Merged: Senate Inquiry
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Great research - Nicely done.
The clever, cunning rubbing out of 2008 inquiry was a masterpiece, sketched in disappointment, painted in heartbreak and sealed with the disappearance of some great submissions. It's passing strange though, the same arguments, recommendations and advice keep cropping up, year after year; only to be ground under heel.
Keep digging Sarcs, there is a constant factor, join the dots and soon or late, the pattern will emerge from under the rubble; a hint, look at airport management. Tough question number 1 - Will isolating the pattern help to restore matters aeronautical to where they were six years ago? TQ 2- Do people like Kimpton, Basket et al remain interested enough to dust off their still valid submissions? TQ 3- Is there the political courage, horsepower and will to finally implement the repeatedly provided recommendations? Or will we continue to limp along, denigrated, despised and the butt of some very funny, though painful jokes....
Addendum.
Ben Sandilands – Plane Talking.
A first class example of the problems we face, valid, lucid and timely.
Don't worry Ben, it's all been covered in the soft white paper response to the Senate inquiry. You know, the one before the last, where our aviation interested Senators were covered in it. "It's on our to do list". etc.etc. Tick tock, indeed..
Keep digging Sarcs, there is a constant factor, join the dots and soon or late, the pattern will emerge from under the rubble; a hint, look at airport management. Tough question number 1 - Will isolating the pattern help to restore matters aeronautical to where they were six years ago? TQ 2- Do people like Kimpton, Basket et al remain interested enough to dust off their still valid submissions? TQ 3- Is there the political courage, horsepower and will to finally implement the repeatedly provided recommendations? Or will we continue to limp along, denigrated, despised and the butt of some very funny, though painful jokes....
Addendum.
Ben Sandilands – Plane Talking.
A first class example of the problems we face, valid, lucid and timely.
The inherent difficulty for the Australian regulator and airlines is that whatever the merits and strengths of Australian rules and standards, they might not be expressed with the simplicity or unambiguity of the US rule changes, which always seem to be pack more meaning into a smaller number of words, and leave less wriggle room for ‘interpretation’ for want to a better term.
If, stress if this means Australia goes with what is perceived to be a weaker, or less committed, or more convuluted set of rules to address the same requirements as the US rules, there could be some very bad outcomes.
It is strongly in the interests of the flying public, and Australian airlines, and the Minister of the day, to avoid such outcomes.
If, stress if this means Australia goes with what is perceived to be a weaker, or less committed, or more convuluted set of rules to address the same requirements as the US rules, there could be some very bad outcomes.
It is strongly in the interests of the flying public, and Australian airlines, and the Minister of the day, to avoid such outcomes.
Last edited by Kharon; 6th Nov 2013 at 19:23. Reason: Addendum
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As transparent as pooh
What? I am shocked. CAsA removing, burying, hiding recommendations or committments made previously from public view, and more worryingly from the Senators? Treating the Senators, again, with contempt. And all levels of CAsA including the ministers office would have been part of this and would have agreed upon this little sideways sneak. Looks to me like all the hallmarks of a 20 year veteran intellect and a fat bloated board member have their DNA all over this. Oh so naughty.
Indeed, sneaky sneaky. These crooks will stop at nothing to deflect the truth, hide fact, deceive anybody and everybody and do it with contempt, malice, and total disregard as government employee's. Shame shame shame. This is yet another example of how disgraceful they are. The executive level requires rapid removal. All the top dross, the Board, the Ministers footstool, the entire lot of them. Transparency is a word they use, but a word they use in jest. They sneak current documents into old files and classify them as 'released', they make promises vanish and they lie about due process and due dilligence. They make a mockery of absolutely everything aviation and in return are awarded fat paychecks, bonuses and worldwide business travel. Every single person paying any form of aviation fee or charge should take notice as this is where your hard earned money goes.
Mr Truss, by default and due to your absolute refusal to take the axe to these individuals you are now officially also in contempt of Australian aviation. Mr Albanese's shoes fit you very well.
Indeed, sneaky sneaky. These crooks will stop at nothing to deflect the truth, hide fact, deceive anybody and everybody and do it with contempt, malice, and total disregard as government employee's. Shame shame shame. This is yet another example of how disgraceful they are. The executive level requires rapid removal. All the top dross, the Board, the Ministers footstool, the entire lot of them. Transparency is a word they use, but a word they use in jest. They sneak current documents into old files and classify them as 'released', they make promises vanish and they lie about due process and due dilligence. They make a mockery of absolutely everything aviation and in return are awarded fat paychecks, bonuses and worldwide business travel. Every single person paying any form of aviation fee or charge should take notice as this is where your hard earned money goes.
Mr Truss, by default and due to your absolute refusal to take the axe to these individuals you are now officially also in contempt of Australian aviation. Mr Albanese's shoes fit you very well.
The ARRT of bureaucratic obfuscation!
Speaking of addendums Ben has one of his own in that last article (my bold)...
"This is CASA’s initial response to the new US rules.
We’re in middle of introducing new flying training rules – Parts 141 and 142 of the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations come into effect on 4 December 2013. These go to the same standards the US are talking about. But we always review our standards in the light of relevant international developments, so it will be part of the normal processes.
Info on new regs here: http://www.casa.gov.au/scripts/nc.dll?WCMS:STANDARD:
c=PC_101716"....
Never fear Fort Fumble is here!
Before we launch into writing up the Department SCN, of what appears to be obfuscation of the former government's aviation policy (the Great White Elephant Paper) and the RRP, we need to first complete a chronology of events leading up to the alleged offending by the Dept.
IMO the initiation of the Hawke Taskforce (ARRT) should be our starting point for the SCN investigation chronology. So any handy intel, titbits, witness statements, etc (that is fully documented of course
) that could be significant to the chain of evidence would be greatly appreciated.
As an example here is a dusted off article (2008) by SC from the Australian:
Hmm familiar theme this... "Transport Department's failure to release "the important, urgent safety recommendations" it produced.
Addendum
: Continuing on with thoughtful quotes from the 2008 Inquiry:
Another common theme...
"This is CASA’s initial response to the new US rules.
We’re in middle of introducing new flying training rules – Parts 141 and 142 of the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations come into effect on 4 December 2013. These go to the same standards the US are talking about. But we always review our standards in the light of relevant international developments, so it will be part of the normal processes.
Info on new regs here: http://www.casa.gov.au/scripts/nc.dll?WCMS:STANDARD:
c=PC_101716"....Never fear Fort Fumble is here!
Before we launch into writing up the Department SCN, of what appears to be obfuscation of the former government's aviation policy (the Great White Elephant Paper) and the RRP, we need to first complete a chronology of events leading up to the alleged offending by the Dept.
IMO the initiation of the Hawke Taskforce (ARRT) should be our starting point for the SCN investigation chronology. So any handy intel, titbits, witness statements, etc (that is fully documented of course
) that could be significant to the chain of evidence would be greatly appreciated.As an example here is a dusted off article (2008) by SC from the Australian:
FORMER Civil Aviation Safety Authority chairman Dick Smith has returned more than $10,000 paid to him for taking part in a federal government aviation review, in a protest against the Transport Department's failure to release "the important, urgent safety recommendations" it produced.
Mr Smith was part of the Aviation Regulation Review Taskforce set up by the Howard government to provide policy advice on the best way of reforming Australia's aviation regulation over the next five years and what should be done first.
It was chaired by Australian National University chancellor Allan Hawke and included CASA chief Bruce Byron as well as Mr Smith and industry representatives from Qantas and Brindabella Airlines. The taskforce completed its report in December, but it has yet to be released.
