Erebus 25 years on
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Yes. Agree the waypoint was moved without the crew being informed.
Way Point Moved
I have absolutely no connection at all with this very sad event, save having being a fellow aviator.
However my question would be,
If any particular loaded way point had been moved or changed, without the operating Crew being advised at the time, would this change not have been noticed, picked up & subsequently dealt with by the Crew, had they done a complete flight plan V INS check prior to departure?
When I operated long range flights, we (all on the flight deck) always checked, the coordinates, lat & long, track & distance, from the INS against the flight plan provided at briefing. Thus if anything had been changed & was unexpected, it would be immediately noticed, during the check.
No axe to grind at all people, but since this very sad incident & after all the various arguments, who was right / wrong etc, I still can't quite understand, why, if the Crew had done a INS V flight plan check prior to departure & compared the loaded INS waypoints against their flight plan, the anomaly was not picked up.
However my question would be,
If any particular loaded way point had been moved or changed, without the operating Crew being advised at the time, would this change not have been noticed, picked up & subsequently dealt with by the Crew, had they done a complete flight plan V INS check prior to departure?
When I operated long range flights, we (all on the flight deck) always checked, the coordinates, lat & long, track & distance, from the INS against the flight plan provided at briefing. Thus if anything had been changed & was unexpected, it would be immediately noticed, during the check.
No axe to grind at all people, but since this very sad incident & after all the various arguments, who was right / wrong etc, I still can't quite understand, why, if the Crew had done a INS V flight plan check prior to departure & compared the loaded INS waypoints against their flight plan, the anomaly was not picked up.
Last edited by kaikohe76; 13th Jun 2016 at 09:27.
No axe to grind at all people, but since this very sad incident & after all the various arguments, who was right / wrong etc, I still can't quite understand, why, if the Crew had done a INS V flight plan check prior to departure & compared the loaded INS waypoints against their flight plan, the anomaly was not picked up.
There was a briefing a few days prior to the flight where the crew were told the flight path was along a route well to one side of Mt Erebus. It was from this briefing that Jim Collins plotted the course he expected to take on the fateful flight. The waypoint coordinates were changed only the night before the flight.
So the full professionally trained crew did not comply with the company set requirements .
That's why I had a simple check system in place.
Whenever I see the details of an accident I always think " when am I going to do that". Not " I could never be that incompetent"
In Australia for over a decade I have been attempting to get the approach multilateration system in Tasmania to be used properly to reduce the chance of a CFIT.
Many airline pilots tell me that procedural approach is good enough because it would only be an incompetent crew that would let down prematurely and hit Mt Barrow.
I have not heard if one airline pilot requesting the Tasmanian system be fixed . They must think they would not make a Mt Erebus type error. I hope their self confidence is not misplaced .
That's why I had a simple check system in place.
Whenever I see the details of an accident I always think " when am I going to do that". Not " I could never be that incompetent"
In Australia for over a decade I have been attempting to get the approach multilateration system in Tasmania to be used properly to reduce the chance of a CFIT.
Many airline pilots tell me that procedural approach is good enough because it would only be an incompetent crew that would let down prematurely and hit Mt Barrow.
I have not heard if one airline pilot requesting the Tasmanian system be fixed . They must think they would not make a Mt Erebus type error. I hope their self confidence is not misplaced .
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I have not heard if one airline pilot requesting the Tasmanian system be fixed . They must think they would not make a Mt Erebus type error. I hope their self confidence is not misplaced
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I initiated the Antarctic flights and went on the 9 Qantas ones I chartered.
I was always on the flight deck when at low level and personally marked the lat and longitude from the INS on the ONC chart. In those days the aircraft operated at low levels - as low as 500 agl over the pack ice.
One of the flights was on the 17 TH Nov 1977 and was an attempt to get to the South Geographic pole but adverse winds meant a change and we overflew McMurdo at low level. Descent was in IMC using guidance from the McMurdo radar operator . I marked all the positions on the chart so there was a backup.
