Erebus 25 years on
mate. .. . . . do you bash your head against the wall because when you stop you feel a lot better?
. . . and I say BALLS! . . . (saw that one coming)
BTW further digression . .. . in RAAF parlance particularly during Second W W 'balls' was heard a lot.(more balls than bull-****, probably.)
Dr Clyde Fenton the flying doctor in Katharine who wrote his celebrated book called FLYING DOCTOR
about that period of his colourful life. . . . he received a telegram from the department in Melbourne
grounding his Moth and suspending his licence . . forthwith
. His priceless response was to telegraph them back with . . THEY'RE ROUND AND THEY BOUNCE. . .FENTON
If Aunty had aggetts
BTW further digression . .. . in RAAF parlance particularly during Second W W 'balls' was heard a lot.(more balls than bull-****, probably.)
Dr Clyde Fenton the flying doctor in Katharine who wrote his celebrated book called FLYING DOCTOR
about that period of his colourful life. . . . he received a telegram from the department in Melbourne
grounding his Moth and suspending his licence . . forthwith
. His priceless response was to telegraph them back with . . THEY'RE ROUND AND THEY BOUNCE. . .FENTON
Last edited by Fantome; 19th Jun 2016 at 12:24.
3 Holer, you originally said
when pressed you say
which one do you stand by now? Captain God or Aunty Uncle?
Megan, I appreciate your reply. Unfortunately I have run out of puff tonight but look forward to rejoining the conversation tomorrow evening.
As Mahon,Vette, et al found out, by discovering the "incompetent administrative airline procedures", only Captain God could have prevented the Erebus disaster.
framer it is impossible to say if "the outcome would have been the same" if another crew was flying the aircraft that day. It's a bit like saying"If Aunty had aggetts she would have been Uncle."
Megan, I appreciate your reply. Unfortunately I have run out of puff tonight but look forward to rejoining the conversation tomorrow evening.
there is no inconsistency here as the statements require no correlation
suggested reading for the elimination of muddled thought . . . potentially -
STRAIGHT AND CROOKED THINKING
by ROBERT H. THOULESS
READER IN EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE
TABLE OF CONTENTS -
PREFACE
I. EMOTIONAL MEANINGS
II. ALL AND SOME
III. SOME DISHONEST TRICKS IN ARGUMENT
IV. SOME LOGICAL FALLACIES
IV. WORDS AND FACTS
V. THE DANGERS OF SPECULATION
VI. THE MEANINGS OF WORDS
VII. DEFINITION AND SOME OF ITS DIFFICULTIES
IX. TRICKS OF SUGGESTION
X. HABITS OF THOUGHT
XI. PREDIGESTED THINKING
XII. PITFALLS IN ANALOGY
XIII. PREJUDICE
XIV. THE VALUE OF STRAIGHT THINKING
APPENDIX
I. THIRTY-EIGHT DISHONEST TRICKS
II. A DISCUSSION ILLUSTRATING CROOKED THINKING
This revised and enlarged edition first published 1953
by Pan Books Ltd., S Head/art Place, London, S.W.I
suggested reading for the elimination of muddled thought . . . potentially -
STRAIGHT AND CROOKED THINKING
by ROBERT H. THOULESS
READER IN EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE
TABLE OF CONTENTS -
PREFACE
I. EMOTIONAL MEANINGS
II. ALL AND SOME
III. SOME DISHONEST TRICKS IN ARGUMENT
IV. SOME LOGICAL FALLACIES
IV. WORDS AND FACTS
V. THE DANGERS OF SPECULATION
VI. THE MEANINGS OF WORDS
VII. DEFINITION AND SOME OF ITS DIFFICULTIES
IX. TRICKS OF SUGGESTION
X. HABITS OF THOUGHT
XI. PREDIGESTED THINKING
XII. PITFALLS IN ANALOGY
XIII. PREJUDICE
XIV. THE VALUE OF STRAIGHT THINKING
APPENDIX
I. THIRTY-EIGHT DISHONEST TRICKS
II. A DISCUSSION ILLUSTRATING CROOKED THINKING
This revised and enlarged edition first published 1953
by Pan Books Ltd., S Head/art Place, London, S.W.I
Last edited by Fantome; 19th Jun 2016 at 12:51.