In a letter to Transport Department secretary Mike Taylor, Mr Smith said he was refunding the money because "keeping it would be dishonest".
"I have my copy, which contains important, urgent safety recommendations, but it is stamped 'under embargo'," Mr Smith said. "Just why such an important safety document would be embargoed is beyond comprehension to me."
Mr Smith was reluctant to elaborate on the urgent safety recommendations, but it is understood they include issues such as the need for enhanced ground proximity warning systems and collision avoidance alarms in smaller passenger planes. The report is also believed to have recommended speeding up the slow pace of aviation regulatory reform.
The millionaire aviator believes at least $500,000 was spent on the review and said it now appeared to have been an incredible waste of resources.
He said he understood the report had not been released because Mr Hawke had not been able to meet with Transport Minister Anthony Albanese.
But a spokesman for Mr Albanese said last night that Mr Hawke had met staff from the minister's office. "Minister Albanese has received the report ... and is giving it appropriate consideration," the spokesman said.
"The Government's response to the report will be announced in the near future."
Mr Albanese has ordered the nation's first white paper on the aviation industry and a Senate committee will conduct a formal inquiry into CASA's administration next month. The inquiry will look at the effectiveness of administrative reforms undertaken by CASA since 2003 as well as the effectiveness of the authority's governance structure.
Mr Smith was part of the Aviation Regulation Review Taskforce set up by the Howard government to provide policy advice on the best way of reforming Australia's aviation regulation over the next five years and what should be done first.
It was chaired by Australian National University chancellor Allan Hawke and included CASA chief Bruce Byron as well as Mr Smith and industry representatives from Qantas and Brindabella Airlines. The taskforce completed its report in December, but it has yet to be released.
In a letter to Transport Department secretary Mike Taylor, Mr Smith said he was refunding the money because "keeping it would be dishonest".
"I have my copy, which contains important, urgent safety recommendations, but it is stamped 'under embargo'," Mr Smith said. "Just why such an important safety document would be embargoed is beyond comprehension to me."
Mr Smith was reluctant to elaborate on the urgent safety recommendations, but it is understood they include issues such as the need for enhanced ground proximity warning systems and collision avoidance alarms in smaller passenger planes. The report is also believed to have recommended speeding up the slow pace of aviation regulatory reform.
The millionaire aviator believes at least $500,000 was spent on the review and said it now appeared to have been an incredible waste of resources.
He said he understood the report had not been released because Mr Hawke had not been able to meet with Transport Minister Anthony Albanese.
But a spokesman for Mr Albanese said last night that Mr Hawke had met staff from the minister's office. "Minister Albanese has received the report ... and is giving it appropriate consideration," the spokesman said.
"The Government's response to the report will be announced in the near future."
Mr Albanese has ordered the nation's first white paper on the aviation industry and a Senate committee will conduct a formal inquiry into CASA's administration next month. The inquiry will look at the effectiveness of administrative reforms undertaken by CASA since 2003 as well as the effectiveness of the authority's governance structure.
Addendum
: Continuing on with thoughtful quotes from the 2008 Inquiry:
(AFAP's Capt Bryan Murray {sub 40} on the subject of the RRP)
With regard to CASA’s Regulatory Reform Programme (RRP), progress has been slow. The time, energy and money (both public and industry) that have been invested in this project are disproportionate to outcomes. The reasons why there has been such little return on this investment are varied and complex. We support Bruce Byron’s move towards appointing small specialist working groups for future policy development. We could learn from our counterparts in New Zealand when they undertook to recast their aviation rules in FAR format. They set a goal to complete the project and did so.
With regard to CASA’s Regulatory Reform Programme (RRP), progress has been slow. The time, energy and money (both public and industry) that have been invested in this project are disproportionate to outcomes. The reasons why there has been such little return on this investment are varied and complex. We support Bruce Byron’s move towards appointing small specialist working groups for future policy development. We could learn from our counterparts in New Zealand when they undertook to recast their aviation rules in FAR format. They set a goal to complete the project and did so.
Last edited by Sarcs; 7th Nov 2013 at 07:48.
There is a simple solution to this entire mess, and would ensure that the political and legislation issues within CASA are dealt with, and would ensure a uniform high standard in aviation between both Australia and New Zealand.
Simply sack everyone at CASA, and expand CAA NZ to have jurisdiction over both countries. Former CASA employees could apply for new Australian positions within the new Trans Tasman CAA, naturally with their previous experience and performance taken into account when selecting the best people for the job. The poorly written, incomplete and confusing regulations in Australia would be superseded by the New Zealand rules, which are IMHO far clearer and more sensible than the mess of Australian CARs, CAOs, and CASRs.
It has been done before (see Food Standards Australia New Zealand), and could quite easily be done again if there were the political will. There would be natural synergies by having one regulatory structure, delivering savings on costs, and providing a more efficient service to the aviation industries and general public of both Australia and New Zealand.
Then again, I'm just a pilot, what would I possibly know about aviation?
Simply sack everyone at CASA, and expand CAA NZ to have jurisdiction over both countries. Former CASA employees could apply for new Australian positions within the new Trans Tasman CAA, naturally with their previous experience and performance taken into account when selecting the best people for the job. The poorly written, incomplete and confusing regulations in Australia would be superseded by the New Zealand rules, which are IMHO far clearer and more sensible than the mess of Australian CARs, CAOs, and CASRs.
It has been done before (see Food Standards Australia New Zealand), and could quite easily be done again if there were the political will. There would be natural synergies by having one regulatory structure, delivering savings on costs, and providing a more efficient service to the aviation industries and general public of both Australia and New Zealand.
Then again, I'm just a pilot, what would I possibly know about aviation?
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Somewhere, under the haystack.
"I have my copy, which contains important, urgent safety recommendations, but it is stamped 'under embargo'," Mr Smith said. "Just why such an important safety document would be embargoed is beyond comprehension to me."
'They' appear to be jolly good at this, or at least someone is. No matter how much money, time and effort goes into a project or inquiry, no matter how lucid or intelligent the submissions, no matter how important or urgent the topic; the burial is never far away. It's almost as if any inquiry were a dummy given to a querulous child to shut it up while mummy is busy with the gin bottle; anything to stop the noise, even for a while.
Somehow the minister is always convinced (or advised) that it's all the rumblings of a minority (IOS) and is really neither urgent or important. Once the minister is pacified, comfortable with the degree of top cover the good work gets shuffled away, under the nearest pile. In this manner when questions are asked, ( e.g. coroner or Senate) there is a container delivered, full of boxes, packed with paper; and somewhere, under the haystack a needle.
The 2008 event not only buried the needle but managed to extinguish the work of some very canny minds which would have made. back then, a significant contribution toward taking Australian aviation into the 20th century. It's time to acknowledge that the majority of submissions were not provided by the Ills of Society. The time, care and effort required to produce a submission reflects the integrity of the advice made by highly competent, qualified people like:-
Baskett; 50 years at the coal face and providing simple, elegant practical solutions to the identical issues raised today. (get well soon mate).
Kimpton; intelligent, sound advice from a legal mind. Qualified opinion, clearly framed, cleverly drafted, sane, competent, practical solutions to the identical issues raised today. See here - All his own work.
McKeown; a balanced, polished submission which just keeps hitting nails on the head. Drafted to be comprehended by all, first class sound, competent (free) legal advice.
There were some 40 odd submissions provided in 2008, all made in good faith with a realistic expectation of change. Someone, somewhere dismissed and disappeared the good work and orchestrated the complete multi handed stropathon we see today, where episodes like Quadrio, Hempell, Pel Air, Canley Vale and important Senate inquiries can, with impunity be ignored or treated with open contempt.
