Erebus 25 years on
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Often presented as fact, Vette's theory about mindset/false horizon causing the pilots to 'see' a flat vista of ice stretching out into the distance is nothing more than an idea
Sector whiteout is well known and well understood.
Mahon saw it for himself during a 212 flight along the final approach profile of the fatal flight. It was even videoed.
With sector whiteout, which can occur even when the nominal visibility is a hundred miles or more, is a pernicious phenomenon and is so common in that part of the world that it may not even be correct to call it a phenomenon at all.
Fast forward to 38:10 in this video to see a description:
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Grateful that here on this forum we have a few who have many times experienced this phenomenon . That their considerable cred is in no doubt can be gauged by dint of (modest) personal messages.
'None so deaf as those that will not hear. None so blind as those that will not see.'
'None so deaf as those that will not hear. None so blind as those that will not see.'
Last edited by FAR CU; 16th Jun 2016 at 13:37.
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if they had of been plotting the position on a chart, taken from the Lat/Long readouts, then they would have known where they were, rather thinking they knew where they were.
Actually, I suspect that someone on the flight deck was trying to relate their actual position to some kind of map or chart.
Note that somebody says "Yes I reckon about here".
That sounds to me like somebody pointing at a chart or a map.
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Sector whiteout is well known and well understood.
There were previous flights that had done VMC descents,but they had all had their position positively identified, and had sighted Mt Erebus prior to going below MSA.
This flight never sighted Mt Erebus, or even positively identified Ross Island before commencing their home made descent procedure.
The only reason Air New Zealand was given the OK to use crews who had no previous experience down at the ice was because if they adhered to the descent procedure as laid down it kept them well clear of Mt Erebus.
That video you keep referring to is good entertainment for people who have no knowledge of things aeronautical, for many it is NZALPA propaganda.
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Cazalet 33 said
Read what I said. I never said there is no such thing as sector whiteout but to surmise, as Mahon and Vette did that at 1500 feet the crew suffered this optical illusion which caused them to "see" good VMC conditions, with a false horizon, and what's more, look convincingly like the entrance to McMurdo Sound is a massive, massive leap of faith that is often written as if it were a proven fact.
Whereas we all know that if you're skimming along the base of a cloud layer at 1500', with ice below you, you're pretty much going to see a wall of white regardless of whatever tricks your occipital cortex might or might not be playing.
It's astonishing how Mahon managed to explain away Brooks asking "where's Erebus/just thinking about high ground in the area" as *not* indicating alarm, but he has no problem putting forwards the optical illusion theory as if it were solid fact.
All the above is, of course, putting aside for a moment the fact they should never have descended to that level in the situation they were in in the first place.
And it's laughably invalid from a scientific point of view.
Mahon said:
And 3-Holer said
I'm not sure what your point is, or why you are trying to cloud the argument with semantics, but the meaning of the above cannot possibly be anything other that Mahon felt the crew were blameless. He was subsequently quoted as such ad infinitum while he was still alive. And this is how Mahon is quoted to this day - by the media, and also the likes of Holmes, Dunne, and Williamson who tried to get the crew formally exonerated in Parliament.
How very wrong!
Sector whiteout is well known and well understood.
Sector whiteout is well known and well understood.
Whereas we all know that if you're skimming along the base of a cloud layer at 1500', with ice below you, you're pretty much going to see a wall of white regardless of whatever tricks your occipital cortex might or might not be playing.
It's astonishing how Mahon managed to explain away Brooks asking "where's Erebus/just thinking about high ground in the area" as *not* indicating alarm, but he has no problem putting forwards the optical illusion theory as if it were solid fact.
All the above is, of course, putting aside for a moment the fact they should never have descended to that level in the situation they were in in the first place.
That video you keep referring to is good entertainment for people who have no knowledge of things aeronautical, for mainly it is NZALPA propaganda.
Mahon said:
In my opinion, neither Captain Collins nor First Officer Cassin nor the Flight Engineers made any error which contributed to the disaster, and were not responsible for its occurrence.
That is NOT saying the crew was blameless, that is saying the crew did not make any error which contributed to the disaster!
Last edited by PapaHotel6; 16th Jun 2016 at 21:22.
Whispering "T" Jet
[quoteI'm not sure what your point is,][/quote]
My point is, Mahon never attempted to blame any person(s), throughout the whole inquiry, for this accident. He and others were merely investigating what the causal factors may have been. He was, of course, hindered from the start by unrelenting screams of "pilot error" from the government and Air NZ, but he carried on methodically and with great professionalism. He was afforded many accolades for the way he conducted the inquiry and the findings, which have already been acknowledged here.
"Others" will continue with the pilot error theory but we know now it was the administrative failures in the structure of the airlines' Antarctic operation that contributed most to this disaster.
