Senate Inquiry, Hearing Program 4th Nov 2011
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Wheel's come off.
"It is controversial because of evidence that alleges that the ATSB conspired with CASA, to frame all of the cause of the crash on the pilot to the exclusion of substantial failures by the air safety regulator to properly audit the operator Pel-Air and meet its obligations to exercise oversight of the carrier, and its pilots, among other matters". Ben Sandilands – Plane Talking.
“Mr Bond, they have a saying in Chicago: 'Once is happenstance. Twice is coincidence. The third time it's enemy action'.” - Fleming Goldfinger.
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Interesting aside, back in the early 2000s when the lease for the CASA airline office in Little Collins Street was about to expire, Melbourne Airport proposed a purpose built building close to the old Travel Lodge. There was almost a mutiny amongst staff because of the lack of transport and the interference with their lunch time shopping in the city
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SMS - ATSB report.
An ATSB review of the effectiveness of safety management systems in Australia completely contradicts the position in took its much criticised final report into the crash of a Pel-Air medical flight near Norfolk Island in 2009.Ben Sandilands – Plane Talking.
Last edited by PAIN_NET; 11th Dec 2012 at 01:34.
AQONs 21/11
Answers to Questions on Notice for the RRAT Senate Pel-Air Inquiry hearing (21/11/12) have been posted:
Link: Senate Committees – Parliament of Australia
There are some very interesting revelations and discrepancies in the answers/documentation provided, hopefully the good Senators and their staff are all over this??
One of the most outstanding pieces of spin and attempted obfuscation is contained within the answer to ATSB QON 8:
The last documented correspondence between the ATSB and the CASA ALIU Manager is dated 26/03/2010 on the ‘critical safety issue’. What that effectively means is that, despite the spin in the answer to QON 8, this ‘critical safety issue’ wasn’t acquitted or downgraded for nearly 29 months. I don’t know about anyone else but that ‘fact’ alone should require several heads on sticks…sheesh!
Another disturbing fact is that the extremely well researched and factual report compiled by the ATSB Pel-Air investigative team into the ‘critical safety issue’ was completely omitted from the ‘Safety Action’ section of the ‘Final Report’, where all it reads is this:
So in effect all the good instructive safety information contained within “Attachment One to ATSB letter AO-2009-072 of 26 February 2010” would have been lost forever had it not been for this inquiry.
It is also interesting to note that had the ATSB issued a safety recommendation, like they did in the good old days (pre-Beaker), for this ‘critical safety issue’ that it would have been totally transparent and placed on the ATSB database for the rest of the world to peruse and learn from. It would also have meant that CASA would have been forced to respond/acquit the ‘CSI’ (do you like that?) in a timelier manner!
2
Answers to questions taken on notice on 21 November 2012, in Canberra;(PDF 4052KB)
Answers to questions taken on notice on 21 November 2012, in Canberra;(PDF 4052KB)
Link: Senate Committees – Parliament of Australia
There are some very interesting revelations and discrepancies in the answers/documentation provided, hopefully the good Senators and their staff are all over this??
One of the most outstanding pieces of spin and attempted obfuscation is contained within the answer to ATSB QON 8:
8. HANSARD, PG 21
CHAIR: Mr Dolan, could you assist the committee by giving us the date on which the decision was taken in the ATSB to downgrade the report from intolerable to broadly acceptable? You can take that on notice if you like.
Mr Dolan: I will take that on notice.
Mr Dolan: I will take that on notice.
ATSB response:
Early in the investigation, initial information indicated that there was a safety issue and the ATSB wrote to CASA about that issue. Subsequently, CASA brought additional information to the attention of the ATSB that they believed mitigated the level of risk associated with the safety issue. Additionally, during the interim period, the ATSB was gaining a better understanding of the interaction of the individuals/organizations involved. As the investigation and report underwent reviews within the ATSB the safety issue remained open. The day the Commission approved s25 release of the final report, on 16 August 2012, was when the safety issue was formally re-classified as a minor safety issue.
CHAIR: Mr Dolan, could you assist the committee by giving us the date on which the decision was taken in the ATSB to downgrade the report from intolerable to broadly acceptable? You can take that on notice if you like.
Mr Dolan: I will take that on notice.
Mr Dolan: I will take that on notice.
ATSB response:
Early in the investigation, initial information indicated that there was a safety issue and the ATSB wrote to CASA about that issue. Subsequently, CASA brought additional information to the attention of the ATSB that they believed mitigated the level of risk associated with the safety issue. Additionally, during the interim period, the ATSB was gaining a better understanding of the interaction of the individuals/organizations involved. As the investigation and report underwent reviews within the ATSB the safety issue remained open. The day the Commission approved s25 release of the final report, on 16 August 2012, was when the safety issue was formally re-classified as a minor safety issue.
The last documented correspondence between the ATSB and the CASA ALIU Manager is dated 26/03/2010 on the ‘critical safety issue’. What that effectively means is that, despite the spin in the answer to QON 8, this ‘critical safety issue’ wasn’t acquitted or downgraded for nearly 29 months. I don’t know about anyone else but that ‘fact’ alone should require several heads on sticks…sheesh!
Another disturbing fact is that the extremely well researched and factual report compiled by the ATSB Pel-Air investigative team into the ‘critical safety issue’ was completely omitted from the ‘Safety Action’ section of the ‘Final Report’, where all it reads is this:
Fuel planning and en route decision-making
Minor safety issue
The available guidance on fuel planning and on seeking and applying en route weather updates was too general and increased the risk of inconsistent in-flight fuel management and decisions to divert.
Minor safety issue
The available guidance on fuel planning and on seeking and applying en route weather updates was too general and increased the risk of inconsistent in-flight fuel management and decisions to divert.
So in effect all the good instructive safety information contained within “Attachment One to ATSB letter AO-2009-072 of 26 February 2010” would have been lost forever had it not been for this inquiry.
It is also interesting to note that had the ATSB issued a safety recommendation, like they did in the good old days (pre-Beaker), for this ‘critical safety issue’ that it would have been totally transparent and placed on the ATSB database for the rest of the world to peruse and learn from. It would also have meant that CASA would have been forced to respond/acquit the ‘CSI’ (do you like that?) in a timelier manner!
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AQONs_211112_100 pdf
Seasons Greetings!
The PAIN team are busy reviewing "AQONs_211112_100" which was released on the Senate site 24/12/2012. For ease of access for those interested here is a more direct link to the pdf;
Zippyshare.com - AQONs_211112_100.pdf
Cheers and all the best for the New Year!
P2
The PAIN team are busy reviewing "AQONs_211112_100" which was released on the Senate site 24/12/2012. For ease of access for those interested here is a more direct link to the pdf;
Zippyshare.com - AQONs_211112_100.pdf
Cheers and all the best for the New Year!
