Merged: Senate Inquiry

[Sarcs]

c173 this thread is an oldy but goldy...well done for lighting it back up again

US AOPA article is also worth a read:

FAA releases final ATP certification rule
July 10, 2013
By Benét J. Wilson

The FAA on July 10 released the final rule for the Pilot Certification and Qualification Requirements for Air Carrier Operations, which will require pilots to hold an air transport pilot certificate in order to fly for an air carrier.

AOPA expressed its concern in the original notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on the effect the rule will have on Part 61 flight training providers and new student pilot starts. AOPA’s concerns were also expressed in the proceedings leading up to the final rule, scheduled to go into effect on Aug. 1, by commenting on both the advance notice of proposed rulemaking and notice of proposed rulemaking, released on Feb. 29, 2012, and participating in the First Officer Qualifications Aviation Rulemaking Committee.

Pilots applying for an air transport pilot (ATP) certificate and those intending to serve as first officers for airlines will be the ones most affected by the new rule. But it will also affect pilots wanting to serve as pilot in command in Part 121 air carrier operations, part 91 subpart K operations, or Part 135 operations because of changes to requirements for obtaining an ATP certificate.

Pilots pursuing an ATP certificate after July 31, 2014, in addition to having 1,500 hours, will have to complete a new, yet-to-be developed, ATP certification training program. The program, consisting of 30 hours of ground and 10 hours of simulator training, must be completed prior to being eligible to take the ATP written and practical tests. The 10 hours of simulator training will include six hours of training in a level C or D (full-motion) simulator. According to the rule, this course will only be offered through Part 141, 142, 135, or 121 certificate holders, not allowing for Part 61 flights schools to develop courses and provide the training.
The new rule also establishes a new ATP certificate with restricted privileges for multiengine airplane only. The restricted ATP certificate can only be used to serve as a first officer at an air carrier. To obtain that certificate an applicant must be at least 21 years old, hold a commercial pilot certificate with an instrument rating, complete an ATP certification training program, and pass the ATP written and knowledge tests. For the restricted ATP certificate, applicants do get some relief as they are required to have at least 750 hours total time as a military pilot; at least 1,000 hours total time and a bachelor’s degree with an aviation major; at least 1,250 hours total time and an associate’s degree with an aviation major; or 1,500 hours total time as pilot.

“Although seemingly primarily directed at air carriers, AOPA had significant concerns with the NPRM about the effect this rule will have on Part 61 flight training providers and new student pilot starts,” said AOPA Vice President of Regulatory Affairs Rob Hackman. “The final rule will effectively prevent Part 61 training providers from being a viable pathway to an airline carrier both by limitation on who can provide the required training and on how time is credited toward the restricted ATP certificate. On first read, it appears the final rule does little to address AOPA’s concerns. As it stands, it has the potential to negatively affect flight training by disenfranchising potential career pilots thus negatively effecting flight schools.”
Topics Advocacy and Legislation, Pilot Training and Certification

Also from AOPA (US) that is worthy of reading is this article: 'Obama signs Pilots Bill of Rights' What's that pilot's have their own bill of rights??...nah it will never happen!

Still an interesting concept, the trouble is we don't even have a basic 'Bill of Rights' here in Oz

[Sarcs]

The OZ's.."Finding a survival formula"!

Further to my previous post there was a further insightful commentary piece from the Australian's A-Plus section in Friday's edition.

This IMO further highlights some more interesting parallels to the Norfolk ditching ATSB investigation by stealth vs the full and frank highly publicised preliminary investigation by the NTSB.

As a sidenote it will be of extreme interest if the ATSB's preliminary report for AO-2013-100willbe just as full and frank, because there is certainly some disturbing parallels to Norfolk with that one, remember 50:50 opinion on alternate minimas and diversion and BOM WX forecasting reliability??

AS Flight 214 descended over San Francisco Bay, the Asiana Airlines pilots were trying something new.

In the left seat of the cockpit sat Lee Gang-kuk, a 46-year-old pilot with 35 hours' experience flying a Boeing 777 who was landing the big jet for his first time at San Francisco International Airport. To his right was Lee Jeong-min, making his first trip as an instructor pilot for the South Korean carrier.

