Senate Inquiry, Hearing Program 4th Nov 2011
Thank you Sarcs. For your explanation.
The Sunfish VFR flight planning skills are rudimentary at best. I barely understand the concept of alternates, tempo, inter and Octas so if it's dodgy I don't go and I always load full fuel and plan to use less than half. The few times I have had to consider/weight/range/alternates etc. normally takes me a day or Two to work through.
..But then I'm paying the bills myself and I don't have the commercial pressures that you guys do...
The Sunfish VFR flight planning skills are rudimentary at best. I barely understand the concept of alternates, tempo, inter and Octas so if it's dodgy I don't go and I always load full fuel and plan to use less than half. The few times I have had to consider/weight/range/alternates etc. normally takes me a day or Two to work through.
..But then I'm paying the bills myself and I don't have the commercial pressures that you guys do...
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Avoiding the black boxes in the middle of the room
Kharon, Up-into-the-air - You boys got it, you understand exactly what I meant! 
Sarcs,
Spot on!!
It would seem that there was 'something in the Spring air' as the similarities in reports are amazing! Was the ATSB and CASA trying to cross pollenate and produce some kind of hybrid robust demon child? Was Beaker in all his stupidity, and due to being out of his league, trying to save money by merely copying a report from Fort Fumble? The fact that Beaker was happy to leave the orange boxes sitting in a few inches of water (my exageration, but you get my point) is testimony and evidence to him being nothing more than a politician with absolutely no idea. He needs to 'walk the green mile'. NOW.
The Manager of CASA's Accident Liaison section should be punted for signing off on that report without including the one key piece of crucial information - The CVR/FDR evidence. The final report should have never been finalised without that evidence being considered. He should have held back and forced the ATSB's hand. It is apparent that he is somewhat limp wristed and not capable, or able, or both, to stand his ground and do his job correctly. Also his CASA superiors who accepted that crock should also be forced to 'walk the green mile'.
There were other good elements and causal factors identified in the report, but no final version could or should have been released without those bloody orange boxes being recovered. Clowns.
I recently spoke to a 'highly regarded, well respected and keenly sought after' member of another international aviation investigative body (who shall not be identified or even de-identified, and no it is not Flyingfiend or Blackhandi) and he is watching this unfolding steaming mess with great interest. He also is of the opinion (and we all have the right to have one) that this current debacle is one of the most embarressing and bizzar spectacles he has observed in decades of sifting through smoking holes (and submerged holes).
Sarcs,
Which kind of makes you think that maybe the ATSB missed that fact because they were reading from the prepared CASA script ala the CASA investigator's report.
The investigators also never make it clear if the pilot had acknowledged receipt of either the 0803 UTC amended TAF or the 0800 UTC auto
SPECI. What we really need is a copy of the original unaltered version of the transcript from the taped communications between ATC and the aircraft!!
What I also find quite remarkable is that except for the usual ATSB
embellishments the ATSB Final Report almost exactly mirrors that put out by the CASA investigators!
The investigators also never make it clear if the pilot had acknowledged receipt of either the 0803 UTC amended TAF or the 0800 UTC auto
SPECI. What we really need is a copy of the original unaltered version of the transcript from the taped communications between ATC and the aircraft!!
What I also find quite remarkable is that except for the usual ATSB
embellishments the ATSB Final Report almost exactly mirrors that put out by the CASA investigators!
It would seem that there was 'something in the Spring air' as the similarities in reports are amazing! Was the ATSB and CASA trying to cross pollenate and produce some kind of hybrid robust demon child? Was Beaker in all his stupidity, and due to being out of his league, trying to save money by merely copying a report from Fort Fumble? The fact that Beaker was happy to leave the orange boxes sitting in a few inches of water (my exageration, but you get my point) is testimony and evidence to him being nothing more than a politician with absolutely no idea. He needs to 'walk the green mile'. NOW.
The Manager of CASA's Accident Liaison section should be punted for signing off on that report without including the one key piece of crucial information - The CVR/FDR evidence. The final report should have never been finalised without that evidence being considered. He should have held back and forced the ATSB's hand. It is apparent that he is somewhat limp wristed and not capable, or able, or both, to stand his ground and do his job correctly. Also his CASA superiors who accepted that crock should also be forced to 'walk the green mile'.
There were other good elements and causal factors identified in the report, but no final version could or should have been released without those bloody orange boxes being recovered. Clowns.
