Senate Inquiry, Hearing Program 4th Nov 2011
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casa and Honesty!!
This is interesting read:
http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/avi...-rev_Mar09.pdf
In particular, Geoff Edwards in early 2009, at page 22 summarises an intuitive paper:
http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/avi...-rev_Mar09.pdf
In particular, Geoff Edwards in early 2009, at page 22 summarises an intuitive paper:
Where Does Public Interest Lie?
Public interest in aviation safety is in practice defined by “every staff member in their own operations” (McIntyre, 2001), especially by the key decision-makers. So in turn public interest is shaped by the process and values under which key people are appointed to their positions. These have not been transparent and the language of public interest has been absent from the debate.
Managerial competence was a major factor contributing to instability during the years of reform after 1982. En route, the reforms failed at several levels: poor acceptance by stakeholders; weak forums for multi-lateral dialogue and reconciliation; fragmented accountability; clumsy executive management. These are failures of routine administration. A capable departmental Secretary and CASA CEO with a supportive CASA Chair should have been able to manage them away, even in the teeth of unrelenting fiscal pressure from the Department of Finance.
It is not possible from the material gathered to be certain whether the reforms of the post-1980 period were ultimately ‘successful’. Critics of the current regime can claim that the number of near misses indicates that the system is an `accident waiting to happen’; supporters can claim that the absence of jet fatalities shows that the regime is still working satisfactorily despite the cutting of $100 million per year of padding from the previous budgets.
Having said that, however, three fundamental observations can be made.
First, some of the internal problems have not yet been resolved. The 2008 Issues Paper and Green Paper and public submissions indicate that a coordinated and forward-looking air traffic policy is missing; tensions characterise the relationship between CASA and ATSB; and after more than a decade, the conversion of regulations to performance-based format is still incomplete. Was CASA’s skills base eroded too much in the 1990s or is the whole notion of non-prescriptive regulation misconceived anyway?
Second, global air travel is extraordinarily safe. Internationally, safety is not politicised and is not a subject of geo-political wrangling. Governments can achieve extraordinary results if they apply collective minds to an objective that is accepted as being in the public interest of all.
Third, the instability has been fuelled by the lack of a shared understanding of whether the safety regime’s customers are industry, the travelling public or the community. Until the leadership articulates a clear conception of public interest, the staff will never know whose interests they labour to serve.
Public interest in aviation safety is in practice defined by “every staff member in their own operations” (McIntyre, 2001), especially by the key decision-makers. So in turn public interest is shaped by the process and values under which key people are appointed to their positions. These have not been transparent and the language of public interest has been absent from the debate.
Managerial competence was a major factor contributing to instability during the years of reform after 1982. En route, the reforms failed at several levels: poor acceptance by stakeholders; weak forums for multi-lateral dialogue and reconciliation; fragmented accountability; clumsy executive management. These are failures of routine administration. A capable departmental Secretary and CASA CEO with a supportive CASA Chair should have been able to manage them away, even in the teeth of unrelenting fiscal pressure from the Department of Finance.
It is not possible from the material gathered to be certain whether the reforms of the post-1980 period were ultimately ‘successful’. Critics of the current regime can claim that the number of near misses indicates that the system is an `accident waiting to happen’; supporters can claim that the absence of jet fatalities shows that the regime is still working satisfactorily despite the cutting of $100 million per year of padding from the previous budgets.
Having said that, however, three fundamental observations can be made.
First, some of the internal problems have not yet been resolved. The 2008 Issues Paper and Green Paper and public submissions indicate that a coordinated and forward-looking air traffic policy is missing; tensions characterise the relationship between CASA and ATSB; and after more than a decade, the conversion of regulations to performance-based format is still incomplete. Was CASA’s skills base eroded too much in the 1990s or is the whole notion of non-prescriptive regulation misconceived anyway?
Second, global air travel is extraordinarily safe. Internationally, safety is not politicised and is not a subject of geo-political wrangling. Governments can achieve extraordinary results if they apply collective minds to an objective that is accepted as being in the public interest of all.
Third, the instability has been fuelled by the lack of a shared understanding of whether the safety regime’s customers are industry, the travelling public or the community. Until the leadership articulates a clear conception of public interest, the staff will never know whose interests they labour to serve.
Last edited by Up-into-the-air; 15th Nov 2012 at 00:07. Reason: Just missed something!!!
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It was written
So how do we find our way back to actually being "world class".
There are people here openly trying to address contemporary issues and doing a good job of it. Put that question to them.
There are others like me who want the whole evolutionary "problem" "devolved" into a nutshell that can be flushed down the dunny.
The problems are real, the problems are compounded by complacency, (but who cares), the problems are opportunistic, having doors open to CASA, by "industry experts" with weird enthusiasm for junkets and headlines. People who would foist blame on "adventurers" to guild the class divide. People who run "representative groups for the power an executive Troika gives them.
As for me, I want revenge!
Last edited by Frank Arouet; 15th Nov 2012 at 01:58.
CASA/ATSB AQONs!
Have taken a look at the regulator and bureau answer to questions on notice that were released on the Senate site yesterday. Boy both Federal agencies are sure digging themselves a very big hole!
Lets start with Fort Fumble’s arrogant replies to their QONs
:
Doesn’t Fort Fumble realise how hypocritical and short-sighted that answer is especially when you put it into context of the following discourse from the hearing Hansard pg 35
:
But hang on wasn’t this “Mr Ian ‘Wally’ Meyer” the former Chief Pilot that was deemed ‘ineffective’ in his role? Presumably he was also the individual that had overseen previous CASA audits, AOC changes etc..etc for a number of years prior to being forced to relinquish the CP position to Mr Wickham. Therefore it can be assumed that he was the main purveyor of sustained ‘normalised deviations’ within the Pel-Air AOC. Which ironically probably more than justifies Pel-Air’s decision to replace him as CP.
So the new CP then defers his ‘operational duties’ on the Westwind aircraft to WM who is designated the Westwind fleet manager. Presumably, aside from losing his CP approval, WM kept all his previous CASA approvals so in effect although he has swapped caps WM’s normalised deviations are allowed to continue albeit in a different role. Which the CASA special audit team more than adequately highlighted throughout the SAR. Some examples being (a) WM was one of two pilots who landed at Norfolk (05/10/09) with less than alternate fuel and; (b) WM was found to be giving less than adequate 20.11 training and checking.
