Pursuit of excellence - the X-Factor in training accidents
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Pursuit of excellence - the X-Factor in training accidents
With already 81,930 views and six Pprune pages on the Darwin Air North Brasilia crash, a fresh perspective is needed. Hence this point of view which it is hoped the Mods will not submerge literally with the current thread.
As it is, the Brasilia accident report should be vital reading for airline check pilots, flying instructors, and their ilk. In particular, the ATSB animated picture of the Brasilia flight path is a graphic example of the adage “A picture is worth a thousand words”
Several years ago, an ATO friend of mine died of injuries sustained in a similar asymmetric accident at Camden. In his undoubted enthusiasm to be realistic, he cut the mixture control to simulate engine failure on a Duchess shortly after lift-off. The student, himself a current Boeing 767 captain and flying instructor, was momentarily caught unawares and the aircraft yawed sharply. The ATO was too slow to set up zero thrust - the resulting drag from the windmilling propeller causing severe loss of climb performance. The Duchess clipped tree tops at the departure end of the runway and stalled wings level into rising terrain. The impact was not severe but during the ground slide the aircraft hit an unseen iron girder in long grass and a fuel tank ruptured. Both pilots evacuated the aircraft unhurt but were caught by fire. The student survived although badly burned. The instructor was not so fortunate and died in hospital of his injuries. He was a former student of mine in the RAAF where in 1959 I did his conversion to the Lincoln four engine bomber at Townsville. I remembered him as a keen and enthusiastic pilot.
Recently, I was reminiscing with another former Lincoln pilot about the good old days. He was a retired airline pilot and I was still involved in aviation training. He recalled that during his Lincoln training in 1957 it seemed to him we were rarely flying with four engines going– grumbling with good humour that I was always pulling engines on him. To be fair, in those days the Rolls Royce liquid cooled piston engines on the Lincoln were not as reliable as today’s power plants - engine failures being relatively common. For that reason, simulated engine failures were often practiced after lift-off while feathered propeller landings were part of conversion and recurrent training.
Despite over fifty years between our Lincoln flying and present conversation, I felt a twinge of guilt at what he perceived as my over-enthusiasm for practice engine failures. I wondered how many former students had felt the same way and why on earth didn’t someone tell me about it at the time? In those days, the squadron QFI worked almost single handed for conversion of new pilots to the Lincoln and with twenty or more pilots to worry about, he was a busy man. Commanding Officers ran the squadron while the QFI ran the training. If pilots privately felt the QFI’s enthusiasm for the job was a bit beyond a joke - especially with engine failures – it was a pity that their concerns never reached their Commanding Officer. As result, QFI’s often operated unsupervised in the job, except for an annual flight check at the RAAF Central Flying School.
There were a few hairy moments during conversion training on newly graduated 200 hour pilots who had never flown a multi-engine aircraft - let alone a big four engine tail-wheel bomber. All they had flown were Tiger Moths and Wirraways. Over-confidence is a close relation to over-enthusiasm and looking back at those years of instructing on Lincolns, I am sure over-enthusiasm for training excellence was a factor in close shaves some QFI’s experienced on other types over the years. The 1991 RAAF Boeing 707 fatal accident near East Sale was one such example, attributed to simulation of asymmetric flight training that resulted in a sudden and violent departure from controlled flight.
In later years, this scribe tried his hand at instructing in general aviation. One mellows with age and I soon became cautious of pulling engines at low speed and altitude - whether in a multi-engine type or a Cessna 172. From previous experience I was aware it takes only a momentarily wrong rudder or high nose attitude to cause an accident such as the Air North Brasilia.
Mixture cuts or sudden throttle closure to simulate engine failure at low speed after lift-off can be potentially dangerous, with any training value far outweighed by the risk of mishandling by the student or the instructor.
The two instructors on the Brasilia in Darwin, and the Duchess at Camden, were experienced on type. But I can’t help thinking that in the end their over-enthusiasm for the job may have led to their demise. If only someone in authority had pulled them up sharply when it was clear to others their very enthusiasm to impart knowledge was bordering on perilous for their students. It took 54 years before someone sorted out this writer and made him realise the potential dangers to which he had exposed his students in real aeroplanes all those years ago. Nowadays, simulators are the way to go. Yet, even in the safety of the simulator, instructors need to sit back sometimes and smell the roses, rather than overdo engine failures at V1. While an enthusiastic instructor is generally regarded as an asset to an organisation, over-enthusiasm has been known to lead to dangerous practices in flying training.
