Swiss Cheese ASA Style

[gobbledock]

Mr J McCormick: We have not actually discussed the disposition of the report, other than to say that we will complete that work and then work with Airservices Australia to address the findings, such that they are.

I feel like a Bride on her wedding day, very eager. C'mon John, surely the report is complete. Wouldn't it have been completed , disseminated and made available to the Senators, as it should be completed in line with CASA internal guidelines and procedures? Or is it more likely that no formal guidelines and processes exist to back your statement?

Then again, couldn't Board member Mr Danos (Mr Danos was appointed as the Chair of CASA’s Board Audit Committee in February 2010) ensure that any agreed time frames are met? Oh no, speaking of audits and the recent highlights of CASA's inability to conduct proper, mature and robust audits of anything from Pelair to ASA to the Brisbane Regional Office bloody green buildings worm farm, would it be safe to question whether his role is tenable or even moderately working? Or is he only a participant in ICAO and FAA audits of CASA?
Then again, maybe all of the Board, the Director, Deputy Director, Associate Director and a cast of merry men, nuptys, mid-level spin doctors and other assorted members of Club 'Those Who Shall Feed From Troughs' need to spend some quality time discussing said matters over expensive wine, lobster and truffles at Brisbane and Spamberra's most exclusive restaurants prior to anything be released?
Footnote: All funded by industry and the taxpayer! Good to see your money well spent.

I am smelling a lack of robustness in favor of the smell of s#it!

OINK OINK

[Sarcs]

Noticed that Ben is still punching away at his keyboard...more's the pity you blokes can't get some mainstream media coverage.

ATSB updates information about ‘lost’ Virgin Australia 737
Ben Sandilands| Nov 15, 2012 12:00PM |EMAIL|PRINT

The ATSB update on the incident on 28 September in which AirServices Australia lost its awareness of a Virgin Australian 737 for most of its flight between Sydney and Brisbane is a detailed reminder that the air traffic controller is a danger to the safety of flight in our skies until it fixes some significant deficiencies in the competencies of its controllers and its management.

This was an incident in which the original notification of the incident to the ATSB was amended to tell the truth to the ATSB after an initial attempt to portray it as a procedural error.

It also lead to AirServices Australia issuing statement that lied about the nature and seriousness of the incident, and continuing to lie about it even when Plane Talking published the amended incident notification (see link).
This link ends with a guide to the reporting of the incident and the untruthful description of it provided by AirServices Australia in a chronological sequence.

In its attempt to discredit the Plane Talking report AirServices Australia this is what the Acting Chief Executive Officer of AirServices Australia, Andrew Clark, said, in the second of two untruthful statements made to this publication.

The aircraft was never ‘lost’ to Airservices air traffic controllers. It continued to be displayed on all air traffic control displays managing the airspace and was not in the vicinity of any other aircraft.

The lost status of the flight is however confirmed in this section of this morning’s ATSB update.

The 737’s flight data record had been inhibited on the controllers’ displays for a total of 27 minutes, which was equivalent to a flight distance of about 222 NM (411 km). During this period, none of the controllers involved were aware of the aircraft’s presence in their respective airspace. There was a loss of separation assurance. The ATSB has examined the recorded radar data and found no separation conflicts in the affected airspace during that time.

The issues that have arisen from this incident, and many other examples of dangerous and incompetent behavior by the air traffic controller are of acute concern. Australia has an ATC provider with a proven inability to safely and professionally separate airliners, and a management that lies.

This is totally unacceptable, and puts Australian and foreign airliners in our skies at risk.

Still you got to hand it to Ben he's like a dog with a bone!ATSB updates information about 'lost' Virgin Australia 737 | Plane Talking

[1Charlie]

I'm confused. Last week a manager told me the entire east coast services north group is basically surviving on overtime, and that the overtime budget has been blown out. Yet in Australian Aviation the CEO says "there is no staff shortage, we employ 922 controllers from a minimum requirement of 743". Would the overtime budget really be a problem if there was truly enough staff? And would I have needed to do 20 hours of overtime in the last two weeks?