While the two men had years of aviation experience, this mission involved unfamiliar duties, and it was the first time they had flown together. The flight came to a tragic end when the airliner came in too low and too slow, killing two passengers and injuring many others as it skittered and spun along the ground.

Investigators trying to piece together what went wrong on Sunday are looking at the pairing of the pilots, who were assigned to work together through a tightly regulated system developed after several deadly crashes in the 1980s blamed in part on inexperience in the cockpit.

They will also be examining the men's working relationship, according to US National Transportation Safety Board chairman Deborah Hersman. "We are certainly interested to see if there are issues where there are challenges to crew communication, if there's an authority break in where people won't challenge one another," she said yesterday.

Pilots are trained to communicate their concerns openly, Hersman says, "to make sure that a junior pilot feels comfortable challenging a senior pilot and to make sure the senior pilot welcomes feedback in a cockpit environment from all members of the crew and considers it".

In August 1997, Korean Air Flight 801 crashed into a hill during heavy rain as the captain tried to make an instrument landing on the US territory of Guam. Besides pilot fatigue, the cause of the Boeing 747-300 crash was put down to a cultural issue: respectful subordinate crew declined to challenge the captain's authority.

The NTSB has concluded interviews with all four pilots who were aboard the weekend Asiana Airlines flight. Hersman says the pilot trainee told investigators he was blinded by a light at about 500 feet, which would have been 34 seconds before impact, and the point at which the airliner began to slow and drop precipitously. Lasers had not been ruled out. It is unclear, however, whether the flash might have played a role in the crash.
Hersman also says that a third pilot in the jump seat of the cockpit told investigators he was warning his colleagues as they approached the runway that their speed was too slow.

Hersman added that, once the plane had come to a stop, the pilots told passengers to remain seated while they communicated with the tower as part of a safety procedure. Hersman says this has happened after other accidents and is not necessarily a problem.

People did not begin fleeing the aircraft until 90 seconds later, when a fire was spotted outside the aircraft. "We don't know what the pilots were thinking, though I can tell you in previous accidents there have been crews that don't evacuate, they wait for other vehicles to come to be able to get the passengers out safely," Hersman says.

It is possible the pilots in the cockpit could not see the fire outside the aircraft, she adds. "Certainly, if there is an awareness that there's fire on board an aircraft, that is a very serious issue." The NTSB chief stresses that, while the trainee pilot was flying the plane, the instructor is ultimately responsible, and thus the way that they worked together will be scrutinised.

James Hall, a former NTSB chairman, says: "That's what the airline needs to do, be responsible so that in the cockpit you're matching the best people, especially when you're introducing someone to a new aircraft."
Massachusetts Institute of Technology aeronautics professor Mary Cummings says it is common for two commercial pilots who have never worked together before to be assigned to the same flight.

However, she says that the military typically tries to have crews work together more permanently. "Research would tell you that crew pairing with the same people over longer periods of time is safer," Cummings says.
"When two people fly together all the time, you get into a routine that's more efficient. You have experience communicating."

Jeff Skiles, a US Airways first officer, says that with the right training it should not matter if a pilot new to a plane is paired with a pilot making his first trip as a training captain. "Everybody had to have their first time," Skiles says. "You can't show up and have 500 hours experience in an aircraft."

Skiles was the co-pilot of the "Miracle on Hudson" jet that lost thrust in both engines after colliding with a flock of geese in January 2009 taking off from New York's LaGuardia Airport.

The skilful flying of captain Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger and teamwork between Skiles and Sullenberger was credited for a water landing on the Hudson River that saved the lives of all aboard. That accident happened after the pilots had been paired together for only four days.

Details emerging from the Asiana Airlines pilot interviews, cockpit recorders and control-tower communications indicate that Lee Gang-kuk, who was halfway through his certification training for the Boeing 777, and his co-pilot and instructor thought the airliner's speed was being controlled by an autothrottle set at 157mp/h.

Inspectors found that the auto-throttle had been "armed" or made ready for activation, Hersman says. However, investigators are still determining whether it had been engaged. In the final two minutes, there was a lot of use of autopilot and auto-thrusters, and investigators intend to look into whether pilots made the appropriate commands and if they knew what they were doing.