P2
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Baby oil with a dashing amount of induced osciliation.
With your friend of current favour of course and notwithstanding the rites of passage for anybody of voting age.
Strewth!
With your friend of current favour of course and notwithstanding the rites of passage for anybody of voting age.
Strewth!
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From
Aviation safety regulation timeline 1982-2011 – Parliament of Australia
(found this snip thanks to UITA posting the above link in the Barrier thread)
Gobbles is very quiet is he in Montreal or the dog house?
Aviation safety regulation timeline 1982-2011 – Parliament of Australia
(found this snip thanks to UITA posting the above link in the Barrier thread)
18 September 2008
Tabling of the statement for the report of the Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport into CASA. The committee found that the CASA Regulatory Reform Program's (RRP) implementation had been deferred and delayed over past years and required conclusion as quickly as possible. With restructure, CASA had experienced a significant turn over in staff with a loss of technical expertise. The committee received a range of submissions in relation to CASA's move to become a partner with industry, rather than continuing with a more traditional regulatory approach. The report’s three recommendations related to issues of: strengthening CASA’s governance framework, conclusion of the RRP and, that the Australian National Audit Office audit CASA's implementation and administration of its Safety Management Systems approach.
Tabling of the statement for the report of the Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport into CASA. The committee found that the CASA Regulatory Reform Program's (RRP) implementation had been deferred and delayed over past years and required conclusion as quickly as possible. With restructure, CASA had experienced a significant turn over in staff with a loss of technical expertise. The committee received a range of submissions in relation to CASA's move to become a partner with industry, rather than continuing with a more traditional regulatory approach. The report’s three recommendations related to issues of: strengthening CASA’s governance framework, conclusion of the RRP and, that the Australian National Audit Office audit CASA's implementation and administration of its Safety Management Systems approach.
Last edited by halfmanhalfbiscuit; 31st Dec 2012 at 19:54. Reason: credit to UITA for the link.
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casa and the effect on commercial operations
From the Barrier Air thread, but relevant here:
From Thornbird, some references:
Aviation forum’s formula for recovery – aviationadvertiser.com.au
RAAA: TAAAF Policy Document
From Thornbird, some references:
Aviation forum’s formula for recovery – aviationadvertiser.com.au
RAAA: TAAAF Policy Document
Beaker's new paradigm for the ATSB
Someone on here suggested I should post this on this thread as it has relevancy with the now infamous Norfolk CSI, so here it is:
Why indeed?
Spike I would add that the Norfolk final report isn’t a one off aberration in the Beakerised recent years, it is just the one accident that caught mainstream media attention and hence public interest. Which, due to the pilot surviving, created an awkward situation for the relevant authorities that they couldn’t automatically default to the normal line of defence..“nothing to see here it was all the pilot’s fault!”
Hence the ATSB final report fell under public scrutiny, 4 corners got hold of it and the good Senator X (Saint Nick) and Senator Fawcett ultimately pushed for a ‘please explain’ which has led to where we are now.
If you refer to Attachment B of ATSB supplementary submission 2[1] headed ‘Managing safety issues and actions’ you will see get an insight into Beaker’s grand vision for the future.
Senate Committees – Parliament of Australia
In summary this is where the Beaker defends his new methodology into the management of safety issues and actions picked up in the course of an ATSB transport safety accident/incident investigation. The questions that need to be asked, is it working? Does it promote the dissemination and free flow of safety critical information to industry participant’s worldwide?
Attachment B paragraph 4 reads:
Here’s a short exercise that perhaps highlights the deficiencies and flaws in the Beaker vision of managing safety issues and actions. The following are extracts from the changed (Beakerised) Safety Issues and Actions ATSB database for all sections of the ATSB remit i.e. not just Aviation:
Safety issues and actions
We then put in 'critical' in the 'original risk' section.
Safety issues and actions
You’ll see that it comes up with one entry only, which is probably because this is the new Beaker method of recording safety actions and recommendations and therefore the system is yet to ‘catch up’ with the new methodology.
Ok for sh*ts and giggles lets open up the one entry that deals with those RR engines mounted on the A380:
Recommendation AO-2010-089-SR-012
So this SR was generated because of the uncontained engine explosion on the Qantas A380 VH-OQA out of Singapore in 2010. However what this one example shows is that normally a ‘critical safety issue’, like most of the world, should automatically generate a Safety Recommendation.
Now we’ll go to the next level down i.e. ‘Significant safety issues’:
Safety issues and actions
We now have a total of 11 entries depicted and of those 2 are SRs. One Marine SR that occurred on 30 July 2012 and one Aviation SR that occurred on 13 December 2010, which deals with a standby power deficiency in the B747-400 QRH.
Although the new methodology means there aren’t many entries so far it is still possible to see that even a significant safety issue can lead to the ATSB generating a SR. It is also interesting to note that all 11 entries are listed under the “Type:” column as either recommendations or ‘safety advisory notices’ and that significant safety issues (at least) are now starting to be listed, example: AO-2009-012-SI-001. So I wonder if the same thing is happening for minor safety issues?
Safety issues and actions
And that would be a yes! Ok so is the Pel-Air ‘critical safety issue,’ that has only recently been downgraded to ‘minor’, in there?..Err it would appear not, nor is any of the other ‘minor’ safety issues published in the Pel-Air final report! So although under the Beaker system all safety issues will now be supposedly published in the ATSB database, the Pel-Air (and god knows how many others) minor safety issues are yet to be included….just another cloak of invisibility!
Such a convoluted system! Too bad if you are operating in a remote base with dodgy internet coverage and you don’t know where to look on the ATSB site for that significant safety issue that happens to be relevant to the aircraft you’re operating…I mean WTF??
The biggest issue from this Beakerised system in regards to the ATSB investigation into the Norfolk ditching is perhaps best highlighted by this quote from the ‘Safety Action’ section of the preliminary report issued 13 January 2010:
This was prior to the ATSB bringing to the attention their now infamous CSI to the regulator. Under the old system that CSI would have automatically triggered a SR that would have had to be addressed in a timely matter as per the TSI Act. Instead we ended up with the ridiculous situation where a CSI that was well supported by an excellent documented investigative review by the ATSB investigation team, gets left in limbo for over 29 months before finally being downgraded to a minor safety issue!
Perhaps this farce is best summed up by Jinglie’s last:
Link to post on Norfolk thread
http://www.pprune.org/7611770-post652.html
Here's some more unexplained discrepancies with the new Beakerised 'safety issues and actions' database....
The final paragraphs of ‘Attachment B’ read:
Besides the fact that there is a degree of obfuscation in trying to state that 28 significant safety issues can possibly provide an accurate, statistical cross section of safety issues acquitted/actioned, there also appears to be a skewing of the total safety issues as I only get 10 entries for FY 11/12, see here:
Safety issues and actions
Perhaps this discrepancy is best explained by this further quote from Attachment B:
So maybe the other 18 significant safety issues are buried (or totally invisible) in the ATSB SIIMS??
