Blind Reliance on Automation in Australian airlines
Thread Starter
Blind Reliance on Automation in Australian airlines
ATSB rarely publish foreign accident reports even though some may have valuable lessons for Australian pilots. Pilots are therefore left to their own devices to read accident reports from internet sources if they wish to improve their professional knowledge. Except for the occasional enthusiast, few Australian airline pilots and even fewer GA pilots can be bothered to look on the internet specifically for overseas accidents to their own aircraft type, and thus valuable lessons are never taken up, simply because of apathy and other interests outside of flying. The excellent flight safety record of Australian airlines may be due to the unique Australian character where flight crew (in some airlines) are all mates and they have no hesitation is speaking their mind to God in the left seat. That is not a bad thing provided a commonsense attitude prevails on both sides. First class ATC, few natural hazards and of course good year round weather, all contribute to the good safety record. Ergo - why bother about studying boring old overseas accidents (even if you can be bothered looking for the links) when all is well in sunny OZ?
Automation from lift off to short final in severe CAVOK is all the go in some Australian airlines - including the regionals who copy whatever the big boys are doing. We have a new class of pilots brought up by their company SOP's on a strict diet of blind use of automation which is seen as a Good Thing. Pilots happily press buttons with great aplomb so they can watch their highly sophisticated autopilots LNAV into the CAVOK circuit following beautifully crafted waypoints to downwind, base and final with both pilots glued on to flight directors and the thrust levers quietly adjusting the power.
There is bated breath as the PF announces gravely the dreaded words :Standby -standby – autopilot disconnected NOW” and the PNF hunches in great concentration to monitor the man on the controls. Jeez! It is a truly emotional moment in a pilot’s career when several times a day he actually gets to disconnect the automatics in the last few minutes or even seconds of a visual approach..
Levity aside – let us pray for the poor souls of 135 innocents who died at the hands of two automatic zombies in the Middle East in the Year 2004. These Zombies no doubt had been trained in the simulator that the safest way to fly – indeed the only way to fly, was to leave it all to the automatic pilot and its two friends the flight director and automatic throttles. Sound familiar?
This is part of the CVR transcript originally in Arabic of the last 30 minutes of Flash Air Boeing 737-300 Flight 604 departing Sharm El Sheikh for Cairo. Cairo is in Egypt, for the geographically challenged. For brevity the extract is edited but you will soon get the picture.
ATC clearance was delivered at 0235 GMT and read back by the F/O as follows:
ATC Flash 604 destination Cairo as filed climb initially flight level 140. 1673 on squawk.
F/O: Our clear to destination via flight plan route 140 initially 1673 on the squawk Flash 604 we have total pax 135. God Willing.
At time 02:42:02, TOGA mode engaged and then disengaged two seconds later. Aileron movements during take off roll and lift off were consistent with a crosswind. At 02:42:43, climbing through 440 feet, captain requested Hdg select. The F/O confirmed the command and the FDR records Hdg select mode engaged. At 02:42:48, captain requested “Level Change.” And F/O replied “Level change, MCP speed, N1 armed - Sir.”
ATC reported departure time and confirmed left turn clearance. The clearance was acknowledged by the F/O. This was the last ATC transmission from the crew. The aircraft rolled 20 degrees left bank and began a climbing left turn. At time 02:43:47 the captain calls for after take off checklist. No audible response from F/O. At time 02:43:55 captain called “Autopilot”. No immediate response from F/O or mode changes recorded on FDR. At 02:43:58, the captain states “Not Yet.”
02:43:59 FDR recorded autopilot was engaged and the roll mode transition to CWS-R mode resulting in loss of Hdg mode.
At 02:44:00 the F/O stated “Autopilot in command, Sir.”
02:44:01 captain says “EDEELO” an Arabic exclamation expressing a sharp response of some kind while at same time FDR records momentary aileron surface movements and soon after FDR records autopilot disengaged. Increase in pitch and decay in airspeed recorded.
At 02:44:07 FDR records a series of aileron motions that command right bank and subsequent right turn. One second later the captain says “See what the aircraft did”. The aircraft was now in a 12 degree bank to right.