When the pilots realised the plane was approaching the waterfront runway too low and too slow, they both reached for the throttle. Passengers heard a roar as the plane revved up in a last-minute attempt to abort the landing.

The two pilots at the controls during the accident had also been in the cockpit for take-off. Then they rested during the flight while a second pair of pilots took over. The two pairs swapped places again about 90 minutes before landing, giving the trainee a chance to fly during the more challenging approach phase.

With the investigation continuing, Hersman is cautioning against speculating about the cause of the crash. However, she stresses that, even if the auto-throttle did malfunction, the pilots were still ultimately responsible for control of the airliner.

"There are two pilots in the cockpit for a reason," she says. "They're there to fly, to navigate, to communicate, and if they're using automation (then) a big key is to monitor." As the trainee pilot flew, she says, the instructor captain, who is ultimately responsible for flight safety, was tasked with monitoring. The third pilot was in the cockpit jumpseat also to monitor the landing. The Asiana Airlines flight originated in Shanghai and stopped over in Seoul before making the almost 11-hour trip to San Francisco.

A dozen survivors were still in hospital yesterday, half of them flight attendants, including three thrown from the airliner during the accident. One has been identified as 25-year-old Maneenat Tinnakul, whose father told the Thairath newspaper in Thailand that she suffered a minor backache. Another flight attendant, Sirithip Singhakarn, was reported to be in intensive care.

Meanwhile, fire officials are continuing their investigation into whether one of their trucks might have run over one of the two Chinese teenagers headed for a US summer camp, Wang Linjia and Ye Mengyuan, who were killed in the crash.

Citing similarities to a February 2009 fatal US airline crash near Buffalo, New York state, Democrat senator Charles Schumer yesterday called on the Federal Aviation Administration to issue long-delayed safety regulations that would require pilots to undergo more extensive training on how to avoid stalling accidents.

"While the (Asiana) investigation is still ongoing, one thing is clear, this crash and the other recent crashes like Flight 3407 demonstrate a troubling pattern in which pilots are mishandling air speed, which can lead to fatal stalls," Schumer said.

Whatever everyone's opinion on the different methodologies to handling/managing an investigation, NTSB vs ATSB, it is obvious that the NTSB approach will certainly provide all worldwide aviation stakeholders with a source of valuable lessons probably for many years to come! Something sadly lacking in the Norfolk ditching 'Final Report'

Lefty I guess it is implying that both pilots were 'green on green', hence the relevance to this thread Tinny, not to mention the references to reliance on automation which was also relevant to the Pilot Training Inquiry.

Perhaps this Avweb article is a better example of the relevancy to this thread (and ironically to the other Senate thread):

I do it. You do it. We all do it.
As pilots, in the wake of an accident like Asiana 214 last Saturday in San Francisco, we crank up our piety and discipline and decline public comment until the investigators are done. But amongst ourselves, there’s no such restraint and there’s not much in the e-mail I’ve been getting, either, the tone of which is to flat out ask how this crew could have flown such an unstable, off-speed approach. Might as well come right out and say it, even if it will be months before the NTSB puts the puzzle together and learns why the pilots appeared to be so far off acceptable airmanship, much less an A-game. I’ve seen a few unkind student pilot analogies posted and not all of them are from the aviation illiterate masses.

If the current fact pattern is sustained, I’m sure the NTSB will get around to finding out how large looms the human factors aspect of this accident. And at that juncture, a certain déjà vu settles in; a couple of correspondents think they’ve seen this movie before. One of the things investigators will probably examine is how the flying pilots worked both the automation and the CRM. That may cause the surprise appearance of a large elephant long thought dead: the bad old days of Korean air safety when KAL and related companies had 16 hull losses between 1970 and 1999. Two of the worst were KAL 801 in Guam and KAL 8509, both of which occurred within two years of each other in 1997 and 1999.

In KAL 801, the Captain failed to brief the 747 crew on the approach then followed erroneous glideslope signals, crashing into a hill and killing 228. Investigators determined that a contributing cause was a fundamental aspect of Korean culture in which subordinates don’t question their superiors--filial piety woven into the base societal structure in a way that deifies the left seat occupant. In the west, you'll sometimes hear the term "five-striper" applied to such a situation . The FO and engineer on 801 failed to question the Captain’s actions and decision-making, the very thing that modern CRM is supposed to prevent.

