Merged: Senate Inquiry
Join Date: Mar 2011
Location: Florence
Age: 74
Posts: 121
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
DAS credibility
Dear Miniscule,
If Mike Smith has been considered not good enough for the DAS appointment
, then be warned that the person you appoint must have demonstrably superior skills, knowledge and regulatory experience that are credible in the eyes of the industry if you are not about to embark on a second wave of dissent in the aviation regulatory space. 
If you pick a dud, neither you nor your appointee will get any slack in the Parliament or the press...
If Mike Smith has been considered not good enough for the DAS appointment
, then be warned that the person you appoint must have demonstrably superior skills, knowledge and regulatory experience that are credible in the eyes of the industry if you are not about to embark on a second wave of dissent in the aviation regulatory space. If you pick a dud, neither you nor your appointee will get any slack in the Parliament or the press...
Join Date: Oct 2010
Location: Styx Houseboat Park.
Posts: 2,055
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Is Truss the reincarnation of 'Elphy Bay'?
Flashman – by G.M. Fraser has long been one of my top 10 reads. Our erstwhile DPM reminds me of the Flashman description of General William Elphinstone. a.k.a. Elphy Bey. The parallels irresistibly draw the reader to the inevitable conclusion.
You can see what I mean – the train wreck is occurring as we speak – the only mystery remaining is where will the wreckage lay when it stops. IF the unthinkable happens and there are almost 60 outstanding recommendations for reform, a damning Senate report and a damning Government report and a demeaning international report gathering dust on the minuscule's desk then the fall of a government would be inevitable.
You are being badly and deceitfully advised Minister; appoint Mike Smith with David Fawcett to oversight; and deal with the very real issues before disaster (in one form or another) strikes. Shirley there must be one of the 'inner circle' who can see through this flummery and advise the Minister that Pink Bats in the belfry may sound like one of those good ideas, but get it wrong and lives are lost.
Selah.
But I still state unhesitatingly, that for pure, vacillating stupidity, for superb incompetence to command, for ignorance combined with bad judgment --in short, for the true talent for catastrophe -- Elphy Bey stood alone. Others abide our question, but Elphy outshines them all as the greatest military idiot of our own or any other day.
Only he could have permitted the First Afghan War and let it develop to such ruinous defeat. It was not easy: he started with a good army, a secure position, some excellent officers, a disorganised enemy, and repeated opportunities to save the situation. But Elphy, with the touch of true genius, swept aside these obstacles with unerring precision, and out of order wrought complete chaos. We shall not, with luck, look upon his like again.
And later, when Elphy’s incompetence causes things to go from bad to worse to downright disastrous:
Possibly there has been a greater shambles in the history of warfare than our withdrawal from Kabul; probably there has not…I am at a loss for words to describe the superhuman stupidity, the truly monumental incompetence, and the bland blindness to reason of Elphy Bey and his advisers. If you had taken the greatest military geniuses of the ages, placed them in command of our army, and asked them to ruin it utterly as speedily as possible, they could not – I mean it seriously -- have done it as surely and swiftly as he did. And he believed he was doing his duty. The meanest sweeper in our train would have been a fitter commander.
Only he could have permitted the First Afghan War and let it develop to such ruinous defeat. It was not easy: he started with a good army, a secure position, some excellent officers, a disorganised enemy, and repeated opportunities to save the situation. But Elphy, with the touch of true genius, swept aside these obstacles with unerring precision, and out of order wrought complete chaos. We shall not, with luck, look upon his like again.
And later, when Elphy’s incompetence causes things to go from bad to worse to downright disastrous:
Possibly there has been a greater shambles in the history of warfare than our withdrawal from Kabul; probably there has not…I am at a loss for words to describe the superhuman stupidity, the truly monumental incompetence, and the bland blindness to reason of Elphy Bey and his advisers. If you had taken the greatest military geniuses of the ages, placed them in command of our army, and asked them to ruin it utterly as speedily as possible, they could not – I mean it seriously -- have done it as surely and swiftly as he did. And he believed he was doing his duty. The meanest sweeper in our train would have been a fitter commander.
You are being badly and deceitfully advised Minister; appoint Mike Smith with David Fawcett to oversight; and deal with the very real issues before disaster (in one form or another) strikes. Shirley there must be one of the 'inner circle' who can see through this flummery and advise the Minister that Pink Bats in the belfry may sound like one of those good ideas, but get it wrong and lives are lost.
Selah.
Last edited by Kharon; 6th Sep 2014 at 18:41. Reason: Perhaps runways could be paved with pink bats – for soft landings?
'Bureaucracy virus' - home to roost.
Kharon - You are being badly and deceitfully advised Minister; appoint Mike Smith with David Fawcett to oversight; and deal with the very real issues before disaster (in one form or another) strikes. Shirley there must be one of the 'inner circle' who can see through this flummery and advise the Minister that Pink Bats in the belfry may sound like one of those good ideas, but get it wrong and lives are lost.
Findings against public servants in royal commission ‘regrettable’
The royal commission says public servants should be examined for wrongdoing in the home insulation rollout. The Public Service Commission calls it “regrettable”.
The public service commissioner says it’s “regrettable” findings were made against senior public servants in the royal commission into home insulation. And the federal department responsible for the management of the botched pink batts program is examining the recommendations, including whether senior public servants should face action.
The royal commission says public servants should be examined for wrongdoing in the home insulation rollout. The Public Service Commission calls it “regrettable”.
The public service commissioner says it’s “regrettable” findings were made against senior public servants in the royal commission into home insulation. And the federal department responsible for the management of the botched pink batts program is examining the recommendations, including whether senior public servants should face action.
So RED is probably high enough up the food chain to be filtered from any real scrutiny in the aftermath of the HIP RC but will he escape such scrutiny in certain other areas that fall within his remit??
It has been suggested that one major area of vulnerability for RED is Government leased airports. Since Senator Fawcett's first foray into Senate Estimates one of his major campaigns has been to expose this vulnerability of RED and his Department.
The following is a long passage of Hansard from the Supp Estimates from October 2011 but it is IMO important to put in full:
Senator FAWCETT: Gentlemen, a number of individuals and aviation associations have criticised—in fact, some have condemned in quite strong words—both the minister and the department for their handling of the issues around commercial development on Bankstown and Archerfield airports. I would like to know if you would make an opening statement about how you see the department's role in interacting with airport operators, the minister and CASA in terms of that process.
Mr Mrdak: I would be interested in seeing what those comments are. I do not believe that those comments are in any way reflective of the regulatory arrangements and the actual situation at a number of airports, particularly those. I am aware of recent criticism of decisions, but I do not think that some of the media commentary reflects the facts.
In essence our role is set out in the act and also under the airport leases, which provide for the way in which we go about ensuring that the airport master plan provides for growth at the airports for aeronautical and non-aeronautical activity and to make sure that demand is being met. We also have a range of statutory requirements in relation to building control, environmental regimes and operations of the airport that we administer. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority obviously has responsibility for safety at the airports.
In relation to particular planning matters there are obviously differences of views at times between those of the airport operators in relation to development and those of some of the customers at that airport, particularly general aviation customers. I would characterise that at times as being robust, but I do not believe I would agree at any time that the act, the regs and the statutory requirements have not been met.
Senator FAWCETT: You mentioned that one of your requirements it to ensure the potential for growth. Are you referring there to growth in the aviation use of the airport or growth in the commercial use of the airport?
Mr Mrdak: Both. Our primary focus is to make sure the airports are available to provide facilities for aviation growth. That is the primary focus of the master planning process and the way in which we regulate the airports.
Senator FAWCETT: Perhaps if we go to a couple of examples that might help to unpack some of the concerns of industry. We will start with Archerfield and runway 28 right in particular. There have been some concerns in terms of the new corporate hangars and warbird hangars that have been built very close to runway 28 right and the impact that has in terms of instrument flight rules departures from that runway. One of the initial actions when that was raised was that the runway take-off distance available was shortened. If you look at the on-route supplement in the annexe at the rear, that restriction is still there. That starts to limit the type of aircraft that you can operate. If you are looking to operate a business jet or even something like a King Air 350, for example—which in Archerfield's case would need a weight exemption—that starts limiting rather than enhancing the growth of the airport. Can you explain that inconsistency for me?
Mr Mrdak: I am not sure there is. I will ask Mr Doherty to comment. I am certainly not aware that there has been any restriction on anyone's ability to operate from that field.
Senator FAWCETT: Shortening the runway is one heck of a restriction.
Mr Mrdak: I would be interested in seeing whether that has actually in practice impacted on any operation, but I will ask Mr Doherty to comment on the specifics.
Mr Doherty: Certainly the intention would not be to allow a development which was going to restrict the nature of the operation. I am aware that there has been controversy over a couple of buildings at Archerfield and I understand that there was basically disagreement between experts as to the extent to which that may or may not affect the operations of some aircraft at that airport. My understanding was that the most recent exercise on that was a study by the ATSB that indicated that those structures were, in fact, not an issue, so there was not an ongoing program. I am interested to hear you say that the restriction is still reflected in the documentation. The way the process should work would be that, if the airport lessee proposes a development, if would go through a building control process and would be referred to the expert agencies—in this case particularly, Air Services and CASA—for them to comment on any possible interference with aviation operations. As I understand in that case, it must have been around the interpretation at that stage. While it was given the clearance at the time, I think there are others who felt subsequently that it should not have been. But as I said, I thought the latest on that episode was that the ATSB had had a close look at it and advised that they did not see this as a problem.
Senator FAWCETT: You are correct that the ATSB did do an investigation and you are correct that there was a difference of opinion; but, interestingly, the ATSB investigation appears to have made the same error of interpretation of the Manual of Standards part 139, which looks at obstacle clearances, in that there are actually two tables in the back of that chapter which determine clearance gradients required. They took table 7.1, which applies to approach and landing clearances, and table 7.1-2 applies to the take-off requirement and expands the runway width requirement from 150 to 180 metres. With that, the splay that then goes out puts those two buildings well and truly in the zone where it impacts on the capability to use that for departures.
Mr Doherty: I am not able to comment that—that is not an area within my expertise—but it may be a matter that you can take up with ATSB.
CHAIR: Rather than spending the next 20 minutes inquiring, is this the place for Senator Fawcett to ask the questions about his concerns or is it ATSB?
