Your landing or mine - the captain's ultimate responsibility
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Your landing or mine - the captain's ultimate responsibility
Interesting Channel Seven TV documentary on the Air France A340 overrun at Toronto last year. All aboard (311) escaped with minor injuries. It was compelling viewing especially when compared with the official accident report.
The A340 landed in heavy rain and thunderstorm activity. The captain gave the F/O the landing despite reports of really severe conditions. After coming over the fence at 100ft with a 33 knot crosswind and a quarter inch of water on the runway, the F/O floated 4300ft in to the 9000 ft runway before touch down. To compound the problem reverse thrust was not selected until 13 seconds after touch down. It seems the F/O might have frozen on the reverse levers. The aircraft left the runway at 70 knots and caught fire after nosing into a ravine. The documentary revealed the captain urging the F/O to "get it down, get it down" during the float.
Passengers still tried to carry hand baggage with them down the escape slides and one frame showed a man with a large bag blocking the escape slide flow. I found it compelling watching when a few of the survivors were interviewed for the programme some months after the accident and it made one realise the real responsibility of the captain for the safe conduct of the flight. The people down the back were absolutely terrified as flames erupted after the A340 went into the ravine and the survivors that were interviewed still carried horrible memories of the crash sequence.
Which brings me to the point of this post. Often once the cockpit door is closed, there is a tendency for the two pilots to forget that the cabin crew and passengers are a captive audience to whatever dangers the captain takes them into. In the A340 accident at any stage of the approach the captain could have taken over control from the F/O and either handled the approach and landing himself - or gone around - or diverted well before the aircraft was on final in the thunderstorm. Perhaps if the pilots with hindsight could have seen and heard the screams of the passengers as the aircraft went off the end, they would have never continued the approach
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It is all too easy to sit in splended isolation up front - after all it is up to the cabin crew to deal with problems with passengers. As the TV documentary pointed out, the captain was aware of the commercial cost of a diversion and there is little doubt this weighed heavily on his mind. The trick is to know when a decision to approach in bad weather is not being subconsciously influenced by commercial pressures. The example of the British Airways Boeing 747 captain to continue 10 hours to London on three engines after losing an engine in the early climb from New York (?) is a case in point. The FAA certainly thought it was a bad decision but BA didn't.
In the documentary on the Air France A340 accident, the captain offered the F/O either the take off or the landing. There was no indication then of possible bad weather at the other end. The F/O then told the captain that he (the captain) could do the take off while he (the F/O) would do the landing at Toronto. The problem arises when the captain starts to have nagging doubts about the wisdom or otherwise of his subordinate doing the handling when weather conditions turn really nasty. It matters not whether the F/O is highly experienced. There is a point where certain conditions dictate that the captain assume handling responsibility and he must not allow his perceived respect for his F/O's experience and demonstrated skills to abrogate that command responsibility.
The decision becomes clouded when a mateship culture pervades on the flight deck as it does in some airlines. The captain feels slightly embarrassed that he is harbouring doubts about who should be doing the flying. Often the captain will find himself rationalising that the F/O can do the job just as well as the captain and disregards his conscience. Maybe the F/O can do the job as well as his captain - but that's not the point here. When weather conditions are such that the captain begins to feel that perhaps he should be running the show rather than "monitoring" the F/O's decision making and handling - then that it is the time to take decisive action and DO something.
It is too late when the aircraft is high and fast over the fence and the captain does not know if the F/O is going to flare high in heavy rain or float down the runway. How can the captain possibly know if the F/O is going to be far too slow to pull reverse thrust - or to kick off the drift in a strong crosswind on a wet runway.
Of course the F/O may harbour the same feelings when the captain is handling in bad conditions. But the command responsibility is with the captain and the passengers are expecting this God among men to fly them safely. The captain should remember that he is doing his F/O no favours by putting him in the position of vital decision making that could go either way in bad weather. Leave those risks to the simulator during ccommand training. The flight deck is not a democracy and the captain should not feel a wimp if he decides to take over control. Equally the F/O should put himself in the captain's position and realise that it is not necessarily a reflection on his decision making or handling skills if the captain changes his mind and decides to do the handling himself.