The circumstances were different for 8509, a 747 freighter, but the outcome was the same.The Captain’s INU/ADI had proven faulty on the inbound flight and wasn’t repaired properly. When the Captain overbanked on a night takeoff from London’s Stansted Airport, the FO rode through the subsequent departure and crash without uttering a word, even though his ADI was functioning normally. That accident proved to be a watershed for KAL, serving as a wakeup call to improve training and CRM in a way that eventually elevated the airline to among the safest in the world. But human perfectibility being what it is, changing a thousand years of culture might not be as easy as that, and I’m sure investigators will consider it during their interviews and CVR analysis.

Some have seen in the 214 accident an eerie echo of another more recent crash: Air France 447 in 2009. In that accident, three crew members mushed a perfectly recoverable aircraft into the ocean because of confusion over instrument and automation indications and a baffling inability to interpret stall indications. Could flight 214’s crew have suffered similar confusion over the arming of but the failure to engage the autothrottles? Did that even matter? Is there a human interface issue with the automation that’s a design flaw or a training lapse in the airline’s program? I’m sure that’s another lead that will have to be pursued in explaining why the approach went so wrong.

The Asiana crash reminds me of another accident I remembered, but I had to call my friend John Eakin at Air Data Research to pin down the details. It was Continental 1713, which crashed on departure in a raging snow storm from the then-Stapleton Airport in Denver in November, 1987. The investigation revealed that the airline had paired two inexperienced in-type crew members, one with 166 hours, the other with 26 hours. And the relatively green Captain assigned the takeoff to the FO who over rotated on takeoff and lost control of the DC-9.

After 1713, the NTSB recommended—and the FAA adopted—not pairing two low-time crew members on the same flight. I suspect the NTSB will consider if Asiana repeated that mistake. Although both pilots had plenty of total time, the Captain was 43 hours into his IOE and, according to Asiana, the check airman training him was on his first flight as an instructor. Could that, coupled with whatever remnants of Korean culture that persist despite CRM training, have been a factor?
I’m sure that question will come up, too. And given the language and culture barriers, I don’t envy the NTSB figuring it out.

I rest my case your Honour??

[Lookleft]

AS Flight 214 descended over San Francisco Bay, the Asiana Airlines
pilots were trying something new.

Sarcs could you point be in the direction in the article of what the new thing was the Asiana pilots were trying?

[Tidbinbilla]

Back on topic, please. That being the senate enquiry.

[Sarcs]

Now this is definitely relevant to this thread!

ATSB research report released today...

Pilot experience and performance in an airline environment

And Ben's article:

ATSB says hours not valid safety factor in new pilot jobs

http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2013/07/17/atsb-says-hours-not-valid-safety-factor-in-new-pilot-jobs/


Ben Sandilands | Jul 17, 2013 2:05PM | EMAIL | PRINT
An ATSB research report has found that there was no evidence to indicate that cadets or low-hour pilots recruited by Australian airlines were any less competent or proficient than their direct entry and high-hour peers.
The research and subsequent analysis was carried out to address the controversy over pilot experience and training outcomes following the US move to require high minimum hours of actual flight experience for junior pilots employed by its airlines in the aftermath of the 2010 Continental (Colgan) disaster.
The ATSB collected data on various metrics from simulator check flights, which covered non-normal operations, and line checks, which covered normal day-to-day flight operations.
In summary it found that:
The overall performance of cadets and low-hour pilots matched that of their direct entry and high-hour peers. All pilots were marked as proficient at the completion of the check flights, with the only differences between the groups being a function of how many exceeded the required standard.
The differences between the low and high-hour pilots in ‘meeting’ and ‘exceeding’ the standard across all metrics were variable within airlines and inconsistent across all three airlines. This suggests that the differences between the groups were not of a systemic nature that would highlight an area of concern for industry. While the metric normal landing showed a difference across two of the three airlines, none of the other required regulatory manoeuvres or technical metrics were significantly different in more than one airline. For non-technical metrics, both leadership and situation awareness were significantly different in all three airlines. Although this is understandable given the low experience of cadet and low-hour pilots, focused exposure to those metrics during initial airline training may reduce this difference as was seen in the data for cadets collected at the 5-year mark in one airline.
Three Australian airlines were studied. While not identified it is thought that one was Qantas, or a unit of its Qantaslink operation, that another was Virgin Australia, and the third, in which only a single type of airliner was referenced may have been Regional Express or REX, or Skywest prior to its takeover by Virgin.
Despite the intriguing variations found when it come to the performance of low hour inductees between carriers and in abnormal flight situations (download and study the report in a some spare hours) the report finds that “the cadet pathway for low-hour pilots is a valid option for airlines.”
It would be astonishing if it hadn’t reached this conclusion, however the detailed report supports an important observation in common about the Air France AF447 disaster involved a crew with high hours, and the Colgan crash, involving a less experienced set of pilots.