Will the real puppet master stand up, so we may applaud a truly Murky, Machiavellian mind. We loved the glove puppets, but now, your spotlight awaits.
Selah.
Last edited by Kharon; 8th Nov 2013 at 18:01. Reason: Five by Five NZS
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Erratum.
There were 61 submissions provided in 2008, not 40 odd; eight of those were 'confidential'. I have not as yet had the time to fully research and read the remainder. Some of those read are just a shameless attack on Byron, some are clearly self centred, a couple just plain silly. One of the stars (IMO) is the Agricultural boys submission; articulate, on the money and for mine, fair. You could dust this off and whack it into an inquiry tomorrow and it would be equally, if not more valid now, than the day it published. Samples provided for your general entertainment and amusement.
AAAA-2008 :
P. Rundle-2008. (1)...(2). Both submissions have validity, they are quite hard to read and patience is required, but patience is rewarded. The phantom of the real Venn report, not the CASA embuggered version raises it's hoary head once more. I reckon finding a copy of the 'real' report is job for PAIN. (Waits for blast from P7.a.k.a. TOM.. 
).
Anyway, if you can spare the odd half hour, download the submissions grab a coffee, comfy chair and have a read. Note: some of the submissions will not open on screen, on the black screen you get, look for the download button, that works just fine.
Erratum complete. endit...
AAAA-2008 :
CASA does not have aviation problems - it has management problems.
). Anyway, if you can spare the odd half hour, download the submissions grab a coffee, comfy chair and have a read. Note: some of the submissions will not open on screen, on the black screen you get, look for the download button, that works just fine.
Erratum complete. endit...
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Kharon the AAAA 2008 submission makes for very interesting reading.
Five years has past and what's changed?
The same gripes appear in virtually every post concerning CAsA on this website and in almost every publication you pick up, despite what appears to be concerted cyber warfare, whether instigated by CAsA or not, by certain individuals to either, get a thread shutdown, or muddy the water by diverting the discussion off topic.
Some interesting snippets:
“Key Issues Summary”
“In many ways, reform has been compromised by current governance and management structures, a lack of drive for urgent change from the top of CASA and an ongoing combative approach from some in CASA towards industry.”
The angry man in charge?
“Trying to work with CASA is akin to prolonged guerrilla warfare, where success goes to the industry person or organization that can build an alliance with competent staff within CASA and assist them to defeat the other retrograde forces at work within CASA to protect turf, retain power, resist change and to stifle industry.”
Sounds a tad like Wodger Wabbit territory
“It is industry that leads and daily implements aviation safety in Australia, not CASA.”
YUP!
“The effect of much of CASA’s processes is to stop industry from achieving adaptation to a changing market rather than to facilitate it, often as a result of CASA staffs’ personal outlook on aviation.
The FOI of the day routine
“Transparency, accountability and clear performance outcomes are almost unknown concepts within CASA, despite pockets of forward thinking individuals who try and hold CASA to the same standards that are delivered by other public service agencies.”
Hmmm Mr. Truss where are you?
“A poor CASA culture that focuses on personal power at the expense of
aviation safety, sensible regulation and industry development.”
Down the rabbit burrow again
“Management does not seem able to formulate a coherent plan for improvement, nor appears capable of enforcing their will over lower managers, delegates and even field staff in the organisation.”
Which is why Chief pilots are still being overruled when they voice serious safety reservations about operational matters foisted on them by unqualified FOI's pushing their own personal agenda's.
“For example, the role of FOIs and AWI’s varies enormously between individuals and offices, apparently without any coordination from a central manager. Similarly, the outlook of senior management is not shared by many others in the organization, and the perspective of central office to the regions appears worlds apart.”
Which is why operators of the same aircraft can all be operating differently based on the preferences and opinions of their handling FOI.
“In many cases to consult or not, to work positively with industry or not, or to abide by normal standards of good policy development or not, are not decisions made at high level after consideration of the strategic environment. They are frequently made at a local level, often with an agenda of frustrating central office and increasing the power of local staff.”
“There has been no research presented by CASA or government in the pursuit of cost recovery that would indicate proper account has been given to how much of an increase in costs the industry and industry clients can bear and the possible impact of increased costs.”
The impact is clients forgoing aviation for other means of transportation
“For example, the current migration of GA pilots out of CASA controlled aviation to aviation managed by Recreational Aviation Australia should be seen as pilots voting with their feet."
And the migration of foreign commercial students to New Zealand
"The long-term impact of this migration on pilot-shortages and cost-recovery may be substantial. In turn, the impact on the national need for a vibrant and safe aviation industry must not be overlooked.”
Says it all really
Mr. Truss you really need to stand up and be counted.
Five years has past and what's changed?
The same gripes appear in virtually every post concerning CAsA on this website and in almost every publication you pick up, despite what appears to be concerted cyber warfare, whether instigated by CAsA or not, by certain individuals to either, get a thread shutdown, or muddy the water by diverting the discussion off topic.
Some interesting snippets:
“Key Issues Summary”
- Independent review of CASA’s functions required, drawing heavily on industry input.
- Current governance arrangements do not appear to be supporting or encouraging transparency, accountability or performance.
- Industry consultation mechanisms at the technical level may be adequate (for example on regulatory reform working groups), but at the strategic level they are either non-existent or in need of review. Asking industry what their view is and then ignoring it completely is frequently dressed-up as ‘consultation’.
- CASA needs a central policy making function that binds all staff to a single interpretation that has been developed with industry consultation. This must be a central feature of any attempt to improve CASA’s culture.
- CASA must develop a systems-based approach to managing interactions with industry that are currently piecemeal and treated as ‘once-offs’.
- Cost recovery must be based on establishing CASA’s essential functions and priorities (see independent review above), identifying any functions that can be transferred to industry while maintaining safety integrity and removing any requirements that do not deliver a safety outcome that addresses an identified and significant risk.
- CASA must be directed by Government to pursue aggressively an efficiency and cost-cutting program that reduces the burden on industry.
“In many ways, reform has been compromised by current governance and management structures, a lack of drive for urgent change from the top of CASA and an ongoing combative approach from some in CASA towards industry.”
The angry man in charge?
“Trying to work with CASA is akin to prolonged guerrilla warfare, where success goes to the industry person or organization that can build an alliance with competent staff within CASA and assist them to defeat the other retrograde forces at work within CASA to protect turf, retain power, resist change and to stifle industry.”
Sounds a tad like Wodger Wabbit territory
“It is industry that leads and daily implements aviation safety in Australia, not CASA.”
YUP!
“The effect of much of CASA’s processes is to stop industry from achieving adaptation to a changing market rather than to facilitate it, often as a result of CASA staffs’ personal outlook on aviation.
The FOI of the day routine
“Transparency, accountability and clear performance outcomes are almost unknown concepts within CASA, despite pockets of forward thinking individuals who try and hold CASA to the same standards that are delivered by other public service agencies.”
Hmmm Mr. Truss where are you?
“A poor CASA culture that focuses on personal power at the expense of
aviation safety, sensible regulation and industry development.”
Down the rabbit burrow again
“Management does not seem able to formulate a coherent plan for improvement, nor appears capable of enforcing their will over lower managers, delegates and even field staff in the organisation.”
Which is why Chief pilots are still being overruled when they voice serious safety reservations about operational matters foisted on them by unqualified FOI's pushing their own personal agenda's.
“For example, the role of FOIs and AWI’s varies enormously between individuals and offices, apparently without any coordination from a central manager. Similarly, the outlook of senior management is not shared by many others in the organization, and the perspective of central office to the regions appears worlds apart.”
Which is why operators of the same aircraft can all be operating differently based on the preferences and opinions of their handling FOI.