Senator FAWCETT: If I can continue, all I am doing is highlighting an example. We have had the secretary tell us that everything is rosy. I have three or four examples where quite clearly the process of checking, verification and independent audit of the advice, whether it is given by the airport operator, by a consultant or by CASA in some cases has not been taken up and acted on appropriately by the department. That is the issue at hand, so all that detail was merely an example where due diligence has not been applied to a process and the end result is operational restrictions on people at the airport, which flies directly in the face of the stated intention of providing paths for growth for the airport.
CHAIR: Okay. This is fantastic. From a truckie to a test pilot, I do not mind what you do. What I am trying to say is we are not going to sit here all night if there is a quicker way of you getting answers. I am just going to put it to you that way. So I go back to my original question: are we in the right area?
Mr Mrdak: I think there are a range of issues Mr Doherty has been discussing with the senator. I think we need to have a look at what the senator wishes to put forward.
Mr Wolfe: I may add something. With regard to those particular claims that you have indicated in relation to the ATSB advice, my understanding is that the ATSB has responded to those claims, so I would definitely suggest you take it up with the ATSB.
Senator FAWCETT: Okay, let us have a look at the runway and safety area at the end of runway 28 right. You talked about the fact that there is a building inspector who works for the federal government, who is supposed to be involved as part of that development process. In fact the Archerfield Airport Corporation on their website when they talk about developments, very clearly lay out the criteria that should trigger the involvement of a federal agency, and the auction site which has been built in that safety area—or just over the road but still in the area concerned—was not referred—and please correct me if I am wrong—to the building inspector. The airport made their own determination that the site, which was a hardstand for the purpose of auctioning and selling large trucks and machinery and those sorts of things, did not constitute something that they needed to actually involve the federal government in.
Speaking as a professional pilot—and, thankfully, most of my aviation experience in single-engine aircraft means that I have had an ejection seat—if I have a large obstacle in front of me and the engine fails, I can leave the aircraft. The people on the ground will suffer the consequences. In this case part of the requirement in place is that the Queensland government has identified public safety areas around the runway ends.
CHAIR: If there is a question, Senator Fawcett, I would urge you to get to it, please.
Senator FAWCETT: My question is: why are the checks and balances not in place to make sure that when things occur that impact operations on airports which still come under Commonwealth or, where by lease, Commonwealth control, that the airport operator does actually refer things? And, if the subsequent activities on that land break state regulations, why are the checks and balances not there to make sure that we are supporting safe operations at airports? The Commonwealth has said that it wants to work with the state, and the minister has said in his recent speeches that he wishes to integrate more with the state and make sure we work with them. Clearly, the system has broken down in this case.
Mr Doherty: We may need to look more closely at the particular case, but my understanding is that, yes, there is a Queensland policy relating to public safety zones, and certainly in the white paper and beyond we are keen to have that reflected in planning particularly on the airport but also off-airport to the extent that it can. Those policies operate in different ways to define an area within which activity should be restricted because of the risk of exposing either the aircraft or persons on the ground to the risk of damage and, while it might be slight, it becomes a problem.
It does not work as a complete prohibition, however. There may be a range of activities which are still permissible in that area if they do not involve bringing a large concentration of people. So while it might be inappropriate to have a large shopping centre or something like that which involves congregating large groups of people, it may be quite appropriate to have a longstay car park or something which does not involve having large groups of people there at one time.
My understanding of that case is that it has been looked at and that the nature of the activity conducted there does not infringe the public safety zone policy. But it is something that we can take further advice on.
Senator FAWCETT: I would ask you to, and to take that on notice. Certainly what is there, and there is photographic evidence of it being there—large pieces of plant as well as many members of the public attending auctions at that location—is problematical. As you read both the Queensland legislation and the federal, the obligation is a two-way street. One is to protect people on the ground—and there was an accident adjacent to that location a number of years ago when the pilot, and four people working in a factory, were killed when an aircraft crashed. There is also the obligation to the aircraft and its pilot and passengers to provide safety in a zone which is one of the most critical areas. US studies show that about 80 per cent of accidents occur in that area on takeoff, or landing when there is an undershoot, if you have an engine failure. The obligation is on your department to make sure that we provide a safe area around airports so that in the event of an emergency the pilots do have somewhere to land. It is not like military aircraft with ejection seats and the options to try and turn back. Civilians are constrained—
CHAIR: Senator Fawcett, I will remind you that if there is a question would you please come to it. The questions are very important, but I do not honestly believe we need all the preamble. You have the call and I urge you to get to the question.
Mr Wilson: We will take the issue with regard to the end zone at Archerfield on notice and provide the committee with a detailed response.
Senator FAWCETT: About the process: there was a repcon in Flight Safety Australia recently, which looked at the issue of building approvals again, this time well away from the airport. But things that affect what are called the PANS-OPS clearance requirements for aircraft that are in IFR—so they cannot see. What became very clear in that repcon was that as the redacted report went to different agencies the airport operators said, 'It is up to CASA'. And CASA said, 'We can't, actually—it's up to the department'. The department came back and said, 'Look, processes are in place'. But we have seen over the years that rather than saying, 'No, you can't build a building, because that actually infringes the requirements,' the building has gone ahead and instead there has been a reactive approach where the gradients and flight settings increase.
Senator Carr: Be fair. The minister put out a white paper on these issues, the first that had ever actually been produced by the Commonwealth. It outlined the procedures with regard to planning for development around airports. You have raised some issues with regard to one site, which the department has undertaken to have a look at. But I do think we have to get this in context; none of this work was ever done before.
Senator FAWCETT: My point is that this is not just around Archerfield. It is also around the Sydney Basin, and this is a clear indication that what has been put in place in terms of a process is not being applied, monitored or audited. My question is: what checks and balances are in place from the department to make sure that the processes that are laid down are actually being followed and adhered to? What independent body audits or checks the application of these processes?
Mr Doherty: There is work on foot on this. We do take the protection of those services very seriously. There is the OLS relating to visual flight and the PANS-OPS relating to instrument flight. The PANS-OPS is seen as non-negotiable; there is no scope for an intrusion into the PANS-OPS for any particular time.
We have provisions in the Commonwealth legislation which are designed to provide notice of proposed buildings which would go close to the controlled surface, to allow those to be assessed and to make a judgement. We are currently working with a group of state officials to try to do a couple of things. One is to make sure that those sorts of controls are expanded properly into airports which are not controlled under the Commonwealth's Airports Act provisions. And secondly, to make sure that we have robust arrangements in place for how they are administered. So we are keen to work on making sure that we have the right arrangements in place to make sure those are given effect to. We agree with you: those are extremely important.
Senator FAWCETT: I think if you look into it—and again, I am happy to be corrected—I believe that there are at least two examples in Brisbane and Sydney where the PANS-OPS base has been increased as a result of buildings that have gone up and have not been blocked, even though under our ICAO obligations we are supposed to. I encourage you to look into that and, if I could put that on notice to come back to me—
Mr Wilson: If you could put those two examples on notice that would be helpful.
Senator FAWCETT: Certainly.
Mr Mrdak: I would be interested in seeing what those comments are. I do not believe that those comments are in any way reflective of the regulatory arrangements and the actual situation at a number of airports, particularly those. I am aware of recent criticism of decisions, but I do not think that some of the media commentary reflects the facts.
In essence our role is set out in the act and also under the airport leases, which provide for the way in which we go about ensuring that the airport master plan provides for growth at the airports for aeronautical and non-aeronautical activity and to make sure that demand is being met. We also have a range of statutory requirements in relation to building control, environmental regimes and operations of the airport that we administer. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority obviously has responsibility for safety at the airports.
In relation to particular planning matters there are obviously differences of views at times between those of the airport operators in relation to development and those of some of the customers at that airport, particularly general aviation customers. I would characterise that at times as being robust, but I do not believe I would agree at any time that the act, the regs and the statutory requirements have not been met.
Senator FAWCETT: You mentioned that one of your requirements it to ensure the potential for growth. Are you referring there to growth in the aviation use of the airport or growth in the commercial use of the airport?
Mr Mrdak: Both. Our primary focus is to make sure the airports are available to provide facilities for aviation growth. That is the primary focus of the master planning process and the way in which we regulate the airports.
Senator FAWCETT: Perhaps if we go to a couple of examples that might help to unpack some of the concerns of industry. We will start with Archerfield and runway 28 right in particular. There have been some concerns in terms of the new corporate hangars and warbird hangars that have been built very close to runway 28 right and the impact that has in terms of instrument flight rules departures from that runway. One of the initial actions when that was raised was that the runway take-off distance available was shortened. If you look at the on-route supplement in the annexe at the rear, that restriction is still there. That starts to limit the type of aircraft that you can operate. If you are looking to operate a business jet or even something like a King Air 350, for example—which in Archerfield's case would need a weight exemption—that starts limiting rather than enhancing the growth of the airport. Can you explain that inconsistency for me?
Mr Mrdak: I am not sure there is. I will ask Mr Doherty to comment. I am certainly not aware that there has been any restriction on anyone's ability to operate from that field.
Senator FAWCETT: Shortening the runway is one heck of a restriction.
Mr Mrdak: I would be interested in seeing whether that has actually in practice impacted on any operation, but I will ask Mr Doherty to comment on the specifics.
Mr Doherty: Certainly the intention would not be to allow a development which was going to restrict the nature of the operation. I am aware that there has been controversy over a couple of buildings at Archerfield and I understand that there was basically disagreement between experts as to the extent to which that may or may not affect the operations of some aircraft at that airport. My understanding was that the most recent exercise on that was a study by the ATSB that indicated that those structures were, in fact, not an issue, so there was not an ongoing program. I am interested to hear you say that the restriction is still reflected in the documentation. The way the process should work would be that, if the airport lessee proposes a development, if would go through a building control process and would be referred to the expert agencies—in this case particularly, Air Services and CASA—for them to comment on any possible interference with aviation operations. As I understand in that case, it must have been around the interpretation at that stage. While it was given the clearance at the time, I think there are others who felt subsequently that it should not have been. But as I said, I thought the latest on that episode was that the ATSB had had a close look at it and advised that they did not see this as a problem.
Senator FAWCETT: You are correct that the ATSB did do an investigation and you are correct that there was a difference of opinion; but, interestingly, the ATSB investigation appears to have made the same error of interpretation of the Manual of Standards part 139, which looks at obstacle clearances, in that there are actually two tables in the back of that chapter which determine clearance gradients required. They took table 7.1, which applies to approach and landing clearances, and table 7.1-2 applies to the take-off requirement and expands the runway width requirement from 150 to 180 metres. With that, the splay that then goes out puts those two buildings well and truly in the zone where it impacts on the capability to use that for departures.