There have been apologies from Air NZ and the NZ government which are on public record.
My point is, Mahon never attempted to blame any person(s), throughout the whole inquiry, for this accident. He and others were merely investigating what the causal factors may have been. He was, of course, hindered from the start by unrelenting screams of "pilot error" from the government and Air NZ, but he carried on methodically and with great professionalism. He was afforded many accolades for the way he conducted the inquiry and the findings, which have already been acknowledged here.
"Others" will continue with the pilot error theory but we know now it was the administrative failures in the structure of the airlines' Antarctic operation that contributed most to this disaster.
There have been apologies from Air NZ and the NZ government which are on public record.
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Most amusing part of this is all those who find Collins blameless but would never fly his non certified non approved INS wandering letdown.
To all intents and purposes as the inquiry showed when lawyers went after MD and the US DOD, the aircraft shouldn't have been below MSA in those conditions.
IF, and it's a big if, it had been on the track they thought they were on and they descended, they still weren't actually approved to descend "VMC" in those conditions anyway. It's like some of you are saying they got away with breaking the SOPs for that flight before and the should have got away with it again. Flying outbound in the hold using the INS without updating, or Radar, and they still could have hit the western side of Mt Bird instead of Erebus while within INS tolerances.
Lawyers would have said its the manufacturers fault, MD would have shown aircraft not certified for that manoeuvre, Mahon would have hypothesised white out and any professional aviator would still be wondering what they were doing down there.
Guessing location in debatable VMC, at 1500ft, in a relatively featureless barren terrain, at 6 miles a minute, in a widebody jet.
Does anyone remember their first cross country where instructor said "don't look for features outside and try to fit them in on the chart with where you think you are"..........
To all intents and purposes as the inquiry showed when lawyers went after MD and the US DOD, the aircraft shouldn't have been below MSA in those conditions.
IF, and it's a big if, it had been on the track they thought they were on and they descended, they still weren't actually approved to descend "VMC" in those conditions anyway. It's like some of you are saying they got away with breaking the SOPs for that flight before and the should have got away with it again. Flying outbound in the hold using the INS without updating, or Radar, and they still could have hit the western side of Mt Bird instead of Erebus while within INS tolerances.
Lawyers would have said its the manufacturers fault, MD would have shown aircraft not certified for that manoeuvre, Mahon would have hypothesised white out and any professional aviator would still be wondering what they were doing down there.
Guessing location in debatable VMC, at 1500ft, in a relatively featureless barren terrain, at 6 miles a minute, in a widebody jet.
Does anyone remember their first cross country where instructor said "don't look for features outside and try to fit them in on the chart with where you think you are"..........
people who think that doing this;
is not a colossal error of judgement ( what does a Captain get paid for again? ) have either never held a passenger jet command or if they have, they shouldn't have.
in debatable VMC, at 1500ft, in a relatively featureless barren terrain, at 6 miles a minute, in a widebody jet.
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My point is, Mahon never attempted to blame any person(s), throughout the whole inquiry, for this accident
You mean by saying that the "crew committed no error that contributed to the disaster" or in plain English, were blameless, does not shift all the responsibility for the disaster onto other people??
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Once again, referring to Mahon's quote:
3 Holer says:
And 3 Holer also says:
So if I understand you correctly, your interpretation of Mahon's statement that the "crew made no error" does not mean he's saying they were without blame. However, no party is actually blamed for the accident either.
In my opinion, neither Captain Collins nor First Officer Cassin nor the Flight Engineers made any error which contributed to the disaster, and were not responsible for its occurrence.
That is NOT saying the crew was blameless, that is saying the crew did not make any error which contributed to the disaster!
My point is, Mahon never attempted to blame any person(s), throughout the whole inquiry, for this accident.
Whispering "T" Jet
people who think that doing this;
Quote:
in debatable VMC, at 1500ft, in a relatively featureless barren terrain, at 6 miles a minute, in a widebody jet.
is not a colossal error of judgement ( what does a Captain get paid for again? ) have either never held a passenger jet command or if they have, they shouldn't have.
Quote:
in debatable VMC, at 1500ft, in a relatively featureless barren terrain, at 6 miles a minute, in a widebody jet.
is not a colossal error of judgement ( what does a Captain get paid for again? ) have either never held a passenger jet command or if they have, they shouldn't have.
Forecast at McMurdo prior to descent. Cloud base 4000 feet and viz 40 miles.
From CVR:
1.Aircraft 6000 descending to 2000 and in VMC.
2.There are no less than 13 references made by one pilot to the other confirming that the aircraft was flying VMC.
debatable VMC, at 1500ft,..........I don't think so.
Oh, and finally................The hundreds of photos taken by the passengers showed the plane was flying in clear air in good weather.