As it is, the Brasilia accident report should be vital reading for airline check pilots, flying instructors, and their ilk. In particular, the ATSB animated picture of the Brasilia flight path is a graphic example of the adage “A picture is worth a thousand words”
Several years ago, an ATO friend of mine died of injuries sustained in a similar asymmetric accident at Camden. In his undoubted enthusiasm to be realistic, he cut the mixture control to simulate engine failure on a Duchess shortly after lift-off. The student, himself a current Boeing 767 captain and flying instructor, was momentarily caught unawares and the aircraft yawed sharply. The ATO was too slow to set up zero thrust - the resulting drag from the windmilling propeller causing severe loss of climb performance. The Duchess clipped tree tops at the departure end of the runway and stalled wings level into rising terrain. The impact was not severe but during the ground slide the aircraft hit an unseen iron girder in long grass and a fuel tank ruptured. Both pilots evacuated the aircraft unhurt but were caught by fire. The student survived although badly burned. The instructor was not so fortunate and died in hospital of his injuries. He was a former student of mine in the RAAF where in 1959 I did his conversion to the Lincoln four engine bomber at Townsville. I remembered him as a keen and enthusiastic pilot.
Recently, I was reminiscing with another former Lincoln pilot about the good old days. He was a retired airline pilot and I was still involved in aviation training. He recalled that during his Lincoln training in 1957 it seemed to him we were rarely flying with four engines going– grumbling with good humour that I was always pulling engines on him. To be fair, in those days the Rolls Royce liquid cooled piston engines on the Lincoln were not as reliable as today’s power plants - engine failures being relatively common. For that reason, simulated engine failures were often practiced after lift-off while feathered propeller landings were part of conversion and recurrent training.
Despite over fifty years between our Lincoln flying and present conversation, I felt a twinge of guilt at what he perceived as my over-enthusiasm for practice engine failures. I wondered how many former students had felt the same way and why on earth didn’t someone tell me about it at the time? In those days, the squadron QFI worked almost single handed for conversion of new pilots to the Lincoln and with twenty or more pilots to worry about, he was a busy man. Commanding Officers ran the squadron while the QFI ran the training. If pilots privately felt the QFI’s enthusiasm for the job was a bit beyond a joke - especially with engine failures – it was a pity that their concerns never reached their Commanding Officer. As result, QFI’s often operated unsupervised in the job, except for an annual flight check at the RAAF Central Flying School.
There were a few hairy moments during conversion training on newly graduated 200 hour pilots who had never flown a multi-engine aircraft - let alone a big four engine tail-wheel bomber. All they had flown were Tiger Moths and Wirraways. Over-confidence is a close relation to over-enthusiasm and looking back at those years of instructing on Lincolns, I am sure over-enthusiasm for training excellence was a factor in close shaves some QFI’s experienced on other types over the years. The 1991 RAAF Boeing 707 fatal accident near East Sale was one such example, attributed to simulation of asymmetric flight training that resulted in a sudden and violent departure from controlled flight.
In later years, this scribe tried his hand at instructing in general aviation. One mellows with age and I soon became cautious of pulling engines at low speed and altitude - whether in a multi-engine type or a Cessna 172. From previous experience I was aware it takes only a momentarily wrong rudder or high nose attitude to cause an accident such as the Air North Brasilia.
Mixture cuts or sudden throttle closure to simulate engine failure at low speed after lift-off can be potentially dangerous, with any training value far outweighed by the risk of mishandling by the student or the instructor.
The two instructors on the Brasilia in Darwin, and the Duchess at Camden, were experienced on type. But I can’t help thinking that in the end their over-enthusiasm for the job may have led to their demise. If only someone in authority had pulled them up sharply when it was clear to others their very enthusiasm to impart knowledge was bordering on perilous for their students. It took 54 years before someone sorted out this writer and made him realise the potential dangers to which he had exposed his students in real aeroplanes all those years ago. Nowadays, simulators are the way to go. Yet, even in the safety of the simulator, instructors need to sit back sometimes and smell the roses, rather than overdo engine failures at V1. While an enthusiastic instructor is generally regarded as an asset to an organisation, over-enthusiasm has been known to lead to dangerous practices in flying training.
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Prior to conducting EFATO exercises in the real aircraft, how about the pilots be made to sit and watch that EMB120 animation a few times over?
Imagine if somebody had walked into that Air North briefing room just as those pilots were preparing to go out to the aircraft and said something like:
"Hey guys, don't you forget about VMCA now - it's a dangerous thing that VMCA - make sure you keep that airspeed comfortably above VMCA."
What would the reaction by those pilots have been? Their immediate reaction would probably be to look at the speaker with some bewilderment that he is bringing up something so basic.
Then they would probably say something like:
"Yeah ... don't you worry about that ... we've been instructors and training captains for a long time now ... we know all about VMCA ... "
Imagine if somebody had walked into that Air North briefing room just as those pilots were preparing to go out to the aircraft and said something like:
"Hey guys, don't you forget about VMCA now - it's a dangerous thing that VMCA - make sure you keep that airspeed comfortably above VMCA."
