NAS rears its head again

[Howabout]

Nice pick-up Squawk6969.

Unfortunately your observations are yet another 'inconvenient truth' that will just be ignored.

I get ignored as well. Why are people so unkind?

As regards the YMAV study, the subsequent one (2009) said this:

The potential conflict risk area identified in the previous Avalon Aeronautical Study remained. This area was identified as an area to the North of Avalon where VFR aircraft travelling East and West had the potential to conflict with IFR PT aircraft arriving and departing Avalon (approximately 8 to 12 NM North of the aerodrome). Airspace changes proposed in the ACP will assist in mitigating this conflict risk. Barriers to this threat include surveillance and monitoring of the airspace by air traffic control, airspace design measures to provide IFR/VFR segregation; and ACAS protection.

Given that the implementation of Class C, after the 2008 study, addressed the problem, all I can conclude in regard to the E over D is that this was a predetermined outcome, and that the facts have been manipulated to support that pre-determined outcome. In short, the 2009 report alleges that a problem still exists, whereas action, post the 2008 study (Class C), mitigated a risk that no longer exists.

From my perspective, to allege that the risk still exists (when it has already been mitigated by Class C) and that Class E over D will fix it, is a pre-meditated effort to support a pre-determined outcome - and a duplicitous exercise on the part of the OAR.

Just my opinion.

[Dog One]

Smith said

"We will do it after a jet hits a mountain close to Proserpine - so why not do it before the accident."

What about Broome/Karratha? Are we going to wait until a mid-air occurrs before the airspace is re-designed to protect the hundreds of pasengers being exposed to a high risk?

With TCAS as the last line of defense, we are still reliant on the VFR aircraft's transponder being within tolerance.

Will CASA as part of their safety management programs insist on VFR aircraft having their transponders checked each 100 hr inspection?

[rotorblades]

Dick

I will say it again - the UK CAA is the most incompetent aviation regulator in the world....Their airspace system is clearly the worst in the world after one other

You do make me laugh sometimes. The CAA is incompetent because they offer a RAS service to aircraft in G. SO they are incompetent for providing extra safety..hmmm....

They have G to allow routings for anyone who doesnt want their hand held by ATC, dont have a radio, dont have a transponder etc. F is pointless, E is controlled airspace.

ATC is all about flexibility, something you dont seem to have Dick.

Lets be clear, the G that is around is generally low, and away from most airports. The amount of RPT flights going through it is also minimal.

So basically what your saying Dick is anywhere in the world that doesnt align with your god-like view is incompetent. I'm not sure I'd want to be a passenger in airspace designed by someone so pig-headed that its his way or no way. (regardless of the issues against that system from so many).

With reference to Plymouth (what is it with this airport for you) The control service is run by PLYMOUTH APPROACH, as opposed to PLYMOUTH TOWER. If the controller is duly rated for both he can do both.
Im not sure in the case of Plymouth but a lot of aerodromes have their own radar or radar feed from NATS. i.e. Biggin Hill gets a feed off the NATS radar.

What has most of all this to do with NAS (ie Plymouth, CAA, UK Aircraft Industry), Dick?
So the Uk does it this way, the Gods do it that way, the swedes this. Who gives a flying ****. Look at the speciality needs of Australia & the operators, and design an airspace around that to best accommodate everyone. Dont just lift & shift from the US model (we all know how successful the Seasprites & Wedgetail have been)

[Howabout]

Dick,

Welcome back. I'd appreciate comment on my Post#746, and my current one (Post #766).

What do you think?

[Howabout]

Didn't think so.

The repetitive tactic seems to be one of allowing questions pertaining to 'inconvenient truths' to be buried by subsequent posts.

Surely, if one is so passionate in their convictions, that person would be willing to address genuine questions.

I am sure you will agree.

[squawk6969]

With limited time to access I am surprised none of the Nastro's have respended o my post #754.

Its like catching Al Gore out with the inconvenient truth.

Back to the bush I go!

SQ

[Dick Smith]

Rotorblades

Re the British CAA and Airspace.

Just about everyone raves about ICAO on this site – as if it’s some type of God-like organisation that must always be obeyed.

For example, when it’s mentioned that ACAS might be used as a safety mitigator, everyone leaps in and says, “ICAO does not allow ACAS to replace air traffic services” – or words to that effect.

Most posters would support the ICAO decision on classifications to assist in standardising flying all around the world – a bit like the internationalisation of road rules. In most places you can hire a car and as long as you understand which side of the road to drive on, you can pretty-well understand the signs and the procedures. This is important for safety in a globalised world where more and more people travel.