Fort Fumble’s arrogance, disdain etc displayed in this reply is beyond belief! Do these numbnuts think we’re all stupid…sheesh and this is question one!
As Kelpie would say.. “more to follow”.
The AQONs are down near the bottom of this page:Senate Committees – Parliament of Australia
ps UITA had to do it mate the yodelling was doing my head in!
Lets start with Fort Fumble’s arrogant replies to their QONs
:
CASA01: Experience of Pel-Air Chief Pilot
Hansard: p.34
CHAIR: It has been suggested to us that the chief pilot, who is now the CASA Bankstown person, did not really have a lot of experience himself with these types of aircraft. Do you know what his experience was with Westwind aircraft? I presume he was endorsed to fly the damn things—was he?
Mr McCormick: He was, but I do not have the figure in front of me showing what his experience was at the time. It may be in some of the documents we gave you.
CHAIR: Could you take that on notice?
Mr McCormick: Sure.
Answer:
Mr Wickham completed a co-pilot endorsement on the Westwind on 23 September 1992.
Mr Wickham has 50 hours experience on the aircraft as a co-pilot.
A chief pilot need not, in all cases, be endorsed to fly all of the aircraft types covered by an Air Operator’s Certificate as pilot-in-command. In such cases, the Civil Aviation Orders permit the chief pilot to delegate his or her operational duties to another member of the operator’s staff. In this case, the chief pilot’s operational duties in relation to Pel-Air’s Westwind aircraft had been delegated to the fleet manager, Mr Ian ‘Wally’ Meyer. At the time of the accident, Mr Meyer was fully endorsed on the Westwind aircraft, had over 20,000 hours total aeronautical experience with 147 hours as pilot-in-command on the Westwind in
the 12 months preceding the accident.
Hansard: p.34
CHAIR: It has been suggested to us that the chief pilot, who is now the CASA Bankstown person, did not really have a lot of experience himself with these types of aircraft. Do you know what his experience was with Westwind aircraft? I presume he was endorsed to fly the damn things—was he?
Mr McCormick: He was, but I do not have the figure in front of me showing what his experience was at the time. It may be in some of the documents we gave you.
CHAIR: Could you take that on notice?
Mr McCormick: Sure.
Answer:
Mr Wickham completed a co-pilot endorsement on the Westwind on 23 September 1992.
Mr Wickham has 50 hours experience on the aircraft as a co-pilot.
A chief pilot need not, in all cases, be endorsed to fly all of the aircraft types covered by an Air Operator’s Certificate as pilot-in-command. In such cases, the Civil Aviation Orders permit the chief pilot to delegate his or her operational duties to another member of the operator’s staff. In this case, the chief pilot’s operational duties in relation to Pel-Air’s Westwind aircraft had been delegated to the fleet manager, Mr Ian ‘Wally’ Meyer. At the time of the accident, Mr Meyer was fully endorsed on the Westwind aircraft, had over 20,000 hours total aeronautical experience with 147 hours as pilot-in-command on the Westwind in
the 12 months preceding the accident.
:
Senator STERLE: Thank you. The problem that I think some of us on the committee are having is that we have seen, through evidence, that the chief pilot of Pel-Air at the time of the ditching has now moved to a higher grade job but it is also within CASA. So we are thinking, 'Hang on, while this was all going wrong at Pel-Air, who did it slip past?' Is that fair to ask?
Mr McCormick: Yes. I will ask Mr Hood to give you a bit more on this.
Mr Hood: I have a few notes in relation to Pel-Air and the safety alert. In 2008, following the issue of the safety alert to Pel-Air, CASA raised with Regional Express, which is the owner, and with Pel-Air the question of whether the then chief pilot was effective in his role. Pel-Air subsequently said that their view was that the chief pilot in 2008 may not have been effective in his role and therefore appointed Captain Wickham as the chief pilot. Following our assessment on 21 November 2008 Mr Wickham was appointed to the role of head of flight ops.
Senator STERLE: Thank you. Would it be fair to say that anyone can hold that certificate, but in these small operations like Pel-Air is there a trend set? Is it normally the chief pilot or is it a mixture of everyone?
Mr McCormick: No. As far as holding the certificate goes, the chief pilot is an identified position under the regulations and we have to approve the person.
Senator STERLE: Okay. In 2008 there was a different chief pilot, as we have established, because CASA said that the fellow was not up to the mark. All of a sudden there is a new chief pilot appointed, which is Mr Wickham, but for some reason the holding of the certificate does not flow to the chief pilot; it disappears somewhere else.
Mr McCormick: Yes. I will ask Mr Hood to give you a bit more on this.
Mr Hood: I have a few notes in relation to Pel-Air and the safety alert. In 2008, following the issue of the safety alert to Pel-Air, CASA raised with Regional Express, which is the owner, and with Pel-Air the question of whether the then chief pilot was effective in his role. Pel-Air subsequently said that their view was that the chief pilot in 2008 may not have been effective in his role and therefore appointed Captain Wickham as the chief pilot. Following our assessment on 21 November 2008 Mr Wickham was appointed to the role of head of flight ops.
Senator STERLE: Thank you. Would it be fair to say that anyone can hold that certificate, but in these small operations like Pel-Air is there a trend set? Is it normally the chief pilot or is it a mixture of everyone?
Mr McCormick: No. As far as holding the certificate goes, the chief pilot is an identified position under the regulations and we have to approve the person.
Senator STERLE: Okay. In 2008 there was a different chief pilot, as we have established, because CASA said that the fellow was not up to the mark. All of a sudden there is a new chief pilot appointed, which is Mr Wickham, but for some reason the holding of the certificate does not flow to the chief pilot; it disappears somewhere else.
But hang on wasn’t this “Mr Ian ‘Wally’ Meyer” the former Chief Pilot that was deemed ‘ineffective’ in his role? Presumably he was also the individual that had overseen previous CASA audits, AOC changes etc..etc for a number of years prior to being forced to relinquish the CP position to Mr Wickham. Therefore it can be assumed that he was the main purveyor of sustained ‘normalised deviations’ within the Pel-Air AOC. Which ironically probably more than justifies Pel-Air’s decision to replace him as CP.
