Jetstar Cadet Scheme Failing To Produce Safe Pilots?
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It's called "alpha" people...
Andrewr - finally someone with a clue
It's a thread drift but I'll continue...
I'm going to wager that very few besides those piloting the military types have experienced flying (and recovering) a jet in the high alpha regime.
For their various sins some get around in the 1:1 thrust ratio types, and routinely exploit the high AOA spectrum, recognising full well that while yanking on 30+ alpha provides instantaneous turn rate, it also comes with the penalty of energy bleed rate. We're talking lots of knots per second wiped off the dial. No problem if it's planned, all it requires is an extended period of stick forward back into single digit alpha and we're accelerating (and flying in the classical sense) again, but not before significant altitude is lost.
Not a problem for someone who routinely flies in this regime, but who really see this type of flying ever?
I don't think it's too long a bow to draw to assume the AF guys had never experienced high AOA flight. Why would they? Airliners don't go there, right?
POWER + ATTITUDE does not always = PERFORMANCE
It's a thread drift but I'll continue...
I'm going to wager that very few besides those piloting the military types have experienced flying (and recovering) a jet in the high alpha regime.
For their various sins some get around in the 1:1 thrust ratio types, and routinely exploit the high AOA spectrum, recognising full well that while yanking on 30+ alpha provides instantaneous turn rate, it also comes with the penalty of energy bleed rate. We're talking lots of knots per second wiped off the dial. No problem if it's planned, all it requires is an extended period of stick forward back into single digit alpha and we're accelerating (and flying in the classical sense) again, but not before significant altitude is lost.
Not a problem for someone who routinely flies in this regime, but who really see this type of flying ever?
I don't think it's too long a bow to draw to assume the AF guys had never experienced high AOA flight. Why would they? Airliners don't go there, right?
POWER + ATTITUDE does not always = PERFORMANCE
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Power + attitude = performance only when not stalled!
It should have been more obvious to them that they were stalled, full forward stick PLUS forward manual trim was required as the autotrim probably wound in full back stabiliser.
Not enough pilots see effective stall training in any aircraft.
By that I mean NOT immediately recovering but holding in full backstick for some time and then reducing AoA to recover and feeling/seeing the results.
Too many instructors are scared of stalls/spins.
The junior F/O who kept pulling backstick was a huge part of this crash!
Airbus would have shown dual imput at times but not having a visual que for the other pilots as to the fact he was holding in full backstick was also a huge factor.
It should have been more obvious to them that they were stalled, full forward stick PLUS forward manual trim was required as the autotrim probably wound in full back stabiliser.
Not enough pilots see effective stall training in any aircraft.
By that I mean NOT immediately recovering but holding in full backstick for some time and then reducing AoA to recover and feeling/seeing the results.
Too many instructors are scared of stalls/spins.
The junior F/O who kept pulling backstick was a huge part of this crash!
Airbus would have shown dual imput at times but not having a visual que for the other pilots as to the fact he was holding in full backstick was also a huge factor.
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I understand that QF A330 drivers have been briefed by Airbus as to the AF447 crash following the recovery of the "black" boxes. What I have been told (second-hand) is that the problem was the iced pitot tubes were sending corrupt information to the computers. This in turn prevented the computers in protecting the aircraft from going into a stall.
When the autopilot disconnected in the turbulence the aircraft started to lose height. The crew followed their trained procedure by setting the throttles and holding back stick. However as the computers were receiving corrupt information as to speed they did not protect the aircraft and the aircraft stalled and remained stalled because of the back pressure on the side-stick.
Now we can argue all we like about how we would have recognised that the aircraft was stalled and we would have lowered the nose etc etc. But lets place ourselves in that cockpit; its a dark and stormy night, we are fatigued as it is a flight on the back-side of the clock and the aircraft is not responding in the way it should to what we have been trained to do. A test pilot may have thought something along the lines of......"well that's not working, let's try something else"......but an airline crew stepping outside of SOPs' and training?
Airline economics will continue to see cadets being trained in Australia. The problem for the industry is to see that the lowest cost training model, as evidenced by Jetstar, does not become the standard.
For those who believe that pilots will only discuss at length incidents or crashes involving cadets I suggest that you get out of the DG&P site and visit Rumours & News where they will find crashes and incidents of all kinds dissected at length.
When the autopilot disconnected in the turbulence the aircraft started to lose height. The crew followed their trained procedure by setting the throttles and holding back stick. However as the computers were receiving corrupt information as to speed they did not protect the aircraft and the aircraft stalled and remained stalled because of the back pressure on the side-stick.