I recently spoke to a 'highly regarded, well respected and keenly sought after' member of another international aviation investigative body (who shall not be identified or even de-identified, and no it is not Flyingfiend or Blackhandi) and he is watching this unfolding steaming mess with great interest. He also is of the opinion (and we all have the right to have one) that this current debacle is one of the most embarressing and bizzar spectacles he has observed in decades of sifting through smoking holes (and submerged holes).
Last edited by gobbledock; 5th Nov 2012 at 08:17. Reason: Nupties
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The Force of the AIP
Creamie,
Didn't you teach me that the AIP has no force of its own, as it exists only to publish general guidance information (considered to be advice only) and properly made statutory instruments (which in their original form have the force of law by virtue of the head of power under which they are made)?
Didn't you also teach me that there were many statements in AIP that were written as if they were authoritative, but were unenforceable because there was no underlying statutory instrument and, in many cases, no head of power anyway?
What is the penalty for not complying with a provision of the AIP, as distinct from any relevant statutory instruments?
Stay Alive,
Didn't you teach me that the AIP has no force of its own, as it exists only to publish general guidance information (considered to be advice only) and properly made statutory instruments (which in their original form have the force of law by virtue of the head of power under which they are made)?
Didn't you also teach me that there were many statements in AIP that were written as if they were authoritative, but were unenforceable because there was no underlying statutory instrument and, in many cases, no head of power anyway?
What is the penalty for not complying with a provision of the AIP, as distinct from any relevant statutory instruments?
Stay Alive,
Last edited by 4dogs; 5th Nov 2012 at 08:05.
Kharon...
There's a heap more questions about CASA's actions I think.
In particular, questions that arise from the 'secret report'...
The accident happened on 18th November at 2200 hours local (Norfolk Island time) and which should have been referred to in UTC, but that's a minor point. However, it really doesn't surprise me that the CASA investigation process got this wrong, like a lot of other things in their report regarding best practice in report writing.
The ATSB notified CASA it was investigating (on the same date). CASA, from the report, commenced a 'parallel investigation' 'the next day'.
I smell a BIG rat here, and would REALLY like to know WHY the CASA Manager Accident Liaison and Investigation Unit (ALIU) was:
Particularly as the CASA Special Purpose Audit of Pel-Air is referred to in the CASA report.
I would also like to know WHO tasked the Manager ALIU to conduct that investigation?
Something tells me that the nanosecond CASA knew that the ATSB was going to investigate, the penny dropped that the **** was going to hit the fan.
And, as we all now know, it DID!
Maybe these are questions that the Senators may like to ask of CASA management at Round 2?
There's a heap more questions about CASA's actions I think.
In particular, questions that arise from the 'secret report'...
The accident happened on 18th November at 2200 hours local (Norfolk Island time) and which should have been referred to in UTC, but that's a minor point. However, it really doesn't surprise me that the CASA investigation process got this wrong, like a lot of other things in their report regarding best practice in report writing.
The ATSB notified CASA it was investigating (on the same date). CASA, from the report, commenced a 'parallel investigation' 'the next day'.
I smell a BIG rat here, and would REALLY like to know WHY the CASA Manager Accident Liaison and Investigation Unit (ALIU) was:
...tasked with conducting a parallel [to the ATSB] investigation for CASA purposes.
I would also like to know WHO tasked the Manager ALIU to conduct that investigation?
Something tells me that the nanosecond CASA knew that the ATSB was going to investigate, the penny dropped that the **** was going to hit the fan.
And, as we all now know, it DID!
Maybe these are questions that the Senators may like to ask of CASA management at Round 2?
Last edited by SIUYA; 5th Nov 2012 at 08:29.
4Dogs
Im sure you werent taught anything by me, but instead by someone who appears to know what theyre talking about.
This is solid gold and I could not have said it better myself:
Two things, at least, follow from that statement.
First, if something in the AIP reflects a properly made statutory instrument (like a direction under reg 240 quoted earlier), failure to comply with that direction is a breach of reg 239 (quoted earlier), because the direction is published in AIP in accordance with reg 240. Thats the second of your alternatives.
The answer to your question:
is therefore that there is no stand alone penalty for not complying with AIP.
The point I was trying to make earlier in this thread is this: Just because AIP has no stand alone force and therefore sundry bright sparks cant purport to make whatever rules they want by merely putting the text in AIP, it does not follow that the bright idea can never be given legal effect.
There are lots of valid directions that are accurately published in AIP, as a consequence of which the world is on notice of those directions, as a further consequence of which breach = offence.
Further, there are lots of other valid directions that could be made and published in AIP.
A question for you: does CASA have the power to issue a direction requiring pilots to divert to an alternative, in a set of circumstances specified by CASA?
Im sure you werent taught anything by me, but instead by someone who appears to know what theyre talking about.
