Paul Holmes and Erebus
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Quote grip..."So when a critical decision was finally made to climb out to safety in the right direction was made'....
Not sure about that mate.....is that when the GWPS went off ..or are we taliking something else??
Not sure about that mate.....is that when the GWPS went off ..or are we taliking something else??
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Quote grip..."So when a critical decision was finally made to climb out to safety in the right direction was made'....
Not sure about that mate.....is that when the GWPS went off ..or are we taliking something else??
Not sure about that mate.....is that when the GWPS went off ..or are we taliking something else??
2 seconds before the GPWS sounded, they selected heading select to turn the aircraft around.
They didn't like what they could see and interpret , they reacted accordingly. Unfortunately for them the big area of white/grey they could see in front of them they didn't interpret as a mountain.
Just as the cliffs either side they could see they interpreted as McMurdo Sound and not Lewis Bay
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ampan. The ALPA spin is that the change in "McMurdo" upset Collins' situational awareness. No, he never had proper situational awareness; he had a mindset.
I stand to be corrected on this, but I don't "see" Lewis Bay with Ross Island on my right looking anything like McMurdo Sound with Ross Island on my left. Any pilot familiar with the area given an opinion on this?
I cannot help but think if it looked the same they didn't see much (notwithstanding the sector whiteout south) despite the reported visibility at McMurdo Station 40nm? clear (with whiteout). Were the cliffs obscured by fog (Mahon)?
Naturally any VFR flight would track to BYRD, but it was a IFR flightplan, that's the nub.
I stand to be corrected on this, but I don't "see" Lewis Bay with Ross Island on my right looking anything like McMurdo Sound with Ross Island on my left. Any pilot familiar with the area given an opinion on this?
I cannot help but think if it looked the same they didn't see much (notwithstanding the sector whiteout south) despite the reported visibility at McMurdo Station 40nm? clear (with whiteout). Were the cliffs obscured by fog (Mahon)?
Naturally any VFR flight would track to BYRD, but it was a IFR flightplan, that's the nub.
Last edited by Ornis; 28th Mar 2012 at 23:03.
Thats actually all irrelevent in my opinion Ornis.
They should never have been there in the first place. They should have been at FL 160 repeatedly trying to make contact on VHF. They would have made contact about then anyway and all would have become clear.
They should never have been there in the first place. They should have been at FL 160 repeatedly trying to make contact on VHF. They would have made contact about then anyway and all would have become clear.
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I think the rules back then required Chippindale to find the point where the accident became inevitable, which is why he ended up down at 2000 feet, rather than back up at 16000 feet.
Yeah , i just think there is no point getting into what they potentially thought they could or couldn´t see once they had descended to 1500 feet.
It was his job and responsibility to separate the aircraft from terrain, there were several different ways he could have gone about it. The option he chose was both illegal and unsuccessful.
It was his job and responsibility to separate the aircraft from terrain, there were several different ways he could have gone about it. The option he chose was both illegal and unsuccessful.
Thats actually all irrelevent in my opinion Ornis.
They should never have been there in the first place. They should have been at FL 160 repeatedly trying to make contact on VHF. They would have made contact about then anyway and all would have become clear.
They should never have been there in the first place. They should have been at FL 160 repeatedly trying to make contact on VHF. They would have made contact about then anyway and all would have become clear.
The accident could have been averted at that point. Then the issues surrounding the changed flight plan, briefing anomalies etc could have been resolved when the aircraft arrived back at Auckland. 257 lives would have been saved. I think Collins got his priorities mixed up and was more intent on giving the punters a better sightseeing experience.
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so...the "CAPTAIN" of the Aircraft is not "responsible" ...for the final out come of the(a) flight???.......just asking......Im missing something here.....
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I am curious to know just what they saw on the coast. If you saw the coast clearly for >20km each way would you realise you were not west of Erebus.
People, even those who know a bit about aviation, are being duped by Poor Gnomes, I've spoken with some.
In the mid 60s I flew in a SPANZ DC3 from Dunedin to Auckland via Nelson. It was a spectacular day and the pilot deviated to show us Ruapehu. Don't know what altitude flights typically were, not much above 8000ft I guess. And that's the thing Mahon and Holmes can't see, you have to choose your day. As our pilot did.
People, even those who know a bit about aviation, are being duped by Poor Gnomes, I've spoken with some.
In the mid 60s I flew in a SPANZ DC3 from Dunedin to Auckland via Nelson. It was a spectacular day and the pilot deviated to show us Ruapehu. Don't know what altitude flights typically were, not much above 8000ft I guess. And that's the thing Mahon and Holmes can't see, you have to choose your day. As our pilot did.