The TV documentary on the A340 crash at Toronto provides a powerful flight safety message and every crew member should try and view it.
The A340 landed in heavy rain and thunderstorm activity. The captain gave the F/O the landing despite reports of really severe conditions. After coming over the fence at 100ft with a 33 knot crosswind and a quarter inch of water on the runway, the F/O floated 4300ft in to the 9000 ft runway before touch down. To compound the problem reverse thrust was not selected until 13 seconds after touch down. It seems the F/O might have frozen on the reverse levers. The aircraft left the runway at 70 knots and caught fire after nosing into a ravine. The documentary revealed the captain urging the F/O to "get it down, get it down" during the float.
Passengers still tried to carry hand baggage with them down the escape slides and one frame showed a man with a large bag blocking the escape slide flow. I found it compelling watching when a few of the survivors were interviewed for the programme some months after the accident and it made one realise the real responsibility of the captain for the safe conduct of the flight. The people down the back were absolutely terrified as flames erupted after the A340 went into the ravine and the survivors that were interviewed still carried horrible memories of the crash sequence.
Which brings me to the point of this post. Often once the cockpit door is closed, there is a tendency for the two pilots to forget that the cabin crew and passengers are a captive audience to whatever dangers the captain takes them into. In the A340 accident at any stage of the approach the captain could have taken over control from the F/O and either handled the approach and landing himself - or gone around - or diverted well before the aircraft was on final in the thunderstorm. Perhaps if the pilots with hindsight could have seen and heard the screams of the passengers as the aircraft went off the end, they would have never continued the approach
-
It is all too easy to sit in splended isolation up front - after all it is up to the cabin crew to deal with problems with passengers. As the TV documentary pointed out, the captain was aware of the commercial cost of a diversion and there is little doubt this weighed heavily on his mind. The trick is to know when a decision to approach in bad weather is not being subconsciously influenced by commercial pressures. The example of the British Airways Boeing 747 captain to continue 10 hours to London on three engines after losing an engine in the early climb from New York (?) is a case in point. The FAA certainly thought it was a bad decision but BA didn't.
In the documentary on the Air France A340 accident, the captain offered the F/O either the take off or the landing. There was no indication then of possible bad weather at the other end. The F/O then told the captain that he (the captain) could do the take off while he (the F/O) would do the landing at Toronto. The problem arises when the captain starts to have nagging doubts about the wisdom or otherwise of his subordinate doing the handling when weather conditions turn really nasty. It matters not whether the F/O is highly experienced. There is a point where certain conditions dictate that the captain assume handling responsibility and he must not allow his perceived respect for his F/O's experience and demonstrated skills to abrogate that command responsibility.
The decision becomes clouded when a mateship culture pervades on the flight deck as it does in some airlines. The captain feels slightly embarrassed that he is harbouring doubts about who should be doing the flying. Often the captain will find himself rationalising that the F/O can do the job just as well as the captain and disregards his conscience. Maybe the F/O can do the job as well as his captain - but that's not the point here. When weather conditions are such that the captain begins to feel that perhaps he should be running the show rather than "monitoring" the F/O's decision making and handling - then that it is the time to take decisive action and DO something.
It is too late when the aircraft is high and fast over the fence and the captain does not know if the F/O is going to flare high in heavy rain or float down the runway. How can the captain possibly know if the F/O is going to be far too slow to pull reverse thrust - or to kick off the drift in a strong crosswind on a wet runway.
Of course the F/O may harbour the same feelings when the captain is handling in bad conditions. But the command responsibility is with the captain and the passengers are expecting this God among men to fly them safely. The captain should remember that he is doing his F/O no favours by putting him in the position of vital decision making that could go either way in bad weather. Leave those risks to the simulator during ccommand training. The flight deck is not a democracy and the captain should not feel a wimp if he decides to take over control. Equally the F/O should put himself in the captain's position and realise that it is not necessarily a reflection on his decision making or handling skills if the captain changes his mind and decides to do the handling himself.
The TV documentary on the A340 crash at Toronto provides a powerful flight safety message and every crew member should try and view it.