Note: As a comparison for FY 07/08 (before Beakerisation) there was 145 safety issue entries, of which there were 97 formal safety recommendations:
Safety issues and actions
Still all very convoluted and definitely not very user friendly...bit like the 'Flight Safety Mag' no longer being sent out in hard copy. How many people are actually going to bother going to this amount of trouble to source possible relevant 'safety issues'?? Even if you do you still can't be assured that certain safety issues have been captured or discretely omitted on the database!
Jinglie said: Why on earth is the ATSB drifting off from the rest of the world? Imagine if there was ever a large fatal here (touch wood), these clowns wouldn't have a clue.
flying-spike said: What I got from the report done for the ATSB was that it was based on available research into SMSs and that the majority of the research done on OH&S systems with very little done on low probability/high consequence industries such as aviation. I would put about as much value on that report as I would put on the ATSB report into the Norfolk Island ditching.....bugger all.
Hence the ATSB final report fell under public scrutiny, 4 corners got hold of it and the good Senator X (Saint Nick) and Senator Fawcett ultimately pushed for a ‘please explain’ which has led to where we are now.
If you refer to Attachment B of ATSB supplementary submission 2[1] headed ‘Managing safety issues and actions’ you will see get an insight into Beaker’s grand vision for the future.
Senate Committees – Parliament of Australia
In summary this is where the Beaker defends his new methodology into the management of safety issues and actions picked up in the course of an ATSB transport safety accident/incident investigation. The questions that need to be asked, is it working? Does it promote the dissemination and free flow of safety critical information to industry participant’s worldwide?
Attachment B paragraph 4 reads:
The ATSB is in the process of redeveloping its website to be 'safety issue' focused rather than 'recommendation' focussed. The point of importance is that the safety issue remains open (like a recommendation) until such time as it is either adequately addressed, or it is clear that the responsible organisation does not intend taking any action (and has provided its reasons). In the event that no, or limited, safety actions are taken or proposed, the ATSB has the option to issue a formal safety recommendation
Safety issues and actions
We then put in 'critical' in the 'original risk' section.
Safety issues and actions
You’ll see that it comes up with one entry only, which is probably because this is the new Beaker method of recording safety actions and recommendations and therefore the system is yet to ‘catch up’ with the new methodology.
Ok for sh*ts and giggles lets open up the one entry that deals with those RR engines mounted on the A380:
Recommendation AO-2010-089-SR-012
So this SR was generated because of the uncontained engine explosion on the Qantas A380 VH-OQA out of Singapore in 2010. However what this one example shows is that normally a ‘critical safety issue’, like most of the world, should automatically generate a Safety Recommendation.
Now we’ll go to the next level down i.e. ‘Significant safety issues’:
Safety issues and actions
We now have a total of 11 entries depicted and of those 2 are SRs. One Marine SR that occurred on 30 July 2012 and one Aviation SR that occurred on 13 December 2010, which deals with a standby power deficiency in the B747-400 QRH.
Although the new methodology means there aren’t many entries so far it is still possible to see that even a significant safety issue can lead to the ATSB generating a SR. It is also interesting to note that all 11 entries are listed under the “Type:” column as either recommendations or ‘safety advisory notices’ and that significant safety issues (at least) are now starting to be listed, example: AO-2009-012-SI-001. So I wonder if the same thing is happening for minor safety issues?
Safety issues and actions
And that would be a yes! Ok so is the Pel-Air ‘critical safety issue,’ that has only recently been downgraded to ‘minor’, in there?..Err it would appear not, nor is any of the other ‘minor’ safety issues published in the Pel-Air final report! So although under the Beaker system all safety issues will now be supposedly published in the ATSB database, the Pel-Air (and god knows how many others) minor safety issues are yet to be included….just another cloak of invisibility!
Such a convoluted system! Too bad if you are operating in a remote base with dodgy internet coverage and you don’t know where to look on the ATSB site for that significant safety issue that happens to be relevant to the aircraft you’re operating…I mean WTF??
The biggest issue from this Beakerised system in regards to the ATSB investigation into the Norfolk ditching is perhaps best highlighted by this quote from the ‘Safety Action’ section of the preliminary report issued 13 January 2010:
The remainder of the investigation is likely to take some months. However, should any critical safety issues emerge that require urgent attention, the ATSB will immediately bring such issues to the attention of the relevant authorities who are best placed to take prompt action to address those issues.
Perhaps this farce is best summed up by Jinglie’s last:
Wait till the FAA come back and speak to Beaker! We are doomed!
http://www.pprune.org/7611770-post652.html
Here's some more unexplained discrepancies with the new Beakerised 'safety issues and actions' database....
The final paragraphs of ‘Attachment B’ read:
The ATSB's Annual Plan and part of the ATSB's Key Performance Indicators
specifically relate to a measurement of safety action taken in response to safety issues; in the case of 'critical' safety issues, the target is for safety action to be taken by stakeholders 1 00% of the time, while for 'significant' safety issues, the target is 70%.
For the FY11 /12, there were no identified critical safety issues and 28 significant safety issues. In response to the significant safety issues, adequate safety action was taken in 89% of cases and a further 4% were assessed as partially addressed.
specifically relate to a measurement of safety action taken in response to safety issues; in the case of 'critical' safety issues, the target is for safety action to be taken by stakeholders 1 00% of the time, while for 'significant' safety issues, the target is 70%.
For the FY11 /12, there were no identified critical safety issues and 28 significant safety issues. In response to the significant safety issues, adequate safety action was taken in 89% of cases and a further 4% were assessed as partially addressed.
Safety issues and actions
Perhaps this discrepancy is best explained by this further quote from Attachment B:
The ATSB's Safety Investigation Information Management System (SlIMS) provides tools for investigators to record and track safety issues and actions, including through the setting up of alerts to prompt periodic follow-up of progress with safety action where a safety issue is open and the safety actions are being monitored (the same process applies if a recommendation were issued).
Note: As a comparison for FY 07/08 (before Beakerisation) there was 145 safety issue entries, of which there were 97 formal safety recommendations:
Safety issues and actions
Still all very convoluted and definitely not very user friendly...bit like the 'Flight Safety Mag' no longer being sent out in hard copy. How many people are actually going to bother going to this amount of trouble to source possible relevant 'safety issues'?? Even if you do you still can't be assured that certain safety issues have been captured or discretely omitted on the database!
I'm afraid I know where all this ends: The ATSB slides into complete irrelevency and operators take their cues from overseas regulators.
If you keep producing garbage, no one will take any notice of it because they can't learn anything of value from it.
