Merged: Erebus site launched

[forget]

With both Tenerife and Erebus it’s sad that the pilots didn't give more credence to the doubts of the Flight Engineers.

KLM.
17.06:12 Captain. ‘We go …… check thrust’.
17.06:32 F/E. ‘Is he not clear then?’.
17.06:34 Captain. ‘What did you say?’
17.06:35 F/E. ‘Is he not clear … that Pan American’.
17.06:36 Captain. ‘Oh, yes.’
17.06:49 Impact.

ANZ.
12.49.08, Mulgrew. (Observer, Pax commentator.) ‘That looks like the edge of Ross Island there’.
12.49:24 F/E Brooks: ‘I don’t like this.’
12.49:25 Capt Collins: ‘Have you got anything from him?’ (McMurdo)
F/O Cassin: ‘No.’
12.49:30 Capt Collins: ‘We’re 26 miles north. We’ll have to climb out of it’.
12.49:35 Mulgrew: ‘You can see Ross Island? Fine.’
12.49:38 F/O Cassin: ‘You’re clear to turn right. There’s no high ground if you do a one eighty.’
(Collins was happier turning left.)
Capt Collins: ‘No.. . negative.’
GPWS.
12.49:48 F/E Brooks. ‘Five hundred feet’. (RadAlt)
GPWS.
F/E Brooks. ‘Four hundred feet’.
Capt Collins: ‘Go around power please’.
Impact.

[Desert Dingo]

Forget:
you make a good point, but I don't think your interpretation of the Erebus flight engineer's comment is valid.
Can I ask you to read Garry Parata's article at
Gary Parata's Article Page 1
where you will find (page 4)

Time
0048:55 ...have we got them on the tower?
No...I’ll try them again
0049:24 I don’t like this
0049:25 have you got anything from him?
no
The “I don’t like this” comment was voiced by the duty flight engineer, and Cooper says the tone and inflection indicated considerable concern.
It fell within the above exchange between the pilots regarding the lack of VHF communications with “Ice Tower.”
Again, the context must be examined in order to correctly interpret the meaning of this passage, rather than assuming theories of “mounting alarm” from the flight engineers being ignored by the pilots. If that had been the case the flight engineers would not have stopped issuing warnings until the pilots acted. As this did not occur it strongly suggests a less immediate reason for the comment.
It is likely that the duty flight engineer was referring to the exchange between the pilots and was simply expressing his unease that, contrary to expectation, no VHF communications were taking place. To put it another way perhaps, if the engineer had issued a warning the “crew loop” would have required that the flight engineer qualify the statement by clearly defining exactly what was bothering him, and then suggesting a course of action.
This second example serves as a further graphic reminder to leave CVR interpretation to the experts:

Same words, but a completely different meaning.

[forget]

Desert Dingo, I take your point, and we’ll never know one way or the other.

However, I do think that any ‘pilot in the street’ would question the ‘likely’ conclusion below on the FE’s ‘I don’t like this’.

If that had been the case the flight engineer would not have stopped issuing warnings until the pilots acted. As this did not occur it strongly suggests a less immediate reason for the comment. It is likely that the duty flight engineer was referring to the exchange between the pilots and was simply expressing his unease that, contrary to expectation, no VHF communications were taking place.

I can’t accept that lack of comms, alone, prompted the FE’s remark. Why would it? Is it not more likely to have been the trigger - the last straw - in the FE’s increasing discomfort.

As I say, we’ll never know one way or the other. But with 20/20 hindsight, and it’s reasonable to say that the FE wasn’t the only one feeling uneasy, all it would have taken was another crew member to agree, ‘I don’t like it either - lets go’.

Erebus, like the Kennedy assassination, leaves you in no doubt where you were when you heard about it.

[ZK-NSJ]

wasnt one of the crews houses broken into after the crash, and items removed from a planning folder?

[prospector]

When the Flight Engineers comment is aligned with the fact that they had no DME lockon, no radar contact, and no VHF contact, the scenario that forget suggests is a much more likely to be the correct one.

"I can’t accept that lack of comms, alone, prompted the FE’s remark."

After all, he only had 24 seconds from the I don't like it to calling 500ft of the RadAlt. Not a lot to suggest any different plan of action.