What would the reaction by those pilots have been? Their immediate reaction would probably be to look at the speaker with some bewilderment that he is bringing up something so basic.
Then they would probably say something like:
"Yeah ... don't you worry about that ... we've been instructors and training captains for a long time now ... we know all about VMCA ... "
Last edited by FGD135; 25th Feb 2012 at 11:33.
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uninformed pursuits
There is much truth in what Centaurus has to say.
One of the difficulties as a flying supervisor is actually knowing what the boys and girls are doing when they are not aware of being scrutinised.
However, the biggest problem these days is the level of ignorance of those very things that can bite you badly. The aviation world is awash with poor training, research apathy and declining knowledge standards. Instructor courses are a joke in terms of quality and depth of training and airline training pathways are embarrassingly bad. Operators won't pay enough for decent training to be provided and the regulator doesn't demand it. It is a vicious cycle, because the unknowing will set the future standards for the uninterested.
I think it is time to get a bit old fashioned about some of this stuff and to demand real knowledge and real skill from our trainers - which means we have to do some work providing the information and the propoer training.
Stay Alive,
One of the difficulties as a flying supervisor is actually knowing what the boys and girls are doing when they are not aware of being scrutinised.
However, the biggest problem these days is the level of ignorance of those very things that can bite you badly. The aviation world is awash with poor training, research apathy and declining knowledge standards. Instructor courses are a joke in terms of quality and depth of training and airline training pathways are embarrassingly bad. Operators won't pay enough for decent training to be provided and the regulator doesn't demand it. It is a vicious cycle, because the unknowing will set the future standards for the uninterested.
I think it is time to get a bit old fashioned about some of this stuff and to demand real knowledge and real skill from our trainers - which means we have to do some work providing the information and the propoer training.
Stay Alive,
Excellent post Centaurus! I think you, FGD135 and 4dogs have all hit the nail on the head i.e. the loss of older, wiser heads and in particular instructors!
Too many times I have been witness to overzealous ATO/Checkies who think they are re-inventing the wheel. However they all seem to lack knowledge/experience in the basics of physics i.e. what keeps the blue bit up top!
Examples of shoving the power lever back to the flight idle stop on rotation or killing the inside engine while in the middle of a reversal turn, all come to mind.
All of this seems to come back to a lack of good basic initial training and the product these flying school factories are putting out!
Too many times I have been witness to overzealous ATO/Checkies who think they are re-inventing the wheel. However they all seem to lack knowledge/experience in the basics of physics i.e. what keeps the blue bit up top!
Examples of shoving the power lever back to the flight idle stop on rotation or killing the inside engine while in the middle of a reversal turn, all come to mind.
All of this seems to come back to a lack of good basic initial training and the product these flying school factories are putting out!
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Excellent thread. Sometimes it may not only be the enthusiasm of the instructor either than can lead to problems. I was recently having a check flight in a C404 and had been briefed that there would be an EFATO and how the simulated failure would be achieved. The aircraft was nowhere near MTOW and I was expecting a spirited performance. I should add that my previous experience in a C404 was in one equipped for survey and was, therefore, quite heavy.
The takeoff was effected using 10 deg flap setting and following retraction of the gear and flaps the simulated exercise was conducted. I completed the phase 1 actions but was stunned by the lack of performance and was pushing the nose down to keep the airspeed above VMCA. We were not climbing (or only just) which was the complete opposite of what I expected. I was looking for an answer but not finding one when the engine power was restored.
After the engine power was restored I noticed that although the airspeed had increased it wasn't by as much as expected. It was then discovered that the flaps were indicating takeoff setting although the selector handle was up. On checking the emergency checklist and finding nothing that dealt with the situation we set the selector handle to match the flap indicator and returned to base. After landing that the flaps were at full extension which had not been commanded. We handed the aircraft over to the engineers.
They discovered that the wiring leading to the flap-limitation mechanism had shorted which they believe had led the flaps to self select to full possibly during the takeoff (which I admit didn't feel right but I put down to the aircraft being light), when I selected flaps up they retracted to the takeoff setting. On landing they returned to full flap due to the shorting.
On thinking back over the experience I realise that we came very close to a serious problem through no fault of the check pilot. He had briefed me extensively on what we would be doing and how he was going to do it. I should have been more quick in announcing a problem but there was little time and apart from the quickness that the aircraft left the runway (which I put down to the light takeoff weight) there was little else to indicate a problem apart from the flap indicator which I must admit I don't watch at the time of selecting flaps up. It could have ended very badly if the aircraft had been heavy.