It's clear that no one in the accident aircraft marked positions on a visual chart as a safety backup.
I was always on the flight deck when at low level and personally marked the lat and longitude from the INS on the ONC chart. In those days the aircraft operated at low levels - as low as 500 agl over the pack ice.
One of the flights was on the 17 TH Nov 1977 and was an attempt to get to the South Geographic pole but adverse winds meant a change and we overflew McMurdo at low level. Descent was in IMC using guidance from the McMurdo radar operator . I marked all the positions on the chart so there was a backup.
It's clear that no one in the accident aircraft marked positions on a visual chart as a safety backup.
"Where's Erebus in relation to us at the moment"
"Left about (twenty) or (twenty) five miles"
"Left do you reckon"
...
"I think it'll be left yes"
"Yes I reckon about here"
You'd use "here" if pointing at a map, "there" if pointing out the window
The problem being that a) the line would have been drawn using the briefing co-ordinates, not the co-ordinates given to the crew that day, and b) unfortunately for them the geography of the bay they were entering being a good match for the bay they thought they were entering so they weren't getting a visual clue to contradict the picture in their minds.
Prospector who is .. and I say this in all sincerity . .. deeply studied on this subject . . .believes that -
- which is a strange statement to make considering primary causal factors.
On another tack , what gulfairs has to say with first hand knowledge about the personalities at the sharp end whom he knew and had flown with is telling. Incidentally, how anyone can say no more to be said . . . "amen" and so to all that . . . when such footnote revelations add a mite to any research into a comprehensive picture . It is a new contribution. To wish to gag any further debate is rather presumptuous. . . arrogant even .
The debate goes on forever . .. ('and the party never ends') . . . whether it remains a matter of interest or not to the individual is immaterial.
The shifting of the waypoint in itself had nothing to do with the cause of the disaster.
On another tack , what gulfairs has to say with first hand knowledge about the personalities at the sharp end whom he knew and had flown with is telling. Incidentally, how anyone can say no more to be said . . . "amen" and so to all that . . . when such footnote revelations add a mite to any research into a comprehensive picture . It is a new contribution. To wish to gag any further debate is rather presumptuous. . . arrogant even .
The debate goes on forever . .. ('and the party never ends') . . . whether it remains a matter of interest or not to the individual is immaterial.
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Prospector who is .. and I say this in all sincerity . .. deeply studied on this subject . . .believes that -
Quote:
The shifting of the waypoint in itself had nothing to do with the cause of the disaster.
- which is a strange statement to make considering primary causal factors.
Quote:
The shifting of the waypoint in itself had nothing to do with the cause of the disaster.
- which is a strange statement to make considering primary causal factors.
Yes, you could certainly argue the confusion and administration factors surrounding the waypoint shift was an error. Furthermore, if this error hadn't occurred, the accident wouldn't have occurred. But - and I have made this point before - this error occurred in a system that was never designed to prevent an aircraft from crashing into terrain. Whereas the MSA, and VFR rules are very very much systems which are designed for terrain avoidance. And it was these systems that Collins violated.
Reubee. In the 747 the Lat and lon coordinates were constantly shown on the INS when selected.
That's what I used to mark on the ONC. Just basic airmanship and navigation when at low levels in a remote place.
Did the DC10 have similar read outs available? And was there an ONC chart onboard?
Surely they were not using just an atlas ?
That's what I used to mark on the ONC. Just basic airmanship and navigation when at low levels in a remote place.
Did the DC10 have similar read outs available? And was there an ONC chart onboard?
Surely they were not using just an atlas ?
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I was nearly on stand by as a lowley First Officer for that particular flight.
I say nearly, because Greg Cassin and I had agreed to switch dutys because of a family illness, and I agreed to change; but I did make it clear that I was NOT interested in joyriding around the South pole.
I can add now in hind sight that the mindset of many of the the then Captains, and even right up until 1980's was of unmittigated omnipotence.