Let’s look at the British CAA. Over two decades ago, ICAO sensibly came up with a classification system for airspace – we all know this – A, B, C, D, E, F and G. The sole reason for this classification system was so that pilots flying in different countries would have a reasonable understanding of what particular service was provided and rules that existed in a particular category of airspace.

Wait for it … what does the UK do? Once again, I say they are so incompetent that even thought they have Class A, Class D, Class E and Class G, the classifications hardly reflect what ICAO intends.

For example, they actually control IFR airline aircraft in uncontrolled airspace.

Rotorblades, whether you like it or not, the last time I flew into Plymouth – and it’s just one example of many non-radar towers in the UK which service RPT aircraft – the airspace was Class G and they were actually controlling IFR aircraft in the G, ie. controlling aircraft in uncontrolled airspace. Doesn’t this mean something to you?

Many Australian ATCs will be amused to find that there’s a country which provides a full control service to flight planned aircraft in Class G airspace when IMC exists, and to other aircraft in the same airspace no control service is provided – in fact, IFR aircraft do not even require a radio!

The reason I mention Plymouth is that it is one of many non-radar towers in the UK that does not have a local radar unit, and when the nearby military unit closes for the weekend, you have IFR airline aircraft shooting an ILS in uncontrolled airspace while being controlled by Air Traffic Controllers in the tower.

When I last looked, the G airspace above Plymouth went to flight level 245, ie a huge amount of G airspace.

All it needed in the UK was leadership when the ICAO classifications were promulgated to change the British airspace so it reflected the ICAO classifications.

The British don’t completely ignore ICAO – the last time I looked they had actually notified ICAO that they do not require radio for IFR aircraft in G airspace. Amazing!

And Rotorblades, by the way, I don’t believe the CAA is incompetent because “they offer a RAS service to aircraft in G”. Such a service would be fully compliant with ICAO. However, when they actually offer an Air Traffic Control separation service in uncontrolled airspace, that’s incompetent.

[Dick Smith]

Howabout

Re your post #746 – you state

What Class E does, in the terminal environment, is allow a situation where separation responsibility could rest on the shoulders of a minimum hours VFR pilot.

Yes, you are correct. But this is only when VMC exists and there is the backup of “see and avoid”. What about Class G – that is where in the terminal environment, the separation responsibility – when in cloud – can rest on the shoulders of a minimum hours IFR pilot, ie. there is no separation standard for when in IMC and there is nothing to stop a low-time pilot – or even high time pilot - setting a risky separation “standard”. That’s what happened at Orange a couple of years ago, where an airline aircraft was attempting an approach from the east when in cloud and a bank run pilot was attempting an approach from the west – both estimating the circuit area at about the same time.

Re. your post #766
I understood the Avalon study had been totally discredited. I understood it was classed as simple rubbish, and there’d even been a thread about this. For example, to say that the greatest chance of a collision was approximately 8 to 12 nautical miles from an aerodrome is the opposite to what the experts say. The greatest chance of collision is on the runway or close in to the aerodrome.

[Jabawocky]

The greatest chance of collision is on the runway or close in to the aerodrome.

That may well be what they say.....however the last few have not happened on a runway and have been as was the case at YSBK....outside the GAAP.

As for the near hits....they were a fair way from the field. Acurate tracking!

As for See and Avoid...I have excellent views out my windscreen and in a busy CTAF have had several close shaves from instructors who can't listen to their radio and instruct at the same time, and can not look out their window eiether..

J

[peuce]

Dick,

I think many people are a bit ambivalent towards ICAO, HOWEVER, they do set the Rules and we do agree to follow them.

Alphabet Airspace is one of those rules. No matter what we think of the principle, it is a Rule and appears to be here to stay ... and I'm all for standardisation.

However, my problem sits with the implementation of ICAO Airspace ... which has nothing to do with ICAO, but is a function of the member States...in our case, Australia. If what you say is correct about the UK, then my hope is that we don't go down that road. I'm sure there's enough options within the Alphabet to suit most volumes in Australia ... without butchering them.

And, finally, down to specifics....

In the specific case of link airspace above Broome/Karattha ...taking all things ( models, studies, calculations, reality checks, reports, findings etc) into consideration, I don't believe that the implementation of non-surveillance Class E airspace is appropriate.

[Dick Smith]

Peuce

I respect your view, however I believe it’s important that we know what the actual chance of an accident is in the two different airspaces, ie. if it was E and if it was C.