[ampan]

Desert Dingo #120: “I thought the track went down the middle of McMurdo Sound” is not necessarily inconsistent with “I thought the track went direct to McMurdo Station”. The statements would be inconsistent if the witness knows that a direct track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station goes over Ross Island (ie, does not go down the middle of McMurdo Sound). In order to know that a direct track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station goes over Ross Island, you need a map showing Cape Hallett, McMurdo Station and Ross Island.

The Radio Navigation Chart (McFarlane p81) is of small scale, does not identify Ross Island by name and, in any event, is what it says it is: a map for radio navigation purposes.

NZMS135 (McFarlane pp 90,91) is a topographical map showing all three positions, and containing an inset map of the area around McMurdo Station. But this map was not available at the briefing. The map used at the briefing was a photocopy of the inset (McFarlane p37). The inset does not show Cape Hallett, so the map can’t be used to picture the track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station in relation to Ross Island.

The point is that it was possible for a pilot attending the briefing to leave with the impression that the track was direct to McMurdo Station, and that this track would take the aircraft down the middle of McMurdo Sound, with Ross Island to the left.

[ampan]

I don't see the relevance of the "I don't like this" comment, because within 6 seconds of it being made, the captain had decided to climb out - via a left turn.

[prospector]

Perusing the Gary Parata article I find this quite suprising.

" Consider this exchange:
Time 0039:49 Having a bit of radio trouble at the moment
Have you got the squelch off?
Clearance to go down.
Say again?
Have you got the squelch off on that?
Time 0039:58 Yes, on both.
This exchange showed that the crew were actively troubleshooting the reasons why short-range VHF communications from “Ice Tower” 8 were not being received. The crew were utilising their wealth of knowledge and experience to resolve the anomaly. The words are clear and unambiguous, and were signed off unanimously by the CVR Group as having definitely been spoken."

Wealth of knowledge to ask if the squelch was off???

One would have thought that the wealth of knowledge would be trying to ascertain why there was no radar contact, no DME lock on, no VHF contact from a station that was, if they were where they thought they were, no more than, how many miles away???, over flat ice.

[ampan]

Forget about that stuff, prospector. It will be put down to "Monday Morning Quarterbacking".

It seems obvious - in hindsight.

[prospector]

Beg to differ there ampan, this new website was presumably constructed for the education of the layman. The passage I have quoted, to me, is pure spin. To any knowledgable, experienced person it may seem obvious, so why was it put on this website the way it is??. to influence people into agreeing with one interpretation of the facts perhaps???

[Steve Zissou]

This is like being at a tennis match: ampan, prospector, ampan, prospector ...

[Desert Dingo]

ampan

The point is that it was possible for a pilot attending the briefing to leave with the impression that the track was direct to McMurdo Station, and that this track would take the aircraft down the middle of McMurdo Sound, with Ross Island to the left.

Not so. That idea is flatly contradicted by the discussions about having to make a left turn from the waypoint in McMurdo Sound, then estimating the track and distance required to get to McMurdo Station.
The briefed track was not direct to McMurdo Station, regardless of how much you or the airline wish it were so.

[stillalbatross]

So all on here would have done the same and descended based on the company SOPs and the weather at the time. Apart from about 3 of us. Or are you all saying Collins and crew weren't at fault but nor would you have descended? I am confused.

I am still confused as to why you would all descend based on an INS that could have already been 10 or 20 miles out but still have been "in tolerance".

[ampan]

stillalbatross: Because you're in Brian Abraham's "VMC bubble": You'll see the high ground well before getting dangerously close to it.

Dingo: I'm not aware of any evidence about a left turn at the Byrd Reporting Point (or somewhere thereabouts).

PS: Here's the current version of the chart.

http://ortho.linz.govt.nz/antarctic/RossSeaRegions.jpg


If you look at both the main chart and the inset, it is clear that a track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station crosses Ross Island. But what if you only have the inset?

[crocodile redundee]

I wonder whether the recent Air France A330 disaster would have been averted by having that "3rd pair of eyes" on the Flight Deck?? (And many other incidents over the years) Progress?? Technological Redundancy?? Not always a positive step forward in Aviation.........
I did hear said that when Airbus were introducing their A320 (2 crew) concept that they were prepared to wear the "occasional" disaster on the type as an unfortunate "Statistic" when relating incidents precluded by having only 2 crew flight decks.
That 3rd pair of eyes is "Cheap Insurance" (had been calculated at $2 extra per pax ticket based on a 130 pax aircraft over a 4 hour sector.) The general public wouldn't bat an eyelid over paying that, knowing the asset it provided to a flight crew overall....