Mr Doherty: I am not able to comment that—that is not an area within my expertise—but it may be a matter that you can take up with ATSB.
CHAIR: Rather than spending the next 20 minutes inquiring, is this the place for Senator Fawcett to ask the questions about his concerns or is it ATSB?
Senator FAWCETT: If I can continue, all I am doing is highlighting an example. We have had the secretary tell us that everything is rosy. I have three or four examples where quite clearly the process of checking, verification and independent audit of the advice, whether it is given by the airport operator, by a consultant or by CASA in some cases has not been taken up and acted on appropriately by the department. That is the issue at hand, so all that detail was merely an example where due diligence has not been applied to a process and the end result is operational restrictions on people at the airport, which flies directly in the face of the stated intention of providing paths for growth for the airport.
CHAIR: Okay. This is fantastic. From a truckie to a test pilot, I do not mind what you do. What I am trying to say is we are not going to sit here all night if there is a quicker way of you getting answers. I am just going to put it to you that way. So I go back to my original question: are we in the right area?
Mr Mrdak: I think there are a range of issues Mr Doherty has been discussing with the senator. I think we need to have a look at what the senator wishes to put forward.
Mr Wolfe: I may add something. With regard to those particular claims that you have indicated in relation to the ATSB advice, my understanding is that the ATSB has responded to those claims, so I would definitely suggest you take it up with the ATSB.
Senator FAWCETT: Okay, let us have a look at the runway and safety area at the end of runway 28 right. You talked about the fact that there is a building inspector who works for the federal government, who is supposed to be involved as part of that development process. In fact the Archerfield Airport Corporation on their website when they talk about developments, very clearly lay out the criteria that should trigger the involvement of a federal agency, and the auction site which has been built in that safety area—or just over the road but still in the area concerned—was not referred—and please correct me if I am wrong—to the building inspector. The airport made their own determination that the site, which was a hardstand for the purpose of auctioning and selling large trucks and machinery and those sorts of things, did not constitute something that they needed to actually involve the federal government in.
Speaking as a professional pilot—and, thankfully, most of my aviation experience in single-engine aircraft means that I have had an ejection seat—if I have a large obstacle in front of me and the engine fails, I can leave the aircraft. The people on the ground will suffer the consequences. In this case part of the requirement in place is that the Queensland government has identified public safety areas around the runway ends.
CHAIR: If there is a question, Senator Fawcett, I would urge you to get to it, please.
Senator FAWCETT: My question is: why are the checks and balances not in place to make sure that when things occur that impact operations on airports which still come under Commonwealth or, where by lease, Commonwealth control, that the airport operator does actually refer things? And, if the subsequent activities on that land break state regulations, why are the checks and balances not there to make sure that we are supporting safe operations at airports? The Commonwealth has said that it wants to work with the state, and the minister has said in his recent speeches that he wishes to integrate more with the state and make sure we work with them. Clearly, the system has broken down in this case.
Mr Doherty: We may need to look more closely at the particular case, but my understanding is that, yes, there is a Queensland policy relating to public safety zones, and certainly in the white paper and beyond we are keen to have that reflected in planning particularly on the airport but also off-airport to the extent that it can. Those policies operate in different ways to define an area within which activity should be restricted because of the risk of exposing either the aircraft or persons on the ground to the risk of damage and, while it might be slight, it becomes a problem.
It does not work as a complete prohibition, however. There may be a range of activities which are still permissible in that area if they do not involve bringing a large concentration of people. So while it might be inappropriate to have a large shopping centre or something like that which involves congregating large groups of people, it may be quite appropriate to have a longstay car park or something which does not involve having large groups of people there at one time.
My understanding of that case is that it has been looked at and that the nature of the activity conducted there does not infringe the public safety zone policy. But it is something that we can take further advice on.
Senator FAWCETT: I would ask you to, and to take that on notice. Certainly what is there, and there is photographic evidence of it being there—large pieces of plant as well as many members of the public attending auctions at that location—is problematical. As you read both the Queensland legislation and the federal, the obligation is a two-way street. One is to protect people on the ground—and there was an accident adjacent to that location a number of years ago when the pilot, and four people working in a factory, were killed when an aircraft crashed. There is also the obligation to the aircraft and its pilot and passengers to provide safety in a zone which is one of the most critical areas. US studies show that about 80 per cent of accidents occur in that area on takeoff, or landing when there is an undershoot, if you have an engine failure. The obligation is on your department to make sure that we provide a safe area around airports so that in the event of an emergency the pilots do have somewhere to land. It is not like military aircraft with ejection seats and the options to try and turn back. Civilians are constrained—
CHAIR: Senator Fawcett, I will remind you that if there is a question would you please come to it. The questions are very important, but I do not honestly believe we need all the preamble. You have the call and I urge you to get to the question.
Mr Wilson: We will take the issue with regard to the end zone at Archerfield on notice and provide the committee with a detailed response.
Senator FAWCETT: About the process: there was a repcon in Flight Safety Australia recently, which looked at the issue of building approvals again, this time well away from the airport. But things that affect what are called the PANS-OPS clearance requirements for aircraft that are in IFR—so they cannot see. What became very clear in that repcon was that as the redacted report went to different agencies the airport operators said, 'It is up to CASA'. And CASA said, 'We can't, actually—it's up to the department'. The department came back and said, 'Look, processes are in place'. But we have seen over the years that rather than saying, 'No, you can't build a building, because that actually infringes the requirements,' the building has gone ahead and instead there has been a reactive approach where the gradients and flight settings increase.
Senator Carr: Be fair. The minister put out a white paper on these issues, the first that had ever actually been produced by the Commonwealth. It outlined the procedures with regard to planning for development around airports. You have raised some issues with regard to one site, which the department has undertaken to have a look at. But I do think we have to get this in context; none of this work was ever done before.
Senator FAWCETT: My point is that this is not just around Archerfield. It is also around the Sydney Basin, and this is a clear indication that what has been put in place in terms of a process is not being applied, monitored or audited. My question is: what checks and balances are in place from the department to make sure that the processes that are laid down are actually being followed and adhered to? What independent body audits or checks the application of these processes?
Mr Doherty: There is work on foot on this. We do take the protection of those services very seriously. There is the OLS relating to visual flight and the PANS-OPS relating to instrument flight. The PANS-OPS is seen as non-negotiable; there is no scope for an intrusion into the PANS-OPS for any particular time.
We have provisions in the Commonwealth legislation which are designed to provide notice of proposed buildings which would go close to the controlled surface, to allow those to be assessed and to make a judgement. We are currently working with a group of state officials to try to do a couple of things. One is to make sure that those sorts of controls are expanded properly into airports which are not controlled under the Commonwealth's Airports Act provisions. And secondly, to make sure that we have robust arrangements in place for how they are administered. So we are keen to work on making sure that we have the right arrangements in place to make sure those are given effect to. We agree with you: those are extremely important.
Senator FAWCETT: I think if you look into it—and again, I am happy to be corrected—I believe that there are at least two examples in Brisbane and Sydney where the PANS-OPS base has been increased as a result of buildings that have gone up and have not been blocked, even though under our ICAO obligations we are supposed to. I encourage you to look into that and, if I could put that on notice to come back to me—
Mr Wilson: If you could put those two examples on notice that would be helpful.
Senator FAWCETT: Certainly.
We then jump to the Supp Estimates for 2012 where DF began with this...
"...I will just distribute this map. Mr Mrdak, I am sure you would be disappointed if I did not come back to the issue of leased airports and the lot of operators on airports versus airport use..."
And if you thought that with the Coalition winning government that party politic may force DF to blunt his Airports campaign think again...
The parallels between the HIP RC disturbing findings against the PS and the apparent Dept obfuscation of Govt leased airports, may seem tenuous but there is no doubt that Senator Fawcett will not let up till it is sorted, & hopefully before an RC is called...
MTF...
Ps Hmm...I hear Barnaby, DF & NX are very close??
TSBC peer review report - Shame for Truss also.
From Kharon's - SHAME for Truss.
And in an earlier post the Ferryman revealed (if true) a very disturbing rumour...:
A mystery indeed...
Also passing strange is how the ATsB 'go to' man, who was tasked with keeping all interested parties updated with the progress of the TSBC peer review, has from all reports suddenly gone mute?? Ironically this individual also heads up the ATsB Public Interest Disclosure scheme, see here:
A public interest disclosure can be reported to any of the following authorised officers in the ATSB:
Oh well whatever FF (and by association M&M) are trying to cover up, there is no doubt in my mind that the TSBC report cannot be stellar in it's appraisal of the ATsBeaker...
Despite the attempts of obfuscation, by parties outside of our supposedly independent AAI, the TSBC report will eventually have to be released, after all the TSBC have a seriously stellar reputation to uphold...
Finally it should again be highlighted that it is within the power of the miniscule to force the release of the TSBC report.
Shame on you miniscule..SHAME!
At the moment the CASA is staring down a damning report from a Senate committee, which through the investigation of one small incident uncovered a nightmare web of deception, incompetence, 'flexibility' of standards and a total disregard of expert advice. Notwithstanding the flagrant disregard for due process, protocol and the law the most sinister aspect of CASA process was revealed – a willingness to cloud over or cover up the absolute shambles. There can, from the evidence provided, be seen a clear trail of collusion, second agenda and the absolutely crystal clear intention of the manager overseeing the process to manipulate the investigation to suit a predetermined outcome. On May 23, 2013 the Senate released a damning report which, supported by an acknowledged aviation expert, made 26 serious, far reaching recommendations for reform of the regulator, which have simply been ignored by the current Minister, the CASA board and CASA.
And in an earlier post the Ferryman revealed (if true) a very disturbing rumour...
:
I expect the Senate will be interested to see if 'CASA' is ever going to allow the release of the TSBC report. The rumour is that the TSBC have released it; ATSB have seen it as has Truss, but 'CASA' are blocking the publication. Although why is a mystery; what TF has it to do with CASA or the Murky Machiavellian puppet master crew is beyond my humble reach. Normally a tale like that would be dismissed out of hand; but with so much going on behind closed doors, it's hard to know what to believe.