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I think that this is why the old captains (ie, Prospector from Imperial Airways, Derek Ellis from BA, ex-Concorde, the late Sir Rochford Hughes, and many more) get so pissed off about this nonsense.
Fly with your eyes when you can see. If not, you're on instruments.
Fly with your eyes when you can see. If not, you're on instruments.
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There's a reason that Chippindale's attitude of the buck stopping with the Captain regardless of the circumstances died off in the early '80s and that every successful accident investigatory agency has since used Mahon's deductions as a blueprint, and that reason is the inescapable fact that with airlines becoming multi-billion dollar conglomerates, the chain of responsibility becomes more complex.
The only person that knew they were headed into Lewis Bay rather than McMurdo Sound at the time of the accident was Chief Navigator Hewitt, and he was in his office in Auckland at the time.
The ability for Lewis Bay to appear very similar to McMurdo Sound is an unfortunate coincidence of topology, distance and perspective. Certainly something that a pilot headed down there for the first time would not know about - it even seemed to convince the late Peter Mulgrew.
There's another aspect to this that I'd forgotten about, by the way. ANZ was limited in terms of liability for the lives lost by international agreement. However NZCA was not, and if it became a matter of legal record that NZCA were in any way responsible for the loss of TE901, then it had the potential to bankrupt the Muldoon government. Chippindale may not have been aware of this, but you can bet his bosses were.
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The entire crew were *certain* they were over McMurdo Sound
All the warnings were there but the Capt still elected to operate below MSA.
The crew thought they were going to descend under radar guidance.
The Captain initiated a descent without even consulting the crew.
How did they ascertain their position before the descent ? I believe they did not.
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One wasn't - and that was par for the course, because Mulgrew had to be in there.
What warnings?
They thought they *were* under radar guidance, and so did the Captain (by way of the transponder light blinking on and off).
The CVR says different. How's a DC-10 Captain supposed to initiate a descent without the FO seeing the control column, altimeter and artificual horizon? The first words of unease came once they were already down, and the Captain immediately decided to climb.
That's the million-dollar question. Captain Collins' ringbinder, in which he kept all his material, was retrieved from the mountain ice with all its pages intact and with legible writing, according to the team member that found it. It was handed to ANZ's Chief Pilot Capt. Gemmell for "safe keeping", and subsequently appeared in Auckland at the inquest with all its pages missing.
This had the effect of destroying the one piece of evidence that could conclusively confirm or refute that Capt. Collins had done his due diligence and was checking off his position, and making sure that it would forever be in doubt. For my part, I'm deeply suspicious of the fact that the evidence disappeared while in the care of the man who had a lot to lose if pilot error was not found to be the cause.
All the warnings were there
The crew thought they were going to descend under radar guidance.
The Captain initiated a descent without even consulting the crew.
How did they ascertain their position before the descent ? I believe they did not.
This had the effect of destroying the one piece of evidence that could conclusively confirm or refute that Capt. Collins had done his due diligence and was checking off his position, and making sure that it would forever be in doubt. For my part, I'm deeply suspicious of the fact that the evidence disappeared while in the care of the man who had a lot to lose if pilot error was not found to be the cause.
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They thought they *were* under radar guidance, and so did the Captain (by way of the transponder light blinking on and off).
Radar descent could not be started until there was direct VHF contact between FLT 901 and McMurdo radar.
VHF contact was never established. All communication was via HF.
What warnings?
We will try again.
VHF is line of sight, there was no radar contact, there was no reception of the DME from the TACAN and no receipt of VHF communications. They were well within range of these services, they should have had reception but they did not, now what could be the only thing that could stop reception of these services?? they were not where they thought they were because Mt Erebus was between them and the TX stations.
Last edited by prospector; 1st Apr 2012 at 02:48.
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Dozy.......Since when did a blinking transponder [2 blinks from memory] equate to being radar identified ? First you must hear the magic words ' You are identified [position]' followed by tracking and descent INSTRUCTIONS. Since there was no VHF contact....No Radar service.
Dozy will never get it because he´s never done it. We can try and try to explain these things to him but at the end of the day he has reached a conclusion and then just builds arguments around that conclusion.
There is a pattern, the loudest most outspoken lobbyists for an exoneration have never flown an airliner. They have most likely never been responsible for anybodies safety but their own and will never quite get what that means or entails.
