Paul Holmes and Erebus
I'm guessing that your last quote tag was in fact a question.
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DozyW: If Capt Collins was a cautious and meticulous pilot, he and 230 others would not have died that day. The comments you refer to were the result of a natural tendancy to not speak ill of the dead.
The inadequacies of the briefing had nothing to do with it. The issue is the state of the captain's knowledge when he made the decision to descend. That knowledge included nearly 30 years as a fulltime professional pilot, nearly 20 of them as PIC. He was expected to (and was very well paid to) exercise all of that accumated experience and skill.
The MSA was not revoked at the briefing. The briefing did not cause Ross Island to sink into the ocean. The reason for not going below 16000 feet was not because of a rule. It was because there was 13000 foot mountain in the vicinity. If there was any rule, it was one created by plain old common sense.
As to the "to the letter" point, that can't be correct, given the conflicting information about the waypoint that he took from the briefing. It's logically impossible to follow conflicting instructions to the letter.
The inadequacies of the briefing had nothing to do with it. The issue is the state of the captain's knowledge when he made the decision to descend. That knowledge included nearly 30 years as a fulltime professional pilot, nearly 20 of them as PIC. He was expected to (and was very well paid to) exercise all of that accumated experience and skill.
The MSA was not revoked at the briefing. The briefing did not cause Ross Island to sink into the ocean. The reason for not going below 16000 feet was not because of a rule. It was because there was 13000 foot mountain in the vicinity. If there was any rule, it was one created by plain old common sense.
As to the "to the letter" point, that can't be correct, given the conflicting information about the waypoint that he took from the briefing. It's logically impossible to follow conflicting instructions to the letter.
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Applying the rules of common sense, MSA was 14000 feet: 1000 feet above the summit of Erebus.
Applying the rules conveyed at the briefing, MSA was 16000 feet with a discretion to go lower if VMC.
The captain did not have VMC below the cloud, as he had pointed out to himself ten minutes beforehand.
He made what was, in effect, an instruments descent, backed up by what he could see out the window. But as he knew full well, the view out the window is of no assistance when flying on instruments and can be completely misleading - which is why you put the blinds down.
As for his instruments descent, there were three things wrong with it:
(1) It was against the rules, given that he wasn't VMC.
(2) The AINS was not regarded, at the time, as sufficiently precise to go below MSA.
(3) In this specific case, the AINS should never have been used, given the conflicting information about the waypoint, which the captain failed to resolve.
Applying the rules conveyed at the briefing, MSA was 16000 feet with a discretion to go lower if VMC.
The captain did not have VMC below the cloud, as he had pointed out to himself ten minutes beforehand.
He made what was, in effect, an instruments descent, backed up by what he could see out the window. But as he knew full well, the view out the window is of no assistance when flying on instruments and can be completely misleading - which is why you put the blinds down.
As for his instruments descent, there were three things wrong with it:
(1) It was against the rules, given that he wasn't VMC.
(2) The AINS was not regarded, at the time, as sufficiently precise to go below MSA.
(3) In this specific case, the AINS should never have been used, given the conflicting information about the waypoint, which the captain failed to resolve.
ampan @ 30th Dec 2011, 12:26 post #402
It doesn't even do that. All it indicates is that it has been interrogated and has replied. It does not indicate that the reply was received and decoded and displayed. It is even possible that it was interrogated by some naval ship.
"The transponder light only indicated that the aircraft was on the radar screen, somewhere."
#1AHRS @ 27th Dec 2011, 15:03 post #380
If you mean(as logically appears to be the case) that Collins was "{making} good utilization of what the aircraft offers" I have to disagree strongly. It's clear that he made no attempt to use the weather radar. Had he done so, with correct technique, he'd have know exactly where he was.
Hubris kills and Air New Zealand were full of it.
"No lumping together of visual or instrument rules there, just good utilization of what the aircraft offers us. As I suspect Jim Collins was doing."
Hubris kills and Air New Zealand were full of it.
DozyWannabe @ 2nd Jan 2012, 15:17 post #424
Nope a briefing officer can not change MSA. MSA is set by the relevant regulatory authority. Rules for operating airliners are all in hard copy not conveyed verbally.
The MSA was not revoked at the briefing.
"Yes it was - it's there in the briefing pilot's testimony."
"Yes it was - it's there in the briefing pilot's testimony."
Nope a briefing officer can not change MSA. MSA is set by the relevant regulatory authority. Rules for operating airliners are all in hard copy not conveyed verbally.
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Do not know if you followed the thread from the start but this from Dozywannabe is very relevant, note self taught, so knowledge is related to that.
framer,
Also very pertinent to your thrice asked question
.