Okay if I'm reading this right the enquiry was a waste of time and money according to the bureau??

[004wercras]

There was once a time when I would have respected a report like that from the ATSB, trusted its detail and content and then considered that information as to how it may add value to my organisation. But that was in the pre-Beaker days. With the current 3 non aviation experienced Commissioners, including Grand Commissioner Beaker and his 'beyond Reason' hypotheses I would have to say that this report will be inaccurate, tainted, the opposite to the truth and generally smell like pot plant fertiliser.

If ATSB want to regain the trust, respect and robust reputation they once held with pride, they need to ditch the mi mi mi mi-ing one at the helm, his two minions and the other boot lickers puffing up these buffoons ego's. Until that day occurs I will use their reports for purposes not fit to mention on a family style website such as this (unless the reports are authored by a consultant such as Alan Stray )

[c173]

http://www.australianflying.com.au/news/cadet-pilots-meet-the-standard-study

Last paragraph reads:

'Most interesting is that the study results showed that direct entry pilots generally performed better in "non-normal" operations, a function, no doubt, of the experience that comes with flying hours.'

[Sarcs]

Stabilised and Unstabilised approaches

In recent years there has been several ATSB reports (some of which were highlighted in the Pilot Training & Airline Safety enquiry) dealing with unstabilised approaches and Operational Non-compliance while conducting an approach. Therefore a recent blog piece by the Flying Profs investigating the Asiana Flight 214 is IMO of particular relevance. Stabilized and Unstabilized Approaches at KSFO

Quote from the 'Implications' section of that article:

Implications
What are the implications of these data? Although the dataset is not large, it seems possible that there is a structural issue (training, airlines policies, ATC issues, etc.) that is leading to Asiana flying high energy, unstabilized approaches (or failing to go around when they do, since my data doesn’t include cases where flights go around). Of course, it’s impossible to differentiate between, say, a training issue and an airline policy issue by looking at the data here. But if you believe that flying an unstable approach was a contributing factor in the Asiana 214 crash (my tentative opinion is that it was), and the apparent higher rate of unstabilized approaches by Asiana in this limited dataset is real, then there is an important issue that the NTSB and FAA should investigate.
As an aside, there's been no shortage of cultural explanations for the crash, including assertions that Korean pilots engage in too much rote learning, or that they defer too much to senior pilots because Korean culture emphasizes respect for elders. Please don't construe this post as supporting that position. Whether there are significant cultural issues (national or corporate) that contributed to the crash can't possibly be determined from the data presented here. Our focus at Flying Professors is on the math and physics of flying and the joy that that brings (and least to a certain geeky demographic), and we'd like to keep it that way. But please see the article by James Fallows at the Atlantic for a nice discussion about the role of culture in Asiana Flight 214 (and also for some kind words about Flying Professors).

Hats off to the Flying profs!

[Lookleft]

My head hurts Sarcs after reading that but I do understand what they are driving at. It would be interesting for them to do a similar chart for other carriers to see how much of a difference there is (if one exists) for geographic/cultural differences.

[Sarcs]

Forgot this one Mods and this one or maybe even this one....hmm sure there's probably more floating around in cyberspace???

[halfmanhalfbiscuit]

Passing strange the mods closed the senate inquiry and regulatory reform without reason. Why didn't they warn and remove offending posts. The senate inquiry was one of the most successful threads on the oz nz area. Within a whisker of 600,000 views.