The takeoff was effected using 10 deg flap setting and following retraction of the gear and flaps the simulated exercise was conducted. I completed the phase 1 actions but was stunned by the lack of performance and was pushing the nose down to keep the airspeed above VMCA. We were not climbing (or only just) which was the complete opposite of what I expected. I was looking for an answer but not finding one when the engine power was restored.
After the engine power was restored I noticed that although the airspeed had increased it wasn't by as much as expected. It was then discovered that the flaps were indicating takeoff setting although the selector handle was up. On checking the emergency checklist and finding nothing that dealt with the situation we set the selector handle to match the flap indicator and returned to base. After landing that the flaps were at full extension which had not been commanded. We handed the aircraft over to the engineers.
They discovered that the wiring leading to the flap-limitation mechanism had shorted which they believe had led the flaps to self select to full possibly during the takeoff (which I admit didn't feel right but I put down to the aircraft being light), when I selected flaps up they retracted to the takeoff setting. On landing they returned to full flap due to the shorting.
On thinking back over the experience I realise that we came very close to a serious problem through no fault of the check pilot. He had briefed me extensively on what we would be doing and how he was going to do it. I should have been more quick in announcing a problem but there was little time and apart from the quickness that the aircraft left the runway (which I put down to the light takeoff weight) there was little else to indicate a problem apart from the flap indicator which I must admit I don't watch at the time of selecting flaps up. It could have ended very badly if the aircraft had been heavy.
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Correct me if I am wrong but:
CASA do not detail how failures may be given, including appropriate limits. They only say there should be a failure on take off etc.
Perhaps guidance should be given in a training manual backed by the regulator.
CASA do not detail how failures may be given, including appropriate limits. They only say there should be a failure on take off etc.
Perhaps guidance should be given in a training manual backed by the regulator.
IMHO all EFATO's at any multi-crew airline level should only be conducted in a simulator. If said airline cannot afford that sort of training, then maybe they shouldn't be allowed to operate.
Back in the late 90's a young collegue of mine was undergoing transition training on the company's RPT metro. After a grand total of one hour on type, the next phase of training was to be V1 cuts at night. The check captain occupied the LHS, my young friend occupied the RHS, and a third student sat down the back.
Wise beyond his years, the RHS student questioned the wisdom of such a maneuver, especially considering his lack of experience on type (as recorded by the CVR). The Check captain (also relatively young) assured him that it was legal, he had done this sort of thing before, and so it wouldn't be a problem.
The aircraft failed to achieve stable flight after take-off, clipped power lines, and crashed inverted approximately 1 kilometer from the end of the runway. Both students were killed and the Check captain escaped with non life threatening injuries! The airline folded shortly after.
There end'th the lesson.
O
Back in the late 90's a young collegue of mine was undergoing transition training on the company's RPT metro. After a grand total of one hour on type, the next phase of training was to be V1 cuts at night. The check captain occupied the LHS, my young friend occupied the RHS, and a third student sat down the back.
Wise beyond his years, the RHS student questioned the wisdom of such a maneuver, especially considering his lack of experience on type (as recorded by the CVR). The Check captain (also relatively young) assured him that it was legal, he had done this sort of thing before, and so it wouldn't be a problem.
The aircraft failed to achieve stable flight after take-off, clipped power lines, and crashed inverted approximately 1 kilometer from the end of the runway. Both students were killed and the Check captain escaped with non life threatening injuries! The airline folded shortly after.
There end'th the lesson.
O
CAAP advises
CAAP 5.23-1(1) July 2007
Multi-engine Aeroplane Operations and Training
states
4.17.9 Engine failures may occur during any stage of flight and could require considerable time flying around with a propeller feathered. Therefore, a pilot must safely manage the aircraft when in this configuration. Propellers should never be feathered in flight during training below 3000 ft above ground level (AGL).
and
5.5.1 .......It would be folly to simulate an engine failure at low level by selecting the mixture to idle cut-off or turning the fuel selector off.
and
5.8.1 Flight instructors often simulate an engine failure by rapidly closing the throttle or moving the mixture control to idle cut-off. The latter method should never be used at low altitude.
and
5.15.1 Engine failures after take-off must never be practiced at night. History has repeatedly shown that a disproportionate number of fatal accidents have occurred while conducting this exercise.
seems CASA now has it covered, but maybe no one reads CAAPs.