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O.K. Let me try a different approach, as an impartial observer. Let's try the Geoffrey Robertson Hypothetical approach.
Let's say Capt Collins, by some miracle, was the sole survivor of the crash. It has been decided by the authorities that there is adequate cause for him to be put on trial. He is now charged with 256 counts of manslaughter.
Geoffrey Robertson is the prosecutor. He has Capt Collins in the dock and is interrogating him.
Robertson: "So, tell me Capt Collins, why you thought it was safe to descend to a very low altitude, when there was a very large mountain in the vicinity, with terrain height much greater than the altitude you were planning to descend to? - and you had no idea where that mountain was, exactly?"
Collins: "Because I was in VMC and I could see some terrain features fairly clearly - and the passengers were desirous of good, close-up, low-level views of Mt Erebus. It was company policy to give passengers a good spectacular view of Erebus and McMurdo Sound, that's what they paid to see."
Robertson: "I see. But you descended without knowing precisely where Erebus was, in relation to your aircraft, didn't you? Wouldn't you consider this action more than a little foolhardy?"
Collins: "No. I was given a flight path and I was following it. That flight path was supposed to take us past Erebus into McMurdo Sound at low level for the benefit of the passengers. How was I to know there were serious navigational errors in the flight path information given to me?"
Robertson: "But you had the opportunity, both before and during the flight, to check the accuracy of the flight plan information, and to cross-check your position with the information in the flight plan supplied, did you not?"
Collins: Yes, of course, I did some cursory checks - but checking the aircrafts position in flight, was the job of other crew members in the cockpit. I was busy flying the aircraft. I believed we were on the correct course into McMurdo Sound - Mulgrew even indentified Ross Island. I descended in VMC to gain some clarity, visually, as regards my aircrafts precise position in relation to the terrain.
Robertson: "But you descended below the minimum safe altitude, despite poor levels of visibility in that declared VMC - and you are heard saying on the CVR - 'Actually, those conditions don't look very good at all'. And Mulgrew agreed with you - 'No, they don't.' Is that correct?"
Collins: Yes .. but you'll note, I said, a little later in the cockpit conversation, 'We're 26 miles North, we'll have to climb out of this'. I was aware of the potential danger".
Robertson: Yes .. but you didn't climb in time, did you? You crashed, directly into high terrain that you knew, was close by - but which high terrain, you had no inkling of its precise whereabouts, in relation to your aircraft? In essence, you failed totally, in your duty of care towards your 256 passengers. Is that correct?"
Collins: If you prefer to put it that way ......... Yes.
The silence in the courtroom is so intense, one could literally hear a pin drop.
The Outcome: Capt Collins is cleared of all 256 counts of manslaughter, but is convicted of the lesser charge of "reckless flying". Sentencing is deferred to enable the Judge to consider mitigating factors, and correspondingly, the length of the sentence.
As a typical example of what the above scenario could have been, here's one recent one ...
Pilot found not guilty of manslaughter of young passenger
Let's say Capt Collins, by some miracle, was the sole survivor of the crash. It has been decided by the authorities that there is adequate cause for him to be put on trial. He is now charged with 256 counts of manslaughter.
Geoffrey Robertson is the prosecutor. He has Capt Collins in the dock and is interrogating him.
Robertson: "So, tell me Capt Collins, why you thought it was safe to descend to a very low altitude, when there was a very large mountain in the vicinity, with terrain height much greater than the altitude you were planning to descend to? - and you had no idea where that mountain was, exactly?"
Collins: "Because I was in VMC and I could see some terrain features fairly clearly - and the passengers were desirous of good, close-up, low-level views of Mt Erebus. It was company policy to give passengers a good spectacular view of Erebus and McMurdo Sound, that's what they paid to see."
Robertson: "I see. But you descended without knowing precisely where Erebus was, in relation to your aircraft, didn't you? Wouldn't you consider this action more than a little foolhardy?"
Collins: "No. I was given a flight path and I was following it. That flight path was supposed to take us past Erebus into McMurdo Sound at low level for the benefit of the passengers. How was I to know there were serious navigational errors in the flight path information given to me?"