Also passing strange is how the ATsB 'go to' man, who was tasked with keeping all interested parties updated with the progress of the TSBC peer review, has from all reports suddenly gone mute?? Ironically this individual also heads up the ATsB Public Interest Disclosure scheme, see here:A public interest disclosure can be reported to any of the following authorised officers in the ATSB:
- Wayne Artuso, Governance Manager
Email: [email protected] - Martin Dolan, Chief Commissioner/Chief Executive Officer
Email: [email protected] - Julian Walsh, General Manager, Strategic Capability
Email: [email protected] - Peter Foley, General Manager, Surface Safety Investigations
Email: [email protected] - Ian Sangston, General Manager, Aviation Safety Investigations
Email: [email protected]
Despite the attempts of obfuscation, by parties outside of our supposedly independent AAI, the TSBC report will eventually have to be released, after all the TSBC have a seriously stellar reputation to uphold...
Finally it should again be highlighted that it is within the power of the miniscule to force the release of the TSBC report.
Shame on you miniscule..SHAME!
Last edited by Sarcs; 9th Sep 2014 at 11:57. Reason: Love it Soty old son!
Join Date: Aug 2014
Location: Yosemite
Age: 52
Posts: 177
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Should the Canadians publish the TSBC report in Canada?
Sarcs, if Truss won't release the TSBC report, perhaps this deceitful act can be leveraged off? You see, it cost the Canucks money to prepare and carry out their audit of the ATSBeaker. They then had to expend resources writing the final report, and the airfares, accommodation, travel allowances, mini bar bills and stuffed miniature kangaroos will have cost the Canucks a specific sum of their own taxpayer monies would it not? And even if the ATSBeaker footed the bill, the Canucks still had to send their people down under for a set period of time, disadvantaging their own department. So with that in mind, wouldn't the Canadian taxpayer want to see some evidential results of the trip down under, such as an audit report? Don't they want to see exactly what it was that their tax money was being used for? Regardless of what our Minister of coverups is doing here, why don't the Canucks release the audit report on their own website? Makes me wonder whether unlike in Australia, the Canadians have some sympathetic or even interested media outlets or industry people who would be interested in seeing the report and results of what their people did when down under? Surely the Canadians, who have learned a lot of lessons and have lead the field in aviation safety have their own international IOS affiliates?
Now wouldn't that be embarrassing if the Canucks apparent gesture of good will turned into an international bonfire? Oh dear, we know how much Governments hate bad press and hate bad relationships between normally friendly nations.
What do you think Minister, should the Australian chapter of the IOS take their concerns about your tactics of burying important and critical reports to a new level and commence a campaign for transparency upon our Canadian neighbours?
Now wouldn't that be embarrassing if the Canucks apparent gesture of good will turned into an international bonfire? Oh dear, we know how much Governments hate bad press and hate bad relationships between normally friendly nations.
What do you think Minister, should the Australian chapter of the IOS take their concerns about your tactics of burying important and critical reports to a new level and commence a campaign for transparency upon our Canadian neighbours?
Shame the Canucks??
Top idea Soty…:
Apparently, unlike our mob, the Canucks are big on transparency and accountability, example: Core Control Audit of the Transportation Safety Board of Canada January 2013
“…Canadians expect the federal government to be well managed and to be accountable for the prudent stewardship of public funds; the safeguarding of public assets; and the effective, efficient, and economical use of public resources. They also expect reliable and transparent reporting on how the government spends public funds to achieve results for Canadians.
The Financial Administration Act designates deputy heads as accounting officers for their department or agency. As accounting officers, deputy heads are accountable for ensuring that resources are organized to deliver departmental objectives in compliance with government policy and procedures; ensuring that there are effective systems of internal control; signing departmental accounts; and performing other specific duties assigned by law or regulation to the administration of their department or agency.
Core Control Audits are important as they provide deputy heads with assurance on the effectiveness of core controls over financial management in their respective organizations. By doing so, Core Control Audits inform deputy heads of their organization’s level of compliance with key requirements contained in selected financial legislation, policies, and directives…”
Not to mention the TSBC fiercely protect their independence and adhere strenuously to their mission mandate:
The Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act provides the legal framework that governs TSB activities. Our mandate is to advance transportation safety in the marine, pipeline, rail and air modes of transportation by
To instill confidence in the public regarding the transportation accident investigation process, it is essential that an investigating agency be independent and free from any conflicts of interest when investigating accidents, identifying safety deficiencies, and making safety recommendations. As such, the TSB is an independent agency, separate from other government agencies and departments, that reports to Parliament through the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons. Our independence enables us to be fully objective in making findings as to causes and contributing factors, and in making transportation safety recommendations.
In making its findings as to the causes and contributing factors of a transportation occurrence, it is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability. However, the Board does not refrain from fully reporting on the causes and contributing factors merely because fault or liability might be inferred from the Board’s findings. No finding of the Board should be construed as assigning fault or determining civil or criminal liability. Findings of the Board are not binding on the parties to any legal, disciplinary, or other proceedings.
Hmm..so Soteria who do you propose we pitch the IOS request to?? Any ideas??
MTF...
ps Soteria top handle....but I would never have guessed you to be female..
:
:
What do you think Minister, should the Australian chapter of the IOS take their concerns about your tactics of burying important and critical reports to a new level and commence a campaign for transparency upon our Canadian neighbours?
“…Canadians expect the federal government to be well managed and to be accountable for the prudent stewardship of public funds; the safeguarding of public assets; and the effective, efficient, and economical use of public resources. They also expect reliable and transparent reporting on how the government spends public funds to achieve results for Canadians.
The Financial Administration Act designates deputy heads as accounting officers for their department or agency. As accounting officers, deputy heads are accountable for ensuring that resources are organized to deliver departmental objectives in compliance with government policy and procedures; ensuring that there are effective systems of internal control; signing departmental accounts; and performing other specific duties assigned by law or regulation to the administration of their department or agency.
Core Control Audits are important as they provide deputy heads with assurance on the effectiveness of core controls over financial management in their respective organizations. By doing so, Core Control Audits inform deputy heads of their organization’s level of compliance with key requirements contained in selected financial legislation, policies, and directives…”
Not to mention the TSBC fiercely protect their independence and adhere strenuously to their mission mandate:
The Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act provides the legal framework that governs TSB activities. Our mandate is to advance transportation safety in the marine, pipeline, rail and air modes of transportation by
- conducting independent investigations, including public inquiries when necessary, into selected transportation occurrences in order to make findings as to their causes and contributing factors;
- identifying safety deficiencies, as evidenced by transportation occurrences;
- making recommendations designed to eliminate or reduce any such safety deficiencies; and
- reporting publicly on our investigations and on the findings in relation thereto.
To instill confidence in the public regarding the transportation accident investigation process, it is essential that an investigating agency be independent and free from any conflicts of interest when investigating accidents, identifying safety deficiencies, and making safety recommendations. As such, the TSB is an independent agency, separate from other government agencies and departments, that reports to Parliament through the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons. Our independence enables us to be fully objective in making findings as to causes and contributing factors, and in making transportation safety recommendations.
In making its findings as to the causes and contributing factors of a transportation occurrence, it is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability. However, the Board does not refrain from fully reporting on the causes and contributing factors merely because fault or liability might be inferred from the Board’s findings. No finding of the Board should be construed as assigning fault or determining civil or criminal liability. Findings of the Board are not binding on the parties to any legal, disciplinary, or other proceedings.
MTF...
ps Soteria top handle..
..but I would never have guessed you to be female..:
SOTERIA was the goddess or spirit (daimon) of safety, and of deliverance and preservation from harm.
Indeed Bloggsy and they're not going to let up on their SR being adequately addressed either..:
Quite amusing is the Canucks interpretation for CASA - Civil Aviation Safety Alert (CASA)...
:
News release
Voluntary approach to address recommendation from the 2011 Resolute Bay air accident may not go far enough
Gatineau, Quebec, 2 September 2014 — The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) today released its assessment of Transport Canada’s response to Recommendation A14-01, made following the release of the investigation report (A11H0002) into the 20 August 2011 controlled flight into terrain of a Boeing 737 in Resolute Bay, Nunavut. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and an ensuing post-crash fire. Eight passengers and all four crew members died, and three passengers were seriously injured.
In this accident, the aircraft arrived high and fast on final approach, was not configured for landing on a timely basis, had not intercepted the localizer, and was diverging to the right. This approach was not considered stabilized in accordance with the company’s stabilized approach criteria, and the situation required a go-around. Instead, the approach was continued. When the crew initiated a go-around, it was too late to avoid the impact with terrain. The Board recommended that Transport Canada require operators of large commercial aircraft (Canadian Aviation Regulations [CARs] Subpart 705 operators) to monitor and reduce the incidence of unstable approaches that continue to a landing.
In response, Transport Canada issued a Civil Aviation Safety Alert (CASA) in which Subpart 705 operators are encouraged to use their safety management systems (SMS) to identify the incidence of unstable approaches and to develop mitigation measures for the risks they pose.
Additionally, the CASA referenced the voluntary use of flight data monitoring (FDM) in order to gain a greater understanding of unstable approaches and the causes. The CASA was also distributed to Subpart 703 and 704 operators (smaller air carriers) to encourage voluntary participation in mitigation activity. In June 2015, Transport Canada will commence follow-up surveillance activity with operators to see what measures have been put in place to mitigate the risk. Operators who indicate they do not have a problem will be asked to substantiate this
conclusion.
“Unstable approaches continue to be a high risk to safe flight operations in Canada and worldwide,” said Kathy Fox, Chair of the TSB. “Although TC’s Safety Alert is a positive step, it will be some time before the effectiveness of this voluntary approach can be validated.”
The Board noted that SMS has been in place for several years for Subpart 705 operators, yet the incidence of unstable approaches has not been effectively addressed. As well, if a flight data monitoring program is not required by the regulator, operators may not have the data to assess the risk to their operation posed by unstable approaches. Therefore, the Board has assessed the response to Recommendation A14-01 as Satisfactory in Part and it will continue to monitor progress.
The TSB is an independent agency that investigates marine, pipeline, railway and aviation transportation occurrences. Its sole aim is the advancement of transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability.
For more information, contact:
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
Media Relations
819-994-8053
Voluntary approach to address recommendation from the 2011 Resolute Bay air accident may not go far enough
Gatineau, Quebec, 2 September 2014 — The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) today released its assessment of Transport Canada’s response to Recommendation A14-01, made following the release of the investigation report (A11H0002) into the 20 August 2011 controlled flight into terrain of a Boeing 737 in Resolute Bay, Nunavut. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and an ensuing post-crash fire. Eight passengers and all four crew members died, and three passengers were seriously injured.