So the new CP then defers his ‘operational duties’ on the Westwind aircraft to WM who is designated the Westwind fleet manager. Presumably, aside from losing his CP approval, WM kept all his previous CASA approvals so in effect although he has swapped caps WM’s normalised deviations are allowed to continue albeit in a different role. Which the CASA special audit team more than adequately highlighted throughout the SAR. Some examples being (a) WM was one of two pilots who landed at Norfolk (05/10/09) with less than alternate fuel and; (b) WM was found to be giving less than adequate 20.11 training and checking.
Fort Fumble’s arrogance, disdain etc displayed in this reply is beyond belief! Do these numbnuts think we’re all stupid…sheesh and this is question one!
As Kelpie would say.. “more to follow”.
The AQONs are down near the bottom of this page:Senate Committees – Parliament of Australia
ps UITA had to do it mate the yodelling was doing my head in!
Wickham, chief pilot has 50 hours on a westwind as co pilot.
He delegates to Meyer who has 127 hours on the type(not specified as pilot in command, so I assume as co pilot too)
Dominic James, who they purport to supervise, has 923 hours on type.
Then CASA hires Wickham as a flight operations inspector and attempts to hang James out to dry????
This is fcucking bizarre!!!
He delegates to Meyer who has 127 hours on the type(not specified as pilot in command, so I assume as co pilot too)
Dominic James, who they purport to supervise, has 923 hours on type.
Then CASA hires Wickham as a flight operations inspector and attempts to hang James out to dry????
This is fcucking bizarre!!!
Last edited by Sunfish; 15th Nov 2012 at 03:27.
Mr Ian ‘Wally’ Meyer. At thetime of the accident, Mr Meyer was fully endorsed on the
Westwind aircraft, had over 20,000hours total aeronautical experience with 147 hours as pilot-in-command on the
Westwind in the 12 months preceding the accident.
He delegates to Meyer who has 127 hours on the type(not specified as pilot in
command, so I assume as co pilot too)
command, so I assume as co pilot too)
LL well done mate Sunny was jumping the gun there! I'd say there was definitely no problem with WM's currency on type and I dare say he'd probably have upwards of a couple of K total time on type.
Still doesn't address the fact that WM was deemed unsuitable to be the CP and then received several Special Audit blackmarks (including RCAs) throughout the SAR again highlighting his deficiencies and yet he was still the Fleet Manager for the Westwind ops, sorry WTF!
Still doesn't address the fact that WM was deemed unsuitable to be the CP and then received several Special Audit blackmarks (including RCAs) throughout the SAR again highlighting his deficiencies and yet he was still the Fleet Manager for the Westwind ops, sorry WTF!
Nah blackie MQ had already fallen on his sword long before this debacle, plus you skipped a couple of steps along the food chain...(1) FOI overseeing Pel-Air; (2) Team Leader Flight Ops Sydney region; (3) Regional Manager (acting at the time) for Sydney/Bankstown (this is the one where the pony pooh detector goes off the scale).
But blackie don't let us get in the road of your obvious attempt to smear some pony pooh across Mr Quinn's name. Big Mack's rule 101..."forget the ball always, always play the man!"
Let's move onto question 2 from the CASA AQON PDF:
This question when asked was a prelude to one of those golden moments in the hearing, here is the follow on discourse from the QON:
Senator FAWCETT: Does anyone on the panel have that information?
CHAIR: You have to have some idea.
Senator FAWCETT: I have got an email here from a fairly senior person within CASA saying: 'Our FOI perforation seems to be evenly split about the need or not to mandatorily divert from an alternate from the last possible diversion if the destination weather falls below the alternate minima. 'It goes on to talk about a range of things to do with that. That is followed up by another email—fairly senior again within CASA—on 20 March 2010, which says: 'I am happy with the path you are taking. My point is and you are addressing it that, as a result of reliance on the AIP, the Aeronautical Information Publication, which has no head of power and contains much that we need to revisit anyway, there is one group of pilots that have one view which leads to a mandatory diversion, and another group with the opposite view. Putting aside the practicalities, both groups believe that they are legally correct'—
and this is talking about FOIs—senior flying people within CASA. 'If we find ourselves in an AAT or a court, we once again could look a bit foolish if we, the regulator, find ourselves in a position where we have to say that there are two conflicting views, one of which has to be wrong, and we have done nothing to rectify that over the years—very untidy.'
What that says to me is that you have written the paragraph here aimed at Mr James which indicates that this body of knowledge and training should enable him to make the right decision in every circumstance, putting aside the fact of fuel planning and all the rest of it—and I understand that. The fact is, within CASA, 50 per cent of your FOIs disagreed with the other 50 per cent over what the legal interpretation of that was.
CHAIR: Before you respond to that, if you do not mind, just a procedural matter, Mr McCormick: would you care to make that a public document?
Senator FAWCETT: I am happy to.
CHAIR: Thank you. We will publish that.
Senator XENOPHON: If it is noted publicly, the author of that and these other documents should be redacted.
CHAIR: I am sure one of these guys up here is very familiar with it.
(edit note: there was stunned silence at the CASA table)
There was more pregnant pauses, dagger stares, flaming red ears etc..etc but I digress back to question 2...
But blackie don't let us get in the road of your obvious attempt to smear some pony pooh across Mr Quinn's name.
Big Mack's rule 101..."forget the ball always, always play the man!"Let's move onto question 2 from the CASA AQON PDF:
CASA02: FOI views on diversion
Hansard: p. 37
Senator FAWCETT: How many FOIs thought it was a legal requirement to divert your flying operations inspectors?
Mr McCormick: I do not have that information. We can find that on notice, if you like.
Answer:
As part of CASA’s own investigation into the Pel-Air accident, the officer in charge took an informal sample of the views of six CASA Flying Operations Inspectors (FOIs) regarding the appropriate decision to divert, in relation to the actions of the captain of the aircraft involved in the accident. The three FOIs experienced on large aircraft were of the opinion that if a pilot whilst enroute, became aware of the weather at the destination going below alternate minima but remained above the landing minima, then a diversion was not required. The three FOIs who flew smaller aircraft were of the opinion that, in the circumstances of the weather going below alternate minima, whilst enroute, a diversion was required.