I'm happy to admit that I'm no professional aviator, my experience being limited to my Air Cadet days and getting the odd go in a light aircraft. However I've been an aviation enthusiast and self-taught safety freak since you could count the years I'd been around on two hands - I blame watching "A Fall From Grace" on the BBC when I was eight
Also very pertinent to your thrice asked question
.
Yes it was. I've asked it a couple of times now and still no answer. I would appreciate it if you would answer it because it would help me understand your personal position better
It's clear that he made no attempt to use the weather radar. Had he done so, with correct technique, he'd have know exactly where he was.
" The Bendix company (weather radar) opinion was that because the slopes of the mountainside were covered in snow and ice which was totally dry, then the return from from the mountain would be nil. Even though this particular radar equipment was programmed only to detect moisture, it would nevertheless give a return off high terrain composed of rock and earth, but a thick coating of dry snow and dry ice on the northern slopes of Mount Erebus would cause the radar beam to be totally absorbed and make it impossible for any return to be received. This opinion was based upon the inability of the radar pulses from the radar to achieve any return once they penetrated the crystalline structure of dry snow and dry ice.
In the opinion of the Bendix experts there was nothing in the theory that the radar on the DC10, if set in the `weather` mode would have detected the presence of the ice-covered slopes of the mountain ahead.
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. and this from mangere1957
and this from an earlier post of mine in this thread.
Quote:
The only aids available to the crew were,
What about the WX radar in the mapping mode?? Mahon went to great lengths to show this was not relevant, probably because it never fitted into his theory.
From "Aviation Tragedies" John King.
Quote:
One would think given the situation every piece of equipment to confirm position prior to descent below MSA would be used. To leave the radar in WX mode at that time would not be a clever idea, but it got Mahon a trip to America to prove what????
with correct technique, he'd have know exactly where he was.
Quote:
The only aids available to the crew were,
What about the WX radar in the mapping mode?? Mahon went to great lengths to show this was not relevant, probably because it never fitted into his theory.
From "Aviation Tragedies" John King.
Quote:
This aspect has been hotly debated. Many pilots flying the DC10 to the AntArctic used the weather radar in mapping mode which clearly confirmed the outline of Ross Island and the hight ground they could see through the cockpit window in the clear AntArctic conditions. The Chippindale report covered that point.
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I've used radar mapping to assist me to steer clear of the big stuff in the old days getting in to Aspen, CO., but I didn't try to use it to determine my position in the first place!
I think ampan and framer have it correct, Dozy, I think your opinions are off the mark, as pilots we are responsible to formulate a plan of action based on very conservative, and sound judgement.
Formulating a plan based on a lot of assumptions is never good, and only gets worse, whether the company gave him the wrong coordinates on the last fix, or whether the NAV system had a flaw, it was Captain Collins responsibility to know exactly where he was before he began his scud running mission, I'm signing off of this thread, I enjoyed the civilized discussion.
I think ampan and framer have it correct, Dozy, I think your opinions are off the mark, as pilots we are responsible to formulate a plan of action based on very conservative, and sound judgement.
Formulating a plan based on a lot of assumptions is never good, and only gets worse, whether the company gave him the wrong coordinates on the last fix, or whether the NAV system had a flaw, it was Captain Collins responsibility to know exactly where he was before he began his scud running mission, I'm signing off of this thread, I enjoyed the civilized discussion.
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I've enjoyed it too! The only time I've ever flown a public transport catagory jet (albeit a regional jet) at anything like 260kts clean at 1500' was on a visual approach and that was over water. I did ask a retired BA captain (757/767) about the Erebus circumstances quite a few years back and he said that the hair would have been standing up on the back of his neck in those conditions and he was well known for his slightly 'adventurous' style of operation on occasion.
I haven't really got a problem with the apportioning of resposibility for the conduct of the flight to the Pilot in Command but it's what happened in the aftermath which I find so disturbing as a line Captain, and that's what Justice Mahon got to the heart of. Unfortunately for him he learnt what I now suspect is the case in all public inquiries and the like conducted for governments of the Westminster system, and that is that the outcome is known by the establishment from the outset. Mahon discovered the conspiracy to conceal the systemic causes of this accident and laid them bare. Apparently legally he went too far in outing the conspiracy, and for that paid a huge price.
Going by some of the things I've seen posted here the lessons of this whole sorry saga haven't been learnt by some, and I suspect they are the sort of uncompromising black and whiters that I have to deal with from time to time. As was said to me by a wise fleet manager once, 'the ops manual is written in black and white but the world is not black and white'...