In this accident, the aircraft arrived high and fast on final approach, was not configured for landing on a timely basis, had not intercepted the localizer, and was diverging to the right. This approach was not considered stabilized in accordance with the company’s stabilized approach criteria, and the situation required a go-around. Instead, the approach was continued. When the crew initiated a go-around, it was too late to avoid the impact with terrain. The Board recommended that Transport Canada require operators of large commercial aircraft (Canadian Aviation Regulations [CARs] Subpart 705 operators) to monitor and reduce the incidence of unstable approaches that continue to a landing.
In response, Transport Canada issued a Civil Aviation Safety Alert (CASA) in which Subpart 705 operators are encouraged to use their safety management systems (SMS) to identify the incidence of unstable approaches and to develop mitigation measures for the risks they pose.
Additionally, the CASA referenced the voluntary use of flight data monitoring (FDM) in order to gain a greater understanding of unstable approaches and the causes. The CASA was also distributed to Subpart 703 and 704 operators (smaller air carriers) to encourage voluntary participation in mitigation activity. In June 2015, Transport Canada will commence follow-up surveillance activity with operators to see what measures have been put in place to mitigate the risk. Operators who indicate they do not have a problem will be asked to substantiate this
conclusion.
“Unstable approaches continue to be a high risk to safe flight operations in Canada and worldwide,” said Kathy Fox, Chair of the TSB. “Although TC’s Safety Alert is a positive step, it will be some time before the effectiveness of this voluntary approach can be validated.”
The Board noted that SMS has been in place for several years for Subpart 705 operators, yet the incidence of unstable approaches has not been effectively addressed. As well, if a flight data monitoring program is not required by the regulator, operators may not have the data to assess the risk to their operation posed by unstable approaches. Therefore, the Board has assessed the response to Recommendation A14-01 as Satisfactory in Part and it will continue to monitor progress.
The TSB is an independent agency that investigates marine, pipeline, railway and aviation transportation occurrences. Its sole aim is the advancement of transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability.
For more information, contact:
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
Media Relations
819-994-8053
Join Date: Oct 2010
Location: Styx Houseboat Park.
Posts: 2,055
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Brinkmanship – on a razors edge.
Soteria –"Now wouldn't that be embarrassing if the Canucks apparent gesture of good will turned into an international bonfire?
Sarcs – "Not to mention the TSBC fiercely protect their independence and adhere strenuously to their mission mandate."
Bloggs –"The Canadians pulled no punches in the recent report into the 737 CFIT."
If Truss isn't man enough to do the job and won't hire a man like Mike Smith who will, perhaps it's time to start asking for the Truss resignation; before broken Abbott promises becomes the opposition theme song, after the next 'incident'.
Tick tock - Toot toot.
Last edited by Kharon; 10th Sep 2014 at 21:28. Reason: Bloggs #1244 – not me chum. Strict liability offence, fined 1 Choc frog.
Join Date: Jul 2010
Location: sydney
Posts: 1,469
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Kharon,
I think Sunny may have hit the nail on the head in the "Wuss" thread.
Could it be "Wusses" minder has evoked "National security" as a reason not to release the Canook report?
Wonder how the punters would feel about "National Security" being cynically invoked to cover up bureaucratic deficiencies that could have a profound affect on their Safety??
Oh!..sorry, CAsA do that all the time don't they, invoking "Safety" to cover up bureaucratic deficiencies.
I think Sunny may have hit the nail on the head in the "Wuss" thread.
Could it be "Wusses" minder has evoked "National security" as a reason not to release the Canook report?
Wonder how the punters would feel about "National Security" being cynically invoked to cover up bureaucratic deficiencies that could have a profound affect on their Safety??
Oh!..sorry, CAsA do that all the time don't they, invoking "Safety" to cover up bureaucratic deficiencies.
Join Date: Oct 2010
Location: Styx Houseboat Park.
Posts: 2,055
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Balance of probability.
The Senate committee must, by now be fully informed as to what's going on. We must just hope (or encourage) that their wonderings lead them to the inevitable conclusion; they're being done over by the same crowd they publicly exposed as charlatans.
The same crowd which mislead, obfuscated and 'file stuffed' their merry way through the AAI review now have recruited another ally, one with power and influence in their campaign to demonstrate that the Senate is a eunuch. The Senate report was damning, the Forsyth report, in a very subtle manner, even more so. It is reasonable to assume that the TSBC report on the ATSB is equally condemning.
The longer the TSBC report is delayed, the more alarmed the Australian public must be, not so much for their collective safety in the air, but for the inability Australia has to correct the flaws and minimise the risks of maintaining that safety standard.
What concerns me and should concern the TSBC is that the Canadian integrity can be so easily compromised and their charter as quickly confounded at the request of a foreign government, one desperately trying to convince the world to 'move along' – nothing to see here'. Probably played the 'national interest card' at some diplomatic tea party which soothed the fat cats but is driving the TSBC coal face troops nuts.
If Truss and his minions get away with this despicable cover up Australian standards will achieve a new all time low, fully supported by the Government minister who was too either to scared to care, too under the thumb to listen; or, just too idle to act – subjugated by and subservient to faceless public servants. This, by the by, emasculates the Senate, rendering the committee not only nugatory but irrelevant to the aftermath of the future incidents. The last line of defence undermined.
What makes the minuscule think that report has not been seen or even "edited" by the likes of 'independent' analysts ?. Is there not, within the camaraderie of 'safety experts' a system of peer review?; prior to publication – for 'proof reading', 'editorial' purposes and the like. Either the Canadians publish or; someone else will – hopefully in the international media. With egg-on-face for the Canucks who sold out to the Australians who bought it.
The TSBC report is every bit as damning as the Forsyth and Senate reports. They know it; the world knows it; how to cover it all up remains the sole question.
I wish 'them' the best of luck with that; burnt metal and high media drama, like flowers around a lamppost fade into irrelevance; as they must. But the notion of 'who's to bless and who's to blame' lives on, it lives long; hard and resolutely. Publish or perish is a universal maxim.
Selah..-.- &....
The same crowd which mislead, obfuscated and 'file stuffed' their merry way through the AAI review now have recruited another ally, one with power and influence in their campaign to demonstrate that the Senate is a eunuch. The Senate report was damning, the Forsyth report, in a very subtle manner, even more so. It is reasonable to assume that the TSBC report on the ATSB is equally condemning.
The longer the TSBC report is delayed, the more alarmed the Australian public must be, not so much for their collective safety in the air, but for the inability Australia has to correct the flaws and minimise the risks of maintaining that safety standard.
What concerns me and should concern the TSBC is that the Canadian integrity can be so easily compromised and their charter as quickly confounded at the request of a foreign government, one desperately trying to convince the world to 'move along' – nothing to see here'. Probably played the 'national interest card' at some diplomatic tea party which soothed the fat cats but is driving the TSBC coal face troops nuts.
Soteria –"What do you think Minister, should the Australian chapter of the IOS take their concerns about your tactics of burying important and critical reports to a new level and commence a campaign for transparency upon our Canadian neighbours?".
What makes the minuscule think that report has not been seen or even "edited" by the likes of 'independent' analysts ?. Is there not, within the camaraderie of 'safety experts' a system of peer review?; prior to publication – for 'proof reading', 'editorial' purposes and the like. Either the Canadians publish or; someone else will – hopefully in the international media. With egg-on-face for the Canucks who sold out to the Australians who bought it.
The TSBC report is every bit as damning as the Forsyth and Senate reports. They know it; the world knows it; how to cover it all up remains the sole question.
I wish 'them' the best of luck with that; burnt metal and high media drama, like flowers around a lamppost fade into irrelevance; as they must. But the notion of 'who's to bless and who's to blame' lives on, it lives long; hard and resolutely. Publish or perish is a universal maxim.
Selah..-.- &....
Sunday cogitation - " VH-IOS clear to backtrack!"
Senator XENOPHON: Yes, I do. When will we get the TSB review of the ATSB? In the next couple of weeks? When do you expect that to be?
Mr Dolan : My colleague Ms Tadros, the chair of the Transportation Safety Board, indicated to me two weeks ago that she expected that a draft would be complete and available to the ATSB for its consideration and factual input by the end of this month but that it was unlikely, given their internal processes, a final report would be available before the end of June.
Senator XENOPHON: So it is a bit later than you expected—and that is the draft. When you say 'factual input', does it mean that you have an opportunity to comment on the conclusions of the TSB?
Mr Dolan : The TSB have made it quite clear that their conclusions will be their conclusions and that they would be addressed in us confirming the factual content of the report to make sure that they have described our processes and other facts correctly.
Senator XENOPHON: Has the TSB provided a briefing to the Aviation Safety Regulation Review?
Mr Dolan : So I understand.
Senator XENOPHON: The ATSB was not present at that?
Mr Dolan : No, I believe it was in Ottawa.
Senator XENOPHON: You will have an opportunity to respond formally to the TSB's report. Is that right?
Mr Dolan : We will have an opportunity to comment on the factual content of a draft report. The report will then, after consideration by the TSB board, be published by the TSB. But since the report was to examine our processes and see where they could be improved, clearly we will have to respond to any findings or recommendations of the report.
Senator XENOPHON: So the draft report, the response to the draft and the final report and the ATSB's response to the final report are all documents that will be released publicly? Is that the case?
Mr Dolan : I do not believe our response to the draft report on matters of fact will necessarily be made public. It would not be the normal way of doing these things, but certainly anything we make public in terms of our response to findings or recommendations of the final report will be made public.
Mr Dolan : My colleague Ms Tadros, the chair of the Transportation Safety Board, indicated to me two weeks ago that she expected that a draft would be complete and available to the ATSB for its consideration and factual input by the end of this month but that it was unlikely, given their internal processes, a final report would be available before the end of June.
Senator XENOPHON: So it is a bit later than you expected—and that is the draft. When you say 'factual input', does it mean that you have an opportunity to comment on the conclusions of the TSB?
Mr Dolan : The TSB have made it quite clear that their conclusions will be their conclusions and that they would be addressed in us confirming the factual content of the report to make sure that they have described our processes and other facts correctly.
Senator XENOPHON: Has the TSB provided a briefing to the Aviation Safety Regulation Review?
Mr Dolan : So I understand.
Senator XENOPHON: The ATSB was not present at that?
Mr Dolan : No, I believe it was in Ottawa.
Senator XENOPHON: You will have an opportunity to respond formally to the TSB's report. Is that right?
Mr Dolan : We will have an opportunity to comment on the factual content of a draft report. The report will then, after consideration by the TSB board, be published by the TSB. But since the report was to examine our processes and see where they could be improved, clearly we will have to respond to any findings or recommendations of the report.
Senator XENOPHON: So the draft report, the response to the draft and the final report and the ATSB's response to the final report are all documents that will be released publicly? Is that the case?