“In many cases to consult or not, to work positively with industry or not, or to abide by normal standards of good policy development or not, are not decisions made at high level after consideration of the strategic environment. They are frequently made at a local level, often with an agenda of frustrating central office and increasing the power of local staff.”
“There has been no research presented by CASA or government in the pursuit of cost recovery that would indicate proper account has been given to how much of an increase in costs the industry and industry clients can bear and the possible impact of increased costs.”
The impact is clients forgoing aviation for other means of transportation
“For example, the current migration of GA pilots out of CASA controlled aviation to aviation managed by Recreational Aviation Australia should be seen as pilots voting with their feet."
And the migration of foreign commercial students to New Zealand
"The long-term impact of this migration on pilot-shortages and cost-recovery may be substantial. In turn, the impact on the national need for a vibrant and safe aviation industry must not be overlooked.”
Says it all really
Mr. Truss you really need to stand up and be counted.
Last edited by thorn bird; 9th Nov 2013 at 07:45.
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Re AAAA 2008.
TB – yes, it's quite a read. Obviously a concoction whipped up by the Agricultural chapter of the Ills of Society; and what would they know. What with their large, personal investments in aviation, their essential services to the land, their long history of dealing with officialdom since the Wright brothers, or the countless hours spent down in night time cotton, slaughtering grasshoppers or even pissing about putting out the odd small grass fire or two (should the mood descend). Nope –all irrelevant to the great minds over at Sleepy Hollow......
I have managed to work my way through some more of the other submissions and although some are clearly weighted (even a bit biased) toward a specific 'group' argument; the thrust is essentially the same. The large cracks were plugged by robust Green paper, the final glossy finish made with a carefully manufactured white paper; which has proven to be quite handy considering it was used to confound an early inquiry into a world wide issue; flight standards...
Maybe the better submissions from 2008 and subsequent inquires should be bundled up and sent to an appropriate minister, dumped on a desk with a nice little note....: "Dear Sir. The large bundle of paper attached will save you the time, trouble, effort and expense of initiating your promised inquiry. Spend one day reading, then exercise the powers you have. There is a problem, please get off your arse and fix it. We can help. L&K from the I.O.S. (Opposing a minority group of disaffected, narcissistic sociopaths)....
I have managed to work my way through some more of the other submissions and although some are clearly weighted (even a bit biased) toward a specific 'group' argument; the thrust is essentially the same. The large cracks were plugged by robust Green paper, the final glossy finish made with a carefully manufactured white paper; which has proven to be quite handy considering it was used to confound an early inquiry into a world wide issue; flight standards...
Maybe the better submissions from 2008 and subsequent inquires should be bundled up and sent to an appropriate minister, dumped on a desk with a nice little note....: "Dear Sir. The large bundle of paper attached will save you the time, trouble, effort and expense of initiating your promised inquiry. Spend one day reading, then exercise the powers you have. There is a problem, please get off your arse and fix it. We can help. L&K from the I.O.S. (Opposing a minority group of disaffected, narcissistic sociopaths)....
Last edited by Kharon; 9th Nov 2013 at 19:08. Reason: Top of the page = top of the morning, to all.
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Senate Estimates November 2013
From: Estimates daily programs ? Parliament of Australia
Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport (to be provided)
Infrastructure and Regional Development:
Monday, 18 November 2013
Agriculture: Tuesday, 19 November 2013
Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport (to be provided)
Infrastructure and Regional Development:
Monday, 18 November 2013
Agriculture: Tuesday, 19 November 2013
IOS membership is growing!
Yes the AAAA submission could be listed as the official IOS charter, the trouble is on the FF scale (Regulatory Policy- CEO-PN001-2004:
CASA's Industry Sector Priorities and Classification of Civil Aviation Activities,
CASA's Industry Sector Priorities and Classification of Civil Aviation Activities
,organisations like the AAAA are like a blip on the radar of insignificance...still it is an exemplary submission
Although it starts off sticking the boots into Byron I also thought the Benke (crusty but trusty old school FOI & ASAG ) submission was worth the five minutes to read:
) submission was worth the five minutes to read: What Should a Regulator be Trying to Achieve?
This question has been partly answered under the heading ‘What is a Regulator?’,
above. But that answer was couched in legalistic terms. What of the practical
outcome?
above. But that answer was couched in legalistic terms. What of the practical
outcome?
In reality a regulator should be similar to the rule makers of a sporting game like
rugby union, making and applying the same rules for everyone so that fair
competition can take place. Some people call this ‘the level playing field’. By
keeping a level playing field in civil aviation all operators are made aware of their responsibilities and know that if they do not perform they will be removed from the ‘game’. CASA has never been particularly good at that. In the last few yearthe problem has become greater. What happens when the playing field is not
level?
rugby union, making and applying the same rules for everyone so that fair
competition can take place. Some people call this ‘the level playing field’. By
keeping a level playing field in civil aviation all operators are made aware of their responsibilities and know that if they do not perform they will be removed from the ‘game’. CASA has never been particularly good at that. In the last few yearthe problem has become greater. What happens when the playing field is not
level?
When an operator is permitted to operate using procedures outside the law this
encourages other operators to follow. Operators operate outside the law because
there is financial gain to be made. Abiding by the law costs money, not doing so
makes a saving in the short term. Thus the illegal operator by saving money can
charge a lower fee for its services which cannot be matched by the legal operator.
encourages other operators to follow. Operators operate outside the law because
there is financial gain to be made. Abiding by the law costs money, not doing so
makes a saving in the short term. Thus the illegal operator by saving money can
charge a lower fee for its services which cannot be matched by the legal operator.
In time the legal operator ceases to operate leaving the field to the illegal operator and the level of safety enjoyed by the Australian public is degraded. This is essentially what caused the Lockhart River accident. CASA failed to correct known deficiencies in the operators concerned. Aviation safety problems in remote parts of Australia have been known by CASA to exist for a considerable length of time but little has been done to resolve those problems.
Conclusion
CASA is not an effective regulator of Australian civil aviation. It has become even less so over the last 3 to 5 years. The reasons are many and varied. I have
covered some of those above but have left out many others. It is my belief that
CASA will not be an effective aviation regulator until its operations and ethos
have been comprehensively reviewed, and *effective corrective action taken. Even then it will be difficult to rebuild the organisation because of a lack of properly qualified and experienced people.
covered some of those above but have left out many others. It is my belief that
CASA will not be an effective aviation regulator until its operations and ethos
have been comprehensively reviewed, and *effective corrective action taken. Even then it will be difficult to rebuild the organisation because of a lack of properly qualified and experienced people.
*Hard to give up on old habits and language hey Rod!
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Heh heh; spot on Half baked (#1624).....
Maybe instead of sending 2000 pages to the minister, we could just send that clip, with a short explanatory note. Save a lot of time.
There were 52 open submissions presented in 2008, even with the most ruthless culling at least 50% could be considered of value and 50% of the remainder were excellent, first class, considered advice, valid and did not cost squilions in 'consultancy fees' or bonuses. The submitters cannot all be just a deluded minority, the dregs of society or not qualified, can they??
You'd think that even if the boys over at Sleepy Hollow were determined to bury the advice, they would have at least have the common or garden nouse to plagiarise the good oil for their own internal recommendations and reports. Wodger did try to lead the plagiarism charge, perhaps the rest were just busy leaning on shovels or towing the party line. Or maybe, it's just they wouldn't know sound advice from shinola, if it jumped up and bit them.
Maybe instead of sending 2000 pages to the minister, we could just send that clip, with a short explanatory note. Save a lot of time.