It should be noted that, in March 2010, the details of the accident were not widely known amongst the CASA inspectorate. CASA’s position with respect to the diversion issue was and remains that, in all the circumstances of the accident flight, good airmanship should have resulted in a diversion, even if there was no explicit, mandatory requirement that the accident pilot do so.
Hansard: p. 37
Senator FAWCETT: How many FOIs thought it was a legal requirement to divert your flying operations inspectors?
Mr McCormick: I do not have that information. We can find that on notice, if you like.
Answer:
As part of CASA’s own investigation into the Pel-Air accident, the officer in charge took an informal sample of the views of six CASA Flying Operations Inspectors (FOIs) regarding the appropriate decision to divert, in relation to the actions of the captain of the aircraft involved in the accident. The three FOIs experienced on large aircraft were of the opinion that if a pilot whilst enroute, became aware of the weather at the destination going below alternate minima but remained above the landing minima, then a diversion was not required. The three FOIs who flew smaller aircraft were of the opinion that, in the circumstances of the weather going below alternate minima, whilst enroute, a diversion was required.
It should be noted that, in March 2010, the details of the accident were not widely known amongst the CASA inspectorate. CASA’s position with respect to the diversion issue was and remains that, in all the circumstances of the accident flight, good airmanship should have resulted in a diversion, even if there was no explicit, mandatory requirement that the accident pilot do so.
Senator FAWCETT: Does anyone on the panel have that information?
CHAIR: You have to have some idea.
Senator FAWCETT: I have got an email here from a fairly senior person within CASA saying: 'Our FOI perforation seems to be evenly split about the need or not to mandatorily divert from an alternate from the last possible diversion if the destination weather falls below the alternate minima. 'It goes on to talk about a range of things to do with that. That is followed up by another email—fairly senior again within CASA—on 20 March 2010, which says: 'I am happy with the path you are taking. My point is and you are addressing it that, as a result of reliance on the AIP, the Aeronautical Information Publication, which has no head of power and contains much that we need to revisit anyway, there is one group of pilots that have one view which leads to a mandatory diversion, and another group with the opposite view. Putting aside the practicalities, both groups believe that they are legally correct'—
and this is talking about FOIs—senior flying people within CASA. 'If we find ourselves in an AAT or a court, we once again could look a bit foolish if we, the regulator, find ourselves in a position where we have to say that there are two conflicting views, one of which has to be wrong, and we have done nothing to rectify that over the years—very untidy.'
What that says to me is that you have written the paragraph here aimed at Mr James which indicates that this body of knowledge and training should enable him to make the right decision in every circumstance, putting aside the fact of fuel planning and all the rest of it—and I understand that. The fact is, within CASA, 50 per cent of your FOIs disagreed with the other 50 per cent over what the legal interpretation of that was.
CHAIR: Before you respond to that, if you do not mind, just a procedural matter, Mr McCormick: would you care to make that a public document?
Senator FAWCETT: I am happy to.
CHAIR: Thank you. We will publish that.
Senator XENOPHON: If it is noted publicly, the author of that and these other documents should be redacted.
CHAIR: I am sure one of these guys up here is very familiar with it.
(edit note: there was stunned silence at the CASA table
)
Last edited by Sarcs; 15th Nov 2012 at 05:01.
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MQ had already fallen on his sword long before this debacle
Last edited by blackhand; 15th Nov 2012 at 05:18.
It should be noted that, in March 2010, the details of the accident were not widely known amongst the CASA inspectorate. CASA’s position with respect to the diversion issue was and remains that, in all the circumstances of the accident flight, good airmanship should have resulted in a diversion, even if there was no explicit, mandatory requirement that the accident pilot do so.
More importantly, it’s not relevant to the question. The question was about a division of opinion in CASA on whether diversion was mandatory in the circumstances, not about CASA’s ‘position’ on whether ‘good airmanship should have resulted in a diversion’.
Further, knowledge of the details of the accident is irrelevant to the question whether a diversion is mandated or good airmanship, when a PIC becomes aware of the weather at the destination going below alternate minima but remained above the landing minima. That’s a question that may be properly answered in the abstract. What details of the accident could possibly alter the answer?
And remind me: Where is CASA’s power to set the standard of ‘good airmanship’, separate from the standards of pilot competence and experience in the rules, and where is the rule that says a pilot must continuously meet or exceed the standard of ‘good airmanship’ determined by CASA?
Last edited by Creampuff; 15th Nov 2012 at 06:46.
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Sunfish, I think you will find that WM has more than 10k hours on the Westwind, the 127 hours referred to his recency only.
Will be interesting to ask the question who required WM to be delegated this authority. Even more interesting when you know the answer ....
Will be interesting to ask the question who required WM to be delegated this authority. Even more interesting when you know the answer ....
JetA, you may well be right, but CASA has a certain way with words, and is occasionally very economical with them. If the person in question has X thousand hours on type, why not say so?
I still dont understand why CASA hired Wickham either. By their standard I am a perfect potential FOI because I know even less than Wickham would appear to, because I am therefore very trainable since I dont know any better. Or is this some masonic ex RAAF secret handshake thing?
But then, what would I know?
I still dont understand why CASA hired Wickham either. By their standard I am a perfect potential FOI because I know even less than Wickham would appear to, because I am therefore very trainable since I dont know any better. Or is this some masonic ex RAAF secret handshake thing?
But then, what would I know?
Last edited by Sunfish; 15th Nov 2012 at 09:05.
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Sunfish; I'd go so far as to say WM has more Westwind time than just about anyone else in the world. And if that doesn't show the folly of judging management ability by a log book then nothing will. By the way, that's exactly what you have done here. JW's suitability for CASA (or otherwise) had nothing to do with his logbook.
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Project Pony Pooh - Part 3 of 6
Here is the next installment. I have gone to Part 3 because up-into-the-air jumped the gun on me and slotted Mr Skull into second position.
And her relevance and value to aviation is???
So far we have covered three members of the Magnificent 6 - One angry ex Cathay 49er, one lawyer and one long term government bureaucrat. 3 down and 3 to go.
