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Thanks Graybeard.
I actually looked it up. Cape Hallet to McMurdo is 337 n.miles, a track check 15 minutes into that leg would have shown a cross track error of 4 or 5 miles or thereabouts - enough to get your attention, I would've thought.
Tks for the heads-up on the INS - I was going on the Carousel figures, dimly remembered. Allowable drift three miles per hour plus three, I think it was.
Chz.,
Jafa.
I actually looked it up. Cape Hallet to McMurdo is 337 n.miles, a track check 15 minutes into that leg would have shown a cross track error of 4 or 5 miles or thereabouts - enough to get your attention, I would've thought.
Tks for the heads-up on the INS - I was going on the Carousel figures, dimly remembered. Allowable drift three miles per hour plus three, I think it was.
Chz.,
Jafa.
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I don't remember the procedure at Hallett? Did they turn to a new track? At any rate, their flight plan gave the track direct to McMurdo Station, and not the reporting point over the Ross ice shelf. The track angle difference is only 1.7 degrees. What document did they have to compare the new, wrong track to the prior, correct track?
Radio altimeters are C band, and cannot reliably track the surface of the ice, so I'm told. Some of the 1979 generation of Wx radars were C band, also. ANZ had X band in their DC-10, which should detect ice better. In fact, they use two different frequency radars to measure the depth of ice.
I don't remember there being any evidence the WXR on this flight was even energized, nor any comments recorded on the CVR.
There are so many ways this accident could have been avoided, yet I believe this one is the first that could be at least partly attributed to "Stick to the automatics, son; hand flying is for the birds." I referenced this thread in that one.
I further believe the blind reliance on automation was largely overlooked in both investigations.
GB
Radio altimeters are C band, and cannot reliably track the surface of the ice, so I'm told. Some of the 1979 generation of Wx radars were C band, also. ANZ had X band in their DC-10, which should detect ice better. In fact, they use two different frequency radars to measure the depth of ice.
I don't remember there being any evidence the WXR on this flight was even energized, nor any comments recorded on the CVR.
There are so many ways this accident could have been avoided, yet I believe this one is the first that could be at least partly attributed to "Stick to the automatics, son; hand flying is for the birds." I referenced this thread in that one.
I further believe the blind reliance on automation was largely overlooked in both investigations.
GB
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Still don't see how anyone can claim that descent down to 1500ft in an area that has a substantially higher MSA and doing it solely based on what the INS is telling you is normal practise.
Like to hear someone telling me about how they switch off the GPS updating and delete the VORs and fly non precision approaches on a regular basis.
A reliance on the aircraft's nav system that is unbelievable.
Like to hear someone telling me about how they switch off the GPS updating and delete the VORs and fly non precision approaches on a regular basis.
A reliance on the aircraft's nav system that is unbelievable.
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Thirty degree track change at Hallet. Document? The chart. I would've thought they would mark the position on the chart 10 or 15 minutes past Hallet as per normal ops for random track operation. To check for cross track error. However they clearly hadn't checked the flight plan waypoints against the chart to begin with, as you said. Big Error number One.
You are in front of me re the radar technicals. But I would most certainly have had it on. Amongst other things to check for the mountain. Situational awareness back-up.
Couldn't agree with you more re the automatics.
Chz., Jafa.
You are in front of me re the radar technicals. But I would most certainly have had it on. Amongst other things to check for the mountain. Situational awareness back-up.
Couldn't agree with you more re the automatics.
Chz., Jafa.
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Some personal recollections which adds nothing to who was right or wrong in this tragedy and makes no judgements either way.
I had just finished my first marathon and was at the after race function when the provosts turned up and ordered us all down to a hangar. A couple of C130's were backed up to the doors and piles of survival gear and body bags on the hangar floor. We were told to size ourselves up for a survival suit and standby but not told why. News came through that an ANZ DC-10 was overdue in Antartica and we were going down on a SAR flight leaving within an hour (which I was not looking forward to, I could hardly walk after the marathon and sitting in a C130 para seat would not have been an optimal recovery).