Yes the AAAA submission could be listed as the official IOS charter,
You'd think that even if the boys over at Sleepy Hollow were determined to bury the advice, they would have at least have the common or garden nouse to plagiarise the good oil for their own internal recommendations and reports. Wodger did try to lead the plagiarism charge, perhaps the rest were just busy leaning on shovels or towing the party line. Or maybe, it's just they wouldn't know sound advice from shinola, if it jumped up and bit them.
Last edited by Kharon; 11th Nov 2013 at 18:35. Reason: Sudden urge to shout Bollocks - supressed, but pending
Back to the future, Bills and Reason!
Kharon post # 42 from ATSB reports thread:
On the subject of the Kym Bills era…came across a 2006 ATSB endorsed paper labelled.. ‘A Layman’s Introduction to Human Factors in Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation’(ATSB SAFETY INFORMATION PAPER B2006/0094 ), which IMO has particular relevance to the AAI Senate inquiry and the Beaker era (beyond all sensible reason) vs the Bills era (back to the future).
After reading this paper you will again be left scratching your head over the PelAir Final Report debacle and how a supposedly independent, highly respected, well principled transport safety investigative agency (as the ATSB was) could so comprehensively lose their way in the space of three short years.
Okay so here are some quotes of relevance from the paper:
From Executive summary...
“This paper is concerned primarily with the relationship of Human Factors to aircraft accident and incident investigations. The purpose of applying Human Factors knowledge to such investigations is to not only understand what happened in a given accident, but more importantly, why it happened. Without understanding why an accident occurred, safety investigation agencies such as the Australian Transport
Safety Bureau (ATSB) are limited in their ability to draw meaningful conclusions and propose effective safety action and recommendations for change.”
“Since it was known very early on in aviation history that the pilot ‘failed’
significantly more often than the plane did, most aircraft accidents were classified as ‘pilot error’ and often the explanation went little further than that. The use of the term ‘pilot error’ provides a simple, but often misleading explanation of a complex accident sequence.
Sections of the community and some high-risk industries seem to desire a simple explanation for complex events. That is, of what ‘caused’ the event and who is to ‘blame’. Some also tend to see Human Factors as a process of helping individuals avoid their responsibility for accidents.”
“With the evolution of human factors, human sciences knowledge is now not only applied against a systems engineering background, but also against a psychosocial and more recently a business management framework. These evolutionary developments break away from the idea that a pilot operates in a vacuum and that accidents are events isolated from the system which nurtured them.”
Excerpt from Introduction:
The whole paper is well worth the time to read and IMO if Kym Bills (and his former lieutenant Alan Stray) had still been at the helm at the time of the Norfolk Ditching investigation, there would have been a much more different outcome and a final report that the Senators and industry would have been proud of.
Note: The ‘beyond pilot error’ (Airbus A300, American Airlines flight 587 in New York City on 12 November 2001) example on page 12-13 focuses on the progress, largely initiated by the ATSB, in Human Factors research and its relevance to AAI.
I wonder if he ever looks back at what he built, probably not. Come home Kym – all is forgiven;your Mum's worried, the dog won't eat, the cat's out of the bag and there's hell to pay with the Senate.
After reading this paper you will again be left scratching your head over the PelAir Final Report debacle
and how a supposedly independent, highly respected, well principled transport safety investigative agency (as the ATSB was) could so comprehensively lose their way in the space of three short years. Okay so here are some quotes of relevance from the paper:
From Executive summary...
“This paper is concerned primarily with the relationship of Human Factors to aircraft accident and incident investigations. The purpose of applying Human Factors knowledge to such investigations is to not only understand what happened in a given accident, but more importantly, why it happened. Without understanding why an accident occurred, safety investigation agencies such as the Australian Transport
Safety Bureau (ATSB) are limited in their ability to draw meaningful conclusions and propose effective safety action and recommendations for change.”
“Since it was known very early on in aviation history that the pilot ‘failed’
significantly more often than the plane did, most aircraft accidents were classified as ‘pilot error’ and often the explanation went little further than that. The use of the term ‘pilot error’ provides a simple, but often misleading explanation of a complex accident sequence.
Sections of the community and some high-risk industries seem to desire a simple explanation for complex events. That is, of what ‘caused’ the event and who is to ‘blame’. Some also tend to see Human Factors as a process of helping individuals avoid their responsibility for accidents.”
“With the evolution of human factors, human sciences knowledge is now not only applied against a systems engineering background, but also against a psychosocial and more recently a business management framework. These evolutionary developments break away from the idea that a pilot operates in a vacuum and that accidents are events isolated from the system which nurtured them.”
Excerpt from Introduction:
1.1 Background to this paper
The term, Human Factors, is a relatively new term that is not well understood by
some sectors of the community.
Apart from a lack of knowledge about the subject, the misunderstanding seems to
be partly due to the fact that some people seem to believe that investigations into
accidents explicitly for the purposes of improving transport safety should be
concerned with identifying and punishing the people guilty of causing those
accidents.
Given this view, and the fact that in many cases Human Factors investigations tend
to confirm that people who have accidents are victims of their own human frailties,
some members of the community seem to believe modern Human Factors
investigations simply help guilty parties avoid taking responsibility for their actions. {That certainly sounds familiar???)
These notions are completely at odds with the purpose of a safety investigation
which, first and foremost, must be concerned with understanding why an accident
occurred and, on that basis, making effective recommendations to prevent
recurrence and improve transport safety for both the Australian and international travelling public.
In an effort to increase the level of general understanding within the community, the
Executive Director (top stuff KB) of the ATSB commissioned this layman’s information report.
1.2 Objective of this paper
Human Factors is a large and complex subject and a full or detailed coverage of the topic is beyond the scope of this paper. The objective of this paper is to give a
layman’s general explanation of the history, development and application of Human
Factors, particularly as it relates to safety investigations of aircraft accidents and
incidents.
The ATSB would welcome constructive suggestions for improvement of this paper
for a future edition. Any suggestions should be mindful of the introductory focus of
the paper. The ATSB runs a five-day course on introductory human factors which
includes much more depth and employs a number of specialist human factors
investigators. Any suggestions should be sent by email to [email protected] by 31 August 2006.
The term, Human Factors, is a relatively new term that is not well understood by
some sectors of the community.
Apart from a lack of knowledge about the subject, the misunderstanding seems to
be partly due to the fact that some people seem to believe that investigations into
accidents explicitly for the purposes of improving transport safety should be
concerned with identifying and punishing the people guilty of causing those
accidents.
Given this view, and the fact that in many cases Human Factors investigations tend
to confirm that people who have accidents are victims of their own human frailties,
some members of the community seem to believe modern Human Factors
investigations simply help guilty parties avoid taking responsibility for their actions. {That certainly sounds familiar???
)These notions are completely at odds with the purpose of a safety investigation
which, first and foremost, must be concerned with understanding why an accident
occurred and, on that basis, making effective recommendations to prevent
recurrence and improve transport safety for both the Australian and international travelling public.
In an effort to increase the level of general understanding within the community, the
Executive Director (top stuff KB
) of the ATSB commissioned this layman’s information report.1.2 Objective of this paper
Human Factors is a large and complex subject and a full or detailed coverage of the topic is beyond the scope of this paper. The objective of this paper is to give a
layman’s general explanation of the history, development and application of Human
Factors, particularly as it relates to safety investigations of aircraft accidents and
incidents.
The ATSB would welcome constructive suggestions for improvement of this paper
for a future edition. Any suggestions should be mindful of the introductory focus of
the paper. The ATSB runs a five-day course on introductory human factors which
includes much more depth and employs a number of specialist human factors
investigators. Any suggestions should be sent by email to [email protected] by 31 August 2006.