[wateroff]

Aus ATC -We Understand .........

From the office at 35 000', and every thousand below depending on the stack.

We Understand ......................and we know.

You want to manage air traffic

You want us to be on schedule

You are goal orientated like us

You would like increase the frequency of air traffic to be in line with global practices

You are frustrated being bound by rules that date back to 1956

You know the Division of Grayndler needs a new member.!!!!!!!!

You know a simpler more efficient system is possible

You, like us, use great aussie colloquialisms about the people in charge of this mess, when the PTT is off - hopefully

You know - the smart arse asking to cancel speed and track shortening is just joking. guuuyyys - reallly!!!

You know - we know, that they know - there IS A BETTER WAY!!!

You know - we're doing our best, and you doing your best - but there is just something, something preventing it from working like it should.


So, from us up here to you guys and gals down there - Merry Christmas, and here is to a New Year with less of the current ' shall we say ' people living under the flightpath, who make the rules, and who could IMPROVE aviation in Oz.

[longtermatc-career]

Xxxxxxxxx

[Kharon]

Questions of ATC.

Perhaps some of our esteemed ATC colleagues could answer some questions which keep cropping up at Safety Management meetings. We have asked your management but the answers seem a little too 'fluid' for practical purposes. All questions are safety related and we would like some answers.

1) Why is it so hard sometimes to get the latest METAR or traffic for descent lately, we had one crew report actually overflying a reporting point and not being able to make that position report for 18 minutes. Why is frequency congestion such a repeated reported complaint?

2) Why are there so many promises about new technology to resolve the expensive, potentially dangerous delays, especially during bad weather made and not kept?

3) What is the delay on restructured airspace, this has been coming for years; in flight delays involve costs approximating the proposed budget surplus. When is our new efficient airspace due into service?

4) Is true that the indecent amounts of fees your monopoly generates are used to provide funds for court cases and first class travel and accommodation for the 'management' class. Does this explain why important safety matters above are not being dealt with?

5) Can you confirm that combined or reduced service routes or airspace is no longer declared on NOTAM ?

We ask these questions in the interest of the travelling, tax paying passengers who may at some stage become the victims of the current situation. Please explain so can acquit the safety issues our committee has to deal with on a regular basis.

[C441]

I wonder what a good 4-Corners journalist would make of all this.......

[Hempy]

Originally Posted by C441

I wonder what a good 4-Corners journalist would make of all this.......

It'll all come out in the Royal Commission...

Oh and to the Lawyer or Journo researching all this in the future, let it be known that we told them, they just wouldn't listen. :-(

[Robbovic]

According to business experts (oxymoron?) a new CEO has 100 days to put theirmark on an organisation.
Air Vice Marshall Madge is running out of time.
Also going on leave for most of january.
Havent heard the chain saw yet Madge.
Still copious amounts of dead wood in Cantberra.

(sigh) here we go again!!!

[Baileys]

It will all come out in a royal commission....people have been saying that ever since the TAAATS transition. What's that - 15 years? You might be waiting a while yet I think.

All that has really happened in that time is 3 or 4 times reshuffling of the management deck chairs - away from Canberra back again and sideways. A few good projects completed. Mindless chasing of false efficiencies by cutting actual ATC numbers whilst at the same time a ballooning (tripling maybe?) of bureaucrats busying themselves with busy work and meetings about finding more efficiencies in the ATC numbers. A crazy scheme to rearrange the whole airspace and management structure and retrain everyone a few times whilst promoting the elite ATC's to ALM (managers). This would some how save heaps of money and be sooooooo efficient for the airlines. Everyone below bureaucrat level was quietly wondering/laughing/eye-rolling about that doozy.