02:44:27 F/O states “Turning right, Sir.” Three seconds later the captain responses “What.” Bank is now 17 degrees right and FDR records aileron movement to increase right bank.
02:44:37 captain states “how turning right”. At this point bank was slightly more than 40 degrees right bank then a momentary left roll rate before additional right bank to 42 degrees before further inputs to increase right bank.
02:44:41. F/O says “Overbank” with bank now 50 degrees as aircraft reaches max altitude of 5460 feet over water.
02:44:41.7 captain says “Autopilot” and repeats statement one second later. At 02:44:44 the F/O states “autopilot in command.” No autopilot engagement was recorded on FDR.
Bank angle now 60 degrees and pitch angle zero. At 02:44:46 the captain again says “Autopilot” and the F/O replies with “overbank, overbank, overbank” with bank angle now 70 degrees.
02:44: 52.8 F/O says “Overbank” as bank angle approached 90 degrees (still in night IMC) and 23 degrees pitch down.
02:44:56 F/O states “No autopilot, Commander” with bank angle 102 degrees pitch 37 degrees down and altitude 4100 ft.
02:44:58 captain says “Autopilot” with bank angle 111 degrees right and 43 degrees nose down. Altitude 3470 ft. 02:45:01 captain says “Retard power, retard power, retard power” Bank angle now 51 degrees right wing down and 40 degrees nose down altitude 2470 ft.
02:45.02 CVR records overspeed warning and airspeed 307 knots. At time 02: 45:03 the captain states “Come out” . Bank angle now 14 degrees right, 31 degrees nose down altitude 760 feet and airspeed 407 knots.
Aircraft impacted water at 02:45:06 with: bank angle 24 degrees right, pitch 24 degrees nose down, Vertical G load 3.9 and speed 416 knots.
……………………………………………………………………………………………..
Despite the intonation of “God Willing” made by the F/O during his read back of the ATC clearance, it was clear that on this occasion his God was not willing, before the impact of 416 knots…
Someone once said of automation: “Do you control the automated cockpit, or does it dominate you?” Well, it certainly dominated the crew of the ill-fated Flash Air 737 to a fatal extent. For many airline pilots in Australia, the answer would probably be that the automated cockpit dominates them too – although few would admit it in public. Blind reliance on automation is often used to justify laziness in the cockpit. When it comes to a visual circuit, some pilots regard auto-piloting an aircraft into the circuit on heading mode or maybe even lateral and vertical navigation, to waypoints scattered through a circuit area until short final, as the height of “cool”. The well known trap of automation is that its use inevitably erodes pure flying skills. The captain of the Flash Air 737 implored time and again for “Autopilot” even when his aircraft was in an impossible attitude. Proof positive he had lost all semblance of basic flying skills. It would never happen here in Australia of course - or could it?
Automation from lift off to short final in severe CAVOK is all the go in some Australian airlines - including the regionals who copy whatever the big boys are doing. We have a new class of pilots brought up by their company SOP's on a strict diet of blind use of automation which is seen as a Good Thing. Pilots happily press buttons with great aplomb so they can watch their highly sophisticated autopilots LNAV into the CAVOK circuit following beautifully crafted waypoints to downwind, base and final with both pilots glued on to flight directors and the thrust levers quietly adjusting the power.
There is bated breath as the PF announces gravely the dreaded words :Standby -standby – autopilot disconnected NOW” and the PNF hunches in great concentration to monitor the man on the controls. Jeez! It is a truly emotional moment in a pilot’s career when several times a day he actually gets to disconnect the automatics in the last few minutes or even seconds of a visual approach..
Levity aside – let us pray for the poor souls of 135 innocents who died at the hands of two automatic zombies in the Middle East in the Year 2004. These Zombies no doubt had been trained in the simulator that the safest way to fly – indeed the only way to fly, was to leave it all to the automatic pilot and its two friends the flight director and automatic throttles. Sound familiar?
This is part of the CVR transcript originally in Arabic of the last 30 minutes of Flash Air Boeing 737-300 Flight 604 departing Sharm El Sheikh for Cairo. Cairo is in Egypt, for the geographically challenged. For brevity the extract is edited but you will soon get the picture.