Helen Gillies was appointed to the Board on 1 July 2009. She has a Bachelor of Commerce and a Bachelor of Laws (Hons) from the University of Queensland, a Master of Business Administration from the University of Sydney, and a Master of Construction Law from the University of Melbourne.
Ms Gillies has been practising law for 20 years and is currently Corporate Counsel and general manager of Risk and Compliance with Sinclair Knight Merz. She won the Australian Corporate Lawyers Association, Australian Corporate Lawyer of the Year award in 2008 and has been admitted as a Solicitor of the Supreme Courts of Queensland and New South Wales, and admitted as a Solicitor of the Supreme Court of England and Wales.
Ms Gillies has been practising law for 20 years and is currently Corporate Counsel and general manager of Risk and Compliance with Sinclair Knight Merz. She won the Australian Corporate Lawyers Association, Australian Corporate Lawyer of the Year award in 2008 and has been admitted as a Solicitor of the Supreme Courts of Queensland and New South Wales, and admitted as a Solicitor of the Supreme Court of England and Wales.
So far we have covered three members of the Magnificent 6 - One angry ex Cathay 49er, one lawyer and one long term government bureaucrat. 3 down and 3 to go.
Last edited by gobbledock; 15th Nov 2012 at 10:34.
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More pooh just for you
I copied the below 'statement of pooh' directly from the CASA website. I have bolded the parts I believe are laughable and pure ****e.
I also noted that the Skull is still referred to as the CEO. Isn't he the Director? Creampuff have I got this right mate? If so they should be issued a NCN for 'incorrect org structure'!
Here is a link also their website and the small tiny printed section titled - Industry Complaints Management. Not much detail but a listing of complaints registered against Fort Fumble in the first 6 months of this year.You have to scroll down a little.
What was that about a Leopard not changing it's spots?
http://www.casa.gov.au/wcmswr/_asset...d/janjun12.pdf
I also noted that the Skull is still referred to as the CEO. Isn't he the Director? Creampuff have I got this right mate? If so they should be issued a NCN for 'incorrect org structure'!
Who we are
The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) was established on 6 July 1995 as an independent statutory authority. Under section 8 of the Civil Aviation Act 1988, CASA is a body corporate separate from the Commonwealth.
CASA's primary function is to conduct the safety regulation of civil air operations in Australia and the operation of Australian aircraft overseas. It is also required to provide comprehensive safety education and training programmes, cooperate with the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, and administer the Civil Aviation (Carriers' Liability) Act 1959.
The Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 2002, made under authority of the Civil Aviation Act, provide for general regulatory controls for the safety of air navigation. The Civil Aviation Act and the Regulations empower CASA to issue Civil Aviation Orders on detailed matters of regulation. CASA charges for the provision of some services under the Civil Aviation (Fees) Regulations (1995).
Other legislation affecting CASA in the exercise of its powers include the:
Air Navigation Act 1920
Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997
Auditor-General Act 1997
Ombudsman Act 1976
Freedom of Information Act 1982
Privacy Act 1988
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977
The Chief Executive Officer manages CASA, and is responsible to the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government.
The Challenge
To lead the aviation community in providing Australia with a world-class air safety environment which has public trust and confidence.
Our Vision
Safe skies for all.
Our Values
Shared commitment to CASA's vision of Safe skies for all
Continual examination of ways to improve everything we do
Dedication to timely, quality service internally and externally
Integrity and professionalism
Respect and courtesy
Fairness and consistency
Teamwork
Government Policy
In November 2003, the Federal Government issued CASA with a new Charter Letter. This Letter sets out strategic directions for CASA, outlines CASA's governance arrangements and sets out the Government's policy framework for aviation.
In the Charter Letter, the former Minister for Transport and Regional Services, The Hon John Anderson MP, summarises the Government's directions for CASA:
‘I wish to see CASA demonstrate world's best practice in the area of aviation safety regulation. In its daily dealings, CASA must exhibit those behavioural attributes of a good regulator including consistency, accountability, fairness, flexibility and efficiency.
The CASA reform process must be taken forward to achieve the Government's aim of a simple-to-follow regulatory system and a new and improved organisational culture. These objectives must be accompanied by explicit benchmarks and a capacity within CASA to demonstrate in a measurable and accountable way how and when these objectives will be met.’
Our Functions
CASA’s four major functional areas of responsibility are:
Setting civil aviation standards that are appropriate, clear, concise and aligned with international practice
Providing regulatory services to industry in a timely and responsive manner
Securing compliance with Australian aviation standards effectively, fairly and in a consistent manner; and
Fostering an informed and safety motivated aviation community
These functions are further defined and performance measures articulated in CASA’s Corporate Plan.
Our Conduct
The community has a right to expect high standards of service based on sound ethical values.
The CASA Code of Conduct states that CASA staff must:
act honestly and fairly;
be courteous and helpful;
comply with all lawful and reasonable instructions given to them by a person entitled to do so; and
so far as priorities and resources permit, apply the highest possible standards of professionalism in everything they do.
The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) was established on 6 July 1995 as an independent statutory authority. Under section 8 of the Civil Aviation Act 1988, CASA is a body corporate separate from the Commonwealth.
CASA's primary function is to conduct the safety regulation of civil air operations in Australia and the operation of Australian aircraft overseas. It is also required to provide comprehensive safety education and training programmes, cooperate with the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, and administer the Civil Aviation (Carriers' Liability) Act 1959.
The Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 2002, made under authority of the Civil Aviation Act, provide for general regulatory controls for the safety of air navigation. The Civil Aviation Act and the Regulations empower CASA to issue Civil Aviation Orders on detailed matters of regulation. CASA charges for the provision of some services under the Civil Aviation (Fees) Regulations (1995).
Other legislation affecting CASA in the exercise of its powers include the:
Air Navigation Act 1920
Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997
Auditor-General Act 1997
Ombudsman Act 1976
Freedom of Information Act 1982
Privacy Act 1988
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977
The Chief Executive Officer manages CASA, and is responsible to the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government.
The Challenge
To lead the aviation community in providing Australia with a world-class air safety environment which has public trust and confidence.
Our Vision
Safe skies for all.