Last edited by Centaurus; 29th Mar 2007 at 14:11.
I would hardly call that show a "documentary" more like a dramatization of reported events. The only people interviewed were passengers who had no idea about what the hell was going on. The rest of it was speculation. If it was a documentary then maybe they should have had a chat to the controllers and played some of the black box and looked at it from more of a technical point of view not the usual hyped up crap that they go on with.
Loved it how the FO was using two hands to fight the controls in an airbus! About says it all really!
On a serious note though, the newer generation of CRM talk is for the Captain to watch and the FO to fly. Not sure how much of a good idea it is but that's the talk at the moment.
With cadets and MPL's being all the rage these days how will these guys ever get ANY experience doing anything if people don't let them. You can't have Captains taking over the duties every time you encounter crap weather.
In regard to this incident I never understood whether or not the approach was high or it was that they just got a unexpected downwind component and as a result floated. The "documentary" wasn't real clear on that part of it.
One has to ask why when touching down halfway on (the "short" as the "documentary" described it) 3000m runway that they didn't just go around. If you land halfway down a runway in ANY aircraft you would have to seriously consider a go around.
Loved it how the FO was using two hands to fight the controls in an airbus! About says it all really!
On a serious note though, the newer generation of CRM talk is for the Captain to watch and the FO to fly. Not sure how much of a good idea it is but that's the talk at the moment.
With cadets and MPL's being all the rage these days how will these guys ever get ANY experience doing anything if people don't let them. You can't have Captains taking over the duties every time you encounter crap weather.
In regard to this incident I never understood whether or not the approach was high or it was that they just got a unexpected downwind component and as a result floated. The "documentary" wasn't real clear on that part of it.
One has to ask why when touching down halfway on (the "short" as the "documentary" described it) 3000m runway that they didn't just go around. If you land halfway down a runway in ANY aircraft you would have to seriously consider a go around.
Last edited by neville_nobody; 29th Mar 2007 at 14:10.
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the newer generation of CRM talk is for the Captain to watch and the FO to fly
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mateship, I think not, the wx conditions you described are severe in my book, is this not covered in Air France SOP's? I feel no responsibility to let the F/O fly in these conditions, I'm not sure what the captain was thinking by letting him fly in severe conditions with a possible bingo fuel problem, the airplane should have been planted at the end of the runway IMO.
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My (much-maligned on this site) employer has clearly stated minimum visibility and maximum crosswind values for FO's takeoff and landings and in the case of landings, for both precision and non precision approaches. It's clear cut: if the visibility is less or the crosswind component is greater than these clearly stated values, the captain is required to fly the approach.
I've always believed that many if not most so-called 'first order' airlines have similar clauses in the SOPs, including Air France - (if not before this accident, then certainly after it).
I've always believed that many if not most so-called 'first order' airlines have similar clauses in the SOPs, including Air France - (if not before this accident, then certainly after it).
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Some interesting comments in amongst that post but I'm not sure what the point of this thread is overall other than describing this accident.
BTW, Are these all your own words, Centaurus?
Really not sure what the point of this post is but you're right, there is a tendency to forget the passengers during the flight but this is not an absolute.
No captain is doing his passengers any favours if, in a non-normal, all he's thinking about is all the burden of responsibility he feels on his shoulders for all the boguns in his airplane who suddenly wish they'd paid attention to the safety demo. He should be concentrating on getting his arse onto the ground safely; if he succeeds in this, the passengers will safely follow just as certainly.
How is this possible, using "hindsight"?? And do you really think the visualisation of screaming, hysterical passengers should be a part of the decision process??
Not sure what you were smoking when you wrote all this... What does it mean? Why does that second comment follow the first? Ever heard of the term non-sequitur?
That's one of the many, many tricks, yes. But for every incident or accident like the above, there are thousands or tens of thousands of safe and timely decisions being made during the approach and landing phases of flight. Despite this, it is inevitable that an accident scenario will take place from time to time.
Thank you for that. So the intent of this thread is to be a lecture? I think I get it now!! 
I like that. I'm going to take that concept on board as a worthwhile notion to keep in mind, at times. I've noticed it happening occasionally but never put it into words.