Last edited by 3 Holer; 17th Jun 2016 at 09:02. Reason: The photos
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Let's stick to the facts for a minute:
Yes, lets do that.
Weather at the McMurdo area at the time of the disaster was reported to be completely overcast at 3,500ft with other cloud layers above, and a wind of 10 knots. Mountain tops in the area were covered in cloud and although the surface visibility was good surface definition was poor and horizon definition only fair because the sun was obscured and snow surface features could not be readily identified from close up. Other aircraft in the area reported Ross Island as being completely obscured by cloud, and the crew of a helicopter which landed at Cape Bird Hut, 35 kilometres from the crash site and only an hour later, said it was overcast art 1,500ft with light snow Shortly afterwards they landed on the beach 10 kilometres from the site, in snow flurries and deteriorating conditions which made them cut short their visit.
You will note no doubt, that other aircraft in the area reported Ross Island completely obscured by cloud, perhaps they were all part of a conspiracy to refute Mahon, Vette, theory of sector white out??
Oh, and finally................The hundreds of photos taken by the passengers showed the plane was flying in clear air in good weather.
Last edited by prospector; 17th Jun 2016 at 09:47.
Whispering "T" Jet
knowing there was a 12,000 odd foot mountain somewhere very close,
Whispering "T" Jet
prospector, I am flattered you have taken the time to peruse my profile, I myself, have not done the same with yours.
If I said I had flown many thousands of hours in the B747-300 / B767 / B727-200
or was just a PPL with 100 hours in a C150, what difference would that make to you? Would it make my contribution to this thread any more or less credible? Would you be anymore or less rational to reasonable debate?
Thrill me with your acumen prospector.
If I said I had flown many thousands of hours in the B747-300 / B767 / B727-200
or was just a PPL with 100 hours in a C150, what difference would that make to you? Would it make my contribution to this thread any more or less credible? Would you be anymore or less rational to reasonable debate?
Thrill me with your acumen prospector.
For those that hold steadfast to the not below 6,000 argument, Captain Wilson, the briefing officer, told the crews they were permitted to descend to whatever level McMurdo gave them a clearance.
Had Captain Collins been on the track he thought, on confronting the bad weather he possibly would have climbed out straight ahead, knowing from his previous plotting that he would be in the clear re terrain.
Which brings up another point. Have you ever seen an IMC approach procedure without a missed approach depicted? ANZ had one before the NDB was withdrawn. The assumption seems to be that becoming visual was guaranteed, which I guess it might be since you wouldn't be commencing the approach unless McMurdo gave an adequate weather report. But no forethought had been given to an aircraft breaking out below an 8/8ths overcast and what they might have been confronted with.
And that is whiteout. As Chippendale said,
So our crew break out, see the dark buildings of the McMurdo base but SFA of anything else. How long do they bumble about before taking decisive action and get the hell out of there? And in which direction? No guidance on the approach plate. Once again a demonstration of an ill considered operation.
Some seem to have difficulty in coming to grips with what whiteout is capable of. My only experience in Antarctica was 8/8ths at 20,000 and visibility unlimited, but you could see nothing - inside a ping pong ball as someone said earlier.
To place blame, my opinion is it falls on the nav department. They failed in so many areas it is beyond belief. They had no idea where the waypoints lay, and failed in their duty to advise the crew of the change. What's the point of a crew briefing if its not of the route to be flown.
For those who castigate the man for not plotting his position, it wasn't SOP as far as I can tell, so why is it a black mark? Guys and Gals flying RNP into Queenstown I bet don't plot the waypoints. One guy says it better than I.
Who checks the oil levels? Who does the water drains? The maintenance? Who designs the ILS approach? The crew have to accept that the people within all departments are professionals doing their tasks in a professional manner. Not to say they don't make mistakes like all of us, but they all play a role in the safe operation of our air transportation system. To expect the front seats to be the goal keepers for everybody elses mistakes is to expect far too much.
A four engine airliner crashed, following the loss of all engines, with the loss of all on board because it was suspected an engineer erred in doing the fuel drains. A jet put its wheels through the trees because of an error in the airport/approach plate.
Had Captain Collins been on the track he thought, on confronting the bad weather he possibly would have climbed out straight ahead, knowing from his previous plotting that he would be in the clear re terrain.
Which brings up another point. Have you ever seen an IMC approach procedure without a missed approach depicted? ANZ had one before the NDB was withdrawn. The assumption seems to be that becoming visual was guaranteed, which I guess it might be since you wouldn't be commencing the approach unless McMurdo gave an adequate weather report. But no forethought had been given to an aircraft breaking out below an 8/8ths overcast and what they might have been confronted with.