This is solid gold and I could not have said it better myself:
[T]he AIP has no force of its own, as it exists only to publish general guidance information (considered to be advice only) and properly made statutory instruments (which in their original form have the force of law by virtue of the head of power under which they are made)
First, if something in the AIP reflects a properly made statutory instrument (like a direction under reg 240 quoted earlier), failure to comply with that direction is a breach of reg 239 (quoted earlier), because the direction is published in AIP in accordance with reg 240. Thats the second of your alternatives.
The answer to your question:
What is the penalty for not complying with a provision of the AIP, as distinct from any relevant statutory instruments?
The point I was trying to make earlier in this thread is this: Just because AIP has no stand alone force and therefore sundry bright sparks cant purport to make whatever rules they want by merely putting the text in AIP, it does not follow that the bright idea can never be given legal effect.
There are lots of valid directions that are accurately published in AIP, as a consequence of which the world is on notice of those directions, as a further consequence of which breach = offence.
Further, there are lots of other valid directions that could be made and published in AIP.
A question for you: does CASA have the power to issue a direction requiring pilots to divert to an alternative, in a set of circumstances specified by CASA?
SIUYA it's an interesting story which is kind of like a murder mystery novel that is part of a series...the more you read the more intriguing and revealing it all gets...till you quite literally can't put it down and when you finish you just can't wait for the next edition.
SIUYA while your were trolling through the secret, hidden report did you notice section 1.17 which is basically a summary of the Special Audit report (call it SAR for short...I know there's a certain amount of irony in that!), here's some extracts from that section:
And it goes on and on
all in all section 1.17 is a fairly comprehensive summation of the findings of the Special Audit team.
However when you get to Section 2.0 the Investigators analysis it is like there is a total disconnect between what the investigators took from the SAR and what conclusions they eventually come up with.
Maybe it was because investigator No 2 took over the writing of the report and he decided he didnt like the pilot and subsequently dumped it all on Doms lap, either way it is quite bizarre!
Still plenty more in the murky corners of this huge pile of pony and elephant pooh..
SIUYA while your were trolling through the secret, hidden report did you notice section 1.17 which is basically a summary of the Special Audit report (call it SAR for short...I know there's a certain amount of irony in that!), here's some extracts from that section:
1.17.1 Fuel Policy and Practice
- Inadequate fuel policy for Westwind Operations
- Pilots use their own planning tools and there is no control exercised by Pel-air Aviation Pty Limited to ensure the fuel figures entered are valid.
- No policy exists to ensure that flight and fuel planning is cross-checked to detect errors.
- No alternate requirements specified for remote area and Remote Island operations.
- The Operations Manual specifies 30minute fuel checks this appears to be largely ignored by operating crew.
- Criteria to obtain weather updates not specified in Operations Manual.
- Practice of obtaining weather varies among pilots and does not appear to be conducted at appropriate times to support decision making.
- No consideration of loss of pressurisation and an engine failure.
- No operational decision-making tools provided to support crew in balancing aviation versus medical risks.
- Once tasked, the pilots operate autonomously and make all decisions on behalf of the AOC. The AOC exercises little, if any, control over the operation once a task commences.
- The company does not provide domestic charts or publications to pilots and does not ensure that the pilots maintain a complete and current set.
- In many cases inadequate flight preparation time is provided. (Normally pilots are notified two hours prior to departure regardless of when the company becomes aware of the task.
- Failure to maintain required flight records and no apparent checking by the company.
- Pilots use their own planning tools and there is no control exercised by Pel-air Aviation Pty Limited to ensure the data entered is valid.
- Inadequate CAO 20.11 training (life raft refresher and emergency exit training).
- Inadequate documentation of training programs.
- No formal training for international operations.
- Inadequate training records for pilot endorsement and progression.
- Inadequate records of remedial training.
- Endorsement training is the minimum required (five hours) and relies on regular operations to consolidate training.
- No mentoring program for First Officer to Command.
- Deficiencies in training records identified.
However when you get to Section 2.0 the Investigators analysis it is like there is a total disconnect between what the investigators took from the SAR and what conclusions they eventually come up with.
Maybe it was because investigator No 2 took over the writing of the report and he decided he didnt like the pilot and subsequently dumped it all on Doms lap, either way it is quite bizarre!
Still plenty more in the murky corners of this huge pile of pony and elephant pooh..
Don Quixote Impersonator
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Creamy, Sunny 4Dogs et al.
Riddle me why one has to be a Phiiladelphia lawyer to be able to walk from the hangar to the aircraft let alone get in and operate it safely.