Mr Dolan : I do not believe our response to the draft report on matters of fact will necessarily be made public. It would not be the normal way of doing these things, but certainly anything we make public in terms of our response to findings or recommendations of the final report will be made public.
However the questions that remain are did the DRAFT report while being checked for factual accuracy etc. get leaked to other parties example; the miniscule, the Dept or indeed the Senate Committee??
Hopefully not otherwise there would be further serious questions on whether the State (miniscule & his Dept) are upholding their responsibilities to Annex 19 to protect the integrity of the State AAI as being supposedly independent & not influenced by any other Govt aviation safety agencies...
Next question is has the DRAFT findings of the TSBC and indeed the Senate AAI report & ASRR report had any effect on the ATsB and how they go about business i.e. have they learnt from the lessons of the past?? Time will ultimately tell but the first indications are not that reassuring...
Back tracking to this post from Kharon:
Nearly under the radar.
Why was this - ATSB - report delayed 30 months? and why was it released under the white noise coverage of Qantas and Virgin reports? Standing alone there is nothing overtly sensitive, except the incident was Feb 2012 the Senate inquiry started in October. It is noteworthy that no SR issued at the time, which is really the main duty of ATSB. But at least another, fluffy politically correct report was issued - eventually.
Why was this - ATSB - report delayed 30 months? and why was it released under the white noise coverage of Qantas and Virgin reports? Standing alone there is nothing overtly sensitive, except the incident was Feb 2012 the Senate inquiry started in October. It is noteworthy that no SR issued at the time, which is really the main duty of ATSB. But at least another, fluffy politically correct report was issued - eventually.
Which is a shame because there is some real lessons to be learnt from this investigation and it would appear that ASA proactively attempted to mitigate any future safety risk and they deserve some kudos for this. Unfortunately through the passage of time and the BASR philosophy the true value of the lessons learnt are lost in translation perhaps forever.
MTF...(with another example that has disturbing parallels to the PelAir FRMS cover up)...
Comment: One wonders if the TSBC or NTSB had of been tasked with investigating the incident AO-2012-029 whether; (a) it would of taken over 30 months to publish a final report or; (b) whether the safety issues highlighted would have automatically necessitated a 'back to reason' promulgation of an SR?? Instead our bureau (with their BASR methodology) have sat on the 'safety issues' highlighted and have not even published, as a 'safety issue', on their website...
Last edited by Sarcs; 16th Sep 2014 at 00:37.
Part two - Of lessons learnt but not heeded.
The Kharon post here linked to Ben’s article - Is the Pel-Air cover-up going to drag on forever? Which indeed is a good question, much like the RRP will the obfuscation, embuggerance, pineappling & victimisation of minor IOS players, continue unabated until the inevitable extinction of the GA industry or smoking black hole finally grabs the attention of the travelling public and the MSM??
Ben makes the point:
Before I launch into - Part two- it is worth reflecting on a section of MQ’s testimony in the 22 October 2012 Senate AAI inquiry hearing…
"...Yes. It got very personal. I use the term 'pendulum'; the pendulum has now swung from one of adverse tension that was not producing the sort of outcomes that the aviation safety industry wants to completely the opposite way, where I believe those two organisations are basically acting as one....It is a professional thing and it is a big part of the aviation industry that there be transparency and that these two organisations have very specific roles under their acts, and that seems to have diminished...”
Ok the next example starts with this recently released report AO-2013-010. Again the report seems to have taken an inordinate amount of time (over 18 months) to complete given the relative (transparent) complexities involved?? However unlike the previous report this one does go to the trouble of highlighting a 'safety issue'; and eventually (22 August 2014) the bureau published this SI on their website..
: AO-2013-010-SI-01
Although one does wonder if this only happened because CAsA, for some bizarre reason, decided to put in their 2 bob's worth into a 'safety issue', that for all intents & purposes, had been resolved:
As we all know the introduction of CAO 48.1 has been the subject of much contention by Senator X (& some major pilot unions); it should also not be forgotten that 48.1 is effectively a wedge in the RRP, which hopefully will be resolved beyond yet another legislative instrument sometime in the next two decades...
Now for the parallels with the PelAir debacle, to begin remember this??
Senator Fawcett: “…With all due respect, Mr McCormick that complete answer had no relevance to the point that I raised. Everything you have said is quite possibly correct, but it has no relevance to the point that your own internal investigation indicated that CASA's oversight of the Fatigue Risk Management System at Pel-Air was inadequate…”
Some 21 months before the Pel-Air Norfolk Is ditching CAsA conducted a ‘Special Audit’ of Pel-Air’s CAR 217, for that audit report see here. In the course of conducting that audit CAsA discovered a serious non-compliance in regards to the training required for the company’s FRMS, this NCN led to the issuance of a ‘Safety Alert’:
Apparently the company responded proactively…
“…The company accepted CASA's decision and advised CASA on the 17th March 2008 that the required training had been completed. CASA responded on the 18th March 2008 by issuing approval for the company to resume operations in accordance with the FRMS…”
The audit report concluded with this recommendation (page 5):
{Note: The CAsA evaluation on page 6-7 is also worth reading, especially in light of the findings in the AAI inquiry}
Eventually the company CAR 217 (& FRMS) was given a reasonable bill of health (a tick & flick) with the addition of a CAsA caveat that they would be ‘closely monitoring’…
“..The Safety Alert was lifted flight crew were trained and they are currently operating under their FRMS. Management have been cooperative and the REX Board have launched an internal inquiry to ensuring a breach does not occur again. SYD Region is satisfied and are closely monitoring the operation…”
But then we had the ditching of VH-NGA and another ‘Special Audit’ with further damning findings highlighted in Ben Cook’s FRMS SAR.
Ahh…but don’t worry the company put in place and actioned a MAP that CAsA again ‘closely monitored’ and all is well again…
One word BOLLOCKS!
Until such time that we see positive proof that the ATsB has retreated from its current BASR approach and is prepared to (when required) hand out the proverbial pineapple; then the IOS will continue to ‘closely monitor’ all reports and propaganda being published by the bureau and CAsA with a suspicious eye…
MTF…
{Note for Beaker: Pineapples are not meant to be served as wedges decorating the sides of frosted cocktail glasses at some politically correct ‘love in’, organised by ATsBeaker…}
Ben makes the point:
Much depends on candid and fearless disclosure of the truth about the botched Pel-Air inquiry. For the Minister, for his department, for CASA, the ATSB, and the TSB of Canada, and not least, for those injured and damaged by this avoidable accident.
Before I launch into - Part two- it is worth reflecting on a section of MQ’s testimony in the 22 October 2012 Senate AAI inquiry hearing…
"...Yes. It got very personal. I use the term 'pendulum'; the pendulum has now swung from one of adverse tension that was not producing the sort of outcomes that the aviation safety industry wants to completely the opposite way, where I believe those two organisations are basically acting as one....It is a professional thing and it is a big part of the aviation industry that there be transparency and that these two organisations have very specific roles under their acts, and that seems to have diminished...”
Ok the next example starts with this recently released report AO-2013-010. Again the report seems to have taken an inordinate amount of time (over 18 months) to complete given the relative (transparent) complexities involved?? However unlike the previous report this one does go to the trouble of highlighting a 'safety issue'; and eventually (22 August 2014) the bureau published this SI on their website..
: AO-2013-010-SI-01Although one does wonder if this only happened because CAsA, for some bizarre reason, decided to put in their 2 bob's worth into a 'safety issue', that for all intents & purposes, had been resolved:
Although not in response to this occurrence, on 28 March 2013 the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) released revised fatigue management and flight and duty time requirements in Civil Aviation Order (CAO) 48.1 Instrument 2013. These requirements were to take effect for existing operators on 30 April 2016.
The revised CAO 48.1 stated that, for air transport operations, an operator had to comply with a set of limits and requirements (dependent on the type of operation) or operate to a fatigue risk management system (FRMS), if that FRMS was approved by CASA.
If an operator was not using a CASA-approved FRMS, CAO 48.1 stated that a flight crew member (FCM) must not be assigned or commence a flight duty period at home base unless, within the 12 hours immediately before commencing the duty period, they had at least 8 hours consecutive sleep opportunity. For a duty period commencing away from home base, the 8-hours sleep opportunity must be provided within the previous 10 hours. Sleep opportunity was defined as:
a period of time during an off-duty period when an FCM:
(a) is not meeting the reasonable requirements of bodily functioning such as eating, drinking, toileting, washing and dressing; and
(b) has access to suitable sleeping accommodation without, under normal circumstances, being interrupted by any requirement of the AOC [Air Operator’s Certificate] holder.
Compared to the previous standard industry exemption to CAO 48, the revised CAO 48.1 also provided more restrictions regarding the length of duty periods associated with early starts.
The revised CAO 48.1 stated that, for air transport operations, an operator had to comply with a set of limits and requirements (dependent on the type of operation) or operate to a fatigue risk management system (FRMS), if that FRMS was approved by CASA.
If an operator was not using a CASA-approved FRMS, CAO 48.1 stated that a flight crew member (FCM) must not be assigned or commence a flight duty period at home base unless, within the 12 hours immediately before commencing the duty period, they had at least 8 hours consecutive sleep opportunity. For a duty period commencing away from home base, the 8-hours sleep opportunity must be provided within the previous 10 hours. Sleep opportunity was defined as:
a period of time during an off-duty period when an FCM:
(a) is not meeting the reasonable requirements of bodily functioning such as eating, drinking, toileting, washing and dressing; and
(b) has access to suitable sleeping accommodation without, under normal circumstances, being interrupted by any requirement of the AOC [Air Operator’s Certificate] holder.
Compared to the previous standard industry exemption to CAO 48, the revised CAO 48.1 also provided more restrictions regarding the length of duty periods associated with early starts.
Now for the parallels with the PelAir debacle, to begin remember this??
Senator Fawcett: “…With all due respect, Mr McCormick that complete answer had no relevance to the point that I raised. Everything you have said is quite possibly correct, but it has no relevance to the point that your own internal investigation indicated that CASA's oversight of the Fatigue Risk Management System at Pel-Air was inadequate…”
Some 21 months before the Pel-Air Norfolk Is ditching CAsA conducted a ‘Special Audit’ of Pel-Air’s CAR 217, for that audit report see here. In the course of conducting that audit CAsA discovered a serious non-compliance in regards to the training required for the company’s FRMS, this NCN led to the issuance of a ‘Safety Alert’:
CAR 217 Training and Checking Organisation - Fatigue Risk Management System(FRMS)
The company's Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS) was approved by CASA on the
30th April2007. Operations conducted under this FRMS require training for all flight crewsprior to them being rostered for operational duty. The audit of the CAR 217 organisation'sflight crew training records revealed that while flight crews had been operating under theFRMS for 11 months, the FRMS training required had not been conducted. This noncompliancewas considered to represent an immediate threat to the safety of operations andCASA issued a 'Safety Alert' on the 12th March 2008 which required operations conductedunder the FRMS to cease and operations to be conducted in accordance with CA048.