Robertson: "But you had the opportunity, both before and during the flight, to check the accuracy of the flight plan information, and to cross-check your position with the information in the flight plan supplied, did you not?"
Collins: Yes, of course, I did some cursory checks - but checking the aircrafts position in flight, was the job of other crew members in the cockpit. I was busy flying the aircraft. I believed we were on the correct course into McMurdo Sound - Mulgrew even indentified Ross Island. I descended in VMC to gain some clarity, visually, as regards my aircrafts precise position in relation to the terrain.
Robertson: "But you descended below the minimum safe altitude, despite poor levels of visibility in that declared VMC - and you are heard saying on the CVR - 'Actually, those conditions don't look very good at all'. And Mulgrew agreed with you - 'No, they don't.' Is that correct?"
Collins: Yes .. but you'll note, I said, a little later in the cockpit conversation, 'We're 26 miles North, we'll have to climb out of this'. I was aware of the potential danger".
Robertson: Yes .. but you didn't climb in time, did you? You crashed, directly into high terrain that you knew, was close by - but which high terrain, you had no inkling of its precise whereabouts, in relation to your aircraft? In essence, you failed totally, in your duty of care towards your 256 passengers. Is that correct?"
Collins: If you prefer to put it that way ......... Yes.
The silence in the courtroom is so intense, one could literally hear a pin drop.
The Outcome: Capt Collins is cleared of all 256 counts of manslaughter, but is convicted of the lesser charge of "reckless flying". Sentencing is deferred to enable the Judge to consider mitigating factors, and correspondingly, the length of the sentence.
As a typical example of what the above scenario could have been, here's one recent one ...
Pilot found not guilty of manslaughter of young passenger
An interesting courtroom drama play script . . .(minus Robertson's perambulating propensity for theatrics). But as far as enlarging upon our understanding ,. . . ??? then again. . as relevant as my own occasional sweeping digressions .
As with any prosecutor's bag of tricks it is slanted against the plaintiff from the outset.
Captain Collins counsel if he was doing his job would have briefed Jim Collins
whatever you do not admit any errors of judgement. If an attempt is made to put words in your mouth such as you had no idea where that mountain was, exactly ? , you say truthfully that there was no reason to suspect you would at any time be closer to Erebus than 20 miles at the least.
without a long adjournment I think this could be doing my head in . ..
3-holer . .. . your #817 . .. think you might need to insert 'not' in the last line.
(of course anything and everything can be challenged. . . but in this case the facts as confirmed and never denied after Morrie Davis came clean support a position that
the finding . . . of the failure of the airline's nav department to etc etc . .is not now or ever open to any
legitimate challenge.)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE PROBITY OF THE CHIEF INSPECTOR OF ACCIDENTS.
Just in case anyone following or coming new to this debate is labouring under the misapprehension that the conduct of the initial investigation into the accident was entirely transparent and above board, here is an extract from an article by Captain Gary Parata , who found alarming departures from the accepted protocols for making the transcripts from the recovered CVR.
Captain Parata (then Chairman of NZALPA’s Accident, Incident and Safety Group and a flight recorder specialist with the IFALPA Accident Analysis and Prevention Committee) considered flaws in the procedure used for the production of the published transcript, and why – as a result of those procedural flaws – the Chief Inspector’s theory and conclusions were misleading.
The initial CVR Group assembled by Mr R Chippindale travelled to Washington and underwent specialised training, adhered strictly to that training, and produced a single, handwritten transcript. For their efforts and professionalism they were roundly praised by NTSB and FBI experts.
(But) the transcript actually published in the formal accident report was significantly different to the version produced by the CVR Group. Chippindale made 55 changes to the transcript without consultation with the CVR Group and in direct contravention of accepted protocols. Chippindale’s actions were inexplicable - ‘at best, an extraordinarily non-standard performance; at worst, a highly improper and prejudicial act.’
The complete failure of the accident-investigation system to identify and prevent unprofessional conduct like this was what Justice Mahon later described as “culpability of the organisational system” (Mahon, 1981).
As with any prosecutor's bag of tricks it is slanted against the plaintiff from the outset.