None of that really sounds like good business for anyone but it's not really royal commission stuff either. Just annoying for all concerned. Australian ATC's are actually quite good at their jobs so I would doubt you will see a mid air here. Fingers crossed.

[Robbovic]

"promoting elite ATCs to ALM..."

(cough, cough) care to run a poll in Brisbane and Me lbourne as to how many of their ALMs they think are/were elite? Most were those who chose to sell their souls for filthy lucre in the days when contracts were offered above the odds.

[Gentle_flyer]

Kharon, According to controllers I know Airservices has no plan. Their new CEO has apparently made comments that have used up any sympathy she may have got from Heffernan and co. in the Senate. The controllers now call her "Gregaret". Presumably in honour of her seemingly mimic words of the previous incumbent. Her full name was spelled out to me by one who saw it on the controller's blog. If my memory is correct it was "Gregaret Back Staib, Sheikess of Tweak". I am sure one of the controllers will correct me if I have got it wrong? From one of the controllers that attended her briefing she is going to "transform the business". When asked what she meant she indicate the main change was that RAAF and Civil controllers would use the same system. Talk about an anti-climax as this will not do a thing to negate the increasing traffic levels, increasing age demographic of the controllers (i.e. older), and the increasing number of close breakdowns of separations. Airservices should be asked just two questions: 1/. What are you going to do to address the problems confronting Airservices in the short term, i.e. to 2020? 2/. When Airservices finally commissions AFS/CMATS or whatever the GEE WHIZ name that they give the new system, what is going to be different for the controllers at the workface that is better than the current system? Guess what? At the moment the controllers know of nothing in the pipeline before AFS/CMATS and most controllers I know tell me that the goss inside the big project is that it will struggle to do what the current one does. So if honestly answered it would be 1/. NOTHING and 2/. NOTHING. Oh dear. Me thinks the new CEO has a problem!!

[gobbledock]

Dryden vs Australian skies?

Watching the unfolding saga in our skies for some time now has bothered me to say the least. Dryden kept popping up into my mind, an accident I studied 15 years ago. So I went back to the books (and Google) over the last few days and I have posted a snippet of the accident here.

Too many similarities to what Australia is going through, and without surprise inadequate regulatory oversight, funding and bureaucracy as usual pop up their rotting head.
Have we learned any lessons since Dryden, which incidentaly should have had an impact on us here? You be the judge.
(my bolding)

Dryden Disaster, Three Years Later A Look Back On The Crash Of Air Ontario Fokker F28

Author Martin B Aubury January 1993;

On 10 March 1989 an Air Ontario Fokker F28 crashed just after take-off from Dryden Ontario with the loss of 24 lives. The pilot attempted the take-off with ice on the aircraft wings. Why he had done so became the subject of a vast judicial inquiry that delved deeply into the contributing factors which arose from commercial pressures and inadequate safety surveillance.

"The aircraft was hitting trees, hitting trees, and at that point the aircraft I guess was decelerating and we were inside the blender effect... you take a blender, throw in some metal, some trees, people and turn it on." So ended Air Ontario flight 1363 in March 1989. So ended Canada's delusion that the country could have cheap, deregulated air fares without the need for extra air safety surveillance.

The Air Ontario Fokker F28 aircraft crashed immediately after take-off from Dryden Municipal Airport. A routine accident investigation soon found that the aircraft had been unable to gain height because its wings were covered in ice and snow. The pilot should have known that the aircraft could not fly in this condition. When investigators looked at why the pilot had attempted a take off, it became apparent that the real causes of the accident lay at the heart of deregulation and that because of deregulation, traditional air safety standards had been cut.

The accident was all the more tragic because just seven weeks earlier, warnings within the regulatory authority Transport Canada had been leaked to the press. In part the leaked memo said, "Air carrier inspection is no longer capable of meeting even minimum requirements necessary to ensure safety. In fact, it is no longer able to assure the Minister of the safety of large air carrier commercial air services in Canada". It went on with the ominous warning, "The situation is to the point where every ACI (Air Carrier Inspector) and an increasing number of industry pilots are convinced that a major accident is inevitable".