There is a pattern, the loudest most outspoken lobbyists for an exoneration have never flown an airliner. They have most likely never been responsible for anybodies safety but their own and will never quite get what that means or entails.
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Dozy is leading himself astray with conspiracy theories, just like Mahon. For example, he links the missing pages from the ring binder with the issue of whether the crew were certain of their position, when they are not actually related at all. Let's assume that one of the missing pages had the final waypoint at 164E, in the middle of the Sound. So what? We already know that Captain Collins thought that's where the waypoint was (unless it was a murder/suicide). The real point is that the universal rule for a 1970s DC-10 captain was that the inertial nav system was not sufficient for a descent below MSA (which is why the captain pretended to be visual). If he was actually certain of his position before he went down, then he had no right to be. And if he was so confident in the accuracy of the AINS, then why was he so pleased to receive the offer of the radar-assist?
The correct precedure was reasonably obvious, wasn't it?: Stay above MSA to the waypoint. If still no VHF contact, go to the Dry Valleys. The only issue would be whether the TACAN alone could be used to confirm the aircraft's position before going through the cloud layer. Given that it only provided distance information, it would be a 50/50 situation, which means you would think about for a few seconds and then forget it and head for the Dry Valleys.
The correct precedure was reasonably obvious, wasn't it?: Stay above MSA to the waypoint. If still no VHF contact, go to the Dry Valleys. The only issue would be whether the TACAN alone could be used to confirm the aircraft's position before going through the cloud layer. Given that it only provided distance information, it would be a 50/50 situation, which means you would think about for a few seconds and then forget it and head for the Dry Valleys.
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If these flights are inherently dangerous why are they still being carried out by another airline??
If he decided to disregard the SOP's, CAA requirements for descent
THE LOW FEQUENCY NDB APPROACH AT MCMURDO, WHICH PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED OUR ANTARTIC FLIGHTS WITH AN AUTHORISED CLOUD BREAK PROCEDURE TO 6000 FEET, HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN, CONSEQUENTLY THE LET-DOWN BELOW THE COMPANY SECTOR SAFE ALTITUDE OF 16,000 FEET, IS STRICTLY VISUAL AND PERMISSION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO DESCENT TO 6000 FEET QNH IN VMC.
It is agreed that previous non conformity with the requirements laid down for descent should have been cause for reprimand, but they were completed without any problems, so they were not. This may have had an influence on the decision of Capt Collins but it should not have, he was faced with the conditions they experienced and his safety margin was supposed to be provided by the descent requirements, which he ignored.
Chippendale got it right when he said,
The pilot probably assumed that he would be able to see any and all obstructions clearly with a 2000 foot cloud base and 40 miles visibility below the cloud. It is not likely that the potential whiteout hazard indicated by the reports of horizon and surface definition was appreciated by the crew.
Nor is it for nothing that the aircrew who operate down on the ice go through an extensive hands on training program (besides the book learning) before being let loose on their own.
Spent the last week camping with a group of friends, one of whom commanded the first RAAF C-130 to go into McMurdo, and was responsible for training all RAAF crews who followed. He commented that he was "staggered" (his word) that on his first trip to the ice (with another C-130 operator), they permitted him to be the PF. Felt thrown into the deep end, even though the Captain, Nav and FE were all old ice hands providing the mentoring.
"But he was visual", says NZALPA.
No, he wasn't - and he knew he wasn't.
No, he wasn't - and he knew he wasn't.
The captain himself told some "simple bloody lies" during the final 30 minutes of his life, given the various references to VMC.
There is absolutely no proof that the descent below MSA was carried out in anything other than VMC conditions. That the descent was continued below 6,000 is moot, had the cloud base been 4,000 feet higher in order that the 6,000 minimum could be complied with, the accident site would merely be 4,000 feet higher up the mountain side. The Flight Operations Manager said it did not occur to him that knowledge of whiteout and altered perception could be of help to a pilot at 6,000 feet to decide whether he was in VMC. From my own experience on the one trip to the ice I found it impossible to tell that we were VMC in whiteout conditions at 18,000 feet. The only give away was the shadows of isolated cloud on the ice/snow. You could not see the cloud of course, just the shadow, yet visibility was to the horizon - I say to the horizon because we flew for approx 30 or 40 minutes on that particular leg at 18,000 and could detect isolated cloud shadow continuously.
Yes, other captains went below MSA. So what? They were visual.