About 2 hours later word came through the DC-10 had been found and no survivors and that NZ Police SAR would take over. I had a friend who had recently joined the Police and he ended up down there doing the recovery (and which he suffered for years afterwards from).
30 years on and it remains as vivid now as it was then. I seem to recall that ANZ had not had a fatality up until this accident (although NAC was not so lucky) and that they had commissioned an advertisement with Allan Wicker stating this fact which aired a few weeks beforehand. The look on Morrie Davis face when the journalist asked him how felt in that evenings news bulleting remains etched in my memory as does his response.
It is right to discuss these matters as it honours the memories of those who perished and the families left behind. May they rest in peace.
I had just finished my first marathon and was at the after race function when the provosts turned up and ordered us all down to a hangar. A couple of C130's were backed up to the doors and piles of survival gear and body bags on the hangar floor. We were told to size ourselves up for a survival suit and standby but not told why. News came through that an ANZ DC-10 was overdue in Antartica and we were going down on a SAR flight leaving within an hour (which I was not looking forward to, I could hardly walk after the marathon and sitting in a C130 para seat would not have been an optimal recovery).
About 2 hours later word came through the DC-10 had been found and no survivors and that NZ Police SAR would take over. I had a friend who had recently joined the Police and he ended up down there doing the recovery (and which he suffered for years afterwards from).
30 years on and it remains as vivid now as it was then. I seem to recall that ANZ had not had a fatality up until this accident (although NAC was not so lucky) and that they had commissioned an advertisement with Allan Wicker stating this fact which aired a few weeks beforehand. The look on Morrie Davis face when the journalist asked him how felt in that evenings news bulleting remains etched in my memory as does his response.
It is right to discuss these matters as it honours the memories of those who perished and the families left behind. May they rest in peace.
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Still don't see how anyone can claim that descent down to 1500ft in an area that has a substantially higher MSA and doing it solely based on what the INS is telling you is normal practise.
Regarding the weather radar, I believe Mahon went to visit Bendix, where he discovered from the manufacturers concerned that the atmosphere in the region is too dry, weather radar being reliant on atmospheric moisture, to make it useful as a warning for terrain at that altitude. The radar return would, unfortunately, only have confirmed what they believed they were seeing - a flat expanse of sea ice to the horizon.
And as has been stated before many times, the captain did indeed check the waypoints against charts the night before - in fact he showed his daughters where he was going on the family atlas. Those waypoints were changed in the early hours of the morning they took off and the flight crew were not notified of the change.
Regardless of one's opinion of the responsibilities of an airline captain once the aircraft has left the ground, it is important to also bear in mind the responsibilities of the employer to allow their employees to operate safely, and while I'm sure ANZ in the late '70s was not alone in this, there was a staggering degree of corporate complacency going on. Firstly, the rescinding of the rule that every Antarctic flight should have at least one crew member on the flight deck who had been down there before. Secondly, the laissez-faire attitude to the enforcement of MSA on Antarctic sightseeing flights. Thirdly, the failure of the Nav Section to perform a re-check on the co-ordinates fed into the computer, which remained incorrect for over a year - giving line pilots the impression that the intended route was down McMurdo Sound and not over Erebus.
Given sector whiteout conditions, the only clue that the crew would have that something had changed would be the different co-ordinates for the McMurdo waypoint on the printout they were given at pre-flight compared to the materials they'd been given at the briefing - how many pilots check that on a regular basis?
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The last I knew, Erebus was an active volcano. It wasn't just a mountain of ice.
The investigator was misguided by traveling to Bendix to learn if Erebus showed up on the Wx radar, where he would get only theoreticals and hedging. He would have had only to interview ANZ and QF pilots who had been there using that exact same radar.
GB
The investigator was misguided by traveling to Bendix to learn if Erebus showed up on the Wx radar, where he would get only theoreticals and hedging. He would have had only to interview ANZ and QF pilots who had been there using that exact same radar.
GB
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"But every pilot that flew that route prior did just that, and they were allowed to as long as the visibility was good - which as far as the accident crew was concerned, it was."