And that is whiteout. As Chippendale said,
One other hazard is the effect caused by dark coloured rocks or ridges visible above the snow, which may give the impression that good contrast conditions exist, resulting in a landing attempt on terrain which is not suitable for the purpose, but which due to the whiteout effect appears to be safe since the pilot has not realised that the dark colour of the rocks is giving the illusion of contrast.
In addition, a commonly reported problem is a loss of distance judgement or perception and it becomes difficult to estimate whether a perceived hill or hummock is a distant hill or a small protrusion a few feet away.
In addition, a commonly reported problem is a loss of distance judgement or perception and it becomes difficult to estimate whether a perceived hill or hummock is a distant hill or a small protrusion a few feet away.
Some seem to have difficulty in coming to grips with what whiteout is capable of. My only experience in Antarctica was 8/8ths at 20,000 and visibility unlimited, but you could see nothing - inside a ping pong ball as someone said earlier.
To place blame, my opinion is it falls on the nav department. They failed in so many areas it is beyond belief. They had no idea where the waypoints lay, and failed in their duty to advise the crew of the change. What's the point of a crew briefing if its not of the route to be flown.
For those who castigate the man for not plotting his position, it wasn't SOP as far as I can tell, so why is it a black mark? Guys and Gals flying RNP into Queenstown I bet don't plot the waypoints. One guy says it better than I.
Perhaps, though, the paradigms for determining who is in command, who is in direct control and who is responsible, are changing. The levels of complexity of modern transportation systems are such that the notion of the sole commander and his executive crew, all powerful and totally responsible for the safety of the ship, a notion developed over many millennia of maritime (and more lately of aerial) navigation, is not as relevant as it used to be. We now live in an era of transportation systems in which many minds are involved in the operation of any particular vehicle, and the safe delivery of that vehicle to any particular destination can be seen as the product of systematic co-operation by a team of decision makers. There has to be trust at all levels for such systems to function properly. The pilots of modern aircraft have to place their trust in the organisation behind hem for the system to work.
A four engine airliner crashed, following the loss of all engines, with the loss of all on board because it was suspected an engineer erred in doing the fuel drains. A jet put its wheels through the trees because of an error in the airport/approach plate.
For those that hold steadfast to the not below 6,000 argument, Captain Wilson, the briefing officer, told the crews they were permitted to descend to whatever level McMurdo gave them a clearance.
For those who castigate the man for not plotting his position, it wasn't SOP as far as I can tell, so why is it a black mark? Guys and Gals flying RNP into Queenstown I bet don't plot the waypoints. One guy says it better than I.
You would have thought that someone who had little experience operating in this area, would be checking and checking again (or have his crew do it) the aircraft's position given the presence of a 13000' mountains, irrespective of the SOPs. Thats airmanship. My 2c.
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It wouldn't have mattered what level the radar at McMurdo gave them clearance to descend to. All the radar was concerned about was traffic in the area and in prior briefings AirNZ had been told they would receive no support from Radar whatsoever.
The whole idea that any clearance to descend by the briefing officer or radar or the baggage handler at Auckland airport absolves the crew of their own duty of care to their pax is ridiculous.
There is a saying in aviation and any safety led industry "If there is any doubt there is no doubt" The fact that we are debating if the weather was good enough says it all.
And if it makes you feel better then sorry, 2000 ft in marginal VMC, in a widebody jet, at 5 miles a minute, over featureless terrain, including a 12448ft mountain and next to that a 5948ft peak that they also could have hit, while without radar, or any way of updating their maybe 3 miles an hour drifting INS, is still not safe.
Collins let corporate pressure influence him and a false sense that his prior experience enabled him to justify the decisions he made on the day. Any commander has the right to operate outside of the SOPs as he sees fit, if and when required for the safety of his passengers and aircraft. In this instance Collins operated well outside the SOP for no justifiable reason and the accident occurred.
"But thick here eh Bert"
The whole idea that any clearance to descend by the briefing officer or radar or the baggage handler at Auckland airport absolves the crew of their own duty of care to their pax is ridiculous.
There is a saying in aviation and any safety led industry "If there is any doubt there is no doubt" The fact that we are debating if the weather was good enough says it all.
And if it makes you feel better then sorry, 2000 ft in marginal VMC, in a widebody jet, at 5 miles a minute, over featureless terrain, including a 12448ft mountain and next to that a 5948ft peak that they also could have hit, while without radar, or any way of updating their maybe 3 miles an hour drifting INS, is still not safe.
Collins let corporate pressure influence him and a false sense that his prior experience enabled him to justify the decisions he made on the day. Any commander has the right to operate outside of the SOPs as he sees fit, if and when required for the safety of his passengers and aircraft. In this instance Collins operated well outside the SOP for no justifiable reason and the accident occurred.
"But thick here eh Bert"