Our Values
Shared commitment to CASA's vision of Safe skies for all
Continual examination of ways to improve everything we do
Dedication to timely, quality service internally and externally
Integrity and professionalism
Respect and courtesy
Fairness and consistency
Teamwork
Government Policy
In November 2003, the Federal Government issued CASA with a new Charter Letter. This Letter sets out strategic directions for CASA, outlines CASA's governance arrangements and sets out the Government's policy framework for aviation.
In the Charter Letter, the former Minister for Transport and Regional Services, The Hon John Anderson MP, summarises the Government's directions for CASA:
‘I wish to see CASA demonstrate world's best practice in the area of aviation safety regulation. In its daily dealings, CASA must exhibit those behavioural attributes of a good regulator including consistency, accountability, fairness, flexibility and efficiency.
The CASA reform process must be taken forward to achieve the Government's aim of a simple-to-follow regulatory system and a new and improved organisational culture. These objectives must be accompanied by explicit benchmarks and a capacity within CASA to demonstrate in a measurable and accountable way how and when these objectives will be met.’
Our Functions
CASA’s four major functional areas of responsibility are:
Setting civil aviation standards that are appropriate, clear, concise and aligned with international practice
Providing regulatory services to industry in a timely and responsive manner
Securing compliance with Australian aviation standards effectively, fairly and in a consistent manner; and
Fostering an informed and safety motivated aviation community
These functions are further defined and performance measures articulated in CASA’s Corporate Plan.
Our Conduct
The community has a right to expect high standards of service based on sound ethical values.
The CASA Code of Conduct states that CASA staff must:
act honestly and fairly;
be courteous and helpful;
comply with all lawful and reasonable instructions given to them by a person entitled to do so; and
so far as priorities and resources permit, apply the highest possible standards of professionalism in everything they do.
What was that about a Leopard not changing it's spots?
http://www.casa.gov.au/wcmswr/_asset...d/janjun12.pdf
Last edited by gobbledock; 15th Nov 2012 at 10:57. Reason: Avoiding elephants and Leopards in the middle of the room
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CP # 788 –"Further, knowledge of the details of the accident is irrelevant to the question whether a diversion is mandated or good airmanship, when a PIC becomes aware of the weather at the destination going below alternate minima but remained above the landing minima. That’s a question that may be properly answered in the abstract. What details of the accident could possibly alter the answer?"
The upcoming event I am intrigued with is the Information Commissioner being called on Wednesday, has 'I'm a star, see' been treading a bit close to the ragged edges of the FoI Act, again ?, we shall see.
You can fool some of the people all of the time, and all of the people some of the time, but you can not fool all of the people all of the time. Abraham Lincoln.
Last edited by Kharon; 15th Nov 2012 at 17:47. Reason: tempus fugit - GD they locked your story -DGA
The upcoming event I am intrigued with is the Information Commissioner being called on Wednesday, has 'I'm a star, see' been treading a bit close to the ragged edges of the FoI Act, again ?, we shall see.
isn't the subject of attention by the IC, apparently the Senate Committee submitted an FOI request to the ATSB part of which they declined to produce citing the privacy provisions of the TSI Act. Why the IC has to front up and spell out his submission who knows??Onwards and down the page to Q3 which is a doozy and draws attention yet again to the inadequacies of CAR 206. Again there is a fair amount of the usual spin and obfuscation, however 'stop the press' apparently the classification of operations has been sorted back in 2003:
CASA03: ATSB recommendation on aeromedical flights
Hansard: p.44
Mr McCormick: The actual classification of aeromedical flights as aerial work is contained in CAR 206.
Senator XENOPHON: Is that the same as it was 11 years ago, or has it been— Mr McCormick: It goes back significantly further than 2001.
Senator XENOPHON: No, but there was a recommendation made back in 2001 raising issues about having aeromedical flights being in the same category as aerial work, which includes crop dusting—that is correct, isn't it?
Mr McCormick: Aerial work does include crop dusting.
Senator XENOPHON: So there were issues raised by ATSB back in 2001 about the classifications and that something needed to be done about them. That was a recommendation made to CASA; are they still under the same category 11 years later?
Mr McCormick: They are still classified as aerial work of a CAR 206, that is right.
Senator XENOPHON: So it has not been rectified?
Mr McCormick: No—well, I do not know the recommendation out in front of you, but if that is the case—
Senator XENOPHON: Perhaps you could take this on notice: it is ATSB investigation BO/200100348. You could take that on notice.
Answer:
An ATSB Investigation in 2001 (BO/ 200100348) makes a number of references to the classification of operations (pp.75, 80). While the reference on page 80 advises that CASA in a recent Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM 0102OS, August 2001) had summarised
the situation with regard to classification of aircraft operations, the reference on page 75 of the same report refers to safety recommendation R20010195, which is also quoted in another ATSB report. This ATSB report is Investigation Number 200003130 into the accident involving Bell helicopter 206L3, registration VH-FFI, on 23 July 2000 northwest of
Rockhampton. This flight was a helicopter patient transfer carried out as aerial work.
The recommendation in question R20010195 stated:
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority consider proposing an increase in the operations' classification, and/or the minimum safety standards required, for organisations that transport their own employees and similar personnel (for example contractors, personnel from related organisations, or prisoners, but not fare-paying passengers) on a regular basis. This recommendation applies to all such operations, regardless of the take-off weight of
the aircraft involved.
CASA responded in part:-
As you are aware, CASA is presently reviewing the standards contained within the existing Civil Aviation Regulations (CARs) and Civil Aviation Orders (CAOs) with regard to the Classification of Aircraft Operations. The input and recommendations contained within Air Safety Recommendation R20010195 will be taken into consideration and addressed as part of this project.
The outcome of the review will determine which category employees (and similar personnel such as contractors) are placed and the standards that will apply to their transportation in aircraft. I trust that this review will satisfactorily address the issues raised in this Air Safety Recommendation. … CASA has prepared a draft amendment to the Classification of Operations Policy that increases the requirements for operators who carry employees and similar types of passengers. The proposal is currently with the Standards Consultative Committee, and will be presented to the Aviation Safety Forum on 6 December 2002. It is anticipated that an NPRM to amend CAR 206 will then be issued for public comment in early 2003.