Now we can argue all we like about how we would have recognised that the aircraft was stalled and we would have lowered the nose etc etc. But lets place ourselves in that cockpit; its a dark and stormy night, we are fatigued as it is a flight on the back-side of the clock and the aircraft is not responding in the way it should to what we have been trained to do. A test pilot may have thought something along the lines of......"well that's not working, let's try something else"......but an airline crew stepping outside of SOPs' and training?
Airline economics will continue to see cadets being trained in Australia. The problem for the industry is to see that the lowest cost training model, as evidenced by Jetstar, does not become the standard.
For those who believe that pilots will only discuss at length incidents or crashes involving cadets I suggest that you get out of the DG&P site and visit Rumours & News where they will find crashes and incidents of all kinds dissected at length.
Grandpa Aerotart
Bus SOPs say when heavy and high and suffering an unreliable airspeed non normal pull full aft side stick and set TOGA?
Sorry I just don't accept that.
So the pilots were not following SOPS?
It doesn't take a Test Pilot to NOT stall in the first place.
We've all done 'unreliable airspeed' in the sim both before and after AF447 - hands up who buried the stick in their gut and held it there? Yes it can be a work out but come on - if your basic manual flying skills are sound its not THAT hard.
Boeing can give overspeed and stall warning simultaneously too - only difference is they don't unilaterally pitch up.
That is just another charming little 'design feature' of the Bus only a PHd could dream up.
You haven't seen, and won't see, me bash cadets in this thread...or any other.
Sorry I just don't accept that.
So the pilots were not following SOPS?
It doesn't take a Test Pilot to NOT stall in the first place.
We've all done 'unreliable airspeed' in the sim both before and after AF447 - hands up who buried the stick in their gut and held it there? Yes it can be a work out but come on - if your basic manual flying skills are sound its not THAT hard.
Chimbu,
Under certain situations involving loss of airspeed and/or ADR problems along with flight control law degradation, the A320/330/340 etc can be providing the pilot with false overspeed warnings AS WELL AS stall warnings. In such a situation, the overspeed protections may become active providing the pilot with a nose up bias that requires constant forward pressure until the failure is resolved or the affected ADR is switched off. I know of several very experienced pilots that have been tripped up in the sim with failures such as these.
Under certain situations involving loss of airspeed and/or ADR problems along with flight control law degradation, the A320/330/340 etc can be providing the pilot with false overspeed warnings AS WELL AS stall warnings. In such a situation, the overspeed protections may become active providing the pilot with a nose up bias that requires constant forward pressure until the failure is resolved or the affected ADR is switched off. I know of several very experienced pilots that have been tripped up in the sim with failures such as these.
That is just another charming little 'design feature' of the Bus only a PHd could dream up.
You haven't seen, and won't see, me bash cadets in this thread...or any other.
Last edited by Chimbu chuckles; 24th Dec 2011 at 14:40.
Are high altitude stall recoveries not part of initial and recurrent training on the A330. Why in alternate law was there no stick pusher stall protection.
You would think that in this scenario, with loss of airspeed indications, Is when you would need it most.
Back on topic. GA guys flying single pilot turbo props IFR have the toughest jobs in industry surely they have what's needed to be the back up captain.
You would think that in this scenario, with loss of airspeed indications, Is when you would need it most.
Back on topic. GA guys flying single pilot turbo props IFR have the toughest jobs in industry surely they have what's needed to be the back up captain.
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Bus SOPs say when heavy and high and suffering an unreliable airspeed non normal pull full aft side stick and set TOGA?
I can't help but wonder if Bonin was simply subconciously reverting to a muscle memmory type response or similar.
the A330 design really can't be blamed here it acted beautifully. It got confused so it handed all controll back to the humans just as you would want it to. It even remained stable enough in a deep stall for the wings to stay levelled. Unfortunately the humans didn't follow the published attitude/thrust settings for an airspeed unreliable, they didn't seem to realize that they were in alt law, they didn't seem to realize that stall stall is a function of alpha vanes and not AIS so they WERE stalling.
do you agree australia has some/most of the best pilots in the world? i don't think many disagree with that...
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do you agree australia has some/most of the best pilots in the world? i don't think many disagree with that
c173 you seem to belong to that rather large group of arrogant Australians who believe that no one else kows how to fly an aeroplane
and what makes you think they are not
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chuckles, I think you misunderstood me as have several other posters here.