Sarcs, thanks for reminding about the Hempels inquest this month.

Did the meeting the Atsb planned for 24th to discuss re opening the pel air investigation happen?

Guessing casaweary gets people's blood pressure rising. Probably best to stay focussed on the issues not the personalities.

[Kharon]

A measured response to Senate probing?

Regulatory reform Australian style cannot any longer be described as an elephant in the room. We must now beware of Rhinoceros charging about the place. Rhino as in lots of money – Sorearse as in the pain inflicted by these clumsy, dangerous experiments in bad law.

Roll up - Have your knee jerk reaction to unpleasant Senate probing in sensitive areas– robustly managed – right here.

NPRM 1304OS – Regulation of aeroplane and helicopter “ ambulance function” flight as Air Transport Operations has been posted to the CASA website for public comment/review at:

The purpose of this NPRM is to advise the public and aviation community of CASA’s intent to regulate, to the greatest extent practicable, ambulance function flights to the same safety standards that are currently applicable to AT operations.

CASA considers that Part 119 of CASR, with its robust operator management systems, should be implemented by (and integrated into) these essential passenger transport services. This policy and change of classification is based on CASA’s recognition that the focus of these operations is primarily passenger-carrying in nature, albeit in a highly specialised manner, and conforms more closely to international norms for the conduct of these operations.

However, CASA acknowledges that, in some cases, applying all of the Air Transport Operations suite of standards to MT flights would not be practicable. Due to the highly specialised nature of some MT flights, some of the rules in these operational Parts will not apply and other requirements that are not characteristic of normal AT operations will be addressed specifically for MT flights.

This NPRM canvasses those areas of the Air Transport Operations suite where additional compliance or relief considerations would be required, taking into account the purpose and nature of MT flights. CASA seeks comment from the public and aviation community on this proposed policy change to MT operations. My bold.

Now I know there are some clever, competent folk who read these threads, perhaps they would care to read NPRM 1304OS; carefully, and provide comment on this excellent thesis, proposing a micro management approach based on the chaos principal. This to be melded into Part 119. The 'aerodrome standards' part, stand alone left to the discretion of the average FOI opens several interesting avenues for 'robust' discussion.

This appears to be a hastily redrafted version of the one produced several years back which created a requirement for the QPS Citation pilot to shoot someone, thus allowing an 'emergency' to be declared, enabling them to then land at the proposed destination aerodrome (if it was not one of the 14 defined as 'allowable'). That's a yarn that always makes me smile....

Please Minister, can we have our marbles back?

[Up-into-the-air]

casa just do not get it!!!!!!!!!

OK Kharon, the read is at:

Civil Aviation Safety Authority - Changing the rules

There are just thirty five:
Active projects - Flight operations

How on earth can the industry keep up.


casa just don't want us and



Are regulating us out of existance by weight of regulations and micro-management as you say.

[Lucky Six]

ATSB Review

Is this all we are going to get from the Senate report? By Ben Sandilands:

ATSB processes to be independenty reviewed | Plane Talking

[thorn bird]

Well I think this quote says it all..depending how you "Interpret it"...which means....How the FOI of the day "Interprets it" OR how the "Iron Ring" directs the FOI of the day to interpret it.

"intent to regulate, to the greatest extent practicable"

Therefore this could mean:
"Shut the bastards down, dont care how you do it, just shut them down"....understand this was a directive to a certain "Wabbit"at the BK warren.
OR
It could mean:
"Just ensure that it is so expensive that nobody in their right mind could could afford it"...This ensures that no aircraft actually commit "aviation"..all in the interests of "Safety" of course...therefore we can big note our safety record at the Montreal cocktail parties.
Bit like the"let them eat cake" quote..bugger the punters, if they die on the road "Aint our fault"

I would really hate to think that the Mods were pressured into shutting down a thread that generated such interest because of pressure from such an obviously corrupt organisation. This is Australia guys, not Zimbawi.

[Kharon]

A never ending story.

A Never-Ending Story.