Captain Collins counsel if he was doing his job would have briefed Jim Collins
whatever you do not admit any errors of judgement. If an attempt is made to put words in your mouth such as you had no idea where that mountain was, exactly ? , you say truthfully that there was no reason to suspect you would at any time be closer to Erebus than 20 miles at the least.
without a long adjournment I think this could be doing my head in . ..
3-holer . .. . your #817 . .. think you might need to insert 'not' in the last line.
(of course anything and everything can be challenged. . . but in this case the facts as confirmed and never denied after Morrie Davis came clean support a position that
the finding . . . of the failure of the airline's nav department to etc etc . .is not now or ever open to any
legitimate challenge.)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE PROBITY OF THE CHIEF INSPECTOR OF ACCIDENTS.
Just in case anyone following or coming new to this debate is labouring under the misapprehension that the conduct of the initial investigation into the accident was entirely transparent and above board, here is an extract from an article by Captain Gary Parata , who found alarming departures from the accepted protocols for making the transcripts from the recovered CVR.
Captain Parata (then Chairman of NZALPA’s Accident, Incident and Safety Group and a flight recorder specialist with the IFALPA Accident Analysis and Prevention Committee) considered flaws in the procedure used for the production of the published transcript, and why – as a result of those procedural flaws – the Chief Inspector’s theory and conclusions were misleading.
The initial CVR Group assembled by Mr R Chippindale travelled to Washington and underwent specialised training, adhered strictly to that training, and produced a single, handwritten transcript. For their efforts and professionalism they were roundly praised by NTSB and FBI experts.
(But) the transcript actually published in the formal accident report was significantly different to the version produced by the CVR Group. Chippindale made 55 changes to the transcript without consultation with the CVR Group and in direct contravention of accepted protocols. Chippindale’s actions were inexplicable - ‘at best, an extraordinarily non-standard performance; at worst, a highly improper and prejudicial act.’
The complete failure of the accident-investigation system to identify and prevent unprofessional conduct like this was what Justice Mahon later described as “culpability of the organisational system” (Mahon, 1981).
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3-holer . .. . your #817 . .. think you might need to insert 'not' in the last line.
??
That AA aircraft was hardly "perfectly" flyable, and those pilots did everything they were supposed to do until the end
Poor taste? - well, thats in the eye of the beholder. Unfortunately, all accidents have a human element, and a lot of us forget that in our discussions. The whole point of accident discussion is to learn how to protect the human element.
I note that no one has taken up the challenge as to who was to "blame" for the AA191 accident.
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Having trouble with your comprehension?
The thread is supposed to be about Mahon statement that the crew of Flt 901 made no error.
It has been stated many times that no one involved in this disaster is blameless, that includes NZCAA, Air New Zealand,
If you want to establish blame for that incident why not start another thread?
The thread is supposed to be about Mahon statement that the crew of Flt 901 made no error.
It has been stated many times that no one involved in this disaster is blameless, that includes NZCAA, Air New Zealand,
I note that no one has taken up the challenge as to who was to "blame" for the AA191 accident.
no . . .. . this thread's title reflects a much broader canvas. Wirraway who kicked it off eloquently on 21 November 2004 was not rebutted until #11. That poster began by defending Mr Chippendale citing the depth of his experience compared with Justice Mahon , then hinting at the flawed judgement of Justice Mahon and Captain Gordon Vette. All along his tone has invariably been one of not only an absolute intolerance of viewpoints he does not share but a petty sniping tendency to sarcastic belittlement .
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megan at #820 appears to be someone who, when faced with aunanswerable point, elects to answer a completely different one
I said:
" There was a briefing a few days prior to the flightwhere the crew were told that the route was well to the side of MountErebus." Not true. The crew were told that the final waypoint was atMcMurdo Station. There can be no dispute about this, because it was recorded ontape.
Megan’s response:
“Nonsense ampan. Chippendale said: “An examination of thisbriefing revealed certain significant items were not included. The procedure for determining the minimumflight level recognised for the Antarctic area and specifically the McMurdocontrol area. The way in which the Air New Zealand route varied from the normalmilitary route, which followed the reporting points depicted on the RNC,particularly on the leg from Cape Hallett south to McMurdo. A comprehensive discussion of the visualphenomenon peculiar to the Antarctic ie the whiteout conditions, which might beanticipated with overcast sky and snow covered terrain below.”