The routine accident investigation was subsumed into a judicial inquiry under the Honorable Virgil P. Moshansky. His report clearly shows that competitive pressures caused by commercial deregulation cut into safety standards. Moreover the regulatory authority was aware of this but could not counter it because the government was cutting regulatory resources.

The two government policies of commercial deregulation of the airlines and fiscal restraint on federal government services together, were a recipe for disaster. Unfortunately it is a recipe which is being repeated in Australia.

Economic deregulation of the airlines started in the USA in 1978, Canada followed in 1984. In December 1985 the Canadian House of Commons Transport Committee was warned that competitive pressures would erode self policing by the industry of its safety standards. At the same time Transport Canada arranged a number of visits to the USA to learn from their experience of deregulation.

To counter safety problems arising from deregulation the US authority eventually had to double its safety surveillance staff. Some of the Canadians knew that they too needed more resources but their pleas fell on deaf ears.

A report by the Director of Licensing and Certification outlined the problems confronting US authorities. It listed more than 50 areas of concern including:
- rapid expansion of airlines into unfamiliar areas of operation
- inexperienced, unqualified and/or over extended management
- incomplete or inaccurate records -
- non-compliance with approved procedures
- increased contracting out of training and maintenance
- use of unauthorized or improperly trained maintenance personnel
- improper/inaccurate control of aircraft weight and balance


The report was prophetic in predicting the factors which later contributed to the Air Ontario accident.

Air Ontario Inc. was formed by the merger of Air Ontario Limited and Austin Airways. Under the impetus of deregulation it changed from being mainly a charter and cargo operation with a mix of generally small aircraft, to become a feeder airline for the large national carrier Air Canada. Air Canada effectively owned Air Ontario and wanted to project its corporate image through its subsidiary by way of marketing, logo and decor. Unbeknown to passengers Air Canada deliberately distanced itself from operational and airworthiness aspects of Air Ontario.

Similar deceptions are prevalent in Australia.

The judicial inquiry found that Air Ontario had rushed the introduction of its relatively large and complicated jet powered F28. Some personnel were not properly trained and some manuals and procedures were neither correct nor consistent. These deficiencies were not fully detected nor were they countered by a regulatory authority which was hopelessly under resourced.

On the day of the accident the aircraft was flying shuttle services from Thunder Bay to Winnipeg via Dryden. It was a Friday at the start of school holidays so the aircraft was full. This limited the amount of fuel which could be carried on any one leg of the journey without exceeding the maximum allowable weight of the aircraft. Also the weather was inclement and getting worse, so the aircraft needed to carry enough fuel for a longer than normal diversion. These factors combined to force the airline to schedule refueling during the aircraft's second stop at Dryden.

The aircraft had many unrectified defects. The one which became critical to the accident was an unserviceable Auxiliary Power Unit (APU). This is a small extra engine in the rear of the aircraft which among other functions provides compressed air to start the main engines. The main engines can also be started by an external power supply.

The airline put the pilot in a very difficult predicament when he landed at Dryden. It was not normal to refuel at Dryden. At Dryden there were no ground start facilities so the aircraft was dependent on its APU but the APU was not working. If the pilot stopped the engines he could not start them again. He needed to load fuel but this should never be done with engines running and certainly not with passengers on board. Snow was falling gently. Off-loading and reloading passengers took time and the longer the aircraft stayed on the ground the greater was the need for the wings to be sprayed with deicing fluid. On the Fokker F28 aircraft deicing fluid must not be applied while the engines are running.

The pilot had the aircraft fueled while the engines were running and with passengers on board. Although this is a very dubious procedure it was not then prohibited by Transport Canada and airline instructions were inconsistent. The pilot did not have the wings deiced; again airline instructions were unclear on this point.

