong, but I'll make my mind up when some more facts are made available. For all we know it was an experienced, well trained, well respected controller who made their first major error in a lengthy career..
Originally Posted by WhisprSYD
Also seems to me that the media seems to be glossing over the fact that the controller realised the mistake and acted to fix it immediately. Not sure if it was before or after a STCA. Still a huge mistake, but it would be nice for some balanced reporting.. But I guess "controller makes mistake then rectifies it, and along with the added safety net, crises averted" doesn't strike the fear into the flying public as much as making out that an (overworked, undertrained, reckless) air traffic controller pointed 2 at each other and if not for TCAS/quick acting pilots we would of lost 600 lives.
I have flown to BKK when the TCAS has failed. I advised ATC and offset 1nm right of track.
There are a lot of places in the world that that recommend offsets. (See Africa). Honestly, with the accuracy of GPS's these days, it is one more defence mechanism to avoid swapping paint in the cruise.
There are a lot of places in the world that that recommend offsets. (See Africa). Honestly, with the accuracy of GPS's these days, it is one more defence mechanism to avoid swapping paint in the cruise.
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Framer, nobody makes you work 10 in a row at ASA. I have done it on occasion, yes it's tiring but it's up to the person involved to make the right decision. Invariably if you are working 10 in a row it's for the money.
I would have no sympathy for anybody on their 10th day in a row, f@rking up and then blaming fatigue.
I would have no sympathy for anybody on their 10th day in a row, f@rking up and then blaming fatigue.
Framer, nobody makes you work 10 in a row at ASA... it's tiring but it's up to the person involved to make the right decision. Invariably if you are working 10 in a row it's for the money.