Firstly, the crew followed SOPs' (and training) by applying full back stick and throttle to regain the height from the upset caused by the autopilot disconnection. It would have worked but for the problem caused by the iced pitot tubes of which they were not aware therefore their actions caused the aircraft to stall. What the crew needed to do was to not follow their training (and SOPs') and lower the nose.
Secondly, the crew were not aware of the corrupted information coming from the pitot tubes. If they had been aware of the problem they may have approached the whole issue differently depending on their training.
The basic point was that the aircraft was not doing what it says on the box. All the fancy software that is designed to protect the aircraft was not working because of a problem of which the crew were unaware, and it would appear, their training was not sufficient to cover an alternative approach to the problem.
Firstly, the crew followed SOPs' (and training) by applying full back stick and throttle to regain the height from the upset caused by the autopilot disconnection. It would have worked but for the problem caused by the iced pitot tubes of which they were not aware therefore their actions caused the aircraft to stall. What the crew needed to do was to not follow their training (and SOPs') and lower the nose.
Secondly, the crew were not aware of the corrupted information coming from the pitot tubes. If they had been aware of the problem they may have approached the whole issue differently depending on their training.
The basic point was that the aircraft was not doing what it says on the box. All the fancy software that is designed to protect the aircraft was not working because of a problem of which the crew were unaware, and it would appear, their training was not sufficient to cover an alternative approach to the problem.
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Plovett,
BS!
No SOP for full backstick at high altitude.
The crew and aircraft combination killed them,
IF the Captain had been in his seat then things probably would have been different.
Well trained and experienced pilots [of any nationality] should have sorted this out instead of holding backstick into the sea!
BS!
No SOP for full backstick at high altitude.
The crew and aircraft combination killed them,
IF the Captain had been in his seat then things probably would have been different.
Well trained and experienced pilots [of any nationality] should have sorted this out instead of holding backstick into the sea!
These people advocating 'full back stick' in a jet transport at high altitude are a real worry...who are they flying for ? 
There seems to be a distinct lack of the KISS principle at play... I have had the Airspeed on an EFIS go screwy. Seeing I wasn't smart enough to analyse all the permutations and combinations of what the computer may or may not be doing, I held a straight and level attitude on the AH and checked I had cruise power set (as per my initial IFR training in a rickety old Seminole) Seemed to work out ok...
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IMHO the key to having a safe operation with cadets is the quality of the Captains. The RAAF have had low-time pilots (with varying ability) in the RHS of transport aircraft for years, but there is a high level of formal supervision compared to airlines through the process of flight authorisation (getting an "auth"). This means that the Flight Commander (or "autho") will considers who flies with who on what mission in what conditions.
For example, a Flight Commander worth his salt would not pair a green co-pilot with a below-average Captain to carry out a demanding task. A squadron is small enough to manage that but the problem with an airline is, once a low-time pilot is qualified as an FO, they are paired with any Captain. We all know that amongst airline Captains, there is a diverse range of ability from barely-competent to walk-on-water. An airline Fleet Manager is hardly going to look at todays flight to a demanding destination, check the weather, and decide that Captain Bloggs and FO Newbie is the wrong crew for the conditions. That won't work in a cookie-cutter world.
IMHO, cadets need to be paired with highly-competent "old bolds" for an extended period. That means their line-training period should be more like 1000-1500 hours with an above-average Captain that maintains a reasonably steep gradient to keep the operation safe while bloggs learns the ropes.
BTW, 2 degrees nose-down and idle keeps you out of a lot of trouble in a high-level UA – keep it simple.
For example, a Flight Commander worth his salt would not pair a green co-pilot with a below-average Captain to carry out a demanding task. A squadron is small enough to manage that but the problem with an airline is, once a low-time pilot is qualified as an FO, they are paired with any Captain. We all know that amongst airline Captains, there is a diverse range of ability from barely-competent to walk-on-water. An airline Fleet Manager is hardly going to look at todays flight to a demanding destination, check the weather, and decide that Captain Bloggs and FO Newbie is the wrong crew for the conditions. That won't work in a cookie-cutter world.
IMHO, cadets need to be paired with highly-competent "old bolds" for an extended period. That means their line-training period should be more like 1000-1500 hours with an above-average Captain that maintains a reasonably steep gradient to keep the operation safe while bloggs learns the ropes.
BTW, 2 degrees nose-down and idle keeps you out of a lot of trouble in a high-level UA – keep it simple.