It's not hard, becoming a pilot is not rocket science, but then maybe it should be pitched at that level.
Having said that, having a rocket scientist of very close acquaintance one shoudn't assume a lack of dumbosity.
Riddle me why one has to be a Phiiladelphia lawyer to be able to walk from the hangar to the aircraft let alone get in and operate it safely.
It's not hard, becoming a pilot is not rocket science, but then maybe it should be pitched at that level.
Having said that, having a rocket scientist of very close acquaintance one shoudn't assume a lack of dumbosity.
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The thick plottens
For those who remain firmly convinced that DJ is the sole perpetrator of these events, consider a short reading session, commencing at page 39 of the "very" special CASA audit ending at page 103.
The CASA signed confession begins at p.39; the items discussed did not occur overnight. If CASA can identify these problem areas after the event; it follows that they could have done so before. These issues identified and addressed may have prevented the infamous 'group cluster' now referred to as the Norfolk ditching.
Pages 40 41 : CASA identifies experience and cultural 'contributing factors' which had been in effect long before DJ decided to ditch the aircraft. Once again, if CASA can define these issues, so very clearly identified after the event, why were they not identified beforehand by CASA and corrected. It is amusing that the issues are laid at the company's door due to a lack of internal audit, what were CASA auditing, the biscuit tin or the lunch menu ?
Then we come to the RCA section, no page numbers but start at PDF 45 through 78:-
RCA 321058 it's a bit difficult to blame DJ for dodgy evacuation procedures when the company had not provided the training.
RCA 321059 training, including V1 cuts conducted by 'non approved' supervisory pilots.
RCA 321060 more 'non training', this time for ACAS.
RCA 321061 - more 'non training', this time for CRM.
RCA 321062 operations conducted with no DGA certificate
RCA 321063 operations without medical certificate.
RCA 321064 Deficient Fuel policy.
RCA 321065 Deficient flight preparation documentation and procedures.
RCA 321066 Deficient/ non existent navigation log and audit procedures.
RCA 321067 No RTOW or OC charts or procedure.
RCA 321068 Westwind fleet pilots with out of date of no COM.
RCA 321069 No formal training for international operations.
RCA 321071 Systemic failure to report defects.
RCA 321072 Pre fight passenger and crew briefing deficiencies.
RCA 321073 Multiple deficiencies notes related to training not provided.
There are a further 22 pages of the same thing yet to be analysed, but the above certainly gives an idea of the background and culture PA crews operate in. The company failed to correct the issues, CASA failed in previous audit and surveillance to either identify or correct any of these post accident 'discoveries'. Airtex was raped, pillaged, burned and buried for a whole lot less than this, by the same manager I might add. Polar was a stellar exemplar in comparison and poor old Tiger, their administrative policy pissing competion pales to insignificance. Yet PA survives.
This is the audit that did not merit the attention of the ATSB. This is the audit that still has not been presented to the Senate. This audit page count is growing daily, firstly we have a humble 45 page leaked version, then a solid 103 pages under FOI; (and yes there are 'subtle differences). I hear there is more of this audit to come under the FOI, unless 'I'm a star see' can find a way to avoid it by skimming around the edges of the Act without actually, technically breeching it, we shall see.
But that's OK it was all the pilot's fault. Not withstanding Dumbosity and the AIP riddles, do try to remember who issues operational approvals, who oversights operations and who signs it all off as 'acceptable' and who acquits the RCA. Give you a clue, it is not Dominic James.
P.S Can some one please expain how a printed name on an RCA can be different to the signature, it still has me puzzled? - Bloggs is this your signature? - No M'Lud.
The CASA signed confession begins at p.39; the items discussed did not occur overnight. If CASA can identify these problem areas after the event; it follows that they could have done so before. These issues identified and addressed may have prevented the infamous 'group cluster' now referred to as the Norfolk ditching.
Pages 40 41 : CASA identifies experience and cultural 'contributing factors' which had been in effect long before DJ decided to ditch the aircraft. Once again, if CASA can define these issues, so very clearly identified after the event, why were they not identified beforehand by CASA and corrected. It is amusing that the issues are laid at the company's door due to a lack of internal audit, what were CASA auditing, the biscuit tin or the lunch menu ?
Then we come to the RCA section, no page numbers but start at PDF 45 through 78:-
RCA 321058 it's a bit difficult to blame DJ for dodgy evacuation procedures when the company had not provided the training.
RCA 321059 training, including V1 cuts conducted by 'non approved' supervisory pilots.
RCA 321060 more 'non training', this time for ACAS.
RCA 321061 - more 'non training', this time for CRM.