SB
Multi-engine Aeroplane Operations and Training
states
4.17.9 Engine failures may occur during any stage of flight and could require considerable time flying around with a propeller feathered. Therefore, a pilot must safely manage the aircraft when in this configuration. Propellers should never be feathered in flight during training below 3000 ft above ground level (AGL).
and
5.5.1 .......It would be folly to simulate an engine failure at low level by selecting the mixture to idle cut-off or turning the fuel selector off.
and
5.8.1 Flight instructors often simulate an engine failure by rapidly closing the throttle or moving the mixture control to idle cut-off. The latter method should never be used at low altitude.
and
5.15.1 Engine failures after take-off must never be practiced at night. History has repeatedly shown that a disproportionate number of fatal accidents have occurred while conducting this exercise.
seems CASA now has it covered, but maybe no one reads CAAPs.
SB
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Even in the simulator, REALISTIC training is so important. The instructor must know what he expects to happen but be aware what may be a totally unexpected reaction/result of the introduced task.
Whilst the survival rate in the Simulator is a given, the emotional scars of a mishandled and unrealistic task can be carried to the line side of the process.
Even after all that has been written above, the history of events, I rgrettably will still expect to see/read about further disasters in live training.
One other thing, sometimes forgotten, is the right of the "student" to call NO if he feels that the safety of the operation is in any way compromised. This is a fundamental process to be considered by all as on the day, at the time anyone is entitled to call it OFF as stress can reduce the ability of even the so called "guns" of our industry.
Better to be a live NO than an impared acceptor of the process.
Sometimes your so called "best pilots" are NOT the best instructors, carefull vetting of who does what is so very important, the difficulty is the people who do the choosing are not always skilled in the task of choosing.
Please stay safe, I may need to fly with you in row 66
Whilst the survival rate in the Simulator is a given, the emotional scars of a mishandled and unrealistic task can be carried to the line side of the process.
Even after all that has been written above, the history of events, I rgrettably will still expect to see/read about further disasters in live training.
One other thing, sometimes forgotten, is the right of the "student" to call NO if he feels that the safety of the operation is in any way compromised. This is a fundamental process to be considered by all as on the day, at the time anyone is entitled to call it OFF as stress can reduce the ability of even the so called "guns" of our industry.
Better to be a live NO than an impared acceptor of the process.
Sometimes your so called "best pilots" are NOT the best instructors, carefull vetting of who does what is so very important, the difficulty is the people who do the choosing are not always skilled in the task of choosing.
Please stay safe, I may need to fly with you in row 66
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A great thread! I'm in agreement with Krusty on this one. There have been too many fatalities involving asymetric training over the years. All multi-engine, multi-crew turbine operators should be compelled to use simulators for all recurrency training. If they cant afford this, they cant afford to be in business.
Thread Starter
One other thing, sometimes forgotten, is the right of the "student" to call NO if he feels that the safety of the operation is in any way compromised.
Shortly after lift-off at Camden and just as the candidate had selected the gear lever up, the ATO placed a map between the mixture levers and the throttles and cut the right engine mixture. The candidate was caught unawares since the briefing indicated it was not going to happen. Thereafter things happened quickly and power was not re-introduced despite the candidate asking for the mixture to be put back to rich and power made available. None of this came out in the ATSB report but came from the candidate after he had recovered from his burns and returned to Canada where he lived.
------- seems CASA now has it covered, but maybe no one reads CAAPs
People read the CAAPs alright, but then ignore same, because "they know better".
More particularly, "some" FOIs make it quite clear that the CAAPs are ONLY advisory, but "the law" must be complied with, and the various CAOs "require" an "engine failure" ----- and generally conducted in aircraft NOT certified to survive an engine failure on takeoff.
"The Law" does not recognize zero thrust, goes the twisted black letter law logic.
As far as industry pilots are concerned, just have a look at the number of posts on other threads that still not only condone pulling mixtures or shutting the fuel off at low level, but positively encourage same ----- and some of them go on to become FOIs, with the same attitude, now reinforced by their "authority" as an FOI.
What I observe on a regular basis illustrates that we have collectively leaned nothing from the steadily rising toll of fatalities ---- including the Brazilia in Darwin.
Tootle pip!!
Re. the Camden fatal mentioned, the PIC was well known for doing what he did in this accident, that finally took his life. He had been counseled on the subject ---- but the accident proved that it is not easy to teach an old dog new tricks.
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Another issue that comes to mind. There appears to be no guidance on multiple failures. A near accident comes to mind involving this was an examiner's call for a late go around. This was closely followed by a simulated engine failure in the middle of the go around.
Thread Starter
A near accident comes to mind involving this was an examiner's call for a late go around. This was closely followed by a simulated engine failure in the middle of the go around.
The Australian CASA ATO manual states in several places that: "after a simulated failure, the prescribed ATO or prescribed person must ensure the aircraft is configured back to a normal operating mode before another simulated failure may be introduced except where the simulated failures are linked (e.g. electrical failure leading to a flapless approach and landing).
