ABC Radio Intervew Richard de Crespigny
Yes and I don't know
Richard de Crespigny, Qantas's Captain Marvel in second mid-air saga | News.com.au
Richard de Crespigny, Qantas's Captain Marvel in second mid-air saga | News.com.au
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If its mentioned in the book - I will buy it because that's unlucky in anyone's language and I would be interested to what he has to say about that!!!!!!
Hope things don't come in three's.
Hope things don't come in three's.
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35yearpilot (Richard?)
LAND ASAP was displayed was it? Reference?
Ummm, yes it was and in red. Ref: FCOM and the ATSB report
What is the burn rate for jet fuel (perhaps in comparison to gasoline) and at what speed might it blow out?
Do you mean fire burn rate or engine consumption? The burn rate of jet fuel was very evident in the Concorde crash (which flies slightly faster than the A380 even at low alts) and it didn't 'blow out' (if that is what you mean). Running out of fuel wasn't a first issue or my point.
The similarities between the Concorde crash though i.e. wing tank ruptured during/after take off, massive fuel leak, fuel ignites... should be reflected upon when considering how long is too long to hold following a serious failure with a serious fuel leak.
What do you think?
LAND ASAP was displayed was it? Reference?
Ummm, yes it was and in red. Ref: FCOM and the ATSB report
What is the burn rate for jet fuel (perhaps in comparison to gasoline) and at what speed might it blow out?
Do you mean fire burn rate or engine consumption? The burn rate of jet fuel was very evident in the Concorde crash (which flies slightly faster than the A380 even at low alts) and it didn't 'blow out' (if that is what you mean). Running out of fuel wasn't a first issue or my point.
The similarities between the Concorde crash though i.e. wing tank ruptured during/after take off, massive fuel leak, fuel ignites... should be reflected upon when considering how long is too long to hold following a serious failure with a serious fuel leak.
What do you think?
Last edited by MASTEMA; 25th Jul 2012 at 12:01.
"should be reflected upon when considering how long is too long to hold following a serious failure with a serious fuel leak."
My experience in Airline/Airbus flying is that the industry is to focused on completing drills and checklists even with a red LAND ASAP staring at you than just landing the jet. I have flown for airlines where you would fail a sim check by landing without checking landing distance and completing all ECAM's etc.
We are just victims of our training. Hand flown engine out is another example.
My experience in Airline/Airbus flying is that the industry is to focused on completing drills and checklists even with a red LAND ASAP staring at you than just landing the jet. I have flown for airlines where you would fail a sim check by landing without checking landing distance and completing all ECAM's etc.
We are just victims of our training. Hand flown engine out is another example.
Considering the systems were all reportedly so degraded, would you blindly follow a LAND ASAP caption?
Again, I'm not an airline pilot, but if the aeroplane was so badly damaged I'm sure I'd be skeptical of what the information systems were telling me.
Again, I'm not an airline pilot, but if the aeroplane was so badly damaged I'm sure I'd be skeptical of what the information systems were telling me.
Mastema.
Ummm No...You are wrong... A "LAND ASAP" was NEVER displayed to this crew.
Source: ATSB report, and speaking to some of the operating pilots.
Ummm No...You are wrong... A "LAND ASAP" was NEVER displayed to this crew.
Source: ATSB report, and speaking to some of the operating pilots.
Last edited by Jimothy; 24th Jul 2012 at 22:08.
Nunc est bibendum
Does the aeroplane need to say 'land now' in order to make a decision to 'land now'?
I'm going to wait until the report is out to see before I make a more refined judgement but my gut says working through all the messages for an hour plus when you have potential structural damage and fuel streaming out of holes in the wing near where an engine blew up means you haven't quite diagnosed the totality of the situation.
Similarly, sitting on the ground for 60 minutes waiting for the steps to arrive with fuel leaking, hot brakes, an engine that won't shut down which also indicates severe electronic issues in a wing where there is fuel leaking out, is a very brave call when a precautionary disembarkation with slides was available. Sure, I get the desire to not injure anyone on the slides which is a possibility even with a precautionary but still.......
So those are my gut feelings. I'll await the final report and see what the ATSB says about it all. Perhaps my gut feeling is way off the mark. Time will tell.