With ice on the wings, the wings did not lift properly during take off. The aircraft staggered into the air and crashed just beyond the end of the runway. 24 of the 69 people on board were killed.

The pilot died in the accident and in times gone by the accident would have been dismissed as "pilot error". Now, because aircraft accidents are so horrendously expensive for society, society asks what led the pilot to make his mistake.

Commissioner Moshansky found that the aircraft was operating with an excessive number of unrectified defects, that the aircraft should not have been scheduled to refuel at an airport which did not have proper equipment and that neither training nor manuals had sufficiently warned the pilot of the dangers of ice on the wings. Moshansky blamed Transport Canada for letting Air Ontario expand into operation of bigger, more complicated aircraft without detecting the deficiencies.

Most importantly Moshansky expressed concern that the Government had not appreciated the safety implications of embarking on a policy of promoting increased airline competition at the same time as it was imposing a freeze on safety regulation resources.

Nearly two hundred recommendations arose from the Air Ontario accident but two capture the tenor of the report.

"Transport Canada (should)put in place a policy directive that if resource levels are insufficient to support a regulatory or other program having a direct bearing on aviation safety, the resource shortfall and its impact be communicated without delay to successively higher levels of Transport Canada management until the problem is resolved or until it is communicated to the Minister of Transport".

The Australian Government is still deluding itself that it can trust a deregulated industry to maintain standards and that a strong air safety authority is an expensive luxury. From the Board of the Civil Aviation Authority down, those who accept that a 40% cut in resources has no effect on safety are lauded and promoted. Those who disagree have been ousted.

"Transport Canada establish a mandatory education program to ensure that senior managers and officials of the department who are responsible for or associated with aviation programs are aware of the basis for and the requirement to support policies that affect aviation safety".

How sad that this should be necessary. In Australia, from the Chief Executive of the CAA down, seasoned bureaucrats have been replaced with "agents of change" who adhere to the "right" corporate ethos. From airworthiness, the head of airworthiness, the head of maintenance, the head of training, the head of aircraft certification, the head of aircraft structures and the head of aircraft fatigue have all left.

Canada has suffered a number of air disasters and several resulted in formal inquiries akin to that undertaken by Commissioner Moshansky. When the findings of an earlier Royal Commission by Justice Dubin were reviewed by Australian airworthiness specialists they were gratified to see that virtually all of Dubin's recommendations with regard to aircraft safety were already in place in Australia. Ten years later we should be alarmed at how many of the criticisms and recommendations arising from the Air Ontario accident apply in Australia.

We should be most alarmed because, as happened in Canada, our Government is not funding sufficient surveillance resources to keep the industry honest.

Published in Canberra Times, 7 January 1993 and reproduced with permission of the author Martin B Aubury

Author’s Post Script – Within two years Australia suffered several air crashes that led to Parliamentary and judicial inquiries. These inquiries found that
deregulation in Australia had caused exactly the same irregularities as

happened earlier in Canada and the USA.
Review Of Air Ontario Fokker 28 Crash Three Years Later

Smell something familiar? Apart from the obvious smell of kero mixed with burning flesh (tick tock) the smell of an inept government which employs nimwits to run its aviation agencies is just the start. Lessons learned? Correct, SFA. This accident happenned 23 years ago (the devils number for CASA ) and even back then there were references to Human Factors and pathetic regulatory oversight. AND we have had a number of significant events since then. The only thing missing from the report were references to 'tautology and pony pooh'.

One might even question whether the hallowed SMS is truly as efficient as one would expect? Or is it a tool used by regulators to dodge a bullet and place all blame on the operator? And perhaps if the sulking executives at CASA, ATSB, ASA stopped moaning about there precious reputations and actually got on with doing the job efficiently there actually would be a safer sky for all?
Tick tock

[gobbledock]

Kharon, According to controllers I know Airservices has no plan. Their new CEO has apparently made comments that have used up any sympathy she may have got from Heffernan and co. in the Senate. The controllers now call her "Gregaret". Presumably in honour of her seemingly mimic words of the previous incumbent. Her full name was spelled out to me by one who saw it on the controller's blog. If my memory is correct it was "Gregaret Back Staib, Sheikess of Tweak".