The latest figures I looked at showed there was about a 1 in 3,000,000 chance of dying in an airline accident if you purchase a ticket and fly. Obviously most people agree that this level of risk is acceptable.

Now, to keep things simple, surely the experts must have the figures on what chance there is likely to be with a mid-air collision above Broome/Karratha if it is E airspace and what the chance is if it’s C airspace, ie. is there a chance of a collision every 3,000 years or is it every 30 years if the airspace is a particular category?

These figures must be available. I am fascinated by the fact that they are not published. We only have a very limited experience with E airspace, ie. twelve months, and there were no mid-airs. Obviously, that means very little. However, in other countries there was enormous experience of E over D, both in radar covered airspace and non-radar covered. If I was involved in, or responsible for, a decision on what airspace to put above Broome/Karratha, I would want to know those figures.

For example, if I was told there was one a chance of a mid-air collision every 3,000 years with a particular airspace, I would probably find it acceptable. However if I was told there was a chance of a collision every 30 years, I definitely would not find it acceptable.

It’s interesting how the reports we read – completed by these so-called “independent contractors” – never bring the accident rate down to something which is easily understood.

For example, talking about ALARP – “as low as reasonably practical” – means very little to average people. But to say that you have “1 chance in 3,000,000 of losing your life” on a particular flight is very easily understood.

Now the figure of 1 in 3,000,000 has obviously come about by someone looking at the number of flights and then the number of accidents over a reasonably sensible period, whether it be 10, 20 or 30 years. Surely we can do the same with E airspace over D – ie. work out how often there is likely to be a mid-air accident based on the figures that are readily available from around the world.

Of course, figures for C over D are going to be very hard to get from experience, as we are the only country who has this type of airspace – and we hardly have any traffic movements in it.

Could it be that if you do simple figures for risk of E above D, that the risk is so small that it would be clearly acceptable by most people, and that’s why none of the scientific organisations and contractors who do these studies actually give the real figure?

And conversely, if the risk was high – say, as mentioned before, an accident every 30 years – why don’t they say that?

Food for thought.

[peuce]

Dick,

Most on here are also amazed that the figures used for the Broome/Karattha (one day I'll learn how to spell Karratha??) decision are not available ...that's what has caused all the rucus. At present, we're all relying on our own particular questimates.

However, unlike yourself, I would like to see the specific volume figures for the proposed link airspace ... not the US or Mongolian general figures for Class E airspace. That's of little use.

I want to see what the boffins calculate will be the chance of a prang in Broome Class E link Airspace. A comparison with C or D ( in the same volume) would then be worthwhile.

[Dick Smith]

Peuce

I think you mean by stating,

However, unlike yourself, I would like to see the specific volume figures for the proposed link airspace

that you want to see the theoretical calculation of what the accident rate might be.

Peuce, the problem I see is quite often the theoretical rate is inaccurate. I am Patron of the Australian Skeptics and over the years I have seen even qualified scientific people come up with theoretical claims that, when checked in practice, are found to be quite wrong.

Let me give you an example of how theory can be so wrong.

When Airservices reversed the E over D airspace of NAS-2B, they did so because the Board was told that the correct process of safety analysis was not completed before Airservices agreed to change the airspace. It was not that the airspace was not safe, it was the fact that the processes had not been followed and this could leave the Board liable.

The Board made the decision to reverse the airspace, and then had their “experts” complete a safety study to support the Board decision.

The interesting point was that the safety study was very much a theoretical study – it never once looked at what safety levels had been obtained with proven E over D in other countries – and mainly based its statistics on a group of Pilots and Air Traffic Controllers who sat around a table and “guessed” what the chance of mistakes being made would be.

I remember they got answers like “a private pilot would make a 1 in 3 chance of not being on the correct frequency, whereas an IFR airline pilot would only make that mistake 1 in 1,000,000 times”.

But the most important point was that the resultant figures showed how many fatalities there were likely to be in the E over D airspace over a period of time in a place like Hobart. When these figures were interpolated into the US model using similar traffic densities, it showed that the USA would have had over 500 fatalities in a certain period if their resultant rate was to be similar to what was shown by the theoretical study. However, in the same period, the US had no fatalities, suggesting that the theoretical Australian study may have been 500 times “out” in terms of accuracy.

Let’s say you are going to take your family for a fly in a Boeing 747. You could get a group of people to look at the design of the 747 – no doubt cost a fortune – and then come up with their theoretical data of how safe it may be. But what happens if you were told that statistics from the past show that you would have a chance of 1 in 3,000,000 of having an accident and losing your life on a particular flight? If you were told that these figures were taken from actual flights over many years, you’d be far more likely to agree with this type of study.