When, not if, there is a major accident with great loss of life, there are Five certainties:
(1) The ATSB will conceal evidence and cover its backside.
(2) CASA will cover its backside, most probably by blaming the pilot.
(3) Air Services will cover its backside,
(4) Any airport and airline involved will cover their backside.
(5) Everything possible will be done by the Minister and his Department to suppress honest reporting and conceal the truth from the Australian Public.
If you keep producing garbage, no one will take any notice of it because they can't learn anything of value from it.
When, not if, there is a major accident with great loss of life, there are Five certainties:
(1) The ATSB will conceal evidence and cover its backside.
(2) CASA will cover its backside, most probably by blaming the pilot.
(3) Air Services will cover its backside,
(4) Any airport and airline involved will cover their backside.
(5) Everything possible will be done by the Minister and his Department to suppress honest reporting and conceal the truth from the Australian Public.
Last edited by Sunfish; 7th Jan 2013 at 20:24.
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TransAir and Misima [Milne Bay]
The links are:
Accident report:
http://www.aic.gov.pg/pdf/P2-TAA%20F...812.221112.pdf
Thread:
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-general-a...y-crash-6.html
Accident report:
http://www.aic.gov.pg/pdf/P2-TAA%20F...812.221112.pdf
Thread:
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-general-a...y-crash-6.html
The Fairfax Factor!
Interesting article from Ben today, perhaps explains why there has been little coverage from Fairfax media on any significant Oz aviation safety issues like the Pel-Air inquiry or the ASA series of BOS events. Not that News Limited is much better!!
Q/ Does the Fairfax group even have a reputable investigative journo on their books anymore? Oh well Fairfax will continue to fade into obscurity...let's just hope the Senators keep turning over those stones...
Qantas safety list story also about Fairfax's decline | Plane Talking
Q/ Does the Fairfax group even have a reputable investigative journo on their books anymore? Oh well Fairfax will continue to fade into obscurity...let's just hope the Senators keep turning over those stones...
Qantas safety ‘list’ story is also about Fairfax’s decline
Ben Sandilands | Jan 12, 2013 3:41PM | EMAIL | PRINT
If Fairfax is prepared to give top of site billing to the rankings done by the tiny Jet Airliner Crash Data Evaluation Centre based in Hamburg without telling its readers exactly how Finnair ended up on top, and Virgin trumped Qantas, and so forth, it is making itself a party to something very odd to say the least.
Fairfax media is currently leading its online advertorial, lifestyle, spruiking, and supposed news and analysis sites with a story about how Qantas has been bumped down a list of world’s safest airlines.
List stories are in general a nonsense, and seldom tolerated by serious news organisations without a detailed investigation of the methodologies, qualifications and financial affairs of those claiming to be able to make a list of safest airlines, or best lounges, or top resorts, or whatever brain dead nonsense a so called news organisation wants to serve up.
In this case Fairfax is publicising a small German group which has declared in a listing based on parameters not fully disclosed on its website that the world’s safest airline is Finnair, and that Air New Zealand, is the world’s second safest carrier, and Virgin Australia, is ninth, and that Qantas is 13th. It sees this as a ‘downgrade’ of Qantas safety. Seriously? There is much to report, analyse and discuss in matters Qantas, but according a supposedly enthusiast but pay-for-use site in Germany with the credibility to ‘downgrade’ Qantas is absurd.
This is the same Fairfax that has invested scarcely any time even reporting the privileged disclosures of grave safety deficiencies in CASA, the ATSB, Airservices Australia, and in the operations of Jetstar and Pel-Air, even though they have been served up on a plate in Senate committee hearings and protected air safety investigation reports for several years.
It is a Fairfax with some excellent reporters that nevertheless appears to be managerially totally gutless and unfocused when it comes to directing resources into real coverage of seriously relevant matters for its readerships even when they are begging for attention.
But list stories, especially those with PR involvement, are pushed out, even when they are manifestly unsatisfactory in terms of lack of details or have credibility red flags fluttering all over them.
There is no question, on the publicly available safety data, that all of the top 13 carriers in the list have good safety records today. But the rankings are strange.
If Fairfax is prepared to give top of site billing to the rankings done by the tiny Jet Airliner Crash Data Evaluation Centre based in Hamburg without telling its readers exactly how Finnair ended up on top, and Virgin trumped Qantas, and so forth, it is making itself a party to something very odd to say the least.
The courageous and truthful way of dealing with air safety matters that relate directly to Australian carriers and those foreign carriers that Australians most often fly on based on BITRE statistics would be to review the safety literature comprising accident and incident investigations and the evidence and submissions provided to parliamentary committees, including the unfinished business of the Pel-Air report issued by the ATSB last August which is the subject of a Senate inquiry.
Why are serious incidents being kept from clear public view in this country? Why didn’t CASA act against Pel-Air when it found it in serious breach of its safety obligations at the time of the air ambulance ditching near Norfolk Island in 2009?
Why did CASA ground a Singapore owned airline Tiger Airways for safety breaches yet take no action against the AOC of Jetstar when two pilots who couldn’t even speak to each other in the cockpit did nothing to correct the trajectory of an A321 flying toward a landing at Singapore Airport when the captain was so focused on his mobile phone that the first officer had to disregard his last minute instructions to land the flight on his own and instead initiated a go-around when it was around 400 feet above the ground and improperly configured for a touchdown?
Why is Fairfax running trivial and absurd list stories when the public administration of air safety in this country has gone to hell in a hand cart without it paying the slightest attention?
Quite possibly because unless it comes neatly wrapped up in a press release it hasn’t the capability or will to go out and commit real journalism, hard, time consuming, and often costly journalism, that will produce stories readers will pay for.
Ben Sandilands | Jan 12, 2013 3:41PM | EMAIL | PRINT
If Fairfax is prepared to give top of site billing to the rankings done by the tiny Jet Airliner Crash Data Evaluation Centre based in Hamburg without telling its readers exactly how Finnair ended up on top, and Virgin trumped Qantas, and so forth, it is making itself a party to something very odd to say the least.
Fairfax media is currently leading its online advertorial, lifestyle, spruiking, and supposed news and analysis sites with a story about how Qantas has been bumped down a list of world’s safest airlines.
List stories are in general a nonsense, and seldom tolerated by serious news organisations without a detailed investigation of the methodologies, qualifications and financial affairs of those claiming to be able to make a list of safest airlines, or best lounges, or top resorts, or whatever brain dead nonsense a so called news organisation wants to serve up.
In this case Fairfax is publicising a small German group which has declared in a listing based on parameters not fully disclosed on its website that the world’s safest airline is Finnair, and that Air New Zealand, is the world’s second safest carrier, and Virgin Australia, is ninth, and that Qantas is 13th. It sees this as a ‘downgrade’ of Qantas safety. Seriously? There is much to report, analyse and discuss in matters Qantas, but according a supposedly enthusiast but pay-for-use site in Germany with the credibility to ‘downgrade’ Qantas is absurd.