Note: The ‘beyond pilot error’ (Airbus A300, American Airlines flight 587 in New York City on 12 November 2001) example on page 12-13 focuses on the progress, largely initiated by the ATSB, in Human Factors research and its relevance to AAI.
The objective of this paper is to give a
layman’s general explanation of the history, development and application of Human Factors, particularly as it relates to safety investigations of
aircraft accidents and incidents.
layman’s general explanation of the history, development and application of Human Factors, particularly as it relates to safety investigations of
aircraft accidents and incidents.
AAI report chapter 8!
Normally don't partake but I think the keyword was 'Layman', perhaps that is why the good Senators referred to it in the writing up of Chapter 8 of the AAI report (hint refer footnote 3 & 4 Ch 8): Chapter 8 AAI report
Importance of human factors
8.3 The ATSB acknowledges the importance of human factors:
8.4 The ATSB's own information notes:
8.5 The ATSB website points out the agencies expertise in and contribution to the field of human factors at both the individual and organisational level which is acknowledged as world class.[5]
8.6 The ATSB Chief Commissioner has also personally emphasised the importance of human factors:
8.7 The importance of human factors principles was also stressed to the committee:
8.8 Mr Bryan Aherne, an independent aviation accident investigator and safety and risk adviser to the aviation industry, pointed out the international requirements for an investigation which include human factors:
So in other words you are questioning the whole credibility/veracity of the AAI report, in particular R16..
...this is despite saying this back in May(post # 1817):
Importance of human factors
8.3 The ATSB acknowledges the importance of human factors:
The purpose of applying Human Factors knowledge to such investigations is to not only understand what happened in a given accident, but more importantly, why it happened.[3]
8.4 The ATSB's own information notes:
Human Factors are a critical part of the safety investigation process and are at the heart of most aircraft accidents.[4]
8.5 The ATSB website points out the agencies expertise in and contribution to the field of human factors at both the individual and organisational level which is acknowledged as world class.[5]
8.6 The ATSB Chief Commissioner has also personally emphasised the importance of human factors:
The field of human factors is—and always will be—an essential part of the ATSB’s investigation process.[6]
8.7 The importance of human factors principles was also stressed to the committee:
As we said in our submission to the committee, we have a comprehensive methodology for doing this [assessing whether existing arrangements for managing safety risk are adequate]. That methodology takes as its starting point, its base, the principles of human factors that were initially enunciated by Professor Reason and have been built on by a range of others. So, rather than seeing human factors as a separate issue in our investigations, we have integrated them into our overall processes.[7]
8.8 Mr Bryan Aherne, an independent aviation accident investigator and safety and risk adviser to the aviation industry, pointed out the international requirements for an investigation which include human factors:
The collection of Human Factors information is an integral part of the investigation. Thus, the Human Factors information should be integrated into the appropriate areas of the factual part of the report, rather than being placed under a separate heading. Human Factors information should be presented in a language that is consistent with the presentation of the other factual information.[8]
"Recommendation 16
8.35 The committee recommends that, where relevant, the ATSB include thorough human factors analysis and discussion in future investigation reports.
Where human factors are not considered relevant, the ATSB should include a statement explaining why."
8.35 The committee recommends that, where relevant, the ATSB include thorough human factors analysis and discussion in future investigation reports.
Where human factors are not considered relevant, the ATSB should include a statement explaining why."
...this is despite saying this back in May(post # 1817):
Yep great report with some very relevant recommendations. ATSB and to a lessor extent CASA come out looking dodgy.
Last edited by Sarcs; 12th Nov 2013 at 20:09. Reason: HMHB 300k post duly noted!!
No Sarcs I am questioning the credibility of that particular ATSB publication . Credibility of the ATSB seems to be a major discussion point amongst the KKK so I'm not sure why you are surprised at anyone questioning something coming out of the ATSB. Human Factors itself is not the issue and of course the importance of Human Factors is recognized by anyone involved in aviation at an operational level. All I am suggesting is don't hold that discussion of HF up as a shining example of what the ATSB produced during the tenure of KB and AS.
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The time is out of joint.
Sarcs # 1626 –"The whole paper is well worth the time to read and IMO if Kym Bills (and his former lieutenant Alan Stray) had still been at the helm at the time of the Norfolk Ditching investigation, etc.
Sarcs # 1626 –"Note: The ‘beyond pilot error’ (Airbus A300, American Airlines flight 587 in New York City on 12 November 2001) example on page 12-13 focuses on the progress, largely initiated by the ATSB, in Human Factors research and its relevance to AAI. (My bold)
History reflects the downfall of the ATSB, from leading edge to trailing edge; world class to sub standard and yet the beggars still trade on past glories, use the credit of better men and still dare stand up to speak to their peers (at tax payer expense). The whiff of corruption and the stench of collusion still hover over the Pel Air imbroglio.
Time shall unfold what plighted cunning hides,
Who covers faults at last with shame derides.
Well may you prosper. (Lear)
Who covers faults at last with shame derides.
Well may you prosper. (Lear)
Last edited by Kharon; 13th Nov 2013 at 18:48. Reason: Mostly - I stuffed up the draft, no matter.
Truss announces Aviation Safety Regulation Review
Warren Truss
Deputy Prime Minister
Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development
Media Statement
14 November 2013
Aviation Safety Regulation Review
DEPUTY Prime Minister and Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development Warren Truss today announced an independent review of aviation safety regulation in Australia.
“This announcement delivers on one of the key commitments outlined in the Coalition’s 2013 Policy for Aviation,” Mr Truss said.
“Australia has an enviable record in aviation safety – among the best in the world – which has been built on a strong regulatory system, forged over many years.”
In launching the review, Mr Truss said aviation activity is expected to double in the next twenty years. The industry is a vital part of our economy and we must ensure it is supported by a regulatory system that delivers the highest levels of safety.
“Now is the right time to reassess how our safety regulatory system is placed in dealing with this dynamic and evolving sector. The independent review reinforces the Government’s commitment to maintaining safety as the highest priority in aviation.
“The review will be strategic in nature. It is about whether we are on the right track to meet future challenges and respond to growing demand in aviation.”
The review is to be undertaken by a panel of leading aviation safety experts and will benchmark Australia’s safety regulation against other leading countries.
Mr David Forsyth AM, will Chair the review panel. Mr Forsyth is a prominent figure in Australian aviation. He is the chair of Safeskies Australia, former chair of Airservices Australia and has over 30 years of experience in safety management and aviation business.
Mr Forsyth will be joined by Mr Don Spruston, former Director General of Civil Aviation at Transport Canada and former Director General of the International Business Aviation Council, and by Mr Roger Whitefield, former Head of Safety at British Airways, former safety adviser to Qantas and former United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority board member.
The panel will also be supported, as required, by specialist advisers. Mr Truss has appointed Phillip Reiss to take particular responsibility to ensure that the concerns of general aviation and regional operators are well aired.
Mr Truss indicated his confidence that the breadth and depth of expertise secured to conduct this review will ensure that a comprehensive and balanced perspective is reflected in the panel’s findings.
Over the coming months, the review panel will undertake extensive industry and public consultation. Further details, including how to make a submission, will be available from the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development’s website at: www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/asrr<http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/asrr>.
The review panel will provide its report to the Deputy Prime Minister in May 2014.
The Terms of Reference for the review and information about the review panel members follow at Attachments A and B.