I'm going to wait until the report is out to see before I make a more refined judgement but my gut says working through all the messages for an hour plus when you have potential structural damage and fuel streaming out of holes in the wing near where an engine blew up means you haven't quite diagnosed the totality of the situation.
Similarly, sitting on the ground for 60 minutes waiting for the steps to arrive with fuel leaking, hot brakes, an engine that won't shut down which also indicates severe electronic issues in a wing where there is fuel leaking out, is a very brave call when a precautionary disembarkation with slides was available. Sure, I get the desire to not injure anyone on the slides which is a possibility even with a precautionary but still.......
So those are my gut feelings. I'll await the final report and see what the ATSB says about it all. Perhaps my gut feeling is way off the mark. Time will tell.
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lads, if you were not there, then you don't know. Its that simple. Armchair pilots are a pain in the arse. Take it from one who has been there, just hanging in there. Therefore I have taken a great interest in what this bloke has to say, can relate to how he felt afterwards, and how he handled the situation. The bus is on the ground, no PAX or crew lost, the incident not caused by pilot error, a excellent amount of experience on the flight deck, and a successful outcome. For his book then good luck to him, if he has embellished it slightly well so have we all, especially after having a few, the runways get smaller, and the engine fires get bigger, human nature. I would far rather read his book than his obituary, and I imagine that just about goes for all of you.
Reducing to a weight that would allow the aircraft to be stopped on the 4000m runway was also a consideration. With an already-significant fuel leak present, motoring off the end of the runway would not have been ideal. I understand D.E. spent a fair bit of time determining if sufficient runway was available and at what weight it would be, given the failures.
IF the ECAM did say "LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE". That doesn't mean now, it means as soon as possible i.e. when everything is in order. No point blindly reacting to a message and then crashing off the end of the runway. 
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It might be Ramadan, 45deg in the shade and a bit sandy but I am sure I didn’t imagine a post from ‘35yearpilot’. Why the delete?
At the end of the day, the aircraft landed safely with nil injuries. Richard is hailed a hero, makes a motza, has become the darling of the media and maybe the next Flight Centre Captain, who knows? All the kudos, success and motza to him.
Events like these are such important learning tools and there are a few very important factors and considerations worth discussing here. If I had the chance to interview Richard, this is what I would ask;
Richard thanks for joining us…
Q. If you had the chance to do it all again, what would you do differently?
Q. I read in an Airbus safety report that it is strongly recommended that you be on the ground following a fire on board within 15mins, red LAND ASAP within 60mins and amber LAND ASAP within 180mins. From the ATSB report it took 50 mins to complete all checklists and total event time was 109mins. Is that correct?
Q. From the ATSB report; engine two had a fire warning then exploded, you were unable to establish if both fire agents had been discharged, engines one and four were in degraded mode, engine three in alternate mode, you had a severe fuel leak, it was obvious that there was serious damage to the wing, hydraulics and electrical systems. Given the previous question, were did landing sit in the level of priorities?
Q. From the ATSB report; given all of the failures which obviously resulted in a large landing factor and approach speed (166kts), the computer calculated that you had only 100 remaining of the 4000m available. What would have your decision been if the computer said you required greater than 4000m?
Q. Did the QF 001 runway overrun in BKK factor in the decision process?
Q. There was a considerable level of experience and resource available in the cockpit (SO, FO and two CC). Given that you had available; gear down, flap 3, reverse on #3, antiskid, max braking and 4000m of runway, do you think that there was an over analysis of the situation and a mentality of “we can’t screw this up like QF 001 did” rather than prioritise the LAND ASAP and real possibility of the wing falling off or loss of control?
Richard is more than welcome to give actual answers here on Pprune.
At the end of the day, the aircraft landed safely with nil injuries. Richard is hailed a hero, makes a motza, has become the darling of the media and maybe the next Flight Centre Captain, who knows? All the kudos, success and motza to him.
Events like these are such important learning tools and there are a few very important factors and considerations worth discussing here. If I had the chance to interview Richard, this is what I would ask;
Richard thanks for joining us…
Q. If you had the chance to do it all again, what would you do differently?
Q. I read in an Airbus safety report that it is strongly recommended that you be on the ground following a fire on board within 15mins, red LAND ASAP within 60mins and amber LAND ASAP within 180mins. From the ATSB report it took 50 mins to complete all checklists and total event time was 109mins. Is that correct?