Excuse my ignorance here, but why not just set an altitude as zero (say 5000ft) put the aircraft in the required config and then go from there. I know that the point is to test the ability of the pilot at the critical phase of flight, but there is a reason so many problems occur close to the ground. There is NO room for error.
Surely that and solid work overs in the sim could cover the requirements?? Why risk another life?
Surely that and solid work overs in the sim could cover the requirements?? Why risk another life?
Excuse my ignorance here, but why not just set an altitude as zero (say 5000ft) put the aircraft in the required config and then go from there. I know that the point is to test the ability of the pilot at the critical phase of flight, but there is a reason so many problems occur close to the ground. There is NO room for error.
Surely that and solid work overs in the sim could cover the requirements?? Why risk another life?
Surely that and solid work overs in the sim could cover the requirements?? Why risk another life?
Seriously HSA why don't they legislate your suggestion?
Grandpa Aerotart
Simulating OEI at 5000' bears no relationship whatsoever to just after takeoff. There would be absolutely no training benefit.
The Duchess is a very fine training aircraft and has enough performance to fly away from an EFATO on one engine, at typical training weights, climb to 2000' odd feet and return to land or divert to a nearby alternate.
Flown well of course.
I know because I have done exactly that during an IF renewal with John Chesterfield (neither of us light weights) and near full fuel - we were at Lismore having departed Cooly with full tanks, flown a RWY 15 GPS NPA and landed.
For our departure I briefed what I would do before and after the gear was up including a practical escape route on one engine in IMC away from the terrain that feature of Lismore. It was summertime too.
Just airborne with the gear in transit he failed one engine on the mixture and I flew the entire escape route (under the hood) I had briefed to the 2200' MSA.
I had never flown a Duchess before that day - ended up with an endo as part of my IF renewal - and was mighty impressed with that capable little aeroplane
In those days I had CASA ATO approval for the Falcon 200 including initial issue and renewal approvals for command and copilot instrument ratings. I have previously held training approvals for all manner of piston twins.
NEVER EVER do you fail an engine at night for training - you just don't.
Having said all that by way of laying out what I know the BE76, and a well trained pilot, is capable of the crash at Camden could have been averted by the pilot under training by simply pushing the mixture back in and calling the rest of the detail off.
He was 'caught unawares'?
So a real engine failure would have led to the same result?
What happened to 'an amateur is surprised when an engine fails but a professional is surprised when it doesn't'?
I am sorry but he would have had adequate warning of what the ATO was intending to do (despite assurances he would not) when he stuck the map into the throttle quadrant. Anyone with more than 5 minutes ME time knows what happens next when an instructor/examiner does that. All he had to do was say "NO" firmly and either block the mixture from being pulled to ICO or pushed it back in again if his hand was busy with the gear. There is just no excuse for being caught flat footed in this scenario.
The aeroplane WAS capable of climbing away on one engine but was mishandled.
Darkness complicates the situation inordinately which is why we train in the daytime and HOPE we can pull it off if it happens on a pitch dark night - I sincerely hope I am never tested thus. I only THINK/hope I could manage based on 1000s of daytime mixture cuts in piston twins over 30+ years and a ****load of EFATOs in class D jet sims in IMC/dark.
Having climbed away on two engines and reached a safe height you end the training detail and RTB. You don't have a big discussion/argument in the cockpit - you merely say "I am calling this flight off, we will return to XYZ and discuss it further on the ground. Do not touch another thing in this cockpit"
Yes I have done exactly that.
Whether it goes further than that is up to the individuals concerned - if you felt strongly enough and depending on the reaction of the miscreant instructor/examiner you might take the nuclear option.
Yes piston twin EFATO training is higher risk than just flying around. That is not an argument for not doing such training in real aircraft absent a sim with realistic fidelity.
Whether you simulate failure by pulling throttle or mixture is a wash in my experience in both seats. What elevates the risk to unacceptably dangerous is the attitude, experience and skill of the instructor/examiner not whether you pull the mixture or throttle. I prefer the mixture for good engineering/physics reasons.
It is a disgrace that young instructors with bordering on zero ME time, and certainly no meaningful ME time, are able to obtain META purely so they can get more hours in the ME Command column (despite the fact they won't typically be the flying pilot for most of it) for their airline application.
By 'meaningful ME time' I mean hours logged in the real world as opposed to the circuit/local training area while they get the minimum (10-20?) hours before applying for a META.