In March 2003 CASA issued NPRM0304OS, which canvassed possible amendments to the provisions of the Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) covering aerial work (CAR 206).
Consistent with the endorsement of the CASA Board in 2001, the NPRM made no recommendation to reclassify what had been (and remains) aerial ambulance operations.
Hansard: p.44
Mr McCormick: The actual classification of aeromedical flights as aerial work is contained in CAR 206.
Senator XENOPHON: Is that the same as it was 11 years ago, or has it been— Mr McCormick: It goes back significantly further than 2001.
Senator XENOPHON: No, but there was a recommendation made back in 2001 raising issues about having aeromedical flights being in the same category as aerial work, which includes crop dusting—that is correct, isn't it?
Mr McCormick: Aerial work does include crop dusting.
Senator XENOPHON: So there were issues raised by ATSB back in 2001 about the classifications and that something needed to be done about them. That was a recommendation made to CASA; are they still under the same category 11 years later?
Mr McCormick: They are still classified as aerial work of a CAR 206, that is right.
Senator XENOPHON: So it has not been rectified?
Mr McCormick: No—well, I do not know the recommendation out in front of you, but if that is the case—
Senator XENOPHON: Perhaps you could take this on notice: it is ATSB investigation BO/200100348. You could take that on notice.
Answer:
An ATSB Investigation in 2001 (BO/ 200100348) makes a number of references to the classification of operations (pp.75, 80). While the reference on page 80 advises that CASA in a recent Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM 0102OS, August 2001) had summarised
the situation with regard to classification of aircraft operations, the reference on page 75 of the same report refers to safety recommendation R20010195, which is also quoted in another ATSB report. This ATSB report is Investigation Number 200003130 into the accident involving Bell helicopter 206L3, registration VH-FFI, on 23 July 2000 northwest of
Rockhampton. This flight was a helicopter patient transfer carried out as aerial work.
The recommendation in question R20010195 stated:
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority consider proposing an increase in the operations' classification, and/or the minimum safety standards required, for organisations that transport their own employees and similar personnel (for example contractors, personnel from related organisations, or prisoners, but not fare-paying passengers) on a regular basis. This recommendation applies to all such operations, regardless of the take-off weight of
the aircraft involved.
CASA responded in part:-
As you are aware, CASA is presently reviewing the standards contained within the existing Civil Aviation Regulations (CARs) and Civil Aviation Orders (CAOs) with regard to the Classification of Aircraft Operations. The input and recommendations contained within Air Safety Recommendation R20010195 will be taken into consideration and addressed as part of this project.
The outcome of the review will determine which category employees (and similar personnel such as contractors) are placed and the standards that will apply to their transportation in aircraft. I trust that this review will satisfactorily address the issues raised in this Air Safety Recommendation. … CASA has prepared a draft amendment to the Classification of Operations Policy that increases the requirements for operators who carry employees and similar types of passengers. The proposal is currently with the Standards Consultative Committee, and will be presented to the Aviation Safety Forum on 6 December 2002. It is anticipated that an NPRM to amend CAR 206 will then be issued for public comment in early 2003.
In March 2003 CASA issued NPRM0304OS, which canvassed possible amendments to the provisions of the Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) covering aerial work (CAR 206).
Consistent with the endorsement of the CASA Board in 2001, the NPRM made no recommendation to reclassify what had been (and remains) aerial ambulance operations.
Further to my previous post I noticed that PAIN has released another report in relation to the Hempel Inquest, see here:
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-general-a...nquest-23.html
The very first accident reviewed in that report also happens to be the one that Senator X refers to in Q3 of the CASA QONs.
This review makes it very clear that the Coroner recommendation '16' and ATSB recommendation (R20010195) has still not been properly addressed due in part to the fact that the relevant legislation is still (surprise, surprise!) yet to be enacted. Yet the ATSB Safety Action database says the following:
Recommendation R20010195
How very confusing anyway for your info here's the PAIN review:
So despite the smoke and mirrors displayed in the regulator's answer to Q3, sorry we're not swallowing it!
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-general-a...nquest-23.html
The very first accident reviewed in that report also happens to be the one that Senator X refers to in Q3 of the CASA QONs.
This review makes it very clear that the Coroner recommendation '16' and ATSB recommendation (R20010195) has still not been properly addressed due in part to the fact that the relevant legislation is still (surprise, surprise!) yet to be enacted. Yet the ATSB Safety Action database says the following:
Date Issued:02 February 2009Response from:Civil Aviation Safety AuthorityResponse Status:Closed - AcceptedResponse Text:A Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) proposing amendments to Civil Aviation Regulation (CAR) 206 issued in March 2003. Responses to this NPRM and the associated review of the Classification of Operations confirmed that the proposed amendment to CAR 206, which would accommodate this recommendation would be problematic. Consequently, CASA has decided proceed only with the other amendments to CAR 206. The associated NFRM is currently with the Department of Transport and Regional Services for clearance prior to Ministerial approval.
However, under the new Civil Aviation Safety Regulations, Corp-orate Operations will be classified as Aerial work and will be regulated under CASR Part 132. The carriage of patients and other personnel (other than air transport operations) will be regarded as Aerial Work under subpart pf Part 136 to be titled Emergency and Medical Services Operations. It is proposed that 'Emergency Services Flights' will cover aerial fire-fighting, law enforcement, and search and rescue operations., while 'Medical Services Flights' will cover air ambulance flights, health services flights, and emergency medical services flights. The development of these regulations is proceeding in consultation with industry.
ATSB Note:
Based on the above advice the Australian Transport Safety Bureau reclassifies the recommendation as Closed - Partially Accepted as at 2 February 2009.
However, under the new Civil Aviation Safety Regulations, Corp-orate Operations will be classified as Aerial work and will be regulated under CASR Part 132. The carriage of patients and other personnel (other than air transport operations) will be regarded as Aerial Work under subpart pf Part 136 to be titled Emergency and Medical Services Operations. It is proposed that 'Emergency Services Flights' will cover aerial fire-fighting, law enforcement, and search and rescue operations., while 'Medical Services Flights' will cover air ambulance flights, health services flights, and emergency medical services flights. The development of these regulations is proceeding in consultation with industry.