The company's Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS) was approved by CASA on the
30th April2007. Operations conducted under this FRMS require training for all flight crewsprior to them being rostered for operational duty. The audit of the CAR 217 organisation'sflight crew training records revealed that while flight crews had been operating under theFRMS for 11 months, the FRMS training required had not been conducted. This noncompliancewas considered to represent an immediate threat to the safety of operations andCASA issued a 'Safety Alert' on the 12th March 2008 which required operations conductedunder the FRMS to cease and operations to be conducted in accordance with CA048.
“…The company accepted CASA's decision and advised CASA on the 17th March 2008 that the required training had been completed. CASA responded on the 18th March 2008 by issuing approval for the company to resume operations in accordance with the FRMS…”
The audit report concluded with this recommendation (page 5):
Given the fact that the company provide training and checking for 70 pilots it is important in the interest of operational safety for PEL management to resolve the issues stated in this report and establish more effective and frequent internal audit of the conduct and recording of the training and checking of flight crew. Given the number of pilots currently employed and the company's proposed expansion into the SAAB 340 aircraft, a review of the current workload of the Chief Pilot and Head of Training and Checking's should also be considered.
Eventually the company CAR 217 (& FRMS) was given a reasonable bill of health (a tick & flick) with the addition of a CAsA caveat that they would be ‘closely monitoring’…
“..The Safety Alert was lifted flight crew were trained and they are currently operating under their FRMS. Management have been cooperative and the REX Board have launched an internal inquiry to ensuring a breach does not occur again. SYD Region is satisfied and are closely monitoring the operation…”
But then we had the ditching of VH-NGA and another ‘Special Audit’ with further damning findings highlighted in Ben Cook’s FRMS SAR.
Ahh…but don’t worry the company put in place and actioned a MAP that CAsA again ‘closely monitored’ and all is well again…
One word BOLLOCKS!
Until such time that we see positive proof that the ATsB has retreated from its current BASR approach and is prepared to (when required) hand out the proverbial pineapple; then the IOS will continue to ‘closely monitor’ all reports and propaganda being published by the bureau and CAsA with a suspicious eye…
MTF…
{Note for Beaker: Pineapples are not meant to be served as wedges decorating the sides of frosted cocktail glasses at some politically correct ‘love in’, organised by ATsBeaker…
}
I was just reading the 2008 CASA audit, and was struck by a comment in the executive summary on page 2.
http://www.casa.gov.au/wcmswr/_asset...ef12-10004.pdf
"These aircraft operate mainly from bases at Sydney, Darwin, Nowra, and Brisbane conducting night freight within Australia, and national and international medevac and passenger charter. Airwork operations consist of target towing for the Royal Australian Navy at Nowra NSW using Learjet and Westwind aircraft."
This seems to suggest that at that time (March 2008), the medivac work was charter, and that it was only the RAN target towing that was air work? Thats how I interpret this paragraph. Perhaps it is badly worded, and the medivac was air work. However that is not how this reads.
Alternate fuel for remote islands was required for charter operations, but not for airwork. However this 2008 audit implies that the medivac work was in fact charter.
IIRC from the 2009 audit following the accident, Pelair pilots gave inconsistent answers when asked if they were operating as air work or charter.
The question I have now is which category Pelair were operating under. And which category did the AOC require Pelair to operate under.
http://www.casa.gov.au/wcmswr/_asset...ef12-10004.pdf
"These aircraft operate mainly from bases at Sydney, Darwin, Nowra, and Brisbane conducting night freight within Australia, and national and international medevac and passenger charter. Airwork operations consist of target towing for the Royal Australian Navy at Nowra NSW using Learjet and Westwind aircraft."
This seems to suggest that at that time (March 2008), the medivac work was charter, and that it was only the RAN target towing that was air work? Thats how I interpret this paragraph. Perhaps it is badly worded, and the medivac was air work. However that is not how this reads.
Alternate fuel for remote islands was required for charter operations, but not for airwork. However this 2008 audit implies that the medivac work was in fact charter.
IIRC from the 2009 audit following the accident, Pelair pilots gave inconsistent answers when asked if they were operating as air work or charter.
The question I have now is which category Pelair were operating under. And which category did the AOC require Pelair to operate under.
Join Date: Oct 2010
Location: Styx Houseboat Park.
Posts: 2,055
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
On the good ship Lollypop.
Nicely constructed Sarcs and well argued. Adding the personalities involved into the bare bones discussion gives the whole thing a curiously intriguing flavour. Have a read of the Audit report from the FOIA collection – March 2008; Mike (ret) Nolan was the 'lead auditor' reporting to 'tuther Wodger (manager) at the time. The whole thing is heading in a clearly defined direction until the changes are rung and a line mysteriously appears in the sand. Food for the thinking man, methinks:-
Now that is what I call service.
Tick, flick, tick, flick, tick, flick, tick, flick, tick, flick, tick, flick, tick, flick, tick, flick, tick, flick, tick, tick, flick, tick, flick, tick.
Bet there's a few who would have relished that consideration, yes indeed.
My Bold..
Perhaps I'm just too old and cynical – but the line in the sand is obvious. The Senate report, now rendered useless to anything else except historical value, very nearly, but not quite nailed the plot down. All that was required was a bunny and in true magical style, McComic pulled one out of his hat; (which is an alternate spelling of Whazoo).
If, and it's a big IF Fawcett mounts another Senate inquiry into CASA behaviour, motivated by sheer anger, generated by 20/20 hindsight; the questions may just be a little 'sharper'. It's a reasonable bet to take; normally the Pollies, suitably intimidated through lack of expertise, beautifully baffled by pony-pooh, subdued by dismissive attitude and seduced by the 'mystique' give up after an inquiry. If they don't then the time warp machine is plugged in and important matters float away down the back passage of time. The problem for Sleepy Hollow is that Fawcett and Co. are, not only justifiably 'cranky' but have the expertise to see clear through the smoke and mirrors; and, even if they don't, there is a plentiful supply of 'industry' expertise available to provide a helping hand.
The only question remaining, to vex the SP bookie, is that of party politics versus personal integrity.
Selah.
The company is staffed by approximately 120 employees which includes approximately 70 pilots all of whom are subject to the company's CASA approved CAR 217 training and checking organisation.
The audit was scheduled as a result of the inability of the audit team to complete an effective audit of the CAR 217 organisation in October 2007 due to the poor response of the majority of PEL pilots, and check pilot/ATOs to the request from PEL management for the provision of their logbooks. PEL Management accepted CASA's advice of a need to terminate the October 2007 audit and schedule a second audit when all pilots had responded to a subsequent request for the provision of logbooks.
Advice was given to PEL management by the audit team during the first day of the audit that there was no record of FRMS training of flight crew. PEL acknowledged this finding and CASA issued a Safety Alert on the same day.
The audit of the CAR 217 organisation's flight crew training records revealed that while flight crews had been operating under the FRMS for 11 months, the FRMS training required had not been conducted. This non compliance was considered to represent an immediate threat to the safety of operations and CASA issued a 'Safety Alert' on the 12th March 2008 which required operations conducted under the FRMS to cease and operations to be conducted in accordance with CA048. The company accepted CASA's decision and advised CASA on the 17th March 2008 that the required training had been completed. CASA responded on the 18th March 2008 by issuing approval for the company to resume operations in accordance with the FRMS.
Audit of 20 flight crew training records revealed that approximately 80% contained no evidence of training in Emergency Procedures Training- Life Jackets and Life Rafts or Human Factors Management Training. The company was advised on the 17 March 2008 of this breach of CAR 215 (9) and the CEO responded on the 20 March 2008 advising that the training would be conducted and completed within a week. The CEO also advised that the company had reviewed its training requirements as stated in the OPSM with regard to Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT), Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Systems (EGPWS), and Crew Resource Management (CRM) and that all pilots would complete appropriate training within I week.
There are a number of options available to CASA to respond to such breaches of legislation. In this case, CASA considers that the interests of safety will best be served as a first option, by giving you the opportunity to address the breach and initiate action to ensure there are no similar occurrences.
A special audit was conducted on Pelair’s CAR 217 Training and Checking organisation, following up on October 2007 audit. This resulted in a Safety Alert being issued against the Fatigue Risk Management System. The FRMS had been in place for 11 mths. It was established that no initial or recurrent training of any flight crew had been conducted. The Safety Alert prohibited Pelair from using the FRMS and required them to revert to CAO 48. Pelair reacted positively by rearranging schedules and implementing an immediate training program. The Safety Alert was lifted flight crew were trained and they are currently operating under their FRMS. Management have been cooperative and the REX Board have launched an internal inquiry to ensuring a breach does not occur again. SYD Region is satisfied and are closely monitoring the operation.
Perhaps I'm just too old and cynical – but the line in the sand is obvious. The Senate report, now rendered useless to anything else except historical value, very nearly, but not quite nailed the plot down. All that was required was a bunny and in true magical style, McComic pulled one out of his hat; (which is an alternate spelling of Whazoo).
If, and it's a big IF Fawcett mounts another Senate inquiry into CASA behaviour, motivated by sheer anger, generated by 20/20 hindsight; the questions may just be a little 'sharper'. It's a reasonable bet to take; normally the Pollies, suitably intimidated through lack of expertise, beautifully baffled by pony-pooh, subdued by dismissive attitude and seduced by the 'mystique' give up after an inquiry. If they don't then the time warp machine is plugged in and important matters float away down the back passage of time. The problem for Sleepy Hollow is that Fawcett and Co. are, not only justifiably 'cranky' but have the expertise to see clear through the smoke and mirrors; and, even if they don't, there is a plentiful supply of 'industry' expertise available to provide a helping hand.
The only question remaining, to vex the SP bookie, is that of party politics versus personal integrity.
Selah.
Last edited by Kharon; 16th Sep 2014 at 21:24. Reason: Non really - just an itch - you know how it is...