I had several hundred hrs in the Islander in PNG before I was initially tested/approved for BN2 (and ONLY BN2) training. Similarly I had several hundred hours on C402s before I was granted approvals for that aircraft...couple of hundred on the Aerostar etc. This system of young instructors with little, if any, real world experience endorsing pilots on any twin they happen to have a handful of hours on is just crazy. The only time I have ever had to put my foot down and end a flight was with just such a instructor while on leave from PNG and renewing my Oz rating. I defined the parameters of what I would accept and I guess he either thought I wasn't serious or mentally dismissed my requirements as irrelevant.
Big...BIG mistake.
I have never been in a piston twin with a young ME instructor since. I happily fly with people like Chesty.
And yes it is also a disgrace that very experienced ME instructors who show ONGOING disdain for safe practices are not stripped of their approvals.
Certainly I have been guilty of that same 'overzealous' trait early on in my ME training experience as centaurus alludes to. That is just human nature but also quite different to an sustained disdain for what is 'safe' and what is plain stupid. I can honestly say that at my 'most zealous' I NEVER raised my own, or my trainees, pulse to alarming levels.
The Duchess is a very fine training aircraft and has enough performance to fly away from an EFATO on one engine, at typical training weights, climb to 2000' odd feet and return to land or divert to a nearby alternate.
Flown well of course.
I know because I have done exactly that during an IF renewal with John Chesterfield (neither of us light weights) and near full fuel - we were at Lismore having departed Cooly with full tanks, flown a RWY 15 GPS NPA and landed.
For our departure I briefed what I would do before and after the gear was up including a practical escape route on one engine in IMC away from the terrain that feature of Lismore. It was summertime too.
Just airborne with the gear in transit he failed one engine on the mixture and I flew the entire escape route (under the hood) I had briefed to the 2200' MSA.
I had never flown a Duchess before that day - ended up with an endo as part of my IF renewal - and was mighty impressed with that capable little aeroplane
In those days I had CASA ATO approval for the Falcon 200 including initial issue and renewal approvals for command and copilot instrument ratings. I have previously held training approvals for all manner of piston twins.
NEVER EVER do you fail an engine at night for training - you just don't.
Having said all that by way of laying out what I know the BE76, and a well trained pilot, is capable of the crash at Camden could have been averted by the pilot under training by simply pushing the mixture back in and calling the rest of the detail off.
He was 'caught unawares'?
So a real engine failure would have led to the same result?
What happened to 'an amateur is surprised when an engine fails but a professional is surprised when it doesn't'?
I am sorry but he would have had adequate warning of what the ATO was intending to do (despite assurances he would not) when he stuck the map into the throttle quadrant. Anyone with more than 5 minutes ME time knows what happens next when an instructor/examiner does that. All he had to do was say "NO" firmly and either block the mixture from being pulled to ICO or pushed it back in again if his hand was busy with the gear. There is just no excuse for being caught flat footed in this scenario.
The aeroplane WAS capable of climbing away on one engine but was mishandled.
Darkness complicates the situation inordinately which is why we train in the daytime and HOPE we can pull it off if it happens on a pitch dark night - I sincerely hope I am never tested thus. I only THINK/hope I could manage based on 1000s of daytime mixture cuts in piston twins over 30+ years and a ****load of EFATOs in class D jet sims in IMC/dark.
Having climbed away on two engines and reached a safe height you end the training detail and RTB. You don't have a big discussion/argument in the cockpit - you merely say "I am calling this flight off, we will return to XYZ and discuss it further on the ground. Do not touch another thing in this cockpit"
Yes I have done exactly that.
Whether it goes further than that is up to the individuals concerned - if you felt strongly enough and depending on the reaction of the miscreant instructor/examiner you might take the nuclear option.
Yes piston twin EFATO training is higher risk than just flying around. That is not an argument for not doing such training in real aircraft absent a sim with realistic fidelity.
Whether you simulate failure by pulling throttle or mixture is a wash in my experience in both seats. What elevates the risk to unacceptably dangerous is the attitude, experience and skill of the instructor/examiner not whether you pull the mixture or throttle. I prefer the mixture for good engineering/physics reasons.
It is a disgrace that young instructors with bordering on zero ME time, and certainly no meaningful ME time, are able to obtain META purely so they can get more hours in the ME Command column (despite the fact they won't typically be the flying pilot for most of it) for their airline application.
By 'meaningful ME time' I mean hours logged in the real world as opposed to the circuit/local training area while they get the minimum (10-20?) hours before applying for a META.
I had several hundred hrs in the Islander in PNG before I was initially tested/approved for BN2 (and ONLY BN2) training. Similarly I had several hundred hours on C402s before I was granted approvals for that aircraft...couple of hundred on the Aerostar etc. This system of young instructors with little, if any, real world experience endorsing pilots on any twin they happen to have a handful of hours on is just crazy. The only time I have ever had to put my foot down and end a flight was with just such a instructor while on leave from PNG and renewing my Oz rating. I defined the parameters of what I would accept and I guess he either thought I wasn't serious or mentally dismissed my requirements as irrelevant.