This is the same Fairfax that has invested scarcely any time even reporting the privileged disclosures of grave safety deficiencies in CASA, the ATSB, Airservices Australia, and in the operations of Jetstar and Pel-Air, even though they have been served up on a plate in Senate committee hearings and protected air safety investigation reports for several years.
It is a Fairfax with some excellent reporters that nevertheless appears to be managerially totally gutless and unfocused when it comes to directing resources into real coverage of seriously relevant matters for its readerships even when they are begging for attention.
But list stories, especially those with PR involvement, are pushed out, even when they are manifestly unsatisfactory in terms of lack of details or have credibility red flags fluttering all over them.
There is no question, on the publicly available safety data, that all of the top 13 carriers in the list have good safety records today. But the rankings are strange.
If Fairfax is prepared to give top of site billing to the rankings done by the tiny Jet Airliner Crash Data Evaluation Centre based in Hamburg without telling its readers exactly how Finnair ended up on top, and Virgin trumped Qantas, and so forth, it is making itself a party to something very odd to say the least.
The courageous and truthful way of dealing with air safety matters that relate directly to Australian carriers and those foreign carriers that Australians most often fly on based on BITRE statistics would be to review the safety literature comprising accident and incident investigations and the evidence and submissions provided to parliamentary committees, including the unfinished business of the Pel-Air report issued by the ATSB last August which is the subject of a Senate inquiry.
Why are serious incidents being kept from clear public view in this country? Why didn’t CASA act against Pel-Air when it found it in serious breach of its safety obligations at the time of the air ambulance ditching near Norfolk Island in 2009?
Why did CASA ground a Singapore owned airline Tiger Airways for safety breaches yet take no action against the AOC of Jetstar when two pilots who couldn’t even speak to each other in the cockpit did nothing to correct the trajectory of an A321 flying toward a landing at Singapore Airport when the captain was so focused on his mobile phone that the first officer had to disregard his last minute instructions to land the flight on his own and instead initiated a go-around when it was around 400 feet above the ground and improperly configured for a touchdown?
Why is Fairfax running trivial and absurd list stories when the public administration of air safety in this country has gone to hell in a hand cart without it paying the slightest attention?
Quite possibly because unless it comes neatly wrapped up in a press release it hasn’t the capability or will to go out and commit real journalism, hard, time consuming, and often costly journalism, that will produce stories readers will pay for.
Qantas safety list story also about Fairfax's decline | Plane Talking
From Plane Talking:
Burned 787 battery underlines seriousness of incident | Plane Talking
As Ben Sandilands aptly points out there is perhaps no better example of how much the ATSB has been nobbled in recent years (the Beaker years) by Fort Fumble exploiting the 2010 MOU and the recommendations/findings of the Miller review. Just compare the handling by the NTSB Boeing 787 Japan Airlines onboard fire at Logan Airport Boston to that of the Pel-Air Norfolk Island ditching.
Here was the first NTSB press release upon being notified:
Here was the second:
In between we had the FAA announcing a review of the 787 certification and proving process that the FAA had conducted on the 787, which was followed by a joint FAA and Boeing media statement about how outstandingly safe the 787 is.
But the NTSB weren’t going to swallow any of that baloney and put out this further secondary investigative update:
Press Release January 14, 2013
It could be argued that our safety watchdog would have handled this incident in much the same way but given the handling of the Pel-Air Norfolk ditching investigation, the CSI and subsequent Final Report I’d say there would be no guarantee that the ATSB wouldn’t have been swayed by the regulator’s rhetoric and proposed safety actions.
It will be interesting to see the NTSB safety recommendations generated from this incident and I bet it won’t take them over 32 months to produce a Final Report.
In some ways the NTSB relationship to the FAA resembles the way the ATSB used to be a fiercely independent body in relation to CASA until it suited government to neuter it with a pact under which it can no longer embarrass our Civil Aviation Safety Authority or confront Ministers with unpalatable realities about the misdeeds of vested interests in air services in Australia.
(An unfinished Senate committee inquiry into the final report the ATSB released into the Pel-Air ditching at Norfolk Island in 2009 has taken evidence as to how CASA persuaded the ATSB to completely change its mind about the safety issues in the crash, and to state that a suppressed CASA audit that found Pel-Air in serious breach of numerous safety obligations relevant to the incident had no bearing on the accident. Stay tuned.)
(An unfinished Senate committee inquiry into the final report the ATSB released into the Pel-Air ditching at Norfolk Island in 2009 has taken evidence as to how CASA persuaded the ATSB to completely change its mind about the safety issues in the crash, and to state that a suppressed CASA audit that found Pel-Air in serious breach of numerous safety obligations relevant to the incident had no bearing on the accident. Stay tuned.)
As Ben Sandilands aptly points out there is perhaps no better example of how much the ATSB has been nobbled in recent years (the Beaker years) by Fort Fumble exploiting the 2010 MOU and the recommendations/findings of the Miller review. Just compare the handling by the NTSB Boeing 787 Japan Airlines onboard fire at Logan Airport Boston to that of the Pel-Air Norfolk Island ditching.
Here was the first NTSB press release upon being notified:
NTSB investigators looking into Boeing 787 smoke event in Boston
January 07
WASHINGTON - Investigators with the National Transportation Safety Board are gathering information regarding reports of smoke aboard a Boeing 787 at Boston's Logan Airport today. The Japan Airlines 787 was on the ground and empty of passengers at the time of the incident. The NTSB has dispatched an investigator to Boston. Based on a review of the factual information gathered, the NTSB will determine the extent of its investigation.
January 07
WASHINGTON - Investigators with the National Transportation Safety Board are gathering information regarding reports of smoke aboard a Boeing 787 at Boston's Logan Airport today. The Japan Airlines 787 was on the ground and empty of passengers at the time of the incident. The NTSB has dispatched an investigator to Boston. Based on a review of the factual information gathered, the NTSB will determine the extent of its investigation.
NTSB provides investigative update on Boeing 787 fire incident in Boston
January 08
WASHINGTON - The National Transportation Safety Board today released an update on its formal investigation of Monday's fire aboard a Japan Airlines Boeing 787 at Logan International Airport in Boston. There were no passengers or crew on board at the time. One firefighter received minor injuries.
In addition to an investigator already on scene who visually inspected the airplane last night, the NTSB has sent two additional investigators to Boston and formed investigative groups to look at airworthiness and fire and airport emergency response. Senior Air Safety Investigator David Helson has been designated as the investigator-in-charge.
Parties to the investigation are the Federal Aviation Administration and The Boeing Company. In addition, the Japan Transport Safety Board has appointed an accredited representative and Japan Airlines will assist the JTSB as technical advisors.