Q. From the ATSB report; engine two had a fire warning then exploded, you were unable to establish if both fire agents had been discharged, engines one and four were in degraded mode, engine three in alternate mode, you had a severe fuel leak, it was obvious that there was serious damage to the wing, hydraulics and electrical systems. Given the previous question, were did landing sit in the level of priorities?
Q. From the ATSB report; given all of the failures which obviously resulted in a large landing factor and approach speed (166kts), the computer calculated that you had only 100 remaining of the 4000m available. What would have your decision been if the computer said you required greater than 4000m?
Q. Did the QF 001 runway overrun in BKK factor in the decision process?
Q. There was a considerable level of experience and resource available in the cockpit (SO, FO and two CC). Given that you had available; gear down, flap 3, reverse on #3, antiskid, max braking and 4000m of runway, do you think that there was an over analysis of the situation and a mentality of “we can’t screw this up like QF 001 did” rather than prioritise the LAND ASAP and real possibility of the wing falling off or loss of control?
Richard is more than welcome to give actual answers here on Pprune.
Last edited by MASTEMA; 25th Jul 2012 at 12:07.
Buy his book and perhaps all will be revealed!
Good points by Keg about gut feeling - obviously there's a sliding scale to be negotiated, with 'this looks really bad, let's get it on the ground as quick as we possibly can before it falls apart and kills us all' on one end, and 'don't rush into it and do something really stupid which kills us all' on the other.
It appears they trod the middle ground, as no doubt most people would, gathering information and processing it before deciding they were ready and it was time to land.
Good points by Keg about gut feeling - obviously there's a sliding scale to be negotiated, with 'this looks really bad, let's get it on the ground as quick as we possibly can before it falls apart and kills us all' on one end, and 'don't rush into it and do something really stupid which kills us all' on the other.
It appears they trod the middle ground, as no doubt most people would, gathering information and processing it before deciding they were ready and it was time to land.
I just read the book and whilst it doesnt have all the answers (will need the official report due out end of the year for that), you can see it was a good decision not to land straight away. It will be interesting to see what the report mentions on their calculated and actual approach speed and stall speed in their degraded configuration, as it seems like the margin was extremely low.
The book is a good read and there is plenty of praise for the rest of the crew, especially the FO. My hat off to all of them that day. The book does also mention in detail the 744 engine failure on his attempted dead head trip home.
The book is a good read and there is plenty of praise for the rest of the crew, especially the FO. My hat off to all of them that day. The book does also mention in detail the 744 engine failure on his attempted dead head trip home.
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I tend to agree with Teresa, in that second guessing the guy after the event is very easy, but put yourself in the same position and you might be left wanting.
The one thing that does cause me a degree of alarm is the point that Keg makes with regard to control checks and CRM. CRM in Qantas has historically been pathetic (though they will confidently tell you that they are the world leaders!). This effort does nothing but reinforce that opinion.
The one thing that does cause me a degree of alarm is the point that Keg makes with regard to control checks and CRM. CRM in Qantas has historically been pathetic (though they will confidently tell you that they are the world leaders!). This effort does nothing but reinforce that opinion.
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Ummm, Jimothy
From FCOM
If an emergency causes LAND ASAP to appear in red on the ECAM, the flight crew must land as soon as possible at the nearest suitable airport at which a safe approach and landing can be made.
From ATSB report
QF32 had, among other failures, the following;
- engine #2 fire
- engine #2 failed
- engine #3 alternate mode
- engine #1 and #4 in degraded mode
- GREEN hydraulics low pressure and low quantity
- YELLOW hydraulics engine #4 pump error
- failure of AC electrical busses 1 and 2
- flight controls in alternate law
- wing slats inoperative
- ailerons partial control only
- reduced spoiler control
- landing gear control and indicator warnings
- multiple brake system messages
- engine anti-ice and air data sensor messages
- multiple fuel system messages including fuel jettison fault
- center of gravity messages
- autothrust and autoland inoperative
- #1 engine generator disconnected
- left wing pneumatic bleed leaks
- avionic system overheat
Also from the report; "While the SO walked through the cabin a passenger, also a Qantas pilot, pointed out that pictures from the vertical fin mounted camera suggested a fluid leak from the left hand wing. The SO walked down to the lower deck of the passenger cabin and observed damage to the wing and a fluid leak that appeared to be about 0.5meters wide." While back in the cockpit; “They also believed that engine #1 may have been damaged and discussed a number of concerns regarding fuel imbalances that had been indicated by the ECAM.”