Peuce, I have a feeling you want the theoretical study to exist so it can confirm what your “belief system” says the result should be. I would prefer to copy the results from the proven system, especially when you consider that the USA has used this type of airspace – once called “Visual Exempt” – over non-radar towers for over sixty years, with tens of millions of movements.

[Capn Bloggs]

Round and round the merrygoround, here we go again. We are back to square one, although with some interesting admissions:

These figures must be available

So you are basing your complete argument on the fact that you don't even have any statistics, and will simply use the US rates, even though the whole system is demonstrably different?

figures for C over D are going to be very hard to get from experience, as we are the only country who has this type of airspace – and we hardly have any traffic movements in it.

Open your eyes. Apart from an arcane airspace label, we have been using C over D for decades. It is mind-boggling that you can be so blinkered that you will ignore (maybe you didn't even know) what has been going on in your own backyard for years and years.

We only have a very limited experience with E airspace, ie. twelve months, and there were no mid-airs.

Your are joking, aren't you? The Tobago at Launy gave you the clearest message ever and you're ignoring it. Wake up.

What about Class G – that is where in the terminal environment, the separation responsibility – when in cloud – can rest on the shoulders of a minimum hours IFR pilot, ie. there is no separation standard for when in IMC and there is nothing to stop a low-time pilot – or even high time pilot - setting a risky separation “standard”. That’s what happened at Orange a couple of years ago, where an airline aircraft was attempting an approach from the east when in cloud and a bank run pilot was attempting an approach from the west – both estimating the circuit area at about the same time.

So? They didn't have a midair, did they? You can't have it both ways, Dick. You can't ignore one fact, that we almost had a midair in Launy almost immediately after you introduced non-radar E, and then pounce on an isolated event IFR pilots being unable to self-segregate? Be consistent and stop selectively quoting events to suit your argument.

The low-time VFR who is not talking poses a greater threat to me than an errant IFR pilot. I had encounter with a VFR at KTA the other day when he said "we should be well clear, we'll hold out of your way". He actually ended up holding at 6nm final, right where we were intending to go, which caused a significant amount of gnashing of teeth in our cockpit when we finally realised what was going on. And that was after numerous calls between us. In E, that same pilot will have even less information to base his actions (or indeed alerting radio calls) on.

there is no separation standard for when in IMC and there is nothing to stop a low-time pilot – or even high time pilot - setting a risky separation “standard”.

The same applies to VFR keeping away from a jet! You are hung-up on See and Avoid - it is generally too late to avoid me when (if) you finally see me. What occurs when we meet will be based entirely on what you and I had organised BEFORE you get a visual on me.

At last, J Mac/CASA has killed off Dick's favourite mantra:

"Be heard, Be Seen, Be Safe: carry and use your radio" and on the back:

"Use your radio. If in doubt, speak out".

[peuce]

Dick,

I think you mean ..... that you want to see the theoretical calculation of what the accident rate might be.

You are correct.

But it's a little bit more complicated than that.

There is obviously a model produced that, when conflict pairs/actual traffic numbers/ actual traffic mix/ geography/airspace classification/ weather/ blah blah blah or whatnot are entered into it, produces the "estimated risk" ( for want of a better word) for that particular volume of airspace.

I also assume that this model was produced ... taking into account, amongst other things, experiences elsewhere... which would cover off your requirement.

I'm happy that the product of this process would be about as accurrate as us humans can be ... at the moment.

Then, I assume, that "estimated risk" would have to be put to the "cost benefit" sword ... to get a final outcome.

Trouble is, the cupboard is bare ... so we are left to thrust and counter thrust ... round and round in circles.

[Dick Smith]

Bloggsy

Would you like to talk to the Pilot of the Tobago that was involved in the Launceston incident? He has said to everyone including the ATSB that there was never, ever any chance of a collision, that he listened and heard the airline’s pilot’s calls on both the area frequency and the tower frequency; he sighted the aircraft and was not at any time going to run into the aircraft.

He did say it appeared strange that when the airline pilot was given the option of going to right base – which would have been shorter – or left base – which would have been longer but taken the airline into the track of the Tobago, the airline pilot did not confirm with the tower where he was going, and then headed towards left base.

Now Bloggsy, what would you do in similar circumstances? Wouldn’t you make it clear where you were going, knowing that there could be other aircraft in the airspace which needed this vital information? Let’s say you’re in G and you decide to do a straight in approach – do you tell anyone, or just leave that a secret?