Gee, what a shock! Albo hires a bureaucrat and she starts firing off bureaucratic style mitigation? Apart from announcing she will travel cattle class for work, and that she is on leave in January, she has accomplished what?
Hmmm, she knows only how to be subservient to her Ministerial puppet masters, she will spin, tweak, deflect, fluff, polish and produce glossy reports containing references to polluted numbers and already questionable statistics. Sorry boys, she will be another 'Russell', it's what she does, it's her destiny and loyal duty to the Minister, that's what she is trained to do.
That is, has and remains her career.

[Up-into-the-air]

asa and "Metron"

From the asa web-site, at:

CDM Stage 1 – ATFM | Airservices

CDM Stage 1 – ATFM

Ground Delay Programs
CDM Stage 1 entails the replacement of the Central Traffic Management System (CTMS) tool (which only services Sydney and Perth) with an advanced ATFM application capable of simultaneously managing traffic flows at multiple airports. This new application is called Metron Traffic Flow and it will initiåally manage traffic flows at Sydney, Perth, Brisbane, and Melbourne via a staged implementation plan.

From a traffic management aspect, where demand exceeds capacity, Metron Traffic Flow will regulate traffic into a designated airport in a similar manner to CTMS through the allocation of ground delay. Metron Traffic Flow will issue ground delays through the allocation of Calculated Off Block Times, previously known as Programmed Gate Departure Times.

Stakeholder interaction with Ground Delay Programs (GDP)
Metron Traffic Flow accepts real-time updates to schedule data, either via flight plan submission, airline day of operations changes to scheduled departure times, or ATC live data. As a consequence of accepting real-time updates, Metron Traffic Flow is able to display the most up-to-date demand/capacity information for any monitored airport, which in turn provides both airlines and ATC with an enhanced capability to predict traffic management issues. Therefore to maximise the capabilities of Metron Traffic Flow it will be important that all airspace users update their schedules on “day of operations” as soon as schedule changes become known.

All airlines intending to operate through Brisbane and Melbourne will be required to provide schedule information in advance or call to obtain a landing time in the same manner as is currently required to support CTMS operations through Sydney and Perth (details are available in ERSA FAC S-6). Those users that currently access CTMS or Skyflow for information will need to use Metron Traffic Flow when CTMS is decommissioned.

Aircraft operators (and other affected stakeholders) will be able to view the GDP information for affected flights via web based access to the Metron Traffic Flow tool. User login to this service is managed by Airservices Australia.

Is this going to work, or is there another level of organisation, hence more "swiss cheese" holes.

[Capn Bloggs]

Metron...

Is this going to work

Whether it is working (it is actually functional now, you know) is one thing, but it's hardly creating extra swiss cheese holes...

[I Am ATC]

Agree with Bloggs.

If anything this should have a positive effect on safety: i.e. less aircraft holding or airborne in sectors that are at or over capacity frequently. (Metron is actually one of the safety mitigators that Airservices management frequently hang their hats on when addressing safety threats raised by their own internal threat assessment process)

However - and this is a big caveat - this is all quite theoretical.

It is hard to find information on operational information anymore since the Airservices website got turned in to an online shopping basket (yes we all know where that is heading) , but this is the relevant bit:

http://airservicesaustralia.com/aip/...up/s12-h91.pdf

So, this is all part of the CDM (Collaborative Decision Making) process - however it all got a lot less collaborative late last Friday at the 11th hour when an airline that flies a lot of Fokker 100's took out an injunction against Airservices over the system. Many would have preferred to see Airservices continue with the introduction on Sunday and just let the F100's be non-participants leaving the majority of aircraft attempting to comply and see what the overall net benefit is during the introductory period. Unfortunately, Airservices blinked and suspended the entire thing UFN (although not for YSSY which has been going for some time, and appears to be quite successful by most accounts)

I can not find any record of it, but apparently the cute way of suspending this introduction (after months of training for all parties) was to issue a NOTAM cancelling the SUP!