From John King's publication New Zealand Tragedies, Aviation, which has the luxury of hindsight.
From 1987 until the disaster all those pilots had cheerfully flown down McMurdo Sound more or less on the approach path used by the Military Pilots, instead of over Ross Island. The former may have seemed the more logical route, keeping clear of high ground, but the airline preferred its DC10's to stay well away from any conflicting local traffic. In any case it was largely acedemic as all but one flight had approached Antarctica in brilliantly clear conditions and the final letdown was entirely VFR with no need for instrument cloud break procedures.
The one exception was Captain Roger Dalziell's flight which, because of unfavourable McMurdo weather took the alternative sightseeing route over the South Magnetic pole, diverting even before reaching the specified decision point of Cape Hallet. Its unpopularity with the passengers, however, was a likely factor in making Captain Collins more determined to press on to McMurdo when condition were marginal and, according to company instructions, well below minima for the area."
So, we see that not all flights prior did not "do that", and we are also told that the accident crew were well aware that the weather conditions were below that allowed by the company for descent in that area.
- "which as far as the accident crew was concerned, it was."
That statement is quite obviously incorrect.
From John King's publication New Zealand Tragedies, Aviation, which has the luxury of hindsight.
From 1987 until the disaster all those pilots had cheerfully flown down McMurdo Sound more or less on the approach path used by the Military Pilots, instead of over Ross Island. The former may have seemed the more logical route, keeping clear of high ground, but the airline preferred its DC10's to stay well away from any conflicting local traffic. In any case it was largely acedemic as all but one flight had approached Antarctica in brilliantly clear conditions and the final letdown was entirely VFR with no need for instrument cloud break procedures.
The one exception was Captain Roger Dalziell's flight which, because of unfavourable McMurdo weather took the alternative sightseeing route over the South Magnetic pole, diverting even before reaching the specified decision point of Cape Hallet. Its unpopularity with the passengers, however, was a likely factor in making Captain Collins more determined to press on to McMurdo when condition were marginal and, according to company instructions, well below minima for the area."
So, we see that not all flights prior did not "do that", and we are also told that the accident crew were well aware that the weather conditions were below that allowed by the company for descent in that area.
- "which as far as the accident crew was concerned, it was."
That statement is quite obviously incorrect.
Last edited by prospector; 28th Feb 2010 at 03:28.
. . .. seem to recall that ANZ . . . . commissioned an advertisement with Allan Wicker stating this fact,( that ANZ had not had a fatality up until this accident), which aired a few weeks beforehand.
If this is true it may well be the only time ever that an airline boasted of such a thing. Also seems a swag of bad karma followed Morrie Davis around.
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Wasn't aware of any bad karma following Morrie Davis around, care to elaborate? I don't think you were meaning Muldoon.
The Alan Wicker commercial might have been pulled before airing in NZ but I am 100% sure it was made. I recall Alan Wicker stating in a news article that this was the first time in his career where he had endorsed an airline (not that he did it for free of course). I saw the advert when in LA.
The Alan Wicker commercial might have been pulled before airing in NZ but I am 100% sure it was made. I recall Alan Wicker stating in a news article that this was the first time in his career where he had endorsed an airline (not that he did it for free of course). I saw the advert when in LA.
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The investigator was misguided by traveling to Bendix to learn if Erebus showed up on the Wx radar, where he would get only theoreticals and hedging. He would have had only to interview ANZ and QF pilots who had been there using that exact same radar.
And prospector, while I haven't read John King's book in its entirety, it would appear from the extracts I have read that it appears a somewhat one-sided account of events.
Also, we'll never know exactly what went on in the cockpit that day due to the limitations of the CVR technology installed at the time, but it would appear that they went below the cloud cover to provide visual confirmation of where they were. The photos and film taken from inside the jet show there were no problems with visibility at all for some time prior to impact, contrary to the theories put forward by ANZ and Chippindale, which suggested they were lost in cloud until the point of impact. As such, King's assertion that
Its unpopularity with the passengers, however, was a likely factor in making Captain Collins more determined to press on to McMurdo when condition were marginal
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The Holy Grail loosely follows the legend of King Arthur.