RCA 321062 operations conducted with no DGA certificate
RCA 321063 operations without medical certificate.
RCA 321064 Deficient Fuel policy.
RCA 321065 Deficient flight preparation documentation and procedures.
RCA 321066 Deficient/ non existent navigation log and audit procedures.
RCA 321067 No RTOW or OC charts or procedure.
RCA 321068 Westwind fleet pilots with out of date of no COM.
RCA 321069 No formal training for international operations.
RCA 321071 Systemic failure to report defects.
RCA 321072 Pre fight passenger and crew briefing deficiencies.
RCA 321073 Multiple deficiencies notes related to training not provided.
There are a further 22 pages of the same thing yet to be analysed, but the above certainly gives an idea of the background and culture PA crews operate in. The company failed to correct the issues, CASA failed in previous audit and surveillance to either identify or correct any of these post accident 'discoveries'. Airtex was raped, pillaged, burned and buried for a whole lot less than this, by the same manager I might add. Polar was a stellar exemplar in comparison and poor old Tiger, their administrative policy pissing competion pales to insignificance. Yet PA survives.
This is the audit that did not merit the attention of the ATSB. This is the audit that still has not been presented to the Senate. This audit page count is growing daily, firstly we have a humble 45 page leaked version, then a solid 103 pages under FOI; (and yes there are 'subtle differences). I hear there is more of this audit to come under the FOI, unless 'I'm a star see' can find a way to avoid it by skimming around the edges of the Act without actually, technically breeching it, we shall see.
But that's OK it was all the pilot's fault. Not withstanding Dumbosity and the AIP riddles, do try to remember who issues operational approvals, who oversights operations and who signs it all off as 'acceptable' and who acquits the RCA. Give you a clue, it is not Dominic James.
P.S Can some one please expain how a printed name on an RCA can be different to the signature, it still has me puzzled? - Bloggs is this your signature? - No M'Lud.
Last edited by Kharon; 5th Nov 2012 at 20:57. Reason: PAIN - Do you have the FOI 103 page version. PM me if not.
What resources did DJ have access to other than his own experience? It would appear that the company provided almost nothing. Would I be right in thinking that any ONE of those RCA's identifies an area that could have prevented the holes in the cheese from lining up? For example, training in international operations?
Furthermore, if the chief pilot of Pel Air knew of these alleged deficiencies and did nothing to correct them, or didn't even know that the operation was deficient in the areas CASA has identified, then what possible contribution to air safety could he make now that he is employed by CASA? Or were none of these matters anything to do with him?
A crash test dummy perhaps?
Furthermore, if the chief pilot of Pel Air knew of these alleged deficiencies and did nothing to correct them, or didn't even know that the operation was deficient in the areas CASA has identified, then what possible contribution to air safety could he make now that he is employed by CASA? Or were none of these matters anything to do with him?
A crash test dummy perhaps?
Last edited by Sunfish; 5th Nov 2012 at 22:17.
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PA CASA audit part 2
The PDF document provides an additional 57 pages of audit information. We have redacted the identifying cover letter and the name of the decision maker. This provides the second part of what we believe will a three part report.
Download : PA CASA audit V2.
P1. a.k.a. P1.
Download : PA CASA audit V2.
P1. a.k.a. P1.
Last edited by PAIN_NET; 5th Nov 2012 at 23:42. Reason: Cheers "K"
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Same pony pooh, different day
There are a further 22 pages of the same thing yet to be analysed, but the above certainly gives an idea of the background and culture PA crews operate in. The company failed to correct the issues, CASA failed in previous audit and surveillance to either identify or correct
How does the song go? The long and winding road.................
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Déjà vu and Snap.
Déjà vu -Every time I do or read anything to do with the Norfolk incident; Lockhart River seems to creep in and haunt the background, the similarities are irresistible. The robust waiving of some fairly serious issues by the then regional manager rings little bells, but then so does much of the LHR tragedy. Then; I start to compare the PA result and the very special handling of that audit to the Airtex audit, and I get cranky all over again.
Snap I have nearly finished a comparison of Pel Air/ Airtex RCA series. There are literally 20 reams of paper parked in my study for Airtex (AAT transcript), the pile is 830 cm high, not including the electronic data (lots of). If I can manage it, I'll try and post a comparative analysis, but I hear troops over at PAIN HQ are running a report on that; so, we shall see.
Can some one please explain how a printed name on an RCA can be different to the signature, it still has me puzzled? "Bloggs is this your signature?" "No M'Lud".