There is an almost complete disconnection between the pointI made and Chippendale’s quote. It’s like countering a flat-earth proponentwith a recipe for pavlova.
There’s no issue about this. The audio was recorded. Therecording was played at the hearing. The waypoint was at McMurdo Station, whichis exactly where you would expect it to be. Further, Mahon’s report acceptedthat fact, because he had no choice.
I said:
" There was a briefing a few days prior to the flightwhere the crew were told that the route was well to the side of MountErebus." Not true. The crew were told that the final waypoint was atMcMurdo Station. There can be no dispute about this, because it was recorded ontape.
Megan’s response:
“Nonsense ampan. Chippendale said: “An examination of thisbriefing revealed certain significant items were not included. The procedure for determining the minimumflight level recognised for the Antarctic area and specifically the McMurdocontrol area. The way in which the Air New Zealand route varied from the normalmilitary route, which followed the reporting points depicted on the RNC,particularly on the leg from Cape Hallett south to McMurdo. A comprehensive discussion of the visualphenomenon peculiar to the Antarctic ie the whiteout conditions, which might beanticipated with overcast sky and snow covered terrain below.”
There is an almost complete disconnection between the pointI made and Chippendale’s quote. It’s like countering a flat-earth proponentwith a recipe for pavlova.
There’s no issue about this. The audio was recorded. Therecording was played at the hearing. The waypoint was at McMurdo Station, whichis exactly where you would expect it to be. Further, Mahon’s report acceptedthat fact, because he had no choice.
Mr Chippendale forfeited his credibility and his right to the assumption of probity from the time he took it upon himself to doctor the expertly complied transcript of the CVR as described at #826.
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This extract from John King publication has also never been challenged
.
So all the people at McMurdo, and the other aircraft crews who reported that Ross Island was completely covered in cloud were mistaken in their observations?
The statement by Megan that the radar could not monitor the approved descent procedure has also proven to be incorrect or is he is accusing Vette of an "absurdity".
Can anyone advise the date that Captain Wilson was supposed to have advised the crew that any altitude the McMurdo Radar allowed them to descend to was actually made?
Because the findings of the Royal Commission id Inquiry on the cause of the disaster were limited in scope, being legally an opinion and not a statement of fact, they could not be appealed in legal terms, unlike the Office of Air Accidents investigation report, which remains the sole official account- and has never been officially challenged.
then hinting at the flawed judgement of Justice Mahon and Captain Gordon Vette
So all the people at McMurdo, and the other aircraft crews who reported that Ross Island was completely covered in cloud were mistaken in their observations?
The statement by Megan that the radar could not monitor the approved descent procedure has also proven to be incorrect or is he is accusing Vette of an "absurdity".
Can anyone advise the date that Captain Wilson was supposed to have advised the crew that any altitude the McMurdo Radar allowed them to descend to was actually made?
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I clearly remember walking past the Air NZ passenger lounge that fateful day to my 737-200 we were to fly to Apia with Polynesian Airlines.We "jostled" with TE901 parked next to us to try to get pushed first which we did.They taxied right behind us.Hearing the basic news the next day was a horrible shock.
I cant understand all of this silly arguing and discussion now going on.The DC10 crashed because the Captain decided to embark on a VISUAL descent into unfamiliar terrain without actually being in visual conditions and not knowing his actual position.It is just not acceptable to descend to 1500 feet in an area with a 16000 foot MSA in such conditions.Yes we have likely all done it at least once in our careers but the lesson from TE901 must never be forgotten.RIP.
I cant understand all of this silly arguing and discussion now going on.The DC10 crashed because the Captain decided to embark on a VISUAL descent into unfamiliar terrain without actually being in visual conditions and not knowing his actual position.It is just not acceptable to descend to 1500 feet in an area with a 16000 foot MSA in such conditions.Yes we have likely all done it at least once in our careers but the lesson from TE901 must never be forgotten.RIP.