There are quite a few FCOM examples to choose from but this will do;
OPERATING MANUAL
PROCEDURES
ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
FUEL
FCOM AJ → 25 NOV 11
FUEL LEAK
A fuel leak may be detected by:
‐ The sum of FOB and FU is significantly less than FOB atengine start, or is decreasing, or
‐ A passenger observes a fuel spray from an engine/pylon, or a wing tip, or
‐ The total fuel quantity is decreasing at an abnormal rate, or
‐ A fuel imbalance is developing, or
‐ Fuel quantity of a tank is decreasing too fast (leak from engine/pylon, or hole in a tank), or
‐ A tank is overflowing (due to pipe rupture in a tank), or
‐ The Fuel Flow is excessive (leak from engine), or
‐ Fuel is smelt in the cabin.
If visibility permits, leak source may be identified by a visual check from the cabin.
WHEN A LEAK IS CONFIRMED LAND ASAP
Not attempting to second guess here, just trying to piece together the decision process and maybe learn from it.
I also recall an excellent video from CRM training years ago. A Delta 767 had an engine explode on takeoff, crew discharged the agents and the warning went out. When they eventually returned to land the tower observed that the engine and wing was still on fire (magnesium fire). They also delayed desembarking pax even though the danger remained.
The class was very divided on the interesting decision process there also.
Maybe that the A380 is built like a tank or there was some incredible luck involved but I am mostly interested to know to what degree the 'QF culture' at the time, determined Capt RDC's decision process.
From FCOM
If an emergency causes LAND ASAP to appear in red on the ECAM, the flight crew must land as soon as possible at the nearest suitable airport at which a safe approach and landing can be made.
From ATSB report
QF32 had, among other failures, the following;
- engine #2 fire
- engine #2 failed
- engine #3 alternate mode
- engine #1 and #4 in degraded mode
- GREEN hydraulics low pressure and low quantity
- YELLOW hydraulics engine #4 pump error
- failure of AC electrical busses 1 and 2
- flight controls in alternate law
- wing slats inoperative
- ailerons partial control only
- reduced spoiler control
- landing gear control and indicator warnings
- multiple brake system messages
- engine anti-ice and air data sensor messages
- multiple fuel system messages including fuel jettison fault
- center of gravity messages
- autothrust and autoland inoperative
- #1 engine generator disconnected
- left wing pneumatic bleed leaks
- avionic system overheat
Also from the report; "While the SO walked through the cabin a passenger, also a Qantas pilot, pointed out that pictures from the vertical fin mounted camera suggested a fluid leak from the left hand wing. The SO walked down to the lower deck of the passenger cabin and observed damage to the wing and a fluid leak that appeared to be about 0.5meters wide." While back in the cockpit; “They also believed that engine #1 may have been damaged and discussed a number of concerns regarding fuel imbalances that had been indicated by the ECAM.”
There are quite a few FCOM examples to choose from but this will do;
OPERATING MANUAL
PROCEDURES
ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
FUEL
FCOM AJ → 25 NOV 11
FUEL LEAK
A fuel leak may be detected by:
‐ The sum of FOB and FU is significantly less than FOB atengine start, or is decreasing, or
‐ A passenger observes a fuel spray from an engine/pylon, or a wing tip, or
‐ The total fuel quantity is decreasing at an abnormal rate, or
‐ A fuel imbalance is developing, or
‐ Fuel quantity of a tank is decreasing too fast (leak from engine/pylon, or hole in a tank), or
‐ A tank is overflowing (due to pipe rupture in a tank), or
‐ The Fuel Flow is excessive (leak from engine), or
‐ Fuel is smelt in the cabin.
If visibility permits, leak source may be identified by a visual check from the cabin.
WHEN A LEAK IS CONFIRMED LAND ASAP
Not attempting to second guess here, just trying to piece together the decision process and maybe learn from it.
I also recall an excellent video from CRM training years ago. A Delta 767 had an engine explode on takeoff, crew discharged the agents and the warning went out. When they eventually returned to land the tower observed that the engine and wing was still on fire (magnesium fire). They also delayed desembarking pax even though the danger remained.