I haven't really got a problem with the apportioning of resposibility for the conduct of the flight to the Pilot in Command but it's what happened in the aftermath which I find so disturbing as a line Captain, and that's what Justice Mahon got to the heart of. Unfortunately for him he learnt what I now suspect is the case in all public inquiries and the like conducted for governments of the Westminster system, and that is that the outcome is known by the establishment from the outset. Mahon discovered the conspiracy to conceal the systemic causes of this accident and laid them bare. Apparently legally he went too far in outing the conspiracy, and for that paid a huge price.
Going by some of the things I've seen posted here the lessons of this whole sorry saga haven't been learnt by some, and I suspect they are the sort of uncompromising black and whiters that I have to deal with from time to time. As was said to me by a wise fleet manager once, 'the ops manual is written in black and white but the world is not black and white'...
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In this case, the world was white and white.
Screeds could be written about Mahon's conspiracy theories, but the real point is that they had no relevance to the issue. The mighty judge had exposed the alleged conspiracies. Having done that, his job was to determine the cause/s. Instead, he got completely sidetracked - and don't take my word for it:
But there was an aviation expert more or less attached to the commission and not associated with the airline – Air Marshall Sir Rochford Hughes, who was the technical advisor to David Baragwanath QC, the senior lawyer appointed to assist the inquiry and Mahon’s legal right hand during the hearings. Hughes had a distinguished service career and had been advisor to foreign governments on aviation matters. He had also sat as an assessor on an aircraft crash investigation in Britain. …
“Mahon wrote his report on Erebus entirely on his own, without any reference to either David Baragwanath or certainly myself,” says Hughes … I think David read it with as great an interest as I did as it was completely contrary to some things we had urged him to take cognisance of. The main point was he had convinced himself – and we had no disagreement with that – that the basic cause of the accident was the lack of proper organisation within Air New Zealand for the execution of a flight to a territory totally remote from regular airline routes. For reasons best known to the judge, he formed a great sympathy for the lot of the pilots on that flight. That’s where the difficulties arose. He felt they were fully entitled to rely implicitly on the internal navigation system which they used on regular routes, but of course that had limitations on the Antarctic route, and I don’t think any of the air force authorities or I would agree that was the way an Antarctic flight should be conducted.”
Sir Rochford Hughes says the crew must accept 10 to 20 percent of the blame for descending without first being picked up by radar and without identifying the high ground: “My great difference of opinion with the judge is that the captain ultimately had full responsibility for the control and navigation of his aircraft. It was a terrible error of judgement coming below safety height without positive radar control. He came down at low altitude in a position which prevented the US naval radar from seeing him because the mountain was in the way. That was the fatal mistake. He should never have come below safety height until he was under positive radar control. That is the rule for military flights.” (North & South magazine, November 1989, pages 85-86)
Screeds could be written about Mahon's conspiracy theories, but the real point is that they had no relevance to the issue. The mighty judge had exposed the alleged conspiracies. Having done that, his job was to determine the cause/s. Instead, he got completely sidetracked - and don't take my word for it:
But there was an aviation expert more or less attached to the commission and not associated with the airline – Air Marshall Sir Rochford Hughes, who was the technical advisor to David Baragwanath QC, the senior lawyer appointed to assist the inquiry and Mahon’s legal right hand during the hearings. Hughes had a distinguished service career and had been advisor to foreign governments on aviation matters. He had also sat as an assessor on an aircraft crash investigation in Britain. …
“Mahon wrote his report on Erebus entirely on his own, without any reference to either David Baragwanath or certainly myself,” says Hughes … I think David read it with as great an interest as I did as it was completely contrary to some things we had urged him to take cognisance of. The main point was he had convinced himself – and we had no disagreement with that – that the basic cause of the accident was the lack of proper organisation within Air New Zealand for the execution of a flight to a territory totally remote from regular airline routes. For reasons best known to the judge, he formed a great sympathy for the lot of the pilots on that flight. That’s where the difficulties arose. He felt they were fully entitled to rely implicitly on the internal navigation system which they used on regular routes, but of course that had limitations on the Antarctic route, and I don’t think any of the air force authorities or I would agree that was the way an Antarctic flight should be conducted.”