ATSB Note:
Based on the above advice the Australian Transport Safety Bureau reclassifies the recommendation as Closed - Partially Accepted as at 2 February 2009.
How very confusing anyway for your info here's the PAIN review:
1) CFIW: East of Cape Hillsborough, QLD, Bell 407, VH-HTD; 17 October 2003.
Report - R20050002.
Issue date 14 March 2005.
Issue date 14 March 2005.
As a result of the investigation, safety recommendations were issued to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority recommending: a review of the night VFR requirements, an assessment of the benefits of additional flight equipment for helicopters operating under night VFR and a review of the operator classification and/or minimum safety standards for helicopter EMS
operations.
ATSB Safety Recommendation.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority review it's operators classification and/or it's minimum safety standards required for helicopter Emergency Medical Services operations. This review should consider increasing; (1) the minimum pilot qualifications, experience and recency requirements, (2)
operational procedures and (3) minimum equipment for conduct of such operations at night.
Coroner Hennessy.
12. That CASA consider regulating for the initial training of a helicopter pilot to include night VFR training.
13. That CASA and the industry move towards a national system of accreditation and uniform standards for provision of EMS services in Australia.
14. That CASA investigate reclassification of EMS helicopter operations into charter category, or create a separate EMS category of aviation in order to provide the benefits of increased level of regulation and CASA oversight, than that presently available under the aerial work category.
15. That CASA ensure that appropriate information be provided to pilots on an ongoing basis regarding the issue of spatial disorientation.
16. The Coroner supports CASR draft regulations point 61 and 133 becoming final.
17. That beacons, both visual and radio, be placed on prominent and appropriate high points along routes commonly utilised by aero-medical retrieval teams, including Cape Hillsborough.
18. The Coroner supports the ATSB recommendations 20030213,and promulgation of information to pilots; 20040052, assessment of safety benefits of requiring a standby altitude indicator with independent power source in single pilot night VFR; 20040053, assessment of safety benefits of requiring an autopilot or stabilisation augmentation system in single pilot VFR; and R20050002, review operator classification and minimum safety standards for helicopter EMS operations.
operations.
ATSB Safety Recommendation.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority review it's operators classification and/or it's minimum safety standards required for helicopter Emergency Medical Services operations. This review should consider increasing; (1) the minimum pilot qualifications, experience and recency requirements, (2)
operational procedures and (3) minimum equipment for conduct of such operations at night.
Coroner Hennessy.
12. That CASA consider regulating for the initial training of a helicopter pilot to include night VFR training.
13. That CASA and the industry move towards a national system of accreditation and uniform standards for provision of EMS services in Australia.
14. That CASA investigate reclassification of EMS helicopter operations into charter category, or create a separate EMS category of aviation in order to provide the benefits of increased level of regulation and CASA oversight, than that presently available under the aerial work category.
15. That CASA ensure that appropriate information be provided to pilots on an ongoing basis regarding the issue of spatial disorientation.
16. The Coroner supports CASR draft regulations point 61 and 133 becoming final.
17. That beacons, both visual and radio, be placed on prominent and appropriate high points along routes commonly utilised by aero-medical retrieval teams, including Cape Hillsborough.
18. The Coroner supports the ATSB recommendations 20030213,and promulgation of information to pilots; 20040052, assessment of safety benefits of requiring a standby altitude indicator with independent power source in single pilot night VFR; 20040053, assessment of safety benefits of requiring an autopilot or stabilisation augmentation system in single pilot VFR; and R20050002, review operator classification and minimum safety standards for helicopter EMS operations.
CASA response.
Date Issued: 29 August 2005
CASA has reviewed its previous advice in relation to this matter [provided with the directly involved parties comments to draft occurrence report 200304282] and I am advised that the Authority has no additional comment to provide in response to recommendation R20050002. However, it should be noted that resources to review this action will be allocated in accordance with CASA's reviewed priorities. For your information, a copy of CASA's initial advice is recorded below. CASA advice CASA will:
* Review the requirements for helicopter EMS operations to include consideration for two pilots, or a stability augmentation and/or autopilot system;
* Review the special operational and environmental circumstances of helicopter EMS services, particularly with regard to pilot qualifications, training and recency including instrument flight competency; and
* Review the pilot recency requirements for helicopter EMS operations to ensure that operator check and training processes are focused on the EMS environment.
CASA 10 October 2007.
The following updates the actions previously advised in response to the recommendation:
Date Issued: 29 August 2005
CASA has reviewed its previous advice in relation to this matter [provided with the directly involved parties comments to draft occurrence report 200304282] and I am advised that the Authority has no additional comment to provide in response to recommendation R20050002. However, it should be noted that resources to review this action will be allocated in accordance with CASA's reviewed priorities. For your information, a copy of CASA's initial advice is recorded below. CASA advice CASA will:
* Review the requirements for helicopter EMS operations to include consideration for two pilots, or a stability augmentation and/or autopilot system;
* Review the special operational and environmental circumstances of helicopter EMS services, particularly with regard to pilot qualifications, training and recency including instrument flight competency; and
* Review the pilot recency requirements for helicopter EMS operations to ensure that operator check and training processes are focused on the EMS environment.
CASA 10 October 2007.
The following updates the actions previously advised in response to the recommendation:
- [*]
This CAO (which is now in effect) empowers appropriately equipped, trained and approved EMS AOC holders to use NVG on their night EMS primary and secondary response tasking.
Both CASA and the industry consider this to be a major safety initiative and we will be monitoring its effect over the next twelve months by way of a formal research process.
Both CASA and the industry consider this to be a major safety initiative and we will be monitoring its effect over the next twelve months by way of a formal research process.
Additionally I can advise that pilot qualification, training and recency requirements were also reviewed by both CASA and the industry as part of the consultation processes associated with the previously mentioned NVG implementation project, and that the industry subject matter experts at these meetings included several representatives from AOC holders who conduct EMS operations in both VFR and IFR situations at diverse
operational locations.
Comment - April 2012.
CASR 133 is still not available for use.
It is our opinion that essentially, the accident scenario potential to reoccur has not been eliminated.
operational locations.
Comment - April 2012.
CASR 133 is still not available for use.
It is our opinion that essentially, the accident scenario potential to reoccur has not been eliminated.