PPRuNe Command School...
No, it's not. It's too late when reverse thrust has been selected on the ground. Before that a go-around is still an option.
It's called faith. As a member of a crew, each of us has to have faith that the other member or members will carry out the required functions as per training. This applies whether the other crew-member is known personally or a complete stranger.
Another option to the faith the company expects you to have in a stranger whom they have certified to do the job, is to lob into the sim with every new crew-member you are rostered to fly with and evaluate him, before you operate the sector. Do you think this will work?
A third option is to curl up into the foetal position and, rocking gently to and fro, cry yourself to sleep in fear.
Let's get real. If your FO's been checked to line, why should you harbour doubts (without previous cause) about his abilities?
You are right in that in many airlines, the captain is expected to act as PF when conditions exceed certain parameters. But this is because he is assumed to be the best suited, not because FOs are generally held in suspicion.
BTW, Are these all your own words, Centaurus?
Which brings me to the point of this post. Often once the cockpit door is closed, there is a tendency for the two pilots to forget that the cabin crew and passengers are a captive audience to whatever dangers the captain takes them into. In the A340 accident at any stage of the approach the captain could have taken over control from the F/O and either handled the approach and landing himself - or gone around - or diverted well before the aircraft was on final in the thunderstorm.
No captain is doing his passengers any favours if, in a non-normal, all he's thinking about is all the burden of responsibility he feels on his shoulders for all the boguns in his airplane who suddenly wish they'd paid attention to the safety demo. He should be concentrating on getting his arse onto the ground safely; if he succeeds in this, the passengers will safely follow just as certainly.
Perhaps if the pilots with hindsight could have seen and heard the screams of the passengers as the aircraft went off the end, they would have never continued the approach
It is all too easy to sit in splended isolation up front - after all it is up to the cabin crew to deal with problems with passengers.
As the TV documentary pointed out, the captain was aware of the commercial cost of a diversion and there is little doubt this weighed heavily on his mind.
As the TV documentary pointed out, the captain was aware of the commercial cost of a diversion and there is little doubt this weighed heavily on his mind.
The trick is to know when a decision to approach in bad weather is not being subconsciously influenced by commercial pressures.
It matters not whether the F/O is highly experienced. There is a point where certain conditions dictate that the captain assume handling responsibility and he must not allow his perceived respect for his F/O's experience and demonstrated skills to abrogate that command responsibility.
Often the captain will find himself rationalising that the F/O can do the job just as well as the captain and disregards his conscience. Maybe the F/O can do the job as well as his captain - but that's not the point here.
When weather conditions are such that the captain begins to feel that perhaps he should be running the show rather than "monitoring" the F/O's decision making and handling - then that it is the time to take decisive action and DO something.
It is too late when the aircraft is high and fast over the fence and the captain does not know if the F/O is going to flare high in heavy rain or float down the runway.
How can the captain possibly know if the F/O is going to be far too slow to pull reverse thrust - or to kick off the drift in a strong crosswind on a wet runway.
Another option to the faith the company expects you to have in a stranger whom they have certified to do the job, is to lob into the sim with every new crew-member you are rostered to fly with and evaluate him, before you operate the sector. Do you think this will work?
A third option is to curl up into the foetal position and, rocking gently to and fro, cry yourself to sleep in fear.
Let's get real. If your FO's been checked to line, why should you harbour doubts (without previous cause) about his abilities?
You are right in that in many airlines, the captain is expected to act as PF when conditions exceed certain parameters. But this is because he is assumed to be the best suited, not because FOs are generally held in suspicion.
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With cadets and MPL's being all the rage these days how will these guys ever get ANY experience doing anything if people don't let them. You can't have Captains taking over the duties every time you encounter crap weather.
They won't.
"You can't have Captains taking over in crap weather....."
Oh yes you can!
The worldwide shortage of pilots has caused a paradigm shift in the way pilots gain experience. The trouble is, it will most likely be a very long and expensive period before the worlds transport safety boards work out what went wrong.