We seem to have a misunderstanding to some degree about what VMC is. In VMC an aircraft can be considered to be at the centre of a sterile bubble whose vertical and horizontal dimensions are laid down by authorities. It relies upon the pilots vision to detect any intrusions into that sterile bubble, whether it be terrain, fog, cloud, smoke, aircraft, rain, radio antenna, snow, or whatever other obscuration you may think of. All detection systems have limits, whether it be radar or anything else, and the eye is no exception. Whiteout is one of those limitations. It only detects a very small part of the electromagnetic spectrum, and would be of great help if it could pick up infra red in this situation.
The basic tenet of VMC is that you can pluck a pilot and place him in an aircraft anywhere in the world without a map, or him knowing where he is, and he can fly all day as long as his fuel and bladder can hold out. The only time a map comes in handy is knowing where an airfield is when the fuel gauge starts bouncing on "E", or the bladder needs draining.
Much is made about the use of radar in the mapping mode, and the crews apparent lack of use. Once again a simple question to a complex issue. The interpretation of ground returns is once again a skill that is not in the average airline pilots bag of tricks, beyond the delineation of surfaces with markedly different dielectrics eg land/water. Should you wish to delve into the complexities of interpretation when ice/snow are introduced, have a read of a good primer, "Radar Reflectivity of Land and Sea" by Maurice W. Long.
Not for nothing do military crews use radar maps so they can make sense of what's showing on the screen.
Brian Abraham is steering the argument from one he can't win towards one he can. Yes, Reason Model, Swiss Cheese, etc, all good stuff - but what's the relevant issue?
If I had to select one particular AirNZ employee who has to shoulder most of the blame, it would be Captain Collins.
A house built on poor foundations.
I'm not in the business of picking a particular employee to blame, as there is more than enough humble pie to be served, but a question I would have raised would have been regarding the route from Hallett to McMurdo. Why directly overhead Erebus, and not following the RNC route down the sound?
Overflying the crater of an active volcano, with frequent Strombolian eruptions known to toss bombs up to 3 metres in diameter a kilometre into the sky and 700 metres laterally, does not show due diligence by whoever was responsible for route planning. There is a reason the RNC route runs down the sound well clear of Erebus.
Lets assume Captain Collins maintained his sanctioned 16,000 feet overflying Erebus, and took a lava bomb which caused the destruction of the aircraft. Does he carry the ultimate responsibly as argued by some? Or might it fall elsewhere?
Gentleman, your strong condemnation of the crew is of concern to me as the issues that resonate most about this tragedy, concern what was known and what was not known and thus inform us about the probable state of mind of the PIC of this flight. That was what Justice Mahon was on about, the reasons not just the acts. Chippendale's version is about the acts not the reasons. Neither Commission of Inquiry or Accident Investigation is comfortable or pleasant reading.
In defence of the crew on the day there are a lot of presumptions made but none really known except what we found out later from the hard physical facts of the evidence that remained. There are a lot of assumptions about safety systems and CRM and there are a lot of assumptions about SOPS.
The issue of deception is critical to understanding what went on that day.
The deception caused by the change in the route coordinates. The deception of time and place and geographical illusions combined with visual illusions. The deception that comes from a reliance on SOPS which were inadequate and poorly thought out.
What was not known was the change in the nav coordinates by AIR NZ flight planning, what was not known was that the changes placed the aircraft in a perilous position at a critical phase in flight where it was expected that the aircraft would be visual, positive of the position and positive about what they were seeing. They were deceived about where they were going to fly.
They were decieved by what they saw. So you think you are one place,your somewhere else, you look out the window and it looks the same, it appears to look like it should ice and sea about the right shape and orientation, but you have never seen it before, you look out the window and it is a sodden grey-white sky with a sodden grey-white surface below. What you may have expected to see and what you were actually seeing may have even been quite incomprehensible except to a trained and experienced eye.
They were deceived by the complacency that was created by past flights operating below MSA without problems in the most inhospitable place on the planet.
The overall deception of safety that was created by the view that it was just another charter flight.
The deception of what to expect and see created by not having current and relevant visual photographic materials and charts properly put together as a briefing aid.
The deception created by the reliance on visual identification to a person who was not part of the flight crew nor an experienced aviator.
The deception of how to to do it when you got there created by not doing sim sessions, where white-out could be experienced and phases of the flight practiced, particularly if a crisis or emergency arose. So a descendng high speed visual fly up into a funnel of rising terrain in an area guaranteed to be probelematic due to visual illusions became an acceptable current airline operational practice and was not practised.