I cant understand all of this silly arguing and discussion now going on.The DC10 crashed because the Captain decided to embark on a VISUAL descent into unfamiliar terrain
Well sorry .. . but this discussion has been going on for years and any ad hoc opinion now as to the whys and the wherefores just does not any longer cut the mustard .. . Cap'n.
BTW . . a post from R & N HIGH WINDS AT SCHIPOL last year. If the question you posed there
Pete was ironic then I get it . . otherwise .. . ?
31st Jul 2015
piratepete
COMPLETE HONESTY
Hand on heart, with total honesty, and after 20,000 plus hours, 14000 hours as PIC on heavy jets, 4000 plus hours as a simulator/line/base/ground instructor, TRE TRI etc bits-of-paper in my Navbag, almost 40 years as an AIRLINE PILOT, .......I HAVE NEVER EVER MADE A SINGLE MISTAKE, NEVER EVER!......
Last edited by Fantome; 20th Jun 2016 at 05:57.
Can anyone advise the date that Captain Wilson was supposed to have advised the crew that any altitude the McMurdo Radar allowed them to descend to was actually made?
The statement by Megan that the radar could not monitor the approved descent procedure has also proven to be incorrect or is he is accusing Vette of an "absurdity".
Their optimism rose as the radio from McMurdo came on with its offer: ‘Within a range of 40 miles of McMurdo we have radar that will, if you desire, let you down to 1500 feet on radar vectors.
‘Roger, New Zealand nine zero one. That is acceptable,’ replied Cassin.
Collins expressed his relief. ‘Crikey, that’s what we Want to hear.’
He eased back slightly on the three power levers, thinking maybe the briefing was wrong and they could pick up the aircraft above 6000 feet, and beyond 40 miles.
They were now passing over a thinning belt of stratus through which the fragmented pack ice showed. But only a short way ahead, a big break of some 40 by 20 miles, broken only by a few fluffy clouds, was showing up.
The safe course was to descend into this space in an orbit which would bring them around and back onto the navigation track again.
From where they were the base of the major cloud areas appeared to be about 10,000 feet. Once they got below this, they could be in the clear with miles of visibility to continue the run up McMurdo Sound until intercepted by radar.
If conditions proved unsatisfactory once they descended into the clear opening, then there would be no problem climbing back to 18,000 feet, and flying on to McMurdo waypoint, before doubling back to do a run over the Dry Valley on the Victoria Coast mainland — which they could still see was in sunshine.
The aircraft, locked on to 18,000 feet, was still {lying in crystal sunshine. Elusive glimpses of pack ice showed through the scattered cloud below, and the tantalising knowledge that the land was close at hand kept the crew on visual tenterhooks, scanning keenly for the white glow of sun on snow, and the darker patterns of rock. It was some consolation for the crew that the radar was operating, and that the Americans were happy for them to fly over the ice airfield at 1500 feet.
There was a nagging doubt at the back of Jim Collins’ mind, possibly associated with the briefing, that the approach radar would be unable to pick them up above 6000 feet. On previous flights the approach had been largely clear of cloud and, as a sure aid, the feed in had been attained by using McMurdo’s NDB (Non-Directional Beacon) to bring them into the orbit of the precision approach radar, at 6000 feet.
‘Roger, New Zealand nine zero one. That is acceptable,’ replied Cassin.
Collins expressed his relief. ‘Crikey, that’s what we Want to hear.’
He eased back slightly on the three power levers, thinking maybe the briefing was wrong and they could pick up the aircraft above 6000 feet, and beyond 40 miles.
They were now passing over a thinning belt of stratus through which the fragmented pack ice showed. But only a short way ahead, a big break of some 40 by 20 miles, broken only by a few fluffy clouds, was showing up.
The safe course was to descend into this space in an orbit which would bring them around and back onto the navigation track again.
From where they were the base of the major cloud areas appeared to be about 10,000 feet. Once they got below this, they could be in the clear with miles of visibility to continue the run up McMurdo Sound until intercepted by radar.
If conditions proved unsatisfactory once they descended into the clear opening, then there would be no problem climbing back to 18,000 feet, and flying on to McMurdo waypoint, before doubling back to do a run over the Dry Valley on the Victoria Coast mainland — which they could still see was in sunshine.