Talk about being totally non-transparent. How about a NOTAM providing specific information? How about an update on the ATFM webpage? Safety critical information anyone?

...............

METRON has been serving SYD well, but many think this is because it has been operating in isolation: i.e. other airports support the Ground delays so Sydney gets the benefit. When you add in ground delays that will need to occur in SY for BN Arrivals, in SY for ML arrivals, in BN for ML Arrivals, in ML for BN arrivals etc, etc, then the problem becomes one of : is there infrastructure capacity on the ground to do this? The answers coming back are no. Another issue, is that METRON does not actually run it's program in synch will all the participating airports - i.e.: each ground delay program for each airport is run in isolation. You can probably see that this will quickly lead to a GIGO information loop, where an aircraft that has been allocated a ground delay at one airport will not be included in the arrival demand forecast for another. On face value it appears to be a major flaw, but nobody will know until it starts running. And until everyone agrees (collaboration!) to use it and comply with it, it won't run properly.

One thing that has not been mentioned, is that the guy running METRON in Australia is one Gregory Russell. Thats right, the CEO of Airservices Australia who oversaw the awarding of a multi-million dollar contract to METRON (rumoured to now be five times the original budget - approaching $30M!), resigned, and started almost immediately with the same company he awarded the contract to! Is our government or media no longer interested in questions of corruption? Or at least the appearance of corruption?

Metron Aviation - Metron Aviation Appoints Greg Russell as Executive Aviation Advisor

At the end of the day your ATC is doing the best he or she can in this environment, with the toxic culture that this man cultivated, and the many poor decisions that will be his legacy for years to come.

I am ATC, and on behalf of the real professionals who work to get you home as safely and as quickly as the system allows, I am truly sorry we can not do better.

[gobbledock]

One thing that has not been mentioned, is that the guy running METRON in Australia is one Gregory Russell. Thats right, the CEO of Airservices Australia who oversaw the awarding of a multi-million dollar contract to METRON (rumoured to now be five times the original budget - approaching $30M!), resigned, and started almost immediately with the same company he awarded the contract to! Is our government or media no longer interested in questions of corruption? Or at least the appearance of corruption?

Very good point indeed.

Dear Senators: Please place the above mentiond item onto your agenda for the new year. This needs an in-depth probing, because from this end of the blunt stick the smell of something untoward is growing very strong.
Perhaps ASA can produce all records of meetings, trips, consultative services and costs incurred by Mr Russell specific to this company.
One can only assume that taxpayer funds have not been used in any manner whatsoever by Mr Russell to further his career aspirations external to ASA?

It would seem that the deeper one digs the more unpallatable shennanigans and actions are exposed relating to management, oversight and operation of the ASA,CASA and ATSB?

[tontinewarrior]

The current culture came from the top i.e. Greg Russell.
Lots of promises to the front line staff and feigned shock at the lack of availability of leave, career progression, staff planning, age profile, etc.
Guts the training area, dubious appointments/promotions followed by departures to pursue other opportunities. TFN is then pushed out the door following Credit Card issues.
What people did he appoint? What management structure did he put in place?

[Fly_by_wire]

So, this is all part of the CDM (Collaborative Decision Making) process - however it all got a lot less collaborative late last Friday at the 11th hour when an airline that flies a lot of Fokker 100's took out an injunction against Airservices over the system. Many would have preferred to see Airservices continue with the introduction on Sunday and just let the F100's be non-participants leaving the majority of aircraft attempting to comply and see what the overall net benefit is during the introductory period.

Why can't said operator play with the other big boys?