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Yeah I can see parallels between a load of coal and 300+ human beings
If he can't demonstrate the required skills in a simulator he doesn't get a career
He had previously demonstrated sufficient skills to get a job as a F/O with a carrier (one you or I would not fly with!) to get his 200 hours A320 time and with a lot of instructor work progressed to a stage of demonstrating sufficient skill to progress to the next stage. The next stage was back to A320 (and I am not knocking Airbus) where within 6 months I suggest any manipulative skills which were refreshed will have disappeared continuing to do so as time passes. Exposure and experience may help but the future is reliance upon more and more automatics with SOPs developed around this concept.
whats unsafe about developing/practicing/maintaining manual skills in a simulator?
Not a thing however, does it replace actual experience? Supplement real time experience yes but it only forms a very small part of the overall operation and I suggest if anything the AF A330 demonstrates where it can all go pear shaped rapidly.
Stall Recovery? Wings Level, Nose Down, Max Power; Recover Airspeed, Attitude & Altitude
there will never be less than 2 pilots on the flight deck of a high capacity jet. It’s the cheapest thing in the cockpit
Reference the 2 pilots in the cockpit I refer to the daily use of UAVs (and regardless of the unsubstantiated statement; `And UAVs of all types crash at around 30 times the rate of manned aircraft’) the evidence suggest to the contrary.
The increasing use and reliability of automatics/technology
CRA unmanned trucks & trains increasing
Passengers daily step off an aircraft onto an unmanned bus or train to transport them to the next destination without knowledge or a thought about who or what is driving the thing.
The high SPEED trains throughout the world (350 passengers plus) have only ONE driver being largely automated, computer monitored.
People, we, accept technology reasonably readily; when we check in we have little qualms about seat assignment via the internet, check in at the automated kiosk & use the baggage drop all eliminating the `counter jumpers’. At the supermarket, Coles & Woolworths, and Bunnings we increasingly use the automated self checkout eliminating the `checkout chicks’.
That is, people do and will accept change.
I do not necessarily agree or like the way it is going but this however, it is the way of the world and it has been ever thus since the beginning and certainly throughout my career DC3s to A380/B747 800, UAVs, etc.
Perhaps, instead of clinging to outmoded philosophies of minimum 1500 hours, etc we need to review our thinking to adjust to the future technologies.
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BTW, 2 degrees nose-down and idle keeps you out of a lot of trouble in a high-level UA – keep it simple
This wasn't a situation whereby there was no procedure so the crew had to make one up by relying on their GA knowledge of light aircraft.
Thread Starter
The trouble, Dark Night, is that when terrestrial automated transport experiences a fault, it fails gracefully and stops on the road. Even a ship can often anchor.
Aircraft don't have that characteristic when they fail.
Furthermore, there is the little question of authority and responsibility in the event of an accident.
I would prefer that a knowledgeable person, who is going to die along with the passengers if anything goes wrong, supervises the despatch and conduct of the flight. I prefer this because of the phenomenon of diffusion of responsibility will preclude a court attaching blame to criminally negligent individuals associated with the despatch of said aircraft.
Diffusion of responsibility - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
I suppose we could solve that problem by fitting the engineers, despatchers and operations managers of said unmanned flights with explosive collars that would be automatically triggered by the aircrafts demise.
Aircraft don't have that characteristic when they fail.
Furthermore, there is the little question of authority and responsibility in the event of an accident.
I would prefer that a knowledgeable person, who is going to die along with the passengers if anything goes wrong, supervises the despatch and conduct of the flight. I prefer this because of the phenomenon of diffusion of responsibility will preclude a court attaching blame to criminally negligent individuals associated with the despatch of said aircraft.
In risk-taking literature, diffusion of responsibility occurs when individual members of a group feel less personal responsibility for potential failure in the pursuit of risky options than if acting alone.
Diffusion of responsibility - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
I suppose we could solve that problem by fitting the engineers, despatchers and operations managers of said unmanned flights with explosive collars that would be automatically triggered by the aircrafts demise.
Last edited by Sunfish; 25th Dec 2011 at 22:49.
Dark Knight. I'm afraid you (and quite a few others) still don't get it. Will 1500 hours and an ATPL ensure a candidate is better equipped for their initial airline seat than a 200 hour Cadet trained from the ground up? Who knows! That argument has been done to death, and will continue to be debated for as long as we have those varying streams of entry.