The aircraft, locked on to 18,000 feet, was still {lying in crystal sunshine. Elusive glimpses of pack ice showed through the scattered cloud below, and the tantalising knowledge that the land was close at hand kept the crew on visual tenterhooks, scanning keenly for the white glow of sun on snow, and the darker patterns of rock. It was some consolation for the crew that the radar was operating, and that the Americans were happy for them to fly over the ice airfield at 1500 feet.
There was a nagging doubt at the back of Jim Collins’ mind, possibly associated with the briefing, that the approach radar would be unable to pick them up above 6000 feet. On previous flights the approach had been largely clear of cloud and, as a sure aid, the feed in had been attained by using McMurdo’s NDB (Non-Directional Beacon) to bring them into the orbit of the precision approach radar, at 6000 feet.
The agreement between the airline and CAA in August 1977 for an authorised letdown to 6,000 feet in the designated area south of Ross Island was regarded by the Americans, when they found out about it, after the disaster, as quite impractical. In the view of Chief Warrant Officer Priest, who was chief traffic controller and Mac Centre Supervisor during the 1979/80 season, this 6,000 feet sector was “absurd” because of the inability of radar control in that sector.
So they guy in charge of McMurdo said it was an absurdity, but your saying he was wrong?
" There was a briefing a few days prior to the flight where the crew were told that the route was well to the side of Mount Erebus." Not true. The crew were told that the final waypoint was at McMurdo Station. There can be no dispute about this, because it was recorded on tape.
An examination of this briefing revealed certain significant items were not included, The way in which the Air New Zealand route varied from the normal military route, which followed the reporting points depicted on the RNC, particularly on the leg from Cape Hallett south to McMurdo.
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Facts
- The high altitude NAV track was changed the night before the flight. The crew were not advised.
- Collins descended VFR below approved MSA. He did not verify his position using the INS readout and a chart prior to commencing descent.
- The area to which he was heading once descended was completely covered in cloud.
- He had failed to establish VHF comms with McMurdo.
- He failed to capture the TACAN
- He re-armed the INS several times during the descent. The INS is not approved for terrain avoidance nor a VFR NAVAID.
- The flight engineer inquired as to high ground during the descent, which didn't elicit any response from the two pilots. No reference to Mt. Bird was made during the descent. The Flight engineer also said "I don't like this" shortly before the decision was made to climb out.
- When still faced with poor visibility at 2000', Collins elected to descend further to 1500'.
Not Facts
- Collins was justified in believing the track ran down Mc Murdo sound.
- They did, or did not have VMC conditions during the descent.
- They were deceived by an optical illusion at 1500' causing them to see a flat horizon and what looked for all the world to be perfect VMC conditions.
- Air New Zealand masterminded a massive cover up.
Mitigating factors
- The crew had no experience in polar flying
- The crew had almost no training in polar flying
- Briefings and SOPs surrounding the flights were vague
- The crew probably felt some commercial pressure
- The high altitude NAV track was changed the night before the flight. The crew were not advised.
- Collins descended VFR below approved MSA. He did not verify his position using the INS readout and a chart prior to commencing descent.
- The area to which he was heading once descended was completely covered in cloud.
- He had failed to establish VHF comms with McMurdo.
- He failed to capture the TACAN
- He re-armed the INS several times during the descent. The INS is not approved for terrain avoidance nor a VFR NAVAID.
- The flight engineer inquired as to high ground during the descent, which didn't elicit any response from the two pilots. No reference to Mt. Bird was made during the descent. The Flight engineer also said "I don't like this" shortly before the decision was made to climb out.
- When still faced with poor visibility at 2000', Collins elected to descend further to 1500'.
Not Facts
- Collins was justified in believing the track ran down Mc Murdo sound.
- They did, or did not have VMC conditions during the descent.
- They were deceived by an optical illusion at 1500' causing them to see a flat horizon and what looked for all the world to be perfect VMC conditions.
- Air New Zealand masterminded a massive cover up.
Mitigating factors
- The crew had no experience in polar flying
- The crew had almost no training in polar flying
- Briefings and SOPs surrounding the flights were vague
- The crew probably felt some commercial pressure