Join Date: Apr 2008
Location: Melbourne
Posts: 62
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Ah yes Kharon,
The interesting question is who and how it is decided whether tick and flick or "The Barrier" is the CAsA response. Clipboards , pencils and check boxes continue to cover a few inconsistencies at the said group of companies. Board Investigations can always be relied on of course......
I suppose the truth is that this behaviour has always gone on but the hypocrisy by the wegulator and its wabbits galls.
Enough. I'm off down the paddock to watch a few of the wabbits. Know your adversery and all that.
The interesting question is who and how it is decided whether tick and flick or "The Barrier" is the CAsA response. Clipboards , pencils and check boxes continue to cover a few inconsistencies at the said group of companies. Board Investigations can always be relied on of course......
I suppose the truth is that this behaviour has always gone on but the hypocrisy by the wegulator and its wabbits galls.
Enough. I'm off down the paddock to watch a few of the wabbits. Know your adversery and all that.
Last edited by Greedy; 18th Sep 2014 at 21:57.
Pel-Air cover-up saga - 'FRMS & polishing turds'
Top post that man and a good question to boot...
Perhaps the truth (&) lies are buried in this extremely defensive rant from the now retired DAS which was brought on by Senator Fawcett's comments - on buckets & wascily weports...
Greedy cont/-
The hypocrisy & the behaviour is indeed more than adequately highlighted in the above vid.
At one point the former DAS resorts to attacking the integrity of his former Manager of Human Factors (03:05) and then proceeds to steer around the real damning parts of the Cook FRMS SAR, with bluff & bluster on how things are oh so much better since he took over etc..etc.
However I diverge and for now let's go back to the two (obviously) tic infected Wodgers...
First we have Wodger one (W1), who tick & flicked his way through the 2008 Pel-Air audit; W1 summary - "All good nothing to see here!" Then unfortunately for W1 DJ through blood shot eyes managed to successfully ditch VH-NGA and had the audacity to survive...
Enter W2 who was tasked with overseeing the next 'Special Audit' of Pel-Air in the aftermath of the ditching. Part of the audit team included HF experts BC & MC who were primarily tasked with auditing the Pel-Air FRMS. Unfortunately for W2 BC was not given to the normal (SOP) perfunctory tick & flick exercise and responsibly took to his task with a complete top to bottom approach: {Ref page 3 FRMS SAR}
And from page 12 of FRMS SAR
Hmm...is it any wonder that W2 and the powers to be attempted to cover up (shelfware) the BC FRMS SAR...
It is also of interest to read the Cook RCA recommendations to the YSBK field office at page eleven. Which W2 interpreted, wrote and countersigned RCAs (all apparently on behalf of BC) applicable to BC's recommendations on pages 79 to 87 of the December 2009 Pel-Air SAR(see here)....
Also fascinating is that W2 was able to acquit all the 'on behalf of' RCAs in one single day i.e. 08 January 2010...
So again W2 comes up with the very same conclusions as W1 i.e. W2 summary - "All good nothing to see here!"
Given the good Senator Fawcett's no back down approach on other aviation matters since the Coalition formed government I don't think he will fold on this issue either, example:
MTF...
Greedy - The interesting question is who and how it is decided whether tick and flick or "The Barrier" is the CAsA response. Clipboards , pencils and check boxes continue to cover a few inconsistencies at the said group of companies. Board Investigations can always be relied on of course......
Greedy cont/-
I suppose the truth is that this behavior has always gone on but the hypocrisy by the wegulator and its wabbits galls....
At one point the former DAS resorts to attacking the integrity of his former Manager of Human Factors (03:05) and then proceeds to steer around the real damning parts of the Cook FRMS SAR, with bluff & bluster on how things are oh so much better since he took over etc..etc.
However I diverge and for now let's go back to the two (obviously) tic infected Wodgers...
First we have Wodger one (W1), who tick & flicked his way through the 2008 Pel-Air audit; W1 summary - "All good nothing to see here!"
Then unfortunately for W1 DJ through blood shot eyes managed to successfully ditch VH-NGA and had the audacity to survive... Enter W2 who was tasked with overseeing the next 'Special Audit' of Pel-Air in the aftermath of the ditching. Part of the audit team included HF experts BC & MC who were primarily tasked with auditing the Pel-Air FRMS. Unfortunately for W2 BC was not given to the normal (SOP) perfunctory tick & flick exercise and responsibly took to his task with a complete top to bottom approach: {Ref page 3 FRMS SAR}
The CASA Human Factors Section was asked to conduct a special audit of the PelAir Express Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS). This audit was completed by (blank) and (blank) over the period 2-21 December 2009. Given the nature of the special audit (initiated due to a recent accident of the operator involving a night ditching), and the high exposure to operational fatigue risks due to adhoc, back of the clock medivac operations, the special audit of the Pel Air Express FRMS was extensive and to a level of detail considered appropriate given the risks.
In the final FRMS SAR BC included a very damning review of previous CAsA oversight attempts of the Pel-Air FRMSRef page 5 & 6 FRMS SAR}
Ref page 5 & 6 FRMS SAR}2.2 Review of Previous CASA Audits of Pel Air FRMS
A summary of previous CASA audits of Pel Air FRMS is contained within Appendix A. Key Findings from previous CASA oversight:
o To date only one audit observation (no: 712500 dated 3Dec07) has been found to be fully completed, signed and filed within the CASA system. All other surveillance documentation from previous CASA audits of the Pet Air FRMS are electronic copies (some partially complete) as obtained from individual FOI's or from the Rex Safety Management Group.
o Based -on findings within Pel Air for this audit and the key points raised (observations, RCA's) from previous CASA audits, the existing system continues to display all of the problems previously identified through CASA oversight. It is suggested previous audits did not provide the quality assurance to confirm problems identified had been rectified, as the one signed observation available was signed off on the premise that corrective actions had been agreed but there is no evidence this was ever followed up by CASA.
o There is no evidence that RCA's raised in May 2006 were closed as the sections titled remedial action, root causes and corrective action remain blank. There is no verification or signature by a CASA representative.
o In the absence of further formal CASA reports, it appears many agreed items were not followed up by CASA.
It is considered that the oversight by CASA has been inadequate as there is evidence to support that many of the problems identified by CASA during surveillance (Nov 04-Mar 08) were never appropriately actioned.
There is a lack of any clear evidence to support corrective actions had been implemented and confirmed by CASA that they were effective. If this process is indicative of broader practices of CASA it is considered CASA is exposed to unnecessary risk, particularly if required to provide evidence to support how it approved an operator's system, in this case, their FRMS.
A summary of previous CASA audits of Pel Air FRMS is contained within Appendix A. Key Findings from previous CASA oversight:
o To date only one audit observation (no: 712500 dated 3Dec07) has been found to be fully completed, signed and filed within the CASA system. All other surveillance documentation from previous CASA audits of the Pet Air FRMS are electronic copies (some partially complete) as obtained from individual FOI's or from the Rex Safety Management Group.
o Based -on findings within Pel Air for this audit and the key points raised (observations, RCA's) from previous CASA audits, the existing system continues to display all of the problems previously identified through CASA oversight. It is suggested previous audits did not provide the quality assurance to confirm problems identified had been rectified, as the one signed observation available was signed off on the premise that corrective actions had been agreed but there is no evidence this was ever followed up by CASA.
o There is no evidence that RCA's raised in May 2006 were closed as the sections titled remedial action, root causes and corrective action remain blank. There is no verification or signature by a CASA representative.
o In the absence of further formal CASA reports, it appears many agreed items were not followed up by CASA.
It is considered that the oversight by CASA has been inadequate as there is evidence to support that many of the problems identified by CASA during surveillance (Nov 04-Mar 08) were never appropriately actioned.
There is a lack of any clear evidence to support corrective actions had been implemented and confirmed by CASA that they were effective. If this process is indicative of broader practices of CASA it is considered CASA is exposed to unnecessary risk, particularly if required to provide evidence to support how it approved an operator's system, in this case, their FRMS.
Findings for CASA:
• Previous CASA oversight did not provide sufficient evidence to confirm the Pet Air FRMS had ever been managing fatigue risk to a necessary standard. Much of the correspondence and closure of RCA's was based on planned actions but no evidence was collected to confirm appropriate corrective actions had been completed.
• Only one signed and filed previous CASA audit report could be located with the Bankstown Field Office. All other reports were partially completed electronic copies or those provided by Rex Safety Management Group. It is assumed this documentation is on file somewhere but it could not be found over the period 3-21 December 2009. Hence, it is not known what follow up action was taken by CASA for many audit reports and observations.
• Previous CASA oversight did not provide sufficient evidence to confirm the Pet Air FRMS had ever been managing fatigue risk to a necessary standard. Much of the correspondence and closure of RCA's was based on planned actions but no evidence was collected to confirm appropriate corrective actions had been completed.
• Only one signed and filed previous CASA audit report could be located with the Bankstown Field Office. All other reports were partially completed electronic copies or those provided by Rex Safety Management Group. It is assumed this documentation is on file somewhere but it could not be found over the period 3-21 December 2009. Hence, it is not known what follow up action was taken by CASA for many audit reports and observations.
It is also of interest to read the Cook RCA recommendations to the YSBK field office at page eleven. Which W2 interpreted, wrote and countersigned RCAs (all apparently on behalf of BC) applicable to BC's recommendations on pages 79 to 87 of the December 2009 Pel-Air SAR(see here)....
Also fascinating is that W2 was able to acquit all the 'on behalf of' RCAs in one single day i.e. 08 January 2010...
So again W2 comes up with the very same conclusions as W1 i.e. W2 summary - "All good nothing to see here!"
Kharon - The only question remaining, to vex the SP bookie, is that of party politics versus personal integrity.
MTF...
Join Date: Oct 2010
Location: Styx Houseboat Park.
Posts: 2,055
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Whoops.
Spoiled for choice – rather than repeat – posted response – HERE.
Blind Freddy has posted a download link for a handy OCR converted version of the Cook audit in the preceding post.. Certainly worth a read, even if just to see how a real pro writes a report.
Toot toot...
Blind Freddy has posted a download link for a handy OCR converted version of the Cook audit in the preceding post.. Certainly worth a read, even if just to see how a real pro writes a report.
Toot toot...
Charter or Aerial Work?
The introduction to the 2008 CASA audit (a fairly significant audit given in had been rescheduled from 2007) implies the medevac work was charter.
It has always been stated that the company complied with the regulations as alternate fuel was not required for Aerial Work.
So which one was it?
It has always been stated that the company complied with the regulations as alternate fuel was not required for Aerial Work.
So which one was it?