MACBETH Act 3,scene 4
It will have blood; they say, blood will have blood:
Stones have been known to move and trees to speak;
Augurs and understood relations have
By magot-pies and choughs and rooks brought forth
The secret'st man of blood. What is the night?
Germane ? Oh yes.
Snap I have nearly finished a comparison of Pel Air/ Airtex RCA series. There are literally 20 reams of paper parked in my study for Airtex (AAT transcript), the pile is 830 cm high, not including the electronic data (lots of). If I can manage it, I'll try and post a comparative analysis, but I hear troops over at PAIN HQ are running a report on that; so, we shall see.
Can some one please explain how a printed name on an RCA can be different to the signature, it still has me puzzled? "Bloggs is this your signature?" "No M'Lud".
MACBETH Act 3,scene 4
It will have blood; they say, blood will have blood:
Stones have been known to move and trees to speak;
Augurs and understood relations have
By magot-pies and choughs and rooks brought forth
The secret'st man of blood. What is the night?
Germane ? Oh yes.
Last edited by Kharon; 6th Nov 2012 at 05:22.
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Taking bets now - "The Tick Tock Cup"
Step right up and place your bets boys. The form guide has just been released for the 'Tick Tock Cup' at the end of November, with some interesting entrants!
Race 3
Horse 1: Skullduggery, Rider: N.Xenophon
Horse 2: Gollan, Rider: Scratched, no willing rider found
Horse 3: Beaker, Rider: D.Fawcett
Horse 4: Brewsters Millions, Rider: G.Russell
Horse 5: Voodoo Hoodoo, Rider: G.Sterle
Horse 6: He Who Shall Not Be Named, Rider: F.Nash
Horse 7: Big Red, Rider: A.Allbuttnese
Stablehand/horse pooh remover: Blak Handi
Race 3
Horse 1: Skullduggery, Rider: N.Xenophon
Horse 2: Gollan, Rider: Scratched, no willing rider found
Horse 3: Beaker, Rider: D.Fawcett
Horse 4: Brewsters Millions, Rider: G.Russell
Horse 5: Voodoo Hoodoo, Rider: G.Sterle
Horse 6: He Who Shall Not Be Named, Rider: F.Nash
Horse 7: Big Red, Rider: A.Allbuttnese
Stablehand/horse pooh remover: Blak Handi
Last edited by gobbledock; 6th Nov 2012 at 06:25.
I'll take an each way bet on Skullduggery. However my local bookie told me on the sly that the Golden West Mafia syndicate's entry is a bit of a wildcard. That is providing they don't once again get scratched for trying to bribe a Green Senator to take the ride.
Last edited by Sarcs; 6th Nov 2012 at 08:53.
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Kharon; for balance you should include in your analysis Airtex's Metro crash prior to Canley Vale, Airtex's response to CASA compared to Pelair's and whether Airtex's owner is a highly compliant RPT operation with an excellent relationship with CASA ... oh and über rich enough to fix the problems. You should also factor that the Pelair SAAB and M23 operation was very good and compliant (read the audit).
Not saying Pelair should have kept their AOC, but comparing to Airtex isn't that accurate.
Not saying Pelair should have kept their AOC, but comparing to Airtex isn't that accurate.
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Balance not the issue.
JetA # 691- Not saying Pelair should have kept their AOC, but comparing to Airtex isn't that accurate.
1) I have no quarrel whatsoever with PA continuing to operate, in fact I applaud the CASA and the company for working together to resolve the issues. This is 'best practice' and to be encouraged. I believe it's the best, indeed the only way to achieve operational safety and legal compliance. That's what both the SAAB and Metro operations clearly demonstrate and well done.
But you'll own that the 'jet operation' was well dodgy and beyond the skill set and experience of the CP, see audit page 39 ish (even CASA agree). A 1000 page COM does not equate to a 'sound' operation, it reflects a CP groping about, trying to come to terms with and micro manage an operation not clearly understood, while the essentials (20.11, CRM, Fuel) etc. are missed.
2) After the "Botany Bay" fatal, CASA, rightfully went through Airtex like the proverbial. The RCA were issued and serious conditions were placed on the AOC. Airtex and the management went through a huge transition period; and, to paraphrase the then CASA manager 'good job all round and a great result for air safety'. (Don't have the "actual" handy). That company worked hard. All independently audited and approved to IOSA standards by a leading ICAO audit company, by CASA and due to go "BARS" green at the next independent audit.
Consider, in early 2010 there were preparations to release the third revision of the COM, IOSA audit results were 'first class', AOC conditions removed over the preceding 12 months, AOC reissued for three years, Safety Management System written with expert help, rough but ready for CASA scrutiny and guidance. Looking good.