Attachment A
Aviation Safety Regulation Review
Terms of Reference
Objectives
The principal objectives of the review are to investigate:
• the structures, effectiveness and processes of all agencies involved in aviation safety;
• the relationship and interaction of those agencies with each other, as well as with the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development (Infrastructure);
• the outcomes and direction of the regulatory reform process being undertaken by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA);
• the suitability of Australia’s aviation safety related regulations when benchmarked against comparable overseas jurisdictions; and
• any other safety related matters.
Outcomes
The report of the review will:
• examine and make recommendations as required on the aviation safety roles of CASA and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) and other agencies as appropriate;
• outline and identify any areas for improvement in the current interaction and relationships between CASA and the ATSB, as well as other agencies and Infrastructure;
• examine and make recommendations as required on the appointment process and criteria applied for key aviation safety roles within CASA and the ATSB;
• examine the current processes by which CASA develops, consults on and finalises changes to aviation safety regulations and other legislative instruments (such as civil aviation orders) and make any proposals for improving these processes such that new regulations are best practice in safe operations for each relevant sector of the aviation industry;
• review the implementation of the current aviation safety regulatory reform programme and assess the effectiveness of the planning and implementation of regulatory changes, including cost impacts on industry;
• examine and make recommendations on options for improving future aviation safety regulatory reform having regard to international experience and stakeholder views, and the Government’s objective of reducing the cost of regulation to business;
• provide advice to Government on priorities for future regulatory development and implementation strategies; and
• provide advice to Government on options for improving oversight and enforcement of aviation regulations, including rights of review.
Consultation
The review will seek the views of the CASA Board and senior management and staff, and the ATSB Commission and senior management and staff in developing its advice to Government on the review’s objectives, and consult closely with:
- international, domestic, regional, general aviation, sport and recreational aircraft and maintenance operators and organisations;
- federal, regional and local airport operators;
- other relevant Government agencies including Infrastructure, Airservices Australia, the Department of Defence and the Office of Parliamentary Counsel (OPC); and
- other industry and public stakeholders.
Background
Australia’s aviation safety governance structures and processes have continued to evolve since the initial establishment of the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (covering the operations of CASA), the Air Services Act 1995 (covering the operations of Airservices) and Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (covering the operations of the ATSB).
In addition the establishment of an Aviation Safety Regulatory Development Taskforce in March 2010, comprising dedicated resources from CASA and OPC, was specifically aimed at helping expedite the completion of the regulatory drafting work for an aviation safety regulatory reform programme.
The current regulatory reform programme involves completion of three main regulatory suites covering aircraft maintenance, aircraft operations and flight crew licensing. The maintenance and licensing suites are largely completed with the operations suite scheduled to be completed next year.
The aviation industry and CASA are in the process of implementing the maintenance and licensing regulatory changes already made and in which significant investment in improved systems, training and education is completed or under way.
Work on updated regulations for areas affecting general aviation such as amendments to Civil Aviation Safety Regulations - Part 42 (Continuing Airworthiness - amendments for charter and aerial work), Part 132 (Limited Category Aircraft Operations - Warbirds), Part 138 (Aerial Work Operations) and for sport and recreational aviation (Parts 103, 105 and 149) are scheduled to be progressed in the next twelve months.
Earlier this year a Senate report into Aviation Accident Investigations highlighted a range of issues with the regulation and governance of aviation safety within Australia.
It is therefore timely to consider future aviation safety structures and regulatory development approaches and processes in Australia by evaluating the effectiveness of the current approach, looking at international experience and possible options for future improvements and bearing in mind the commitment of the Australian Government to reduce the burden of regulation on the economy.
It is also timely to look at which areas should be priorities for future regulatory development to meet continued growth in aviation demand.
Review Membership and Timing
The review panel will comprise Mr David Forsyth (chair), Mr Don Spruston and Mr Roger Whitefield. The panel will be assisted by a Secretariat established within Infrastructure, and will be supported as required by specialist advisers.
The review will report to the Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development in May 2014.
Attachment B
Aviation Safety Regulation Review – Panel Members
Mr David Forsyth AM (Australia) – Review Panel Chair
Mr Forsyth has extensive experience in aviation engineering and management. A professional engineer and a Member of the Order of Australia, he has held executive and board positions across the industry, government, not-for-profit and academic sectors in Australia.
Mr Forsyth currently works as an independent consultant to the aviation industry and has served on a number of Boards, including as Chair of Airservices Australia, Chair of the Safeskies Conference, Vice President of the Royal Flying Doctor Service of Australia (SE Section) and President of the Royal Aeronautical Society Australian Division. He previously worked for Qantas for over 30 years in technical and management roles including: Manager of the Melbourne Maintenance Base; General Manager, Regional Airlines; and Executive General Manager, Aircraft Operations.
Mr Forsyth holds a Bachelor of Aeronautical Engineering (Hons) and a Graduate Diploma in Industrial Engineering Developments from the University of New South Wales (UNSW) and has completed the Stanford University Executive Program. A Councillor of the Royal Aeronautical Society’s Australian division since 2004, he is currently a Senior Visiting Fellow at the UNSW School of Aviation.
Mr Don Spruston (Canada) – Review Panel Member
Mr Spruston has wide-ranging experience in oversight and regulation of the aviation sector with the Canadian Government. He has also been extensively involved in the development and implementation of criteria for reviewing aviation safety regulatory performance as part of the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP).
Formerly Director General of Civil Aviation at Transport Canada, Mr Spruston was until recently, the Director General of the International Business Aviation Council (IBAC) based in ICAO headquarters in Montreal, Canada. He has previously held senior positions with Transport Canada including Director General of Aircraft Services, and Regional Director of Air Navigation Services in the Pacific Region.
Mr Spruston holds a Bachelor of Science from the Royal Military College of Canada and has an Airline Transport Pilot Licence.
Mr Roger Whitefield (United Kingdom) – Review Panel Member
Mr Whitefield has held senior positions in both regulatory and operational roles within the aviation industry – he was previously a commercial pilot for over 30 years. For the past 10 years he has been a board member of the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) during a period of significant structural and governance reform of the Authority.
He is a member of the International Safety Review Team which most recently conducted an independent safety review of Air France following their loss of an A330 aircraft. He is also Chair of Air Safety Support International (a UK Government company charged with helping deliver aviation safety oversight for British overseas territories). A Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society, Mr Whitefield spent a number of years as an external advisor to the Qantas Safety Review Board.
Mr Whitefield has had 39 years’ experience working for UK airlines as a pilot, airline captain and in executive roles, including as Head of Safety and Head of Corporate Safety and Quality with British Airways.
[ENDS]
Media Contact: Brett Heffernan on (02) 6277 7680 or 0467 650 020 or [email protected]>
Deputy Prime Minister
Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development
Media Statement
14 November 2013
Aviation Safety Regulation Review
DEPUTY Prime Minister and Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development Warren Truss today announced an independent review of aviation safety regulation in Australia.
“This announcement delivers on one of the key commitments outlined in the Coalition’s 2013 Policy for Aviation,” Mr Truss said.
“Australia has an enviable record in aviation safety – among the best in the world – which has been built on a strong regulatory system, forged over many years.”
In launching the review, Mr Truss said aviation activity is expected to double in the next twenty years. The industry is a vital part of our economy and we must ensure it is supported by a regulatory system that delivers the highest levels of safety.
“Now is the right time to reassess how our safety regulatory system is placed in dealing with this dynamic and evolving sector. The independent review reinforces the Government’s commitment to maintaining safety as the highest priority in aviation.
“The review will be strategic in nature. It is about whether we are on the right track to meet future challenges and respond to growing demand in aviation.”
The review is to be undertaken by a panel of leading aviation safety experts and will benchmark Australia’s safety regulation against other leading countries.