Sir Rochford Hughes says the crew must accept 10 to 20 percent of the blame for descending without first being picked up by radar and without identifying the high ground: “My great difference of opinion with the judge is that the captain ultimately had full responsibility for the control and navigation of his aircraft. It was a terrible error of judgement coming below safety height without positive radar control. He came down at low altitude in a position which prevented the US naval radar from seeing him because the mountain was in the way. That was the fatal mistake. He should never have come below safety height until he was under positive radar control. That is the rule for military flights.” (North & South magazine, November 1989, pages 85-86)
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Sir Rochford Hughes says the crew must accept 10 to 20 percent of the blame for descending without first being picked up by radar and without identifying the high ground: “My great difference of opinion with the judge is that the captain ultimately had full responsibility for the control and navigation of his aircraft. It was a terrible error of judgement coming below safety height without positive radar control.
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Probably because the captain thought he wouldn't be getting the radar service. Even if he was within range with his transponder being interrogated by the radar, that was of no use to him without VHF contact with the Tower. Of the ten minutes that elapsed between the offer of the radar assist and the decision to descend, most of it was spent trying to make VHF contact, with Mac Station and with the Tower. Radio communications in the Antarctic were notoriously unreliable, so the captain probably thought that the VHF was playing up, hence the decision to go scud running while he still had the chance.
PS - The Air Marshall didn't let AirNZ off the hook:
Sir Rochford’s criticism of the crew is almost mild in comparison with his scathing denunciation of Air New Zealand’s flight planning, which he says deserves 80 to 90 percent of the blame for the disaster. “Air New Zealand treated the flights as a picnic for senior captains. They asked to fly them and they went in order of seniority. The air force insists that potential Antarctic captains do at least one or two trips in the copilot’s seat, which is eminently sensible. But only the flight engineer (Brooks) had been there before and from the voice recording he was the only one concerned. The briefings for the captains were pathetic. I was horrified throughout the inquiry to realise that, in preparation for the flights, the airline had no contact with the RNZAF with their great fund of Antarctic flying experience. This manifested in the ridiculous situation that the airline could not even give Collins a proper topographical map of the area. At Whenuapai (the air force base at Auckland) I saw for myself drawers full of maps. An adequate briefing was available at Whenuapai, if the airline had just pocketed its pride and asked.”
Hughes adds: “That (navigation coordinate change) was an added and very sinister factor which just again weighed the odds against Captain Collins, who was after all following the procedure adopted by captains of the previous flights. Without doubt he should have been told of the change. One can have no sympathy whatsoever with the poor organisation which Judge Mahon revealed was prevalent. It was a chapter in Air New Zealand’s history I’m sure they wish had never been written. (North & South magazine, November 1989, pages 86 & 89)
PS - The Air Marshall didn't let AirNZ off the hook:
Sir Rochford’s criticism of the crew is almost mild in comparison with his scathing denunciation of Air New Zealand’s flight planning, which he says deserves 80 to 90 percent of the blame for the disaster. “Air New Zealand treated the flights as a picnic for senior captains. They asked to fly them and they went in order of seniority. The air force insists that potential Antarctic captains do at least one or two trips in the copilot’s seat, which is eminently sensible. But only the flight engineer (Brooks) had been there before and from the voice recording he was the only one concerned. The briefings for the captains were pathetic. I was horrified throughout the inquiry to realise that, in preparation for the flights, the airline had no contact with the RNZAF with their great fund of Antarctic flying experience. This manifested in the ridiculous situation that the airline could not even give Collins a proper topographical map of the area. At Whenuapai (the air force base at Auckland) I saw for myself drawers full of maps. An adequate briefing was available at Whenuapai, if the airline had just pocketed its pride and asked.”
Hughes adds: “That (navigation coordinate change) was an added and very sinister factor which just again weighed the odds against Captain Collins, who was after all following the procedure adopted by captains of the previous flights. Without doubt he should have been told of the change. One can have no sympathy whatsoever with the poor organisation which Judge Mahon revealed was prevalent. It was a chapter in Air New Zealand’s history I’m sure they wish had never been written. (North & South magazine, November 1989, pages 86 & 89)
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Antarctic Tours - Dreamliner 787-9
Boeing 787-9:
Seating 250 – 290
Range 8000-8500 nm
Cruising speed 0.85 Mach
The distance between Auckland and McMurdo Station is 2473nm: 4.4 hours flying time. Available flying time at cruising speed is a whopping 15.1 hours, so that would give 6 hours for sightseeing. It would be a long day, but I'd pay around NZD900. And given the history, it would be one of the safest scenic flights available.
Range 8000-8500 nm
Cruising speed 0.85 Mach
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From Gordon Vette "Impact Erebus" page 213.
From the aviation expert who was supposed to be Mahon's technical adviser
Vette admits, after his research, that the research of CAA and Capt Gemmel made sense after all, the altitude restrictions were there for a specific purpose, not the story that was given to Mahon that they were irrelevant if VMC.