Don’t keep pushing the Launceston issue too much because one day the truth will come out on how the safety case was written to support a pre-conceived conclusion.

For example, the ATSB prepared two different pages of the final report, and then only published the page which removed the criticism of the Virgin pilots for not stating clearly whether they were going to left or right base. Would you like me to get you a copy of the page which was changed?

By the way, Bloggs, I was the person who consistently pushed for the FAA system in CTAFs of the seven calls rather than our two – I wanted more announcements so there is less jamming of the frequency with dialogue.

I’m glad to see that’s happening.

[CrazyMTOWDog]

But you will not mention the obvious. If we had C airspace provided with the proper tools and staffing, it would indeed be safer. However, we use large amounts of C airspace controlled by a single Controller in the D airspace below. This is the reason other countries have E above D. They wish to allocate their safety resources effectively, and don’t want the concentration of a Controller in D airspace close to the runway to be affected by having to provide a Class C service at the same time when the risk of collision is far less.

and wait for it;

Of course, figures for C over D are going to be very hard to get from experience, as we are the only country who has this type of airspace – and we hardly have any traffic movements in it.

Couldn't help myself;

Let’s say you are going to take your family for a fly in a Boeing 747.

Guess who would be sitting in the left hand seat?

Who wouldn't be sitting down the back?

[Capn Bloggs]

Dick,

He has said to everyone including the ATSB that there was never, ever any chance of a collision, that he listened and heard the airline’s pilot’s calls on both the area frequency and the tower frequency; he sighted the aircraft and was not at any time going to run into the aircraft.

You're losing your memory. I covered this nonsense in detail in a previous post.

Now Bloggsy, what would you do in similar circumstances? Wouldn’t you make it clear where you were going, knowing that there could be other aircraft in the airspace which needed this vital information? Let’s say you’re in G and you decide to do a straight in approach – do you tell anyone, or just leave that a secret?

Knowing that there may be VFR aircraft who think they are God's gift to self separation that they do not need to pipe up? How much would it have cost to have that Tobago, the one that caused a TCAS RA because he lost the plot, on freq and communicating?

If you now want me to make enough broadcasts on the E freq to ensure that any unknown VFR will get a good-enough picture about where I am and what I am doing, I'll be jamming the freq.

That's the beauty of Class G and especially CASA's new rules - pilots, especially VFR, are encouraged to pipe up and talk, so that those who are in the best position to solve any conflicting, the RPT driver, can at least be alerted to what might happen.

By the way, Bloggs, I was the person who consistently pushed for the FAA system in CTAFs of the seven calls rather than our two – I wanted more announcements so there is less jamming of the frequency with dialogue.

I’m glad to see that’s happening.

Read your mailout, Dick. Your famous seven calls have been chucked in the bin.

Any more questions?

[CrazyMTOWDog]

He has said to everyone including the ATSB that there was never, ever any chance of a collision

And what separation tools was he using Dick?

Would you like me to get you a copy of the page which was changed?

Why don't you paste it here Dick and then everyone can make their own conclusion?

[Capn Bloggs]

Thanks Crazy, I missed that bit.

Dick,

Don’t keep pushing the Launceston issue too much because one day the truth will come out on how the safety case was written to support a pre-conceived conclusion.

For example, the ATSB prepared two different pages of the final report, and then only published the page which removed the criticism of the Virgin pilots for not stating clearly whether they were going to left or right base. Would you like me to get you a copy of the page which was changed?

So, we've got the whole pathetic situation turned around so that it is the RPT crew's fault? Where does it say in AIP that IFR aircraft are to broadcast their intentions in enough detail that a VFR aircraft in E can take appropriate self-segregation action? This is exactly what some of us are saying about E airspace, for goodness sake!

Any criticism should obviously be directed at your VFR pilot who decided not to say anything when he later admitted that "it appeared strange...". Did he know what energy state the 737 was in? Did he know who the PF was and what side of the cockpit he was on? Did he know what was going through the minds of the 737 crew as they were presented with the option? No.

I see the RA occurred at about 12nm from Launy; you're trying to tell me that your ace Tobago pilot could tell that a left base, as opposed to a right base, was going to cause a confliction? Come on! That bloke's ego is writing cheques his body can't cash!

That's why having a system that relies solely on the lowest common denominator being responsible for separation is stupid. When will you ever get the message?

The more you mention Launy, the bigger the hole you dig for your beloved E airspace. But keep it coming. I'm enjoying this.

The alarm bells are ringing, the red lights are flashing. Hopefully OAR will see right through the furphy that E airspace is.