Initial investigative findings include:
· The NTSB investigator on scene found that the auxiliary power unit battery had severe fire damage. Thermal damage to the surrounding structure and components is confined to the area immediately near the APU battery rack (within about 20 inches) in the aft electronics bay.
· Preliminary reports from Japan Airlines representatives indicate that airplane maintenance and cleaning personnel were on the airplane with the APU in operation just prior to the detection of smoke in the cabin and that Boston Logan Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting were contacted.
· Rescue and fire personnel and equipment responded to the airplane and detected a fire in the electronics and equipment bay near the APU battery box. Initial reports indicate that the fire was extinguished about 40 minutes after arrival of the first rescue and fire personnel. One firefighter received minor injuries.
January 08
WASHINGTON - The National Transportation Safety Board today released an update on its formal investigation of Monday's fire aboard a Japan Airlines Boeing 787 at Logan International Airport in Boston. There were no passengers or crew on board at the time. One firefighter received minor injuries.
In addition to an investigator already on scene who visually inspected the airplane last night, the NTSB has sent two additional investigators to Boston and formed investigative groups to look at airworthiness and fire and airport emergency response. Senior Air Safety Investigator David Helson has been designated as the investigator-in-charge.
Parties to the investigation are the Federal Aviation Administration and The Boeing Company. In addition, the Japan Transport Safety Board has appointed an accredited representative and Japan Airlines will assist the JTSB as technical advisors.
Initial investigative findings include:
· The NTSB investigator on scene found that the auxiliary power unit battery had severe fire damage. Thermal damage to the surrounding structure and components is confined to the area immediately near the APU battery rack (within about 20 inches) in the aft electronics bay.
· Preliminary reports from Japan Airlines representatives indicate that airplane maintenance and cleaning personnel were on the airplane with the APU in operation just prior to the detection of smoke in the cabin and that Boston Logan Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting were contacted.
· Rescue and fire personnel and equipment responded to the airplane and detected a fire in the electronics and equipment bay near the APU battery box. Initial reports indicate that the fire was extinguished about 40 minutes after arrival of the first rescue and fire personnel. One firefighter received minor injuries.
But the NTSB weren’t going to swallow any of that baloney and put out this further secondary investigative update:
NTSB Provides Second Investigative Update on Boeing 787 Battery Fire in Boston
January 14
WASHINGTON - The National Transportation Safety Board today released a second update on its investigation into the Jan. 7 fire aboard a Japan Airlines Boeing 787 at Logan International Airport in Boston.
The lithium-ion battery that powered the auxiliary power unit on the airplane was removed and transported back to the NTSB Materials Laboratory in Washington on Jan. 10. The battery is currently being examined by NTSB investigators, who plan to disassemble it this week.
In advance of that work, under the direction of the NTSB, radiographic examinations of the incident battery and an exemplar battery were conducted this past weekend at an independent test facility. The digital radiographs and computed tomography scans generated from this examination allowed the team to document the internal condition of the battery prior to disassembling it.
In addition, investigators took possession of burned wire bundles, the APU battery charger, and several memory modules. The maintenance and APU controller memory modules will be downloaded to obtain any available data. Investigators also documented the entire aft electronics bay including the APU battery and the nearby affected structure where components and wire bundles were located. The airplane was released back to Japan Airlines on Jan. 10.
The airplane's two combined flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder units were transported to NTSB headquarters and have been successfully downloaded. The information is currently being analyzed by the investigative team.
The airport emergency response group documented the airport rescue and firefighting efforts to extinguish the fire, which included interviews with first responders. Fire and rescue personnel were able to contain the fire using a clean agent (Halotron), however, they reported experiencing difficulty accessing the battery for removal during extinguishing efforts. All fire and rescue personnel responding to the incident had previously received aircraft familiarization training on the Boeing 787. In accordance with international investigative treaties, the Japan Transport Safety Board and French Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile have appointed accredited representatives to the investigation. The NTSB-led investigative team is comprised of subject matter groups in the areas of airplane systems, fire, airport emergency response, and data recorders and includes experts from the Federal Aviation Administration, The Boeing Company, US Naval Surface Warfare Center's Carderock Division, Japan Airlines (aircraft operator), GS Yuasa (battery manufacturer), and Thales Avionics Electrical Systems (APU battery/charger system).
Further investigative updates will be issued as events warrant. To be alerted to any updates or developments, please follow the NTSB on Twitter at twitter.com/ntsb.
January 14
WASHINGTON - The National Transportation Safety Board today released a second update on its investigation into the Jan. 7 fire aboard a Japan Airlines Boeing 787 at Logan International Airport in Boston.
The lithium-ion battery that powered the auxiliary power unit on the airplane was removed and transported back to the NTSB Materials Laboratory in Washington on Jan. 10. The battery is currently being examined by NTSB investigators, who plan to disassemble it this week.
In advance of that work, under the direction of the NTSB, radiographic examinations of the incident battery and an exemplar battery were conducted this past weekend at an independent test facility. The digital radiographs and computed tomography scans generated from this examination allowed the team to document the internal condition of the battery prior to disassembling it.
In addition, investigators took possession of burned wire bundles, the APU battery charger, and several memory modules. The maintenance and APU controller memory modules will be downloaded to obtain any available data. Investigators also documented the entire aft electronics bay including the APU battery and the nearby affected structure where components and wire bundles were located. The airplane was released back to Japan Airlines on Jan. 10.
The airplane's two combined flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder units were transported to NTSB headquarters and have been successfully downloaded. The information is currently being analyzed by the investigative team.
The airport emergency response group documented the airport rescue and firefighting efforts to extinguish the fire, which included interviews with first responders. Fire and rescue personnel were able to contain the fire using a clean agent (Halotron), however, they reported experiencing difficulty accessing the battery for removal during extinguishing efforts. All fire and rescue personnel responding to the incident had previously received aircraft familiarization training on the Boeing 787. In accordance with international investigative treaties, the Japan Transport Safety Board and French Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile have appointed accredited representatives to the investigation. The NTSB-led investigative team is comprised of subject matter groups in the areas of airplane systems, fire, airport emergency response, and data recorders and includes experts from the Federal Aviation Administration, The Boeing Company, US Naval Surface Warfare Center's Carderock Division, Japan Airlines (aircraft operator), GS Yuasa (battery manufacturer), and Thales Avionics Electrical Systems (APU battery/charger system).
Further investigative updates will be issued as events warrant. To be alerted to any updates or developments, please follow the NTSB on Twitter at twitter.com/ntsb.
It could be argued that our safety watchdog would have handled this incident in much the same way but given the handling of the Pel-Air Norfolk ditching investigation, the CSI and subsequent Final Report I’d say there would be no guarantee that the ATSB wouldn’t have been swayed by the regulator’s rhetoric and proposed safety actions.