ATC clearance was delivered at 0235 GMT and read back by the F/O as follows:
ATC Flash 604 destination Cairo as filed climb initially flight level 140. 1673 on squawk.
F/O: Our clear to destination via flight plan route 140 initially 1673 on the squawk Flash 604 we have total pax 135. God Willing.
At time 02:42:02, TOGA mode engaged and then disengaged two seconds later. Aileron movements during take off roll and lift off were consistent with a crosswind. At 02:42:43, climbing through 440 feet, captain requested Hdg select. The F/O confirmed the command and the FDR records Hdg select mode engaged. At 02:42:48, captain requested “Level Change.” And F/O replied “Level change, MCP speed, N1 armed - Sir.”
ATC reported departure time and confirmed left turn clearance. The clearance was acknowledged by the F/O. This was the last ATC transmission from the crew. The aircraft rolled 20 degrees left bank and began a climbing left turn. At time 02:43:47 the captain calls for after take off checklist. No audible response from F/O. At time 02:43:55 captain called “Autopilot”. No immediate response from F/O or mode changes recorded on FDR. At 02:43:58, the captain states “Not Yet.”
02:43:59 FDR recorded autopilot was engaged and the roll mode transition to CWS-R mode resulting in loss of Hdg mode.
At 02:44:00 the F/O stated “Autopilot in command, Sir.”
02:44:01 captain says “EDEELO” an Arabic exclamation expressing a sharp response of some kind while at same time FDR records momentary aileron surface movements and soon after FDR records autopilot disengaged. Increase in pitch and decay in airspeed recorded.
At 02:44:07 FDR records a series of aileron motions that command right bank and subsequent right turn. One second later the captain says “See what the aircraft did”. The aircraft was now in a 12 degree bank to right.
02:44:27 F/O states “Turning right, Sir.” Three seconds later the captain responses “What.” Bank is now 17 degrees right and FDR records aileron movement to increase right bank.
02:44:37 captain states “how turning right”. At this point bank was slightly more than 40 degrees right bank then a momentary left roll rate before additional right bank to 42 degrees before further inputs to increase right bank.
02:44:41. F/O says “Overbank” with bank now 50 degrees as aircraft reaches max altitude of 5460 feet over water.
02:44:41.7 captain says “Autopilot” and repeats statement one second later. At 02:44:44 the F/O states “autopilot in command.” No autopilot engagement was recorded on FDR.
Bank angle now 60 degrees and pitch angle zero. At 02:44:46 the captain again says “Autopilot” and the F/O replies with “overbank, overbank, overbank” with bank angle now 70 degrees.
02:44: 52.8 F/O says “Overbank” as bank angle approached 90 degrees (still in night IMC) and 23 degrees pitch down.
02:44:56 F/O states “No autopilot, Commander” with bank angle 102 degrees pitch 37 degrees down and altitude 4100 ft.
02:44:58 captain says “Autopilot” with bank angle 111 degrees right and 43 degrees nose down. Altitude 3470 ft. 02:45:01 captain says “Retard power, retard power, retard power” Bank angle now 51 degrees right wing down and 40 degrees nose down altitude 2470 ft.
02:45.02 CVR records overspeed warning and airspeed 307 knots. At time 02: 45:03 the captain states “Come out” . Bank angle now 14 degrees right, 31 degrees nose down altitude 760 feet and airspeed 407 knots.
Aircraft impacted water at 02:45:06 with: bank angle 24 degrees right, pitch 24 degrees nose down, Vertical G load 3.9 and speed 416 knots.
……………………………………………………………………………………………..
Despite the intonation of “God Willing” made by the F/O during his read back of the ATC clearance, it was clear that on this occasion his God was not willing, before the impact of 416 knots…
Someone once said of automation: “Do you control the automated cockpit, or does it dominate you?” Well, it certainly dominated the crew of the ill-fated Flash Air 737 to a fatal extent. For many airline pilots in Australia, the answer would probably be that the automated cockpit dominates them too – although few would admit it in public. Blind reliance on automation is often used to justify laziness in the cockpit. When it comes to a visual circuit, some pilots regard auto-piloting an aircraft into the circuit on heading mode or maybe even lateral and vertical navigation, to waypoints scattered through a circuit area until short final, as the height of “cool”. The well known trap of automation is that its use inevitably erodes pure flying skills. The captain of the Flash Air 737 implored time and again for “Autopilot” even when his aircraft was in an impossible attitude. Proof positive he had lost all semblance of basic flying skills. It would never happen here in Australia of course - or could it?