It is from that point my analysis starts and it is not a pretty picture. The picture becomes really ugly once the RCA and AAT transcripts are analysed. Not my battle, not my dog; but, 40 folk unemployed and a business closed down requires some serious examination of motive, facts and probity. Especially probity, consider this: CASA legal abandoned entirely the evidence of one FOI in the AAT, not court mind you, as untenable. The FOI "returned to industry" shortly thereafter. Start from there and work backwards. It's as an ugly a story as you'll ever hear.
PS. Canley Vale was a Sky Master fatal, very different operation, different animal entirely, just happened to be owned by the same bloke. I am really looking forward to the ATSB report on that one. There is a lot of industry knowledge on the event, should be fun to repeat the Pel Air debacle all over again.
Last edited by Kharon; 6th Nov 2012 at 20:22.
Boy JetA_OK you sure stepped into that one...but the point that "K" was originally trying to make was the "us" and "them" approach that the regulator constantly displays across the aviation spectrum.
Most industry stakeholders are not asking for more regulations but just a level playing field that isn't littered with hidden mines.
As you say it is about the "über rich" but not because they can afford to fix the problems it's more to do with how much political influence you can afford and how much you can contribute to the trough.
It is also interesting to note that none of the wheeling's and dealings, backdoor handouts, obfuscation, maladministration, regulatory capture etc..etc that is becoming revealed by this whole sordid, squalid affair has anything remotely to do with aviation safety. On the contrary it is all severely counter productive to our aviation safety reputation and could threaten Australia's ICAO level one standing.
It is worth also going back in time to when the current system of regulatory oversight was first promulgated, here's a letter from a former DAS which highlighted this change:
So can we still feel proud today?? And do we really have a safety record twice as good as Europe or North America??
If we do it can only be through dumb luck and is definitely not through good management!
Now we have this PA total clusterfcuk revealing more and more shennanigans, coverups, subplots etc within the very same system that the former DAS was fully endorsing (above), can we really be proud of such a system??
No sorry the new tick'a'box routine appears not to be working and as is evidenced here quite obviously open to abuse!
It is also interesting to note that way back then (2001) the DAS had already started to "play the man and not the ball", a tradition that is vigorously endorsed by the current DAS.
Most industry stakeholders are not asking for more regulations but just a level playing field that isn't littered with hidden mines.
As you say it is about the "über rich" but not because they can afford to fix the problems it's more to do with how much political influence you can afford and how much you can contribute to the trough.
It is also interesting to note that none of the wheeling's and dealings, backdoor handouts, obfuscation, maladministration, regulatory capture etc..etc that is becoming revealed by this whole sordid, squalid affair has anything remotely to do with aviation safety. On the contrary it is all severely counter productive to our aviation safety reputation and could threaten Australia's ICAO level one standing.
It is worth also going back in time to when the current system of regulatory oversight was first promulgated, here's a letter from a former DAS which highlighted this change:
You published a letter from Mr John Wood on 25th January 2001 under the title Cracks in Safety. In that letter Mr Wood alleges that CASA is promoting industry self-regulation. Nothing could be further from the truth.
In the days when Mr Wood was employed as a Flying Operations Inspector, the main way the Authority gauged the activities of the major airlines was by a system of product auditing. This meant that the inspectors sat in the cockpit and watched the operation of the aircraft, nominally for up to 0.5% of all hours flown by the airline. And they had to check each area of operation, so annual visits to London, Los Angeles, Hong Kong, Honolulu, Tokyo and other interesting destinations were the norm. Nice work for the likes of Mr Wood, but of no value in understanding what was really happening in the airline, nor of ensuring compliance with the regulatory requirements.
We did not know what we did not know in those days, and in the late 1980s and early 1990s almost certainly did not understand that the approach was wrong. The influx of strong professional experience to the Authority in the last few years has changed that position to one where we know our approach was wrong and what needed to be done to ensure the necessary changes took place. Mr Wood chose to leave the Authority around the time of implementing these changes.
Under the newly adopted approach we undertake a system audit, which is in line with all top quality management and auditing programmes. This approach is being endorsed by all the leading aviation authorities in the world, and Australia is proud to be at the forefront.
Under a systems audit regime the pressure is put on the operator to have all the correct management systems in place to ensure full compliance with all regulatory requirements and to encourage a total safety culture. Under no stretch of any imagination can this be called self-regulation. It is an effective way of focussing industry attention on their obligations.
It is not CASA's role to run the airlines, that is the role of the Airline Manager. Hence, unless we are to employ the same numbers of staff and duplicate an airline's efforts, we can never know everything that happens in an airline. Neither does any regulator in any field. Our responsibility for air safety is best served by ensuring the airlines understand their legal responsibilities and act on them.