Trapping Safety into Rules: How Desirable or Avoidable is Proceduralization?
Bieder, Corrine; Bourrier, Mathilde (editors). Farnham, Surrey, England and Burlington, Vermont, U.S: Ashgate, 2013. 300 pp. Figures, tables, references, index. Trapping Safety into Rules— there is a title as provocative as you are likely to see this year in books aimed at aviation safety professionals.

The book itself is a study and no light "read", fact. The article from Flight Safety is thought provoking and worthy of some consideration in context with our regulatory reform rhinoceros. The BRB are going to have a whip around; see if we can't send a Christmas copy (or two) to the warren, perhaps in the vainglorious hope that the shelf-ware can compete with canapés, champagne and annoying cabin crew on those long, first class flights to exotic destinations.

Any way – the article is badly formatted so I have cherry picked some random paragraphs as an appetitive.

The editors think so. Bieder and Bourrier say that proceduralization of safety is part of a general trend toward “the bureaucratization of everyday life. … Even commonplace consumption or simple emotions are rationalized and subject to prescribed procedures, notably at the workplace. In addition, the dangerous link between bureaucratization and administrative evil has also long been established. The key role played by technical rationality in this irresistible and sometimes dangerous push always combines scientific method and procedures. Therefore, it requires us to stay alert and vigilant in front of constant re-engagement towards more rules and regulations.”1

Personnel do not have infinite attention capacity. Under a regime of excessive proceduralization, they must devote an increasing amount of their attention to keeping up with and following rules and regulations. The corollary is that some time and energy must be debited from attention to the real-world working environment.

Trapping Safety into Rules is a collection of chapters examining various aspects of the theme. Part I is “Where Do We Stand on the Bureaucratic Path Towards Safety?” Part II is about “Contrasting Approaches to Safety Rules.” Part III includes chapters under the heading “Practical Attempts to Reach Beyond Proceduralization,” and Part IV is “Standing Back to Move Forward.”

Several of the book’s chapters suggest that the actual effects of procedures at the “sharp end” must be studied as carefully as their abstract validity. In “Working to Rule, or Working Safely,” Andrew Hale and David Borys say, “Rules and procedures are seen as essential to allocate responsibility and to define and guide behaviour in complex and often conflicting environments and processes. Behind this logical, rational obviousness lies another ‘truth’ about the reality of safety rules and their use.”

They cite a study of Dutch railway workers’ attitudes to safety rules: “Only 3 percent of workers surveyed used the rules book often, and almost 50 percent never; 47 percent found them not always realistic, 29 percent thought they were used only to point the finger of blame, 95 percent thought that, if you kept to the rules, the work could never be completed in time, 79 percent that there were too many rules, 70 percent that they were too complicated and 77 percent that they were sometimes contradictory.”

The authors present two contrasting models of safety rules.

Model 1, popular among those with an engineering background or way of thinking, “sees rules as the embodiment of the one best way to carry out activities, covering all contingencies. They are to be devised by experts to guard against the errors of fallible human operators, who are seen as more limited in their competence and experience, or in the time necessary to work out that one best way.”

Model 2, derived more from sociology and psychology, perceives rules as “behaviour emerging from experience with activities by those carrying them out. They are seen as local and situated in the specific activity, in contrast with the written rules, which are seen as generic, necessarily abstracted from the detailed situation.”

Hale and Borys discuss many studies of both models of rulemaking. Each model has researchers who take a stand basically for or against them; other researchers advocate a balanced position.

The authors themselves conclude, “The review of the two models and their development and use has resulted in the definition of a broad set of concerns and dilemmas. The picture that emerges is of a gap between the reality of work and its routines and the abstraction of the written rules that are supposed to guide safe behaviour. We have described contrasting perceptions of deviations from those written rules, either as violations to be stamped out or as inevitable and sometimes necessary adaptations to local circumstances to be used and reinforced. …

“Model 1 is more transparent and explicit than the tacit knowledge and emerging set of routines characterized by model 2. This makes it more suitable for trainers, assessors and improvers, but at the cost of creating a gap between work as imagined in the rule set and work as carried out in practice. … Rules may be imposed from above, but they must be at least modified from below to meet the diversity of reality. …

“Model 2 fits best with complex, high-uncertainty, high-risk domains with great variety and need for improvisation. However, in these activities, there is scope for making guidance and protocols more explicit, usable and used, by specifying them as process rules rather than action rules.” 