Arthur along with his squire Patsy recruits his Knights of the Round Table, including Sir Bedevere the Wise, Sir Lancelot the Brave, Sir Robin the Not-Quite-So-Brave-As-Sir-Lancelot and Sir Galahad the Pure.
The group is instructed by God to seek out the Holy Grail.
They are led to a castle controlled by the French where they believe the Grail is being held. After being insulted in mangled Franglais and failing to invade the castle in a Trojan Rabbit, Arthur decides that they must go their separate ways to seek out the Grail.
Concurrent to these events, in a manner of breaking the fourth wall, a modern-day historian, while describing the Arthurian legend as for a television program, is killed by a knight on horseback, triggering a police investigation.
Each of the Knights encounter various perils on their quest.
Arthur and Bedevere attempt to satisfy the strange requests of the dreaded Knights who say Ni. Sir Robin narrowly, but bravely, avoids a fight with the Three-Headed Giant. Sir Lancelot accidentally assaults a wedding party at Swamp Castle believing them to be hiding the Grail. Galahad is led by a Grail-shaped beacon to Castle Anthrax, populated by only comely women who wish to perform sexual favours for him, but is "rescued" by Lancelot.
The Knights regroup and travel to see Tim the Enchanter, who points them to caves where the location of the Grail is written on the walls. To enter the caves, the group is forced to defeat the Rabbit of Caerbannog using the Holy Hand Grenade of Antioch.
With their final destination known, the group travels to its last peril, the Bridge of Death, where each Knight is forced to answer three questions by the bridgekeeper before they can cross; Sirs Robin and Galahad fail and are thrown into the chasm below the bridge, before Arthur tricks the bridgekeeper. Lancelot becomes separated from Arthur and Bedevere, later shown arrested by modern-day police for the murder of the historian. Arthur and Bedevere travel to the Grail's castle, which they find is already occupied by the French who send them away with their insults.
They amass a large army to prepare to storm the castle, but just as they are ready to start the charge, the police arrive and stop it, arresting Arthur and Bedevere, and putting an end to the film; the search is never resolved nor are further inquiries ever held.
(Apologies to Monty Python however, there are many, many similarities where I shall leave it to readers to apply places and posters names to characters from the film as appropriate to this everlasting tale)
DK
Arthur along with his squire Patsy recruits his Knights of the Round Table, including Sir Bedevere the Wise, Sir Lancelot the Brave, Sir Robin the Not-Quite-So-Brave-As-Sir-Lancelot and Sir Galahad the Pure.
The group is instructed by God to seek out the Holy Grail.
They are led to a castle controlled by the French where they believe the Grail is being held. After being insulted in mangled Franglais and failing to invade the castle in a Trojan Rabbit, Arthur decides that they must go their separate ways to seek out the Grail.
Concurrent to these events, in a manner of breaking the fourth wall, a modern-day historian, while describing the Arthurian legend as for a television program, is killed by a knight on horseback, triggering a police investigation.
Each of the Knights encounter various perils on their quest.
Arthur and Bedevere attempt to satisfy the strange requests of the dreaded Knights who say Ni. Sir Robin narrowly, but bravely, avoids a fight with the Three-Headed Giant. Sir Lancelot accidentally assaults a wedding party at Swamp Castle believing them to be hiding the Grail. Galahad is led by a Grail-shaped beacon to Castle Anthrax, populated by only comely women who wish to perform sexual favours for him, but is "rescued" by Lancelot.
The Knights regroup and travel to see Tim the Enchanter, who points them to caves where the location of the Grail is written on the walls. To enter the caves, the group is forced to defeat the Rabbit of Caerbannog using the Holy Hand Grenade of Antioch.