It will be interesting to see the NTSB safety recommendations generated from this incident and I bet it won’t take them over 32 months to produce a Final Report.
Last edited by Sarcs; 15th Jan 2013 at 07:39.
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OBR, CVR and FDR.
Suitably fortified with a large slice of Christmas pudding and a bottle of Ireland's finest I had another look at the fuel issues which have caused much throwing of toys and squabbles within the rank and file. First thought was of the Caribbean incident and the NTSB approach – the aircraft had a 4.5 hour supply of fuel on board, which was exhausted after 4.6 hours – "furry muff" sayest the guru's of NTSB; "now lets find out why". Not so with the Norfolk night swimming championships.
I must say the Davies fuel burn effort was at least logical, believable and nicely done; but as for the rest, well. But, that said I wondered why the fuel squabble generated so many pages of assumptions and rhetoric. All the questions and guess work could have been avoided had the actual OBR data from the flight and previous flights been examined to accurately determine the fuel status of the aircraft. There are now three "expert" fuel burn analysis (by assumption) on record and not a shred of hard data for any, not even an analysis of the grid winds and temperature for the day offered in support.
This of course lead to other questions like: why is there no company or pilot supplied version in defence?; and why was the On Board Recording device (OBR) not recovered?
So, to a reading session; the TSI Act 2003 (Part 6 :48-58) and the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (section 32 AO-AU). Note that CASA "intended" (bluffing) a prosecution and from the 1988 Act you can see that only the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) is of interest, strictly in a prosecution only sense, not the rest of the On Board Recording devices (OBR). The TSI includes the lot.
I still wonder why the "Black box" was not recovered, the combined unit would have provided an independent eye witness to the events. We are obliged by law to install and keep serviceable the "boxes": not recovering the thing makes it pointless to do so. The report is happy with 'edited' transcript and 'expert' opinion. I guess expecting the facts and evidence to support assumption are not required in the modern era of investigations. CASA and the ATSB have dreamed up some bull about there being 'enough' evidence without the CVR/FDR; and yet questions are stll being asked against spin, speculation and assumption.
We have three independent witnesses to the event ignored, unheard and buried under a mountain of paperwork; the CVR, the FDR and the co pilot. It would be a brave judge who made a ruling without hearing all the witnesses.
I must say the Davies fuel burn effort was at least logical, believable and nicely done; but as for the rest, well. But, that said I wondered why the fuel squabble generated so many pages of assumptions and rhetoric. All the questions and guess work could have been avoided had the actual OBR data from the flight and previous flights been examined to accurately determine the fuel status of the aircraft. There are now three "expert" fuel burn analysis (by assumption) on record and not a shred of hard data for any, not even an analysis of the grid winds and temperature for the day offered in support.
This of course lead to other questions like: why is there no company or pilot supplied version in defence?; and why was the On Board Recording device (OBR) not recovered?
So, to a reading session; the TSI Act 2003 (Part 6 :48-58) and the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (section 32 AO-AU). Note that CASA "intended" (bluffing) a prosecution and from the 1988 Act you can see that only the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) is of interest, strictly in a prosecution only sense, not the rest of the On Board Recording devices (OBR). The TSI includes the lot.
I still wonder why the "Black box" was not recovered, the combined unit would have provided an independent eye witness to the events. We are obliged by law to install and keep serviceable the "boxes": not recovering the thing makes it pointless to do so. The report is happy with 'edited' transcript and 'expert' opinion. I guess expecting the facts and evidence to support assumption are not required in the modern era of investigations. CASA and the ATSB have dreamed up some bull about there being 'enough' evidence without the CVR/FDR; and yet questions are stll being asked against spin, speculation and assumption.
We have three independent witnesses to the event ignored, unheard and buried under a mountain of paperwork; the CVR, the FDR and the co pilot. It would be a brave judge who made a ruling without hearing all the witnesses.
Last edited by Kharon; 18th Jan 2013 at 23:37. Reason: Come home Gobbles - all should be forgiven.
Top post "K"!
Interesting post “K” and highlights yet another unexplained and unresolved, tainted area within the remit of the Pel-Air enquiry that hopefully hasn’t got past the attention of the good Senators.
A quick Sunday afternoon google search for unrecovered blackboxes turns up a list total of twelve (I guess soon to be 13) from 1965. Some of those cases it wasn’t from a lack of trying to retrieve them. And sometimes they were totally or partially destroyed or lost.
The irony of the Pel-Air Norfolk ditching is that if the crew and pax had of perished then the bureau and FF would have been obligated to recover the blackbox!
Besides being a rather embarrassing retraction by the DAS and points to the question whether the DAS is indeed the puppetmaster or the puppet, the following is interesting in the context of the unrecovered blackbox:
Besides the fact that the Hansard reference to which he refers is actually located on page 53 this revelation may call into question some of the issues that Kharon raises in post #961.
§ How can it be that FF doesn’t have the necessary funds and where’s the cost/benefit/analysis?
§ As “K” infers could it be that FF legal considered the CVR information could be detrimental to their case of trying (initially) to prosecute the pilot under S20A of the Act and given the protections section 32 AO-AU afford the flight crew?
§ Could it also be that FF were aware that had the blackbox been retrieved then the bureau would have full and privileged control over the CVR/FDR information as per the TSI Act?
The DAS revelation would have been a contributing factor to bean-counter Beaker’s ultimate decision not to recover the black box, which
he explained to the committee on page 67 of the Hansard:
You got to say what a load of bollocks! And what about the FDR, surely the invaluable information that it holds over a 100hrs of ‘power on’ was worth the cost of retrieval alone??
Not sure about the FA2100 combined CVR/FDR but a lot of FDR’s these days have so many more flight system parameters measured/recorded.
Whose to say if fuel flows, fuel burn etc wasn’t recorded not to mention (as “K” said) actual winds aloft, ground speed etc..etc. Even PTT actuations, which could have possibly shown transmissions that weren’t received or recorded by ATC. The list isn’t endless but there is a 100hrs of possibly relevant information that is still sitting on the ocean floor.
Hopefully the good Senators are all over this because it certainly is an area that raises the stench of this whole Pel-Air debacle to an extreme level!
and highlights yet another unexplained and unresolved, tainted area within the remit of the Pel-Air enquiry that hopefully hasn’t got past the attention of the good Senators.A quick Sunday afternoon google search for unrecovered blackboxes turns up a list total of twelve (I guess soon to be 13) from 1965. Some of those cases it wasn’t from a lack of trying to retrieve them. And sometimes they were totally or partially destroyed or lost.
The irony of the Pel-Air Norfolk ditching is that if the crew and pax had of perished then the bureau and FF would have been obligated to recover the blackbox!