Not only Aussie airlines, I suspect, Centaurus. The Button Pushing Brigade is slowly but surely being dragged into the real world as aeroplanes spear in at an increasing rate due to the reducing ability of pilots to fly them.
Oh, the ultimate irony..."Pilot handling abilities under threat...Airbus calls for more focus on basic skills, as automation and reliability advances mean crew have forgotten how to fly"; page 12, Flt International, 22-28 Sep 2009. While slanted towards long-haul, the message is pretty obvious for all of the BPB.
Oh, the ultimate irony..."Pilot handling abilities under threat...Airbus calls for more focus on basic skills, as automation and reliability advances mean crew have forgotten how to fly"; page 12, Flt International, 22-28 Sep 2009. While slanted towards long-haul, the message is pretty obvious for all of the BPB.
Join Date: Aug 2007
Location: between supple thighs
Posts: 243
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Direct quote from my companies ops manual:
[FONT='Arial','sans-serif']In order to allow maximum monitoring of all aspects of the inflight operation, particularly during times of high workload, maximum use of the autopilot(s) is encouraged.[/FONT]
[FONT='Arial','sans-serif']In order to allow maximum monitoring of all aspects of the inflight operation, particularly during times of high workload, maximum use of the autopilot(s) is encouraged.[/FONT]
I agree with your sentiments Centaurus, and this appears to be a case of pilots letting the aircraft fly them, instead of flying the aircraft.
I'm sure the reason the autopilot would not engage was due to (pilot induced) control loading, but that is not the real point. The crew should have focused on recovery from the unusual attitude, rather than becoming obsessed with engaging the autopilot. As you inferred, there is a belief in the mind of some pilots that "the automatics will sort it all out".
I am sure you would agree that the recent policy change by Boeing to remove unusual attitude/upset recovery training from their simulator programs is a step in the wrong direction. What next, no assymetric training?
Regarding circuits flown on autopilot, if at night, circling in marginal conditions, I think that is wise, provided only basic modes are used.
Most airlines have a stated policy of no excessive FMS programming below 10,000 feet, yet this policy is rarely enforced.
In my view, if you cannot fly a circuit without relying on automatics, you should consider a different career.
I'm sure the reason the autopilot would not engage was due to (pilot induced) control loading, but that is not the real point. The crew should have focused on recovery from the unusual attitude, rather than becoming obsessed with engaging the autopilot. As you inferred, there is a belief in the mind of some pilots that "the automatics will sort it all out".
I am sure you would agree that the recent policy change by Boeing to remove unusual attitude/upset recovery training from their simulator programs is a step in the wrong direction. What next, no assymetric training?
Regarding circuits flown on autopilot, if at night, circling in marginal conditions, I think that is wise, provided only basic modes are used.
Most airlines have a stated policy of no excessive FMS programming below 10,000 feet, yet this policy is rarely enforced.
In my view, if you cannot fly a circuit without relying on automatics, you should consider a different career.
Join Date: Mar 2008
Location: Australia
Posts: 149
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I like to fly the aircraft. The autopilot has its uses though, I have trouble eating and flying at the same time? On a serious note now, the concept should be, that the pilot is still flying the aircraft with autopilot engaged, ie as much attention is need as without it.
Join Date: Apr 2002
Location: Sydney
Posts: 152
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Interesting reading in the CVR transcript. Note the constant replies of "Sir", "Commander" in the FO's responses. It says a lot about the cross cockpit gradient. I suppose more and more we will see this sort of accident as the airlines head down the path of basically single pilot IFR, ie one experienced pilot and one MPL assistant.
From what I have seen in Australia, we have have a healthy disrespect for the autopilot. We use it a lot, as should be with passengers on board, but if its not doing what it is supposed to do, we disconnect and hand fly without any problems.