Going down to 1500ft at the invitation of the radar controller was not the most sensible thing to do, but it left a rod for the back of following crew who had different weather conditons entirely but were expected to show the pax the same scenery from the same altitude.
.
And the previous quotes show how accurate that sentence is.
When I flew visually in the AntArctic I believed that there was no problem. Prior to m,y research on the AntArctic crash, I would have scoffed at this requirement. I am now firmly convinced that under certain lighting conditions an aircrew could fly into terrain, even with the terrain in the field of view and with plenty of time to take avoiding action. Therefor descent below the top of Mt Erebus, or other Polar terrain, even in clear conditions is hazardous. It appears to me that those of us who conducted the AntArctic flights may unwittingly have exposed ourselves, our passengers and crew, to a similar danger.
Air New Zealand treated the flights as a picnic for senior captains. They asked to fly them and they went in order of seniority. The air force insists that potential Antarctic captains do at least one or two trips in the copilot’s seat, which is eminently sensible. But only the flight engineer (Brooks) had been there before and from the voice recording he was the only one concerned. The briefings for the captains were pathetic. I was horrified throughout the inquiry to realise that, in preparation for the flights, the airline had no contact with the RNZAF with their great fund of Antarctic flying experience.
Vette admits, after his research, that the research of CAA and Capt Gemmel made sense after all, the altitude restrictions were there for a specific purpose, not the story that was given to Mahon that they were irrelevant if VMC.
Going down to 1500ft at the invitation of the radar controller was not the most sensible thing to do, but it left a rod for the back of following crew who had different weather conditons entirely but were expected to show the pax the same scenery from the same altitude.
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Hubris kills and Air New Zealand were full of it.
And the previous quotes show how accurate that sentence is.
Centaurus @ 2nd Jan 2012 18:56 post #431
The last clause, in italics, might(not, in my opinion), or not, be true. However there were plenty of exposed rock faces and cliffs so that in the hands of a skilled operator it would have been possible to see the coastline all the way down from Cape Hallet. Cape Hallet itself would have been detectable from 200 nm(or 180 if the DC10 radar was analogue - I've not flown the 10 but imagine that it was digital). To detect relevant terrain from low altitude the radar should be in weather, not map, mode and tilt and gain manually adjusted to find the sought features.* There were even exposed rock faces on Erebus which would certainly have given strong returns. I don't hold Collins blameworthy for not knowing how to use the radar for an undesigned function, it's just another of the things in which Air New Zealand did not train its pilots. In their normal operations it was of no relevance at all.**
Air New Zealnd training; why was it so bad.
Both in the Sixies and Seventies TEAL and NAC were government owned and totally corrupt. TEAL/AIRNZ, as everybody knows, had destroyed two aircraft in training during the Sixties. Nothing had changed through the Seventies.
*It is often possible to use technology do do useful things other than that for which it was designed, or even, perhaps, known by the designers. For one instance, even in 1961, more than 20 years after its design NAC had still not solved the single circuit U/C downlock indication problem. I solved it withiin minutes of exposure to it on my DC3 course. The solution to the problem was trivial but nobody had bothered to solve it. It did matter. The problem was serious as the bent wings on a DC3, a few years later, attested.
**Except possibly in the early sixties when the Electras constantly succeded in landing on 16 at Wellington when all others were unsuccessful.
"The Bendix company (weather radar) opinion was that because the slopes of the mountainside were covered in snow and ice which was totally dry, then the return from from the mountain would be nil."
Air New Zealnd training; why was it so bad.
Both in the Sixies and Seventies TEAL and NAC were government owned and totally corrupt. TEAL/AIRNZ, as everybody knows, had destroyed two aircraft in training during the Sixties. Nothing had changed through the Seventies.
*It is often possible to use technology do do useful things other than that for which it was designed, or even, perhaps, known by the designers. For one instance, even in 1961, more than 20 years after its design NAC had still not solved the single circuit U/C downlock indication problem. I solved it withiin minutes of exposure to it on my DC3 course. The solution to the problem was trivial but nobody had bothered to solve it. It did matter. The problem was serious as the bent wings on a DC3, a few years later, attested.
**Except possibly in the early sixties when the Electras constantly succeded in landing on 16 at Wellington when all others were unsuccessful.
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except for simulators
T or F: In the 1966 crash, they were spending the day practising an engine failure on take-off?
Why would anyone do something like that 'live'?
T or F: In the 1966 crash, they were spending the day practising an engine failure on take-off?
Why would anyone do something like that 'live'?