The most difficult weather I have observed, was on smaller aircraft (twin turbo props) with different operators and although less experienced, it was IMO an ideal training ground. Why? More sectors, Less inertia, lower ground speeds, fewer runway considerations, more fuel, more alternates, less commercial pressure, smaller route structure, smaller operation, no cultural/ language issues, shorter duty times, no/few time zones. In other words you just flew a lot more, in a very familiar environment and with few variables. When the weather deteriorated a bit, a Captain could take an incremental approach to exposing a lesser experienced First Officer to the conditions. If a pilot showed an aptitude for x/winds, you might let him take on stonger conditions than perhaps someone else. If the individual was weaker, you were going to fly with him next week and he could be left to develop progressively as his and your confidence grew.
Take the large airline scenario, but the same 200hr cadet/mpl pilot. Fewer sectors (don't care what anyone says, it will be fewer), more inertia (when it goes wrong, it happens in a big way), higher ground speeds, every runway is short, less fuel, costly diversions, unfamiliar airfields because you just fly to so many, never flown with the crew before and you both speak different languages (quite possibly English is 2nd for both of you), fatigued and then the weather hits you. To right I'll be doing the landing!
This situation is happening, more so for some airlines than others but an MPL scheme will bring the issue of experience to all. Perhaps not the case with AF but there is common ground between the YYZ accident and what I have discussed.
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The flight deck is not a democracy
WIthout wishing to detract from Centaurus astute posting, one cannot help feeling the makers of Air Crash Investigation must have been desperate when they finalised that program to go to the network broadcasters.
I've watched a few programs in the series and found them to be a little over-dramatised, but this program on AF358 was pure soap.
The official Canada TSB accident investigation report is still not completed. The interim update is available right here.
What the interim report states is that:
It won't do much for SLF confidence in approaches during thunderstorms, that's for sure.
I could not help thinking the captain will probably be wishing for the rest of his non-flying life that he'd made some different decisions earlier in the final stages of the flight. The French term for Captain is "Commandeur", indicating the role is one of leadership, not that of a monitor or spectator.
And that goes in any language.
VHCU
I've watched a few programs in the series and found them to be a little over-dramatised, but this program on AF358 was pure soap.
The official Canada TSB accident investigation report is still not completed. The interim update is available right here.
What the interim report states is that:
- The runway anenometer device had been hit by lightning and final crosswind and gust information were being estimated by crews from previous landings
- Approach was high - 100ft over the threshold
- Touchdown was 4000 ft into the 9000ft runway
- The flight copped a last-minute tailwind of 5 knots due to wind shift. (Not 33kt as the program implied)
- With a -5kt wind, operative reversers and standing water they needed 6614ft to stop
- The reversers were engaged starting from 12.8 seconds after touchdown and max rev thrust achieved 17 seconds after touchdown
- When the runway excursion commenced the aircraft was still travelling at 79kt
- The aircraft was found to be in full working order and according to the FDMR had 7500kg of fuel remaining on board at the the time of the accident. 4500kg would have been needed to reach the alternate at Ottawa.
It won't do much for SLF confidence in approaches during thunderstorms, that's for sure.
I could not help thinking the captain will probably be wishing for the rest of his non-flying life that he'd made some different decisions earlier in the final stages of the flight. The French term for Captain is "Commandeur", indicating the role is one of leadership, not that of a monitor or spectator.
And that goes in any language.
VHCU
Last edited by VH-Cheer Up; 29th Mar 2007 at 23:29. Reason: To clarify I'm supporting the original post
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I haven't got "Handling the big jets" in front of me right now but one of Davies immortal paragraphs is roughly this:
"If you go off the far end and crash you'll sit there, if you survive, saying "what wouldn't I give to have the last 5 minutes of my life over again?".
"Well as you cross the threshold you have that time and if you're not totally happy go around"
Those few lines etched their way onto my heart long ago on slippery short R/Ws. If your sim program doesn't include routine rejected landings at or after touchdown, then ask for it.
"If you go off the far end and crash you'll sit there, if you survive, saying "what wouldn't I give to have the last 5 minutes of my life over again?".
"Well as you cross the threshold you have that time and if you're not totally happy go around"
Those few lines etched their way onto my heart long ago on slippery short R/Ws. If your sim program doesn't include routine rejected landings at or after touchdown, then ask for it.