With their final destination known, the group travels to its last peril, the Bridge of Death, where each Knight is forced to answer three questions by the bridgekeeper before they can cross; Sirs Robin and Galahad fail and are thrown into the chasm below the bridge, before Arthur tricks the bridgekeeper. Lancelot becomes separated from Arthur and Bedevere, later shown arrested by modern-day police for the murder of the historian. Arthur and Bedevere travel to the Grail's castle, which they find is already occupied by the French who send them away with their insults.
They amass a large army to prepare to storm the castle, but just as they are ready to start the charge, the police arrive and stop it, arresting Arthur and Bedevere, and putting an end to the film; the search is never resolved nor are further inquiries ever held.
(Apologies to Monty Python however, there are many, many similarities where I shall leave it to readers to apply places and posters names to characters from the film as appropriate to this everlasting tale)
DK
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DozyWannabe,
There can be no mistaking what the weather at McMurdo base was at the relevant time, it was well below the minimums required for the approved cloud break procedure.
If you want to use the phrase "one sided" try this for one eyed and one sided.
"From the point of view of both organisations they could obtain, so they believed, absolution from their own numerous errors by merely ascribing the disaster to a failure by Capt Collins to observe the minimum flight level of 16,000ft. This was the principal basis for the case for Civil Aviation Division and, as will be seen from what I have already written, it was in my view a basis without any justification whatever".
Here we have the learned judge, stating, in his opinion, that not complying with the Minimum Safe Altitude, had nothing to do with the "accident".
Most people who have any knowledge of this occurence readily accept that many errors were made by a number of parties, both errors of omission and commission, but the prime cause was the decision to go below MSA, without meeting any of the requirements as laid down by both the CAA and the Company.
The statement by Justice Mahon that the decision to go below the route MSA had nothing to do with the accident shows to me anyway, the folly of appointing someone who had never sat in the drivers seat of any aircraft, to enquire into, and criticize the findings of a highly qualified Aircraft Accident Inspector.
Dark Knight,
You have made your opinions abundantly clear, why then does your brousing bring you back to the thread????
There can be no mistaking what the weather at McMurdo base was at the relevant time, it was well below the minimums required for the approved cloud break procedure.
If you want to use the phrase "one sided" try this for one eyed and one sided.
"From the point of view of both organisations they could obtain, so they believed, absolution from their own numerous errors by merely ascribing the disaster to a failure by Capt Collins to observe the minimum flight level of 16,000ft. This was the principal basis for the case for Civil Aviation Division and, as will be seen from what I have already written, it was in my view a basis without any justification whatever".
Here we have the learned judge, stating, in his opinion, that not complying with the Minimum Safe Altitude, had nothing to do with the "accident".
Most people who have any knowledge of this occurence readily accept that many errors were made by a number of parties, both errors of omission and commission, but the prime cause was the decision to go below MSA, without meeting any of the requirements as laid down by both the CAA and the Company.
The statement by Justice Mahon that the decision to go below the route MSA had nothing to do with the accident shows to me anyway, the folly of appointing someone who had never sat in the drivers seat of any aircraft, to enquire into, and criticize the findings of a highly qualified Aircraft Accident Inspector.
Dark Knight,
You have made your opinions abundantly clear, why then does your brousing bring you back to the thread????
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Different Route; Same Destination
Really? As I understood it, QF took a different route entirely and from the computerisation of the route to the flight before the accident - which would have been for more than a year, remember - all ANZ flights would have followed the incorrect INS track down McMurdo Sound. How would a QF or ANZ pilot have been able to tell him what Erebus looked like on the weather radar when none of them had approached Erebus from that angle?
It matters not much from which angle Erebus is approached, it would be either visible under the ice on the radar, or not. Nothing but another transport aircraft with that radar, like ANZ and QF flights, would provide the answer. Still, I have seen or heard nothing suggesting they even had the radar energized.
GB
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As an outside observer, and non-pilot, the Mahon report created an interesting perspective on the use of 'company culture' for the basis of determining the cause of the accident.
I've spent much of the day watching - and re-watching - numerous documentaries, research and interviews regarding the Erebus tragedy, as someone who wasn't born when it happened. I'm no expert - nor am I a pilot - so my comments aren't as informed as most on here. However, I have several questions I hope others can help me with:
Note: No judgement on anyone is cast in my post here!