Big...BIG mistake.
I have never been in a piston twin with a young ME instructor since. I happily fly with people like Chesty.
And yes it is also a disgrace that very experienced ME instructors who show ONGOING disdain for safe practices are not stripped of their approvals.
Certainly I have been guilty of that same 'overzealous' trait early on in my ME training experience as centaurus alludes to. That is just human nature but also quite different to an sustained disdain for what is 'safe' and what is plain stupid. I can honestly say that at my 'most zealous' I NEVER raised my own, or my trainees, pulse to alarming levels.
Last edited by Chimbu chuckles; 27th Feb 2012 at 04:16.
I concur completely with CC in what he has said.
In my case I got META in about 1970, only after I had accumulated 2000 hours, recieved some some specific instruction, been ground examined, and flight tested by an Exminer of Airmen. IIRC that approval was valid only for ME aircraft in which I had in excess of 200 PIC. Further it was subject to renwal at my annual Instructor Rating check. Candidates were randomly vetted by the local Examiners, for a considerable time after the issue.
Simulators were simply not available for GA aircraft, so it was all done for real. Failures were generally introduced by way of mixture cut (manufacturers recommendation), and dexterous lever manipulation for the establishemnt of zero thrust. Yes it had it's risks, but with good tuition and a sensible approach a reasonable level of safety was achieved.
I despair when I hear that these days one only has to be an instructor, and endorsed, to be able to give ME instruction. Same goes for IR instruction. Is it any wonder that airlines are having difficulty with pass rates when the basics are dished out by instructors barely off their own training wheels.
I have been involved with "real time" engine failure training in aircraft from the dear old Twin Comanche thru to the A300. All have had an element of danger, but in each, that risk has been mitigated by proper briefing, and, maturity and experience in the right seat.
If high fidelity simulators are available then obviously that is the way to go. Unfortunately such is not always the case. This is not a reason to abandon proper training, but an imperative to ensure that those imparting such instruction are properly qualified.
Shame CASA shame!
In my case I got META in about 1970, only after I had accumulated 2000 hours, recieved some some specific instruction, been ground examined, and flight tested by an Exminer of Airmen. IIRC that approval was valid only for ME aircraft in which I had in excess of 200 PIC. Further it was subject to renwal at my annual Instructor Rating check. Candidates were randomly vetted by the local Examiners, for a considerable time after the issue.
Simulators were simply not available for GA aircraft, so it was all done for real. Failures were generally introduced by way of mixture cut (manufacturers recommendation), and dexterous lever manipulation for the establishemnt of zero thrust. Yes it had it's risks, but with good tuition and a sensible approach a reasonable level of safety was achieved.
I despair when I hear that these days one only has to be an instructor, and endorsed, to be able to give ME instruction. Same goes for IR instruction. Is it any wonder that airlines are having difficulty with pass rates when the basics are dished out by instructors barely off their own training wheels.
I have been involved with "real time" engine failure training in aircraft from the dear old Twin Comanche thru to the A300. All have had an element of danger, but in each, that risk has been mitigated by proper briefing, and, maturity and experience in the right seat.
If high fidelity simulators are available then obviously that is the way to go. Unfortunately such is not always the case. This is not a reason to abandon proper training, but an imperative to ensure that those imparting such instruction are properly qualified.
Shame CASA shame!
Last edited by maui; 27th Feb 2012 at 07:16.
CC said:
and maui said:
So gents with your combined wisdom and experience how do we fix the problem? How do we lift the standards of ATOs/'Examiner of Airmen'/Checkies/META Instructors?
Because I can see the day when an individual pilot bounces around all the available flying schools trying to get his/her MECIR renewed only to find he/she had to stop the test over and over because the instructors were all trying to kill him/her!
So how do we get back to the 'good old days'?
It is a disgrace that young instructors with bordering on zero ME time, and certainly no meaningful ME time, are able to obtain META purely so they can get more hours in the ME Command column (despite the fact they won't typically be the flying pilot for most of it) for their airline application.
In my case I got META in about 1970, only after I had accumulated 2000 hours, recieved some some specific instruction, been ground examined, and flight tested by an Exminer of Airmen. IIRC that approval was valid only for ME aircraft in which I had in excess of 200 PIC. Further it was subject to renwal at my annual Instructor Rating check. Candidates were randomly vetted by the local Examiners, for a considerable time after the issue.
Because I can see the day when an individual pilot bounces around all the available flying schools trying to get his/her MECIR renewed only to find he/she had to stop the test over and over because the instructors were all trying to kill him/her!
So how do we get back to the 'good old days'?