Excellent, thought-provoking post, Centaurus, regardless of the quality of the show (which I haven't seen). It (not some of the replies) should be required reading for all prospective captains.
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Great post Centaurus - didn't see the programme myself, but this is what I log in to PPruNe to read - thought provoking discussion betwen professionals about flying, rather than slag-fests and bitch fights.
So my question is this - having grown up in the military system, the go-around was burned into our brains as a non-negotiable requirement under a whole range of circumstances.
At 2FTS I think there were 9 defined criteria - ranging from "approach too steep or too shallow" through "S-turn required to line up on finals" etc. I failed one of the best ACM rides I did on intro fighter course - because I didn't go around when I should have back in the circuit. As a senior F-111 QFI I would still go around routinely from approaches.
But I do a lot of commercial flying (down the back) these days, and a go-around is so rare as to be very noteworthy. Indeed from what I've seen, the "go -around culture" isn't nearly so strongly emphasised in civil aviation - and I'm wondering why.
The money aspect is one obvious possibility, but if you follow that thought through it leads logically to the unpalatable statement that "I will compromise safety for $$"
So what else is it? Are you all such sky gods that they aren't necessary? Is it pride / cultural factors? Seemed to be the case in the Air China Airbus prang in Japan a few years back. Traffic density - ie hard to slot back into the circuit because everyone focuses so heaviliy on straight in approaches? Lack of defined criteria that should trigger a go-around? Doubt that that's it - I know QANTAS is very strict on stable approaches etc - but still, what about Bangkok?
So what is it? Is there a problem with go arounds that I'm missing?
Interested in feedback from airline professionals.
So my question is this - having grown up in the military system, the go-around was burned into our brains as a non-negotiable requirement under a whole range of circumstances.
At 2FTS I think there were 9 defined criteria - ranging from "approach too steep or too shallow" through "S-turn required to line up on finals" etc. I failed one of the best ACM rides I did on intro fighter course - because I didn't go around when I should have back in the circuit. As a senior F-111 QFI I would still go around routinely from approaches.
But I do a lot of commercial flying (down the back) these days, and a go-around is so rare as to be very noteworthy. Indeed from what I've seen, the "go -around culture" isn't nearly so strongly emphasised in civil aviation - and I'm wondering why.
The money aspect is one obvious possibility, but if you follow that thought through it leads logically to the unpalatable statement that "I will compromise safety for $$"
So what else is it? Are you all such sky gods that they aren't necessary? Is it pride / cultural factors? Seemed to be the case in the Air China Airbus prang in Japan a few years back. Traffic density - ie hard to slot back into the circuit because everyone focuses so heaviliy on straight in approaches? Lack of defined criteria that should trigger a go-around? Doubt that that's it - I know QANTAS is very strict on stable approaches etc - but still, what about Bangkok?
So what is it? Is there a problem with go arounds that I'm missing?
Interested in feedback from airline professionals.
F/O is going to be far too slow to pull reverse thrust - or to kick off the drift in a strong crosswind on a wet runway.
Last edited by maggotdriver; 30th Mar 2007 at 00:29. Reason: syntax
Centaurus and Nev No
The concept of having the F/O fly the ****ty approaches is not new. It was SOP at TAA/Australian 20 odd years ago. It was the blue tail version of the monitored approach. The procedure allowed the PIC to monitor, more accurately, what was going on around him, rather than focussing on the actual manipulation. At the minima if the F/O had heard nothing to the contrary he had a mandatory missed approach. Upon breaking visual the PIC had a couple of seconds to get his perspective and inputs sorted before he took over the landing. The F/O stayed head down into the roll out, to monitor speed /sink reducing the risk of "duck under" or speed excursions, or as we say now, unstabilised approach.
The system worked well.
Having used both ways of conducting the "monitored approach" I personally prefer the F/O flying. Unfortunately my current operator has it the other way around.
The PIC always had the option of taking over, as was his recognised right. Indeed it was mandated that he take over, it was only a matter of judgement as to when he would do so. This got over the hurt feelings problem that some seem to think is a factor. And also eliminated any misgivings that the PIC might feel, about having given away the leg.