1) While the Chippendale report certainly raised the fact that flying below MSA was the 'cause', it was Mahon's enlarged scope that brought the lack of checks and balances within Air NZ to the fore. It was raised in one of the documentaries (Flight 901 to Erebus) that there had been many documented instances in the media, and in Air NZ's own publicity material, where flights were conducted below MSA. Other pilots - prior to Erebus - had done this as well.
Is it not then feasible - given the circumstances - that 'company culture' played a role in shaping the actions of the crew, not just in the realm of this accident, but in prior Antarctic flights as well? Evidence and submissions showed many contradictions in terms of what expectations and rules crew were to follow.
2) The differences in scope of the investigation (Chippendale vs. Mahon's findings) - as have been noted on here - draw the distinction of a pilot vs. non-pilot making technical judgements in an aviation investigation. However, were it not for Mahon's findings, the many managerial and technical flaws that existed in Air NZ would never have come to light. Also, this breadth of investigation, from my own personal research, seems evident in other accident investigations around the world.
Pure conjecture, but it must be asked: If we relied on the findings of the Chippendale report, without questioning further, would we not be arguing instead about another accident occurring at Air NZ? Another incident involving a flightplan error - however, with the benefit of the lessons of Erebus - was caught on an AKL-RAR flight (termed the '4th December Incident' - had never heard of it before, in the sphere of the Erebus investigation).
I believe it occurred some 8-months after the RC ended?
3) Recently in this forum, much has been made of the Bendix weather radar, and its' ability to pick up ice, etc. The manual for the type of radar installed on the aircraft stated it should not be used for terrain avoidance. Aside from the GPWS (sadly), what other radar systems could the crew have used at the time? Just seems to be disagreement within the forum (not unusual, I know).
I've spent much of the day watching - and re-watching - numerous documentaries, research and interviews regarding the Erebus tragedy, as someone who wasn't born when it happened. I'm no expert - nor am I a pilot - so my comments aren't as informed as most on here. However, I have several questions I hope others can help me with:
Note: No judgement on anyone is cast in my post here!
1) While the Chippendale report certainly raised the fact that flying below MSA was the 'cause', it was Mahon's enlarged scope that brought the lack of checks and balances within Air NZ to the fore. It was raised in one of the documentaries (Flight 901 to Erebus) that there had been many documented instances in the media, and in Air NZ's own publicity material, where flights were conducted below MSA. Other pilots - prior to Erebus - had done this as well.
Is it not then feasible - given the circumstances - that 'company culture' played a role in shaping the actions of the crew, not just in the realm of this accident, but in prior Antarctic flights as well? Evidence and submissions showed many contradictions in terms of what expectations and rules crew were to follow.
2) The differences in scope of the investigation (Chippendale vs. Mahon's findings) - as have been noted on here - draw the distinction of a pilot vs. non-pilot making technical judgements in an aviation investigation. However, were it not for Mahon's findings, the many managerial and technical flaws that existed in Air NZ would never have come to light. Also, this breadth of investigation, from my own personal research, seems evident in other accident investigations around the world.
Pure conjecture, but it must be asked: If we relied on the findings of the Chippendale report, without questioning further, would we not be arguing instead about another accident occurring at Air NZ? Another incident involving a flightplan error - however, with the benefit of the lessons of Erebus - was caught on an AKL-RAR flight (termed the '4th December Incident' - had never heard of it before, in the sphere of the Erebus investigation).
I believe it occurred some 8-months after the RC ended?
3) Recently in this forum, much has been made of the Bendix weather radar, and its' ability to pick up ice, etc. The manual for the type of radar installed on the aircraft stated it should not be used for terrain avoidance. Aside from the GPWS (sadly), what other radar systems could the crew have used at the time? Just seems to be disagreement within the forum (not unusual, I know).
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It was raised in one of the documentaries (Flight 901 to Erebus) that there had been many documented instances in the media, and in Air NZ's own publicity material, where flights were conducted below MSA. Other pilots - prior to Erebus - had done this as well.