The class was very divided on the interesting decision process there also.
Maybe that the A380 is built like a tank or there was some incredible luck involved but I am mostly interested to know to what degree the 'QF culture' at the time, determined Capt RDC's decision process.
Last edited by MASTEMA; 25th Jul 2012 at 12:18.
Some of you Qantas types here need to smell the roses! On the one hand we are told ad nauseum just how good and valuable are Qantas pilots and why they should be paid more etc etc etc. On the other hand, you are all too willing to be very critical of one of your number who has a fantastic story to tell that reflects positively on all Qantas pilots. I should think you should STFU and collectively bask in de Crespigny's glory - to bag the bloke as you do says more about you than it does him. Get over it!!
RdeC was interviewed on commercial radio in SYD today and heaped strong praise on those who were in the flight deck with him. For a longer interview, I suggest you listen to the Conversation Hour at 1100 SYD time tomorrow on ABC702. This interview will be downloadable in podcast form from the ABC website or via iTunes.
RdeC was interviewed on commercial radio in SYD today and heaped strong praise on those who were in the flight deck with him. For a longer interview, I suggest you listen to the Conversation Hour at 1100 SYD time tomorrow on ABC702. This interview will be downloadable in podcast form from the ABC website or via iTunes.
On the contrary Rod, I was quite impressed with that interview.- Harrowing
Speaking as former resident of your sunny country, I'm with Harrowing on this one. R de C gave full credit in this interview to those who backed him up so well - both flight deck and cabin crew - with an additional word of praise for the cabin crew at the end. Very self-deprecating, but cross too, about failing his check ride, apparently because the check captains "helped" him!
Jack
PS Amused by the interviewer's pronunciation of R de C's last name - is that really how it's pronounced?
Speaking as former resident of your sunny country, I'm with Harrowing on this one. R de C gave full credit in this interview to those who backed him up so well - both flight deck and cabin crew - with an additional word of praise for the cabin crew at the end. Very self-deprecating, but cross too, about failing his check ride, apparently because the check captains "helped" him!
Jack
PS Amused by the interviewer's pronunciation of R de C's last name - is that really how it's pronounced?
As the long running earlier VH-OQA thread is closed, it wouldn't be a bad thing if our long-suffering VICTIM OF A BORED GOD mod-man did not have cause to apply the gag again.
Last week's interview given on the ABC FM radio program called Margaret Throsby's Guest should not be listened to by any too precious about the 'oh my god .. . wow .. . . ' factor. (It was Margaret after all who asked the late Alex Henshaw . . ' So did the Germans have Hurricanes or Spitfires?')
And anyway it is the interviewed rather than interviewee who is of prime interest.
On a completely minor point, R DE C does say quite erroneously that we get our VH prefix from Victor Holyman, a co-founder of Holyman's Airways and ANA. That cannot be because the allocation of VH and a swag of others round the world occurred in 1928, predating Holyman's by some eight years.
The former closed thread had mention of a book 'Mayday' but no other detail. It did get a run here back in 2003 -
PPRuNe Forums > Dunnunda, Godzone and the Pacific > DG&P Reporting Points > "Mayday" - book by QF Capt. John Winslow (ret.)
B767300ER
3rd Jul 2003
Just finished reading a softbound book, "MAYDAY" by QF (retired) 747 Captain John Winslow. Subtitled "17 Amazing true-life stories of aircrew fighting near impossible odds to bring their crippled aircraft back to earth."
Very good read, and very good commentary by Capt.Winslow.
Introduction by Nancy-Bird Walton, AO OBE
Highly recommended!
Also, it had some very enjoyable stories about checking out/qualifying new Captains/FOs at QF. Very enlightening perspective of QF training, which obviously is very good.
twobigtesticles
9th Jul 2003
I think I saw this book in a newsagent, and whilst i certainly didnt look at it thoroughly, a quick glance appeared to show that some of the articles were just copies or summaries from Mac Jobs Air Disaster Books.
B767300ER
10th Jul 2003
Not copies of Mac Job's fine "Air Disaster" series, but similarly formatted. "Mayday" has photos, but no artwork like "Air Disaster", and the stories are only 3-5 pages long. In "Air Disaster", the stories are much longer and more comprehensive.