So when a critical decision was finally made to climb out to safety in the right direction was made, the crew were completely and thoroughly deceived and hence not clear about what they were doing and where they were doing it and they forgot how to do it. The leisurely way in which the crew reacted tells you everything about the state of complacency brought about by the deceptions which lulled them into that place in the first place and which promptly killed them and everyone else.
So you would hold Capt Collins responsible for his and this deception?
I cannot.
I can hold him accountable for his mistakes but not the debauched way in which he was led to make them.
The flights should never have been conducted as they were in the first place. The flights should never have been authorised or approved by either the Airline or the Regulator. They were not properly planned, briefed or practised. The aircraft carried no appropriate survival or safety equipment. There was no appropriate alternate place of safe landing once past 60 degrees south.
Those failures of responsibility belong to the Chief Pilot and the Chief Check Pilot and the Operations Department and the Airlines management. They were all responsible.
So no one really asks the critical question:
Is it really a safe thing to do to fly a commercial airliner carrying 257 passengers over the Antarctic and past or near to a mountain range and a volcano that is 12,500 ft high into possible white-out conditions that virtually coincides with the PNR without safety equipment and alternatives ?
And the answer to that is a simple - No it is not and as the events show it was not. The outcome was always predictable, if it had not been Captain Collins and his passengers that day, then it would have been another Captain and another crew another day at some time.
So it is my view that no one is absolved of blame in this one, no one.
In defence of the crew on the day there are a lot of presumptions made but none really known except what we found out later from the hard physical facts of the evidence that remained. There are a lot of assumptions about safety systems and CRM and there are a lot of assumptions about SOPS.
The issue of deception is critical to understanding what went on that day.
The deception caused by the change in the route coordinates. The deception of time and place and geographical illusions combined with visual illusions. The deception that comes from a reliance on SOPS which were inadequate and poorly thought out.
What was not known was the change in the nav coordinates by AIR NZ flight planning, what was not known was that the changes placed the aircraft in a perilous position at a critical phase in flight where it was expected that the aircraft would be visual, positive of the position and positive about what they were seeing. They were deceived about where they were going to fly.
They were decieved by what they saw. So you think you are one place,your somewhere else, you look out the window and it looks the same, it appears to look like it should ice and sea about the right shape and orientation, but you have never seen it before, you look out the window and it is a sodden grey-white sky with a sodden grey-white surface below. What you may have expected to see and what you were actually seeing may have even been quite incomprehensible except to a trained and experienced eye.
They were deceived by the complacency that was created by past flights operating below MSA without problems in the most inhospitable place on the planet.
The overall deception of safety that was created by the view that it was just another charter flight.
The deception of what to expect and see created by not having current and relevant visual photographic materials and charts properly put together as a briefing aid.
The deception created by the reliance on visual identification to a person who was not part of the flight crew nor an experienced aviator.
The deception of how to to do it when you got there created by not doing sim sessions, where white-out could be experienced and phases of the flight practiced, particularly if a crisis or emergency arose. So a descendng high speed visual fly up into a funnel of rising terrain in an area guaranteed to be probelematic due to visual illusions became an acceptable current airline operational practice and was not practised.
So when a critical decision was finally made to climb out to safety in the right direction was made, the crew were completely and thoroughly deceived and hence not clear about what they were doing and where they were doing it and they forgot how to do it. The leisurely way in which the crew reacted tells you everything about the state of complacency brought about by the deceptions which lulled them into that place in the first place and which promptly killed them and everyone else.
So you would hold Capt Collins responsible for his and this deception?
I cannot.
I can hold him accountable for his mistakes but not the debauched way in which he was led to make them.
The flights should never have been conducted as they were in the first place. The flights should never have been authorised or approved by either the Airline or the Regulator. They were not properly planned, briefed or practised. The aircraft carried no appropriate survival or safety equipment. There was no appropriate alternate place of safe landing once past 60 degrees south.
Those failures of responsibility belong to the Chief Pilot and the Chief Check Pilot and the Operations Department and the Airlines management. They were all responsible.
So no one really asks the critical question:
Is it really a safe thing to do to fly a commercial airliner carrying 257 passengers over the Antarctic and past or near to a mountain range and a volcano that is 12,500 ft high into possible white-out conditions that virtually coincides with the PNR without safety equipment and alternatives ?
And the answer to that is a simple - No it is not and as the events show it was not. The outcome was always predictable, if it had not been Captain Collins and his passengers that day, then it would have been another Captain and another crew another day at some time.
So it is my view that no one is absolved of blame in this one, no one.
"All truths are easy to understand once they are discovered; the point is to discover them." - Galileo