Is it not then feasible - given the circumstances - that 'company culture' played a role in shaping the actions of the crew, not just in the realm of this accident, but in prior Antarctic flights as well? Evidence and submissions showed many contradictions in terms of what expectations and rules crew were to follow.
Is it not then feasible - given the circumstances - that 'company culture' played a role in shaping the actions of the crew, not just in the realm of this accident, but in prior Antarctic flights as well? Evidence and submissions showed many contradictions in terms of what expectations and rules crew were to follow.
The statement by Justice Mahon that the decision to go below the route MSA had nothing to do with the accident shows to me anyway, the folly of appointing someone who had never sat in the drivers seat of any aircraft, to enquire into, and criticize the findings of a highly qualified Aircraft Accident Inspector.
The point I was trying to get at, that Mr Seatback 2 has explained so eloquently, is that while a descent in what could have been marginal conditions while relying on INS was a contributing factor to the crash, it was not the first such descent made, and in fact ANZ had been quietly removing layers of safety for two years prior to the accident, and had also been very lax about enforcing the MSA - which in today's world would and should be considered major contributing factors to the accident. That the holes in the cheese created by ANZ lined up on flight it did had more to do with bad luck than especially poor judgement (compared to their peers in ANZ) on the part of the crew in charge that day.
Remember - the only part of Mahon's report that was censured was the language referring to a cover-up. ANZ and Muldoon claimed that the whole thing was vacated, when in fact the report was considered painstaking and a model of its kind in every respect other than that.
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DozyWannabe,
"In any case it was largely acedemic as all but one flight had approached Antarctica in brilliantly clear conditions and the final letdown was entirely VFR with no need for instrument cloud break procedures."
You say,
"it was not the first such descent made, and in fact ANZ had been quietly removing layers of safety for two years prior to the accident"
Which is where I disagree. It was the first descent made in marginal weather conditions, we have a record of flights descending below the laid down minima, but they were all carried out in "brilliantly clear conditions".
If you want to break the rules you must make sure everything is going for you, that was possible in Brilliantly Clear Conditions.
"In any case it was largely acedemic as all but one flight had approached Antarctica in brilliantly clear conditions and the final letdown was entirely VFR with no need for instrument cloud break procedures."
You say,
"it was not the first such descent made, and in fact ANZ had been quietly removing layers of safety for two years prior to the accident"
Which is where I disagree. It was the first descent made in marginal weather conditions, we have a record of flights descending below the laid down minima, but they were all carried out in "brilliantly clear conditions".
If you want to break the rules you must make sure everything is going for you, that was possible in Brilliantly Clear Conditions.
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Prospector: "In any case it was largely acedemic as all but one flight had approached Antarctica in brilliantly clear conditions and the final letdown was entirely VFR with no need for instrument cloud break procedures."
If the book is the one I've seen, which is a 300-odd pager referring to all aviation mishaps in NZ over a time period, firstly one would need to look at the sources - was Chippindale himself one of them?
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Dozy Wannabe,
This thread has been running for a long time. There have been many publications quoted from, from some very eminent people in the Aviation World, many have not agreed with the findings of Justice Mahon.
I would suggest you start from the beginning of the thread and absorb what has already been scribed.
The enquiry was as to the cause of the accident. All the other errors of omission and commission, of which there were many, would not have made one ioata of difference to the safety of the flight if it had remained above the required altitudes as laid down by the Company and CAA.
To state that it was a sight seeing flight therefor it was acceptable to bend the rules is ridiculous.
This thread has been running for a long time. There have been many publications quoted from, from some very eminent people in the Aviation World, many have not agreed with the findings of Justice Mahon.
I would suggest you start from the beginning of the thread and absorb what has already been scribed.
The enquiry was as to the cause of the accident. All the other errors of omission and commission, of which there were many, would not have made one ioata of difference to the safety of the flight if it had remained above the required altitudes as laid down by the Company and CAA.
To state that it was a sight seeing flight therefor it was acceptable to bend the rules is ridiculous.