[Brian Abraham]

Because you're in Brian Abraham's "VMC bubble": You'll see the high ground well before getting dangerously close to it.

Not necessarily, due to the limitations of the Mk. 1 Mod 0, electromagnetic detector in the 790–400 terahertz range. In my one and only flight over the ice the limitation was made plain when at 18,000 in VMC conditions we could have flown into the proverbial brick wall without seeing it. The military practice the art of camouflage - seeing without seeing, if you get the drift. I don't know why you are so unwilling to accept evidence provided by very experienced ice people such as compressor stall and P-B. All detectors, whether they be radar, sonar or the human eyeball, have limitations and can be spoofed one way or the other. Training in the detectors limitations can surmount many of the problems, but not all - eg specialist photo interpreters searching for camouflaged equipment.

[Desert Dingo]

ampan

Dingo: I'm not aware of any evidence about a left turn at the Byrd Reporting Point (or somewhere thereabouts).

Well you would be if you looked at the evidence about what was shown at the briefings.

PS: Here's the current version of the chart.

http://ortho.linz.govt.nz/antarctic/RossSeaRegions.jpg


If you look at both the main chart and the inset, it is clear that a track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station crosses Ross Island. But what if you only have the inset?

And why would you have only that chart or the inset?
Yep. That is a lovely chart, and you keep referring to it, and it does not have a track on it, which makes it hard to relate to the flight planned track.

However, the evidence shows that the other charts presented at the briefing were:

Strip Chart (annex 1) Topographic chart showing military tracks, including the two down McMurdo Sound to Byrd waypoint and left turn to McMurdo Station.


and
(DOD Strip chart Exhibit 165) Shows military route down McMurdo Sound to Byrd waypoint then left turn to McMurdo Station. Similar to Strip Chart (annex 1) but without topographic detail.


and RNC4 Radionavigation chart showing (among others) direct track from New Zealand down McMurdo Sound to Byrd waypoint where the track ends. McMurdo Station is off to the left of ith inbound track



and Exhibit 164. An ANZ Nav department chart with no topographic detail but showing the two military tracks down McMurdo Sound to Byrd waypoint ending at a common waypoint with the track from New Zealand via Cape Hallet.


Even the map for the passengers showed a track down McMurdo Sound and a left turn.


For you to be convinced that the briefed track was direct to McMurdo Station is contrary to the evidence. For you to believe that any crew member, after being shown these charts, would leave the briefing thinking the track was direct to McMurdo Station defies logic.

Please don’t try to refer us to the Annex J chart which does show a track direct to McMurdo Station and over Erebus. That is the obsolete chart the airline fed to Mr. Chippindale in their initially successful attempt to make it all look like pilot error.
I'll try to make the point once more.
THE BRIEFED TRACK WAS NOT DIRECT TO McMURDO STATION.

[ampan]

Desert Dingo #137: Thanks D. Dingo. Great post. (I wish I could figure out how to do that.)

Starting with the passenger map, I accept that this was available at the briefing, but doubt that it was given any attention. It was obviously not intended to represent the nav track down McMurdo Sound from Cape Hallett and back, because the nav track going back was the same as the nav track going down.

As for the other four maps, they all show a route that turns left at the Byrd Reporting Point. But as you note, that’s the military route, for aircraft landing at McMurdo Station. Obviously, none of the AirNZ flights intended landing at McMurdo Station – which is why none of the flights made any left turn at Byrd. They usually went to the right of track to get a closer view of the coast of Victoria Land, and then turned left towards McMurdo Station, passing the general Byrd location on the way.

But the real point is that the pilots at the briefing were expressly told that they would not be flying the military route. Even Capt. Gabriel accepted that this was said.

Another point: Although the strip chart is obviously a topographical map, it was not available at the briefing. Rather, it was one of the maps provided on the morning of the flight.

As for Ex. 164, I don’t understand the controversy. AirNZ said it was a working document prepared by the nav section and that it made yet another error by including it in the briefing materials for the 1978 flights. Is that explanation not plausible? All anyone needs to do is look at the document. Would anyone draw any conclusions about the nav track from a “chart” like that?