Mr David Forsyth AM, will Chair the review panel. Mr Forsyth is a prominent figure in Australian aviation. He is the chair of Safeskies Australia, former chair of Airservices Australia and has over 30 years of experience in safety management and aviation business.
Mr Forsyth will be joined by Mr Don Spruston, former Director General of Civil Aviation at Transport Canada and former Director General of the International Business Aviation Council, and by Mr Roger Whitefield, former Head of Safety at British Airways, former safety adviser to Qantas and former United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority board member.
The panel will also be supported, as required, by specialist advisers. Mr Truss has appointed Phillip Reiss to take particular responsibility to ensure that the concerns of general aviation and regional operators are well aired.
Mr Truss indicated his confidence that the breadth and depth of expertise secured to conduct this review will ensure that a comprehensive and balanced perspective is reflected in the panel’s findings.
Over the coming months, the review panel will undertake extensive industry and public consultation. Further details, including how to make a submission, will be available from the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development’s website at: www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/asrr<http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/asrr>.
The review panel will provide its report to the Deputy Prime Minister in May 2014.
The Terms of Reference for the review and information about the review panel members follow at Attachments A and B.
Attachment A
Aviation Safety Regulation Review
Terms of Reference
Objectives
The principal objectives of the review are to investigate:
• the structures, effectiveness and processes of all agencies involved in aviation safety;
• the relationship and interaction of those agencies with each other, as well as with the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development (Infrastructure);
• the outcomes and direction of the regulatory reform process being undertaken by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA);
• the suitability of Australia’s aviation safety related regulations when benchmarked against comparable overseas jurisdictions; and
• any other safety related matters.
Outcomes
The report of the review will:
• examine and make recommendations as required on the aviation safety roles of CASA and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) and other agencies as appropriate;
• outline and identify any areas for improvement in the current interaction and relationships between CASA and the ATSB, as well as other agencies and Infrastructure;
• examine and make recommendations as required on the appointment process and criteria applied for key aviation safety roles within CASA and the ATSB;
• examine the current processes by which CASA develops, consults on and finalises changes to aviation safety regulations and other legislative instruments (such as civil aviation orders) and make any proposals for improving these processes such that new regulations are best practice in safe operations for each relevant sector of the aviation industry;
• review the implementation of the current aviation safety regulatory reform programme and assess the effectiveness of the planning and implementation of regulatory changes, including cost impacts on industry;
• examine and make recommendations on options for improving future aviation safety regulatory reform having regard to international experience and stakeholder views, and the Government’s objective of reducing the cost of regulation to business;
• provide advice to Government on priorities for future regulatory development and implementation strategies; and
• provide advice to Government on options for improving oversight and enforcement of aviation regulations, including rights of review.
Consultation
The review will seek the views of the CASA Board and senior management and staff, and the ATSB Commission and senior management and staff in developing its advice to Government on the review’s objectives, and consult closely with:
- international, domestic, regional, general aviation, sport and recreational aircraft and maintenance operators and organisations;
- federal, regional and local airport operators;
- other relevant Government agencies including Infrastructure, Airservices Australia, the Department of Defence and the Office of Parliamentary Counsel (OPC); and
- other industry and public stakeholders.
Background
Australia’s aviation safety governance structures and processes have continued to evolve since the initial establishment of the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (covering the operations of CASA), the Air Services Act 1995 (covering the operations of Airservices) and Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (covering the operations of the ATSB).
In addition the establishment of an Aviation Safety Regulatory Development Taskforce in March 2010, comprising dedicated resources from CASA and OPC, was specifically aimed at helping expedite the completion of the regulatory drafting work for an aviation safety regulatory reform programme.
The current regulatory reform programme involves completion of three main regulatory suites covering aircraft maintenance, aircraft operations and flight crew licensing. The maintenance and licensing suites are largely completed with the operations suite scheduled to be completed next year.
The aviation industry and CASA are in the process of implementing the maintenance and licensing regulatory changes already made and in which significant investment in improved systems, training and education is completed or under way.
Work on updated regulations for areas affecting general aviation such as amendments to Civil Aviation Safety Regulations - Part 42 (Continuing Airworthiness - amendments for charter and aerial work), Part 132 (Limited Category Aircraft Operations - Warbirds), Part 138 (Aerial Work Operations) and for sport and recreational aviation (Parts 103, 105 and 149) are scheduled to be progressed in the next twelve months.
Earlier this year a Senate report into Aviation Accident Investigations highlighted a range of issues with the regulation and governance of aviation safety within Australia.
It is therefore timely to consider future aviation safety structures and regulatory development approaches and processes in Australia by evaluating the effectiveness of the current approach, looking at international experience and possible options for future improvements and bearing in mind the commitment of the Australian Government to reduce the burden of regulation on the economy.
It is also timely to look at which areas should be priorities for future regulatory development to meet continued growth in aviation demand.
Review Membership and Timing
The review panel will comprise Mr David Forsyth (chair), Mr Don Spruston and Mr Roger Whitefield. The panel will be assisted by a Secretariat established within Infrastructure, and will be supported as required by specialist advisers.
The review will report to the Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development in May 2014.
Attachment B
Aviation Safety Regulation Review – Panel Members
Mr David Forsyth AM (Australia) – Review Panel Chair
Mr Forsyth has extensive experience in aviation engineering and management. A professional engineer and a Member of the Order of Australia, he has held executive and board positions across the industry, government, not-for-profit and academic sectors in Australia.
Mr Forsyth currently works as an independent consultant to the aviation industry and has served on a number of Boards, including as Chair of Airservices Australia, Chair of the Safeskies Conference, Vice President of the Royal Flying Doctor Service of Australia (SE Section) and President of the Royal Aeronautical Society Australian Division. He previously worked for Qantas for over 30 years in technical and management roles including: Manager of the Melbourne Maintenance Base; General Manager, Regional Airlines; and Executive General Manager, Aircraft Operations.
Mr Forsyth holds a Bachelor of Aeronautical Engineering (Hons) and a Graduate Diploma in Industrial Engineering Developments from the University of New South Wales (UNSW) and has completed the Stanford University Executive Program. A Councillor of the Royal Aeronautical Society’s Australian division since 2004, he is currently a Senior Visiting Fellow at the UNSW School of Aviation.
Mr Don Spruston (Canada) – Review Panel Member
Mr Spruston has wide-ranging experience in oversight and regulation of the aviation sector with the Canadian Government. He has also been extensively involved in the development and implementation of criteria for reviewing aviation safety regulatory performance as part of the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP).
Formerly Director General of Civil Aviation at Transport Canada, Mr Spruston was until recently, the Director General of the International Business Aviation Council (IBAC) based in ICAO headquarters in Montreal, Canada. He has previously held senior positions with Transport Canada including Director General of Aircraft Services, and Regional Director of Air Navigation Services in the Pacific Region.
Mr Spruston holds a Bachelor of Science from the Royal Military College of Canada and has an Airline Transport Pilot Licence.
Mr Roger Whitefield (United Kingdom) – Review Panel Member
Mr Whitefield has held senior positions in both regulatory and operational roles within the aviation industry – he was previously a commercial pilot for over 30 years. For the past 10 years he has been a board member of the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) during a period of significant structural and governance reform of the Authority.
He is a member of the International Safety Review Team which most recently conducted an independent safety review of Air France following their loss of an A330 aircraft. He is also Chair of Air Safety Support International (a UK Government company charged with helping deliver aviation safety oversight for British overseas territories). A Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society, Mr Whitefield spent a number of years as an external advisor to the Qantas Safety Review Board.
Mr Whitefield has had 39 years’ experience working for UK airlines as a pilot, airline captain and in executive roles, including as Head of Safety and Head of Corporate Safety and Quality with British Airways.
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