From what I have seen in Australia, we have have a healthy disrespect for the autopilot. We use it a lot, as should be with passengers on board, but if its not doing what it is supposed to do, we disconnect and hand fly without any problems.
Last edited by MrWooby; 24th Sep 2009 at 00:08.
Join Date: Jul 2000
Location: London
Posts: 1,256
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I've raised these issues on Safety and CRM and other arenas many times. Fortunately (?)tombstone safety is at last beginning to cut in! Hope the present post is followed up.
Join Date: Sep 2007
Location: asia
Posts: 947
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Our current PC includes 1 hour of no A/P no A/T, all OEI. No big deal I hear you say except that our glorious CP, on loan from the greatest airline in the world, is completely against practicing this stuff in the A/C.
So in theory the first time in 6 months you get to do this is when your ar5e is on the line. ( No, there is no training before the check in Dragonair, actually, there is no training
)
So in theory the first time in 6 months you get to do this is when your ar5e is on the line. ( No, there is no training before the check in Dragonair, actually, there is no training
)
Join Date: Aug 2003
Location: Sale, Australia
Age: 80
Posts: 3,832
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Understand what you are saying Centaurus, but a reading of the following would seem that its a problem that is only going to become more relevant perhaps.
4-D Nav Is Coming | AVIATION WEEK
4-D Nav Is Coming | AVIATION WEEK
Join Date: May 2006
Location: The Dog House
Posts: 45
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Departure and Approach profile design complexity, ATC requirements, software development and hardware processor speed have culminated in automated engine and airframe management – not piloting - it’s all data processing – confirmation and mode selection.
Walk into the most advanced simulators and its all the same, the first thing you are briefed on is – “don’t think of this as a hands on aircraft, its all about data and process management, once you have this concept you will have no issue flying the aircraft”. We fine tune our “gross error” management skills and are actively discouraged to “fly” the aircraft.
Automation has dramatically reduced hand skill and more importantly the confidence pilots’ have in hands on flying ability.
Mind you, the automation starts from the planning stage all the way to the post flight sign-off.
The automation in use that wasn’t in existence even 10 years ago is astounding – what used to take several hours to acquire, calculate and asses now takes minutes.
Professionally we are disengaging from the very aspects that develop and round our understanding and skill of piloting the aircraft even before we get into the cockpit, this fact is possibly lost on those born into this highly advanced tech laden era.
Aircraft flight system design, Organisational culture, Training and Checking programs will need to cater for this increasing concern.
Walk into the most advanced simulators and its all the same, the first thing you are briefed on is – “don’t think of this as a hands on aircraft, its all about data and process management, once you have this concept you will have no issue flying the aircraft”. We fine tune our “gross error” management skills and are actively discouraged to “fly” the aircraft.
Automation has dramatically reduced hand skill and more importantly the confidence pilots’ have in hands on flying ability.
Mind you, the automation starts from the planning stage all the way to the post flight sign-off.
The automation in use that wasn’t in existence even 10 years ago is astounding – what used to take several hours to acquire, calculate and asses now takes minutes.
Professionally we are disengaging from the very aspects that develop and round our understanding and skill of piloting the aircraft even before we get into the cockpit, this fact is possibly lost on those born into this highly advanced tech laden era.
Aircraft flight system design, Organisational culture, Training and Checking programs will need to cater for this increasing concern.
Join Date: Aug 2004
Location: Wherever the job takes me...
Posts: 318
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I don't think there is any argument that the steady decline in basic flying skills is all too apparent these days. However, if I may offer a slightly different perspective, I find it less of a concern that too many pilots are reliant upon automation, than the fact that too many pilots relying on said automation do not fully understand the automation they are using. As has been mentioned elsewhere, the organisation I fly for does not encourage us to hand fly (with emphasis on the fact that we are discouraged, although not prohibited), and whilst occasionally there are opportunities to do so, I must confess to my own detriment that I don't take advantage of those opportunities as much as I used to. That said, automation mode awareness is just as critical as traditional "situational awareness," and failure to develop and maintain such skills can be just as dangerous as failure to maintain basic stick-&-rudder skills. The two go hand in hand, and both are vital parts of the equation to maintaining safety on the flight deck.