The main issue is the pure evil of the Jetstar Cadet Scam. It is in existence for one reason and one reason only. To drive down wages and conditions. Anything else is just a diversion. The creation of cheaper pilots will lead to one inexorable conclusion, disaffected and distracted pilots. The FAA has recognized this and have mandated a system to put value back into the profession. Something that Jetstar management are unwilling to accept, and we all know what Jetstar (and QF) want, they usually get.
If Cadetships are so superior, why doesn't the operator foot the bill? After all, at Qantas "Safety is our number one priority"! Instead the candidate is mired in debt and subjected to subsistence wages on
graduation? That's a recipe for disaster! That's the argument. Anything else is just smoke and mirrors.
The main issue is the pure evil of the Jetstar Cadet Scam. It is in existence for one reason and one reason only. To drive down wages and conditions. Anything else is just a diversion. The creation of cheaper pilots will lead to one inexorable conclusion, disaffected and distracted pilots. The FAA has recognized this and have mandated a system to put value back into the profession. Something that Jetstar management are unwilling to accept, and we all know what Jetstar (and QF) want, they usually get.
If Cadetships are so superior, why doesn't the operator foot the bill? After all, at Qantas "Safety is our number one priority"! Instead the candidate is mired in debt and subjected to subsistence wages on
graduation? That's a recipe for disaster! That's the argument. Anything else is just smoke and mirrors.
Last edited by KRUSTY 34; 26th Dec 2011 at 07:26.
If the quality of the graduated cadet released to line seems be a problem, it would be a problem with the training department for not doing their job correctly. If there is a problem with the ex GA skygod captains flying with graduated cadets, it would once again be a problem with the training department for the quality of its command course.
Where I work at the moment, cadets graduate straight to the right hand seat of the A330 or B777. They are required to pass the same checks to the same standard as none cadet FOs. If they can't, they are either retrained or dismissed. The next flight after they graduate may be over the Bay of Bengal in the middle of the monsoon, or to Moscow in the middle of winter. When they achieve 6000hrs, they are eligible for a command. They complete the same upgrade course to the same standard as everyone else or they don't pass.
This company has been hiring between 500 to 700 pilots a year from many years. At the moment they are taking all the ex ryan air and easy jet ex cadets they can get, as they are very happy with the high standard of the product that is produced. At these companies ex cadet FOs may be offered commands on A320s or B737 with as little as 2500hrs.
The best experience for a future A320/B737 captain is to fly a A320/B737 and to be taught how to operate it correctly. Working for a GA company being paid under award salaries, flying antique aircraft VFR may prepare you for the ever decreasing T&Cs of the aviation industry (see the above about buying type ratings etc), but does little else.
If you go the GA route enjoy the flying and the variety and the special locations. Just because you have done the hard yards does not entitle you anything except more hard yards. The world has moved on. If you go the Cadet route be careful hiring a light aircraft for that weekend fly away, as you will have no idea of how those small aircraft work.
The Don
The Middle East was comical at the entry level where the scheme was based on nationalism and wasta. What was interesting, was the end product, which I did have experience with. That is, a cadet who was promoted to Captain.
The knowledge/experience gaps would probably have been addressed with flying experience outside of the airline. I have seen this at both airlines with absurd decisions that would not be expected from pilots with a solid base- for example, both airlines I worked for have seen cadet captains fly an airliner after an engine failure well beyond the first suitable airport.
It is politically naive in my experience to expect a training department not to be powerfully influenced by management! Cadet programs are industrial weapons, they drive conditions lower as they try to take experience out of the equation, and the end product I have seen is in no way near the standard you would expect of a First Officer in an airline which sees safety as a priority. What I am seeing now in Asia, is serious incidents as Captains are overloaded in managing the inexperience of the RHS.
I have cadets sitting next to me with operational limitations such as 10KT X-W and 5KM viz. That gives should give you an idea as to the other gaps in their knowledge base.
Last edited by Gnadenburg; 26th Dec 2011 at 14:24.
Under certain situations involving loss of airspeed and/or ADR problems along with flight control law degradation, the A320/330/340 etc can be providing the pilot with false overspeed warnings AS WELL AS stall warnings. In such a situation, the overspeed protections may become active providing the pilot with a nose up bias that requires constant forward pressure until the failure is resolved or the affected ADR is switched off. I know of several very experienced pilots that have been tripped up in the sim with failures such as these.
We know that the overspeed warning can be erroneous. What about about the stall warning on Airbus? Coming off the ELAC and based on alpha, do you view it as genuine in all circumstances?
Last edited by Gnadenburg; 26th Dec 2011 at 03:21.