When you refer, in red capitals, to the “briefed track”, what do you mean? Do you mean the track shown on a couple of handouts? So does a briefing consist of the receipt of handouts? So why not simply mail the handouts to the pilots and let that constitute the briefing? You have to consider the whole briefing exercise: Slides with accompanying audio, plus the verbal information from Capt. Wilson, plus the subsequent simulator session conducted by Capt. Johnson.

For the sake of argument, let it be assumed that Capts. Wilson and Johnson are the liars that they are alleged to be, and that both were prepared to risk several months in prison (for … and I’m struggling here … in Wilson’s case, to keep his post-retirement briefing job at half the salary that he received before? As for Johnson, to keep on getting that extra 4k per annum, minus lost expenses, that he got for being an executive pilot?) So let’s ignore any evidence from Capts. Wilson and Johnson. Let’s only use the union’s evidence.

Start with Exhibit 12, which was the script that Wilson used to make the audio commentary. This is what the script says, and this is what the audio said:

“A standard route definition will be used employing the From-Via-To format. Enter NZAA then 78S/167E this being the approximate co-ordinates of McMurdo Station.”


Desert Dingo suggests that the above co-ordinates are also the approximate co-ordinates of a point 20nm to the west of McMurdo Station, by the Dailey Islands. Really? The actual co-ordinates of the final waypoint for TE901 were “7752.7S/1665.80E”. If you round those ordinates off to the nearest degree, the result is 78S/167E. The co-ordinates for the Dailey Islands waypoint were “7753.0S/16448.0E”. If you round those co-ordinates off to the nearest degree the result is 78S/165E.

Further, I have the whole of the script in front of me, and there is absolutely nothing to suggest that the waypoint was anywhere other than at McMurdo Station.

Moving on to the pilots who attending briefings in 1978 and 1979, not a single solitary one of them said that “Wilson told us that the nav track went to a point by the Dailey Islands”. The only evidence they gave was either in the negative: “”He didn’t say the track went over Erebus” or it was “We did some rough eyeballing etc.” Not a single one gave any evidence about what Wilson said about the location of the final waypoint. Desert Dingo has done the search, and has come up with nothing. There is no evidence from any pilot to the effect that “Wilson said that the nav track went to a point by the Dailey Islands [or somewhere similar].”

[FGD135]

About this "briefed track":

Nobody seems to be addressing the fact that there were two, fundamentally different tracks in play.

One track was the track that ANZ wanted the crew, for optimum sightseeing, to follow. This track was the "sightseeing track". It was only around Antarctica and would be flown visually (with the AINS disengaged).

The other track was the one that would be programmed into the AINS. This track was the "AINS track" and was purely to get the aircraft from New Zealand to a position from where the sightseeing track could commence.

It would be folly to assume that these two tracks were intended to be one and the same. Mahon seems to have made that assumption and you, Desert Dingo, seem to be doing the same - or have I just misread your posts?

All the discussion I see in this thread about "the briefed track" fails to differentiate between the two.

Of course the passenger handout will show the sightseeing track. Of course the briefing will include detail as to where the sightseeing track should go.

The briefing should also have included some detail on the AINS track - given how fundamentally and conceptually different it was/is to the sightseeing track. Whether the briefing did or did not include this information seems to be in hot dispute.

I find it difficult to believe that the briefing would not have made references to the AINS track. The transition from the AINS track to the sightseeing phase - thence back to the AINS track was surely a significant aspect of how the flight would be conducted.

If I had been at the briefing and been told that the AINS track terminated at a point 27 miles west of McMurdo Station, I would have been asking "why does it terminate there? That makes no sense. It should terminate at the McMurdo Station TACAN".

Collins seems to have realised that the two tracks may have been different - hence his plotting the AINS track for himself the night before the flight.

[Brian Abraham]

But as you note, that’s the military route, for aircraft landing at McMurdo Station. Obviously, none of the AirNZ flights intended landing at McMurdo Station – which is why none of the flights made any left turn at Byrd. They usually went to the right of track to get a closer view of the coast of Victoria Land, and then turned left towards McMurdo Station, passing the general Byrd location on the way.

But they would need to make the left turn in order to carry out the NDB approach should the weather dictate. What each crew actually did was make a judgement that they were in VMC and descended accordingly, just as the fateful flight.