Win win.
Maui
The concept of having the F/O fly the ****ty approaches is not new. It was SOP at TAA/Australian 20 odd years ago. It was the blue tail version of the monitored approach. The procedure allowed the PIC to monitor, more accurately, what was going on around him, rather than focussing on the actual manipulation. At the minima if the F/O had heard nothing to the contrary he had a mandatory missed approach. Upon breaking visual the PIC had a couple of seconds to get his perspective and inputs sorted before he took over the landing. The F/O stayed head down into the roll out, to monitor speed /sink reducing the risk of "duck under" or speed excursions, or as we say now, unstabilised approach.
The system worked well.
Having used both ways of conducting the "monitored approach" I personally prefer the F/O flying. Unfortunately my current operator has it the other way around.
The PIC always had the option of taking over, as was his recognised right. Indeed it was mandated that he take over, it was only a matter of judgement as to when he would do so. This got over the hurt feelings problem that some seem to think is a factor. And also eliminated any misgivings that the PIC might feel, about having given away the leg.
Win win.
Maui
Bring back "Black Box".
Now there was outstanding television.
I had to turn this one off about half way through, the repetition and hysteria was driving me nuts.
Now there was outstanding television.
I had to turn this one off about half way through, the repetition and hysteria was driving me nuts.
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I know QANTAS is very strict on stable approaches etc - but still, what about Bangkok?
In some other respects the situation on VH-OJH at BKK on 23 Sept 1999 may have been similar. Certainly the changing wind and worsening weather was similar at both Bangkok and Toronto.
Transcripts from the CVR of OJH shows the Captain said ‘get it down, get it down, come on you’re starting your flare’.
Aboard AF358 the captain may have said something similar, if you can believe the dramatisation. I don't think TSB Canada has released CVR transcripts yet.
Any QF drivers care to comment on whether the go-around decision or any other safety culture was significantly re-engineered, following Bangkok?
VHCU
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It's called faith. As a member of a crew, each of us has to have faith that the other member or members will carry out the required functions as per training. This applies whether the other crew-member is known personally or a complete stranger.
Noone should have "faith" that everything will be just sweet when yours and a couple of hundred other lives depend on split second decisions, especially under conditions like those. Otherwise I may as well catch up on a few winks of sleep and tell the guy to wake me after the landing. This of course doesn't mean you have to swing the pendulum fully the other way and be completely paranoid. A nice, calm balance somewhere in the middle would be good.
On go-arounds, from the QF perspective the company has done a lot of work trying to encourage that practice if there are any doubts about the safety of the approach. Several people I know recently (myself included, as the non-flying pilot
) have done them for various reasons, made the required phone call to Ops (just to fill them in and pre-empt any "I thought we were all going to die!" reports from pax), and not another word has been said.
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Dutch Roll - precisely the way it should be I think. The more a go-around is seen as routine, the less chance you've got of pushing a bad situation into a position from which you cannot recover.
After all, you're pointing several hundred tonnes of metal at the ground at nearly 300 km/h - if people imagine that it is possible to get that right every single time, then they are deluding themselves.
SW
After all, you're pointing several hundred tonnes of metal at the ground at nearly 300 km/h - if people imagine that it is possible to get that right every single time, then they are deluding themselves.
SW
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Enjoyed reading the posts, Dutch Roll I do agree with you on your go around philosophy, but you have to admit, that your FUEL state must come into play before starting the approach, it's all about options, as far as how will the cadets get experience, I was taught in teaching fundamentals that watching a demonstration is most effective, Scottydoo, I understand your faith statement, but I feel that most posters and all captains agree that this shouldn't have been an F/O landing.
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There are (well should be at least!) stringent tolerances that require the PM to call for the MA. The SOPs do go quite far in shifting the "mateship" factor out of the cockpit. Stable calls and out of tolerance calls allow for the captain to 'objectively' can an approach or the FO to speak up if the cockpit gradient is dangerous, eliminating the "but I had it" scenario. As for this particular incident, be careful when making your analysis from a TV DocuDrama, hardly objective information... What did we learn from Current Affairs this week...