Besides being a rather embarrassing retraction by the DAS and points to the question whether the DAS is indeed the puppetmaster or the puppet, the following is interesting in the context of the unrecovered blackbox:
At page 41 of the Hansard from Monday 22 October it was stated:
CHAIR: So your department had no part, no conversations, in the recovery of the black box?
Mr McCormick: No, Senator, we did not.
CHAIR: No input at all?
Mr McCormick: No, Senator.
I have since been advised that this statement is not correct. On 8 December 2009
the ATSB raised with CASA by email the possibility of contributing to a joint fund
sharing arrangement to recover the black box and was advised that CASA did not have the funds to contribute to that exercise. I was not aware of this email at the time of my advice to the Committee.
I apologise if my comments have been in any way misleading.
CHAIR: So your department had no part, no conversations, in the recovery of the black box?
Mr McCormick: No, Senator, we did not.
CHAIR: No input at all?
Mr McCormick: No, Senator.
I have since been advised that this statement is not correct. On 8 December 2009
the ATSB raised with CASA by email the possibility of contributing to a joint fund
sharing arrangement to recover the black box and was advised that CASA did not have the funds to contribute to that exercise. I was not aware of this email at the time of my advice to the Committee.
I apologise if my comments have been in any way misleading.
§ How can it be that FF doesn’t have the necessary funds and where’s the cost/benefit/analysis?
§ As “K” infers could it be that FF legal considered the CVR information could be detrimental to their case of trying (initially) to prosecute the pilot under S20A of the Act and given the protections section 32 AO-AU afford the flight crew?
§ Could it also be that FF were aware that had the blackbox been retrieved then the bureau would have full and privileged control over the CVR/FDR information as per the TSI Act?
The DAS revelation would have been a contributing factor to bean-counter Beaker’s ultimate decision not to recover the black box, which
he explained to the committee on page 67 of the Hansard:
Mr Dolan: At the initial stages, we understood the aircraft was in comparatively shallow water and that access to the recorders would be reasonably achievable by a diver or other mechanisms without too much difficulty. That brief was to convince me to make the necessary allocation of resources to retrieve the flight data recorder and the cockpit voice recorder. Upon investigation, it became clear that the depth at which the aircraft was in the water, its location at a remote island, Norfolk Island, and the work health and safety standards applying to diving to those depths meant that there would have been a substantial cost of recovery.
The requirement was effectively that there be a decompression chamber, none of which was available on Norfolk Island, for the full time of the retrieval because of the depth at which the divers would be operating. When we got a reasonable and first approximation assessment of that, in the knowledge that, from our point of view, the key information we had about flight decision making would not have been recorded on the cockpit voice recorder which only had a two-hour time on it—
The requirement was effectively that there be a decompression chamber, none of which was available on Norfolk Island, for the full time of the retrieval because of the depth at which the divers would be operating. When we got a reasonable and first approximation assessment of that, in the knowledge that, from our point of view, the key information we had about flight decision making would not have been recorded on the cockpit voice recorder which only had a two-hour time on it—
You got to say what a load of bollocks! And what about the FDR, surely the invaluable information that it holds over a 100hrs of ‘power on’ was worth the cost of retrieval alone??
Not sure about the FA2100 combined CVR/FDR but a lot of FDR’s these days have so many more flight system parameters measured/recorded.
Whose to say if fuel flows, fuel burn etc wasn’t recorded not to mention (as “K” said) actual winds aloft, ground speed etc..etc. Even PTT actuations, which could have possibly shown transmissions that weren’t received or recorded by ATC. The list isn’t endless but there is a 100hrs of possibly relevant information that is still sitting on the ocean floor.
Hopefully the good Senators are all over this because it certainly is an area that raises the stench of this whole Pel-Air debacle to an extreme level!
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Gotta love Google.
Sarcs #954 –"A quick Sunday afternoon Google search for unrecovered black-boxes turns up a list total of twelve (I guess soon to be 13) from 1965. Some of those cases it wasn’t from a lack of trying to retrieve them. And sometimes they were totally or partially destroyed or lost".
NTSB Investigators Manual.
From page 156 (PDF) – there are guidelines for OBR which make no bones about how important the recovery of the CVR etc. is to their investigations, most refreshing attitude. Now I know the manual is 'dry' reading, but there is some really good stuff tucked away in the 'procedural' parts worth cherry picking, just for reference.
I also found this from an interview with NTSB 's James Cash:-
Would the thing even spit out anything useful after four months in salt water? While we can’t answer the first question, we talked to James Cash, chief of the vehicle recorders division at the National Transportation Safety Board, to get some answers to the latter two.
Cash also says it is absolutely possible that a plane’s black box would still be in working condition after four months on the ocean floor. The current record goes to a recorder that, after nine years at the bottom of the Mediterranean, was perfectly fine. “The water, in general, doesn’t hurt them at all,” Cash says. “It’s the air that hurts them once they’ve been wet. It starts the corrosion and rust process.”
Once the black box is found at a wreckage site, it’s transferred to the lab in a water-filled cooler so the data can be retrieved and copied right away. So although we know Widmore has the black box, we’re still not entirely sure he has a copy of the data that it recorded.
According to Cash, it only takes a few days before the leads on the SSD start to corrode. The exact time that needs to pass before the data’s not retrievable is unknown. “I would say a couple of days,” Cash says, agreeing that a month out of water is probably sufficient time to render the black box useless. “We try not to experiment with that so I don’t know if I have a good answer. But if you let it dry out for quite a period of time, it’s going to make [data] much more difficult to recover.”
Cash also says it is absolutely possible that a plane’s black box would still be in working condition after four months on the ocean floor. The current record goes to a recorder that, after nine years at the bottom of the Mediterranean, was perfectly fine. “The water, in general, doesn’t hurt them at all,” Cash says. “It’s the air that hurts them once they’ve been wet. It starts the corrosion and rust process.”
Once the black box is found at a wreckage site, it’s transferred to the lab in a water-filled cooler so the data can be retrieved and copied right away. So although we know Widmore has the black box, we’re still not entirely sure he has a copy of the data that it recorded.
According to Cash, it only takes a few days before the leads on the SSD start to corrode. The exact time that needs to pass before the data’s not retrievable is unknown. “I would say a couple of days,” Cash says, agreeing that a month out of water is probably sufficient time to render the black box useless. “We try not to experiment with that so I don’t know if I have a good answer. But if you let it dry out for quite a period of time, it’s going to make [data] much more difficult to recover.”
Cash interview.
The CVR data is still there - its encased in Stainless steel. The trouble is that the wreck may move. From memory, the depth (44m?) is just over the limit for sport (non decompression) diving, but it is an absolute doddle for a professional.
Last edited by Sunfish; 21st Jan 2013 at 18:04.