There's also a good article on Crosswind landing, worth the half cup of coffee it takes to read. Thanks Flight Safety.

[004wercras]

"Practical Attempts to Reach Beyond Proceduralization"?? Sounds like a type of Beaker methodology?
At the end of the day human governments have and are becoming more and more paranoid about accountability. As a result they massage and introduce law upon law and rule upon rule, all done under the guise of 'safety' or some othwr ficticious reason, but in reality all done to cover their pathetic asses. But society is wising up to their weasel words, empty statements and hypocritical standards. You can only push people so far before the masses fight back. The French revolution is a noteworthy study if you have the time to examine that time period deeply. Perhaps they should consider that fact and include it in their methodology?

[Algie]

004

Good point about the paranoia on accountability.

We need (i.e us the public) to own up to some of our own role in this. Forcing Macca's to put "Caution, might be HOT" on coffee cups etc, insurance premiums on pony clubs that grind them down etc....on every potentially "risky" issue some group somewhere wants everyone else to be accountable. for everything.

We collectively want someone else to own the solution to everything.

So all we get are the risk avoiders. Won't build rail link to MEL airport in case it costs too much. Won't build a second Sydney airport or alter existing flight paths or curfews because there will be pushback from hysterical voters. Can't build a decent medium speed rail line MEL-CBR-SYD because it might cost money. Qantas won't order 777s because they're not quite perfect. The list goes on.

I could go on too.....but I think you get the point. Wish we could wind back the clock.

Algie

[004wercras]

Phelan's latest about Fort Fumble stupidity

CAsA dines on another pooh sandwich?
Another brief but salient article below by Phelan which exposes the idiocy that embodies Fort Fumble.
Wow, these old ex pilots and long term legal eagles really have their eye on the ball at FF, NOT.

Maintenance mayday resolved | Pro Aviation

[Kharon]

Fractured fairy tales-repaired.

The pre-emptive and IMO wholly unnecessary closure of a Senate Inquiry thread very effectively destroyed the impetus and focus on some very serious issues. I expect there were huge sighs of relief around various campfires. Disappointing? a little, but perhaps our real disappointment should be reserved for those who should know better but chose 'safe closure' over moderation and balance. Aye well, such are the mysteries and miseries of modern life.

I am always amused when a direct quote from a Hansard transcript reveals yet another howler or a crock-up how very few posters (if any) attempt to defend the 'accused'. E.g. I've not yet seen a word said in defence of the decision to leave the sleeping OBR dog from the Pel Air aircraft lay.

Scattered to the winds, posters sought refuge is various threads diffusing cogent comment through various topics; there have been some excellent posts made which would have been of interest to the dedicated followers of the now locked Senate thread:-

ATSB reports – kicked off by Old Akro

ATSB to be reviewed by Canadian TSB - courtesy TWT.

CAO 100.5 – by TNUC.

CASA – The Mc-Comick view – instigated by UITA.

All worthy of a few moments consideration. However, undaunted Paul Phelan has provided a focus point for those who still have an interest and belief (hope) that some good will come from the last Senate inquiry. I don't believe the likes of David Fawcett, Nick Xenophon, Bill Heffernan, Fiona Nash, Glen Sterle et al, enjoy having the likes of Beaker and McComic publicly thumbing their noses at the committees honest efforts to bring some semblance of realism to matters aeronautical.

Sen Fawcett remains unimpressed: “This raises serious concerns about the efficacy of any resulting report unless the Minister ensures that the terms of reference (ToR) and Australian management of the audit are transparent and independent.”

Senator Fawcett again called on Minister Albanese to ensure that this review of the ATSB has the confidence of the aviation industry and the public by adopting Recommendation 8 of the Senate report:

“While the engagement of the Canadian TSB is welcome, the gravity of the issues raised in the Senate report means that theMinister should be overseeing the review with the support of an expert panel rather than the ATSB,” Senator Fawcett said.

“It is critical that this review of the ATSB is allowed to examine all sensitive areas of the ATSB investigation processes as identified in the Senate report including the Canley Vale accident.”

Election squabbling buries air safety recommendations.