Already we have found that we have had great success in identifying problem areas that we could never have found in Mr Wood's days, and ensuring corrective action is taken. All this is a great leap forward for our safety in Australia, where we already enjoy a safety record twice as good as Europe or North America.
That is something of which Australians can be proud.
In the days when Mr Wood was employed as a Flying Operations Inspector, the main way the Authority gauged the activities of the major airlines was by a system of product auditing. This meant that the inspectors sat in the cockpit and watched the operation of the aircraft, nominally for up to 0.5% of all hours flown by the airline. And they had to check each area of operation, so annual visits to London, Los Angeles, Hong Kong, Honolulu, Tokyo and other interesting destinations were the norm. Nice work for the likes of Mr Wood, but of no value in understanding what was really happening in the airline, nor of ensuring compliance with the regulatory requirements.
We did not know what we did not know in those days, and in the late 1980s and early 1990s almost certainly did not understand that the approach was wrong. The influx of strong professional experience to the Authority in the last few years has changed that position to one where we know our approach was wrong and what needed to be done to ensure the necessary changes took place. Mr Wood chose to leave the Authority around the time of implementing these changes.
Under the newly adopted approach we undertake a system audit, which is in line with all top quality management and auditing programmes. This approach is being endorsed by all the leading aviation authorities in the world, and Australia is proud to be at the forefront.
Under a systems audit regime the pressure is put on the operator to have all the correct management systems in place to ensure full compliance with all regulatory requirements and to encourage a total safety culture. Under no stretch of any imagination can this be called self-regulation. It is an effective way of focussing industry attention on their obligations.
It is not CASA's role to run the airlines, that is the role of the Airline Manager. Hence, unless we are to employ the same numbers of staff and duplicate an airline's efforts, we can never know everything that happens in an airline. Neither does any regulator in any field. Our responsibility for air safety is best served by ensuring the airlines understand their legal responsibilities and act on them.
Already we have found that we have had great success in identifying problem areas that we could never have found in Mr Wood's days, and ensuring corrective action is taken. All this is a great leap forward for our safety in Australia, where we already enjoy a safety record twice as good as Europe or North America.
That is something of which Australians can be proud.
And do we really have a safety record twice as good as Europe or North America?? If we do it can only be through dumb luck and is definitely not through good management! Now we have this PA total clusterfcuk revealing more and more shennanigans, coverups, subplots etc within the very same system that the former DAS was fully endorsing (above), can we really be proud of such a system??
No sorry the new tick'a'box routine appears not to be working and as is evidenced here quite obviously open to abuse!
It is also interesting to note that way back then (2001) the DAS had already started to "play the man and not the ball", a tradition that is vigorously endorsed by the current DAS.
Last edited by Sarcs; 7th Nov 2012 at 05:22.
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Bad boys bad boys what ya gonna do..........
Now we have this PA total clusterfcuk revealing more and more shennanigans, coverups, subplots etc within the very same system that the former DAS was fully endorsing (above), can we really be proud of such a system??
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Oh dear, it seems that CASA may need to bring back the former HR Manager, GH, to fix all these 'people issues'?
Now we have this PA total clusterfcuk revealing more and more shennanigans, coverups, subplots etc within the very same system that the former DAS was fully endorsing (above), can we really be proud of such a system??
Last edited by halfmanhalfbiscuit; 7th Nov 2012 at 06:37.
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Can someone explain PIC?
It may be semantics, but picture this.
Like most Ambulance configurations a Westwind would have the patient on the starboard side because, the door is on the port side and it doesn't make sense to embark the patient and then swap sides?
In the readings the FO said she looked back to see how things were going with the patient. From the starboard seat this would be difficult.
However if the semantics are deliberately confused to hide the fact she may actually have been occupying the Captain/ port seat it would be possible for her to see how the patient was going?
This would explain why she was not doing radio calls and he was.
Am I missing something here?
Like most Ambulance configurations a Westwind would have the patient on the starboard side because, the door is on the port side and it doesn't make sense to embark the patient and then swap sides?
In the readings the FO said she looked back to see how things were going with the patient. From the starboard seat this would be difficult.
However if the semantics are deliberately confused to hide the fact she may actually have been occupying the Captain/ port seat it would be possible for her to see how the patient was going?
This would explain why she was not doing radio calls and he was.
Am I missing something here?
Last edited by Frank Arouet; 8th Nov 2012 at 03:23. Reason: spelling police got me and thick fingers.