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Springfield, USA
Posts: 57
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I don’t see automation being too much of a problem in Australia where most pilots seem to get a solid grounding in developing hands on flying skills in GA or the Military. No one I’ve flown with has displayed ‘blind reliance on automation’.
I have seen a few strange ideas and quietly watch newbies mess around and learn the limitations of the box. When it all becomes too hard they disconnect the a/p or the lnav/vnav and it’s all under control again. All part of the learning process.
The problem lies with the introduction of the MPL and the reasons are obvious.
I have seen a few strange ideas and quietly watch newbies mess around and learn the limitations of the box. When it all becomes too hard they disconnect the a/p or the lnav/vnav and it’s all under control again. All part of the learning process.
The problem lies with the introduction of the MPL and the reasons are obvious.
Join Date: Mar 2003
Location: The Big V
Posts: 45
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I agree with Chief Wiggam.
In my experience, the guys who seemed to be blindly following LNAV/VNAV are within 12 months of their line training, but they tend to be very interested in applying basic modes when given a chance. Often, removing VNAV display is a great tool for forcing a newbe into managing their descent profile.
I'm sure that there are some exceptions as with all generalisations, but if you have an obvious issue with-in your operation, it's likely that the line training wasn't thorough enough.
Knowledge precedes Power, created by Education.
L/Dog.
(grammar edit.)
In my experience, the guys who seemed to be blindly following LNAV/VNAV are within 12 months of their line training, but they tend to be very interested in applying basic modes when given a chance. Often, removing VNAV display is a great tool for forcing a newbe into managing their descent profile.
I'm sure that there are some exceptions as with all generalisations, but if you have an obvious issue with-in your operation, it's likely that the line training wasn't thorough enough.
Knowledge precedes Power, created by Education.
L/Dog.
(grammar edit.)
Last edited by Leatherdog; 24th Sep 2009 at 06:01.
Join Date: Sep 2007
Location: asia
Posts: 947
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I don’t see automation being too much of a problem in Australia where most pilots seem to get a solid grounding in developing hands on flying skills in GA or the Military
So when should we hand fly the aircraft? At the beginning of the 13 hour duty while we are "fresh" and "alert" making us more fatigued at the end of the day should an emergency occur.Or at the end of the day while we are tied and likely to make mistakes?It's a catch 22 brought about by excessive duty time fatigue on the day,possible accumulated fatigue from previous duty times or potential fatigue that may occur should the day be unexpectedely extended.It's not as obvious as we would like.
The current generation of senior pilots learnt on and flew aircraft with little in the way of reliable automation and may therefore be prejudiced against relying too much on automatics.
The new generation of twenty year olds are getting used to reliance on increasingly reliable automation. As this generation move through, expect to see less manual flying.
Times change, we now have more reliable engines and allow ETOPS. Anyone fancy being three hours from an airport with a pair of PW R1830s or Wright Cyclone motors ?
Down the track expect to see automatics being a no go item and failure of the auto thrust being practiced for in the sim just like we practice engine failures.
The new generation of twenty year olds are getting used to reliance on increasingly reliable automation. As this generation move through, expect to see less manual flying.
Times change, we now have more reliable engines and allow ETOPS. Anyone fancy being three hours from an airport with a pair of PW R1830s or Wright Cyclone motors ?
Down the track expect to see automatics being a no go item and failure of the auto thrust being practiced for in the sim just like we practice engine failures.
Join Date: May 2008
Location: Global Drifter
Age: 64
Posts: 24
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Those with a sound understanding of the automatics most often tend to hand fly well also.
Those who don't understand the automatics, usually don't hand fly very well either.
Simple as that.
Those who don't understand the automatics, usually don't hand fly very well either.
Simple as that.
I would suggest it also has a lot to do with the low cost model too.
Where training is considered by the accountants to be an additional cost and to be achieved in minimum time and cost.
How about some suggestions about how to improve peoples 'manual' flying skills and maybe this thread can become a help to all the newbies out there?
Where training is considered by the accountants to be an additional cost and to be achieved in minimum time and cost.
How about some suggestions about how to improve peoples 'manual' flying skills and maybe this thread can become a help to all the newbies out there?