I flew with Collins about two weeks prior to the il-fated 901,and admit he was a pleasant fellow to fly with, but there was a hard nosed streak, that occasionally showed up.
Cassin was at the other end of the scale, a very pleasant and mildly submissive.
The utimate end could have been different, if there had been a crew change, but never the less MSA is just that, Minimum Safe Altitude.
and VMC means a visual flight conditions which must include a defined horizon of some sort,that did not exist that day.
The first warnings were loud and clear by their ommisssions.
Loss of VHF radio contact, and a loss of VHF Nav contact.
I think most of us would have made it known that all is not well and to get back up to MSA was necessary at that time.
The 'Bell' could not have been much louder!
I say nearly, because Greg Cassin and I had agreed to switch dutys because of a family illness, and I agreed to change; but I did make it clear that I was NOT interested in joyriding around the South pole.
I can add now in hind sight that the mindset of many of the the then Captains, and even right up until 1980's was of unmittigated omnipotence.
I flew with Collins about two weeks prior to the il-fated 901,and admit he was a pleasant fellow to fly with, but there was a hard nosed streak, that occasionally showed up.
Cassin was at the other end of the scale, a very pleasant and mildly submissive.
The utimate end could have been different, if there had been a crew change, but never the less MSA is just that, Minimum Safe Altitude.
and VMC means a visual flight conditions which must include a defined horizon of some sort,that did not exist that day.
The first warnings were loud and clear by their ommisssions.
Loss of VHF radio contact, and a loss of VHF Nav contact.
I think most of us would have made it known that all is not well and to get back up to MSA was necessary at that time.
The 'Bell' could not have been much louder!
So if I read you right, you are suggesting that Jim Collins might not have been the sort of person whose demeanour would have encouraged open feedback from other crew members? I myself heard that recently prior to this flight, a F/O had filed an incident report against him over a hot & high approach into NAN.
Ultimately though, whether these things are true or whether he really was an aviation demigod as suggested by Mahon et al is irrelevant. Every single one of us, regardless of history, is capable of making dumb mistakes.
You will note that this is the ONLY let down procedure approved by the Company and the CAA
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I flew with Collins about two weeks prior to the il-fated 901,and admit he was a pleasant fellow to fly with, but there was a hard nosed streak, that occasionally showed up.
Cassin was at the other end of the scale, a very pleasant and mildly submissive.
Cassin was at the other end of the scale, a very pleasant and mildly submissive.
By what company directive were they enabled to descend to the company advertised "see Antarctica from 2,000 feet". The advertised 2,000 rather puts the contention that 6,000 was the limit in some doubt.
Nevertheless, it was a requirement as laid down by CAA before these flights were commenced. As has been said on this thread a number of times, CAA denied having any knowledge of these indiscretions. As there were no repercussions from CAA the practice continued.
I can add now in hind sight that the mindset of many of the the then Captains, and even right up until 1980's was of unmittigated omnipotence
If you want to break, or disregard the rules, and have the end result this crew had, and then we get the findings of Mahon that the crew were blameless, this discussion will go on forever.
Last edited by prospector; 14th Jun 2016 at 07:43.
and in real VFR conditions
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My regulators limits are 5K vis, 1.5K horizontal & 1,000 feet vertical from cloud
Do you really think that a vis of 5K would be of any use at 260kts?
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Whispering "T" Jet
Welcome aboard megan. This debate has been going on since the 29th November 1979 and will remain ongoing because there is no middle ground to which the two warring parties can agree.
1. The crew did not survive the accident, therefore it is only speculation on what was briefed at the planning stages (before the aircraft got airborne), during the cruise and prior to descent. (MSA, discussion about the route down Mc Murdo Sound, the actual weather at the time (NOT forecast) etc,.)
2. Mahon found during his inquiry; “The palpably false sections of evidence which I heard could not have been the result of mistake, or faulty recollection. They originated, I am compelled to say, in a pre-determined plan of deception. They were very clearly part of an attempt to conceal a series of disastrous administrative blunders and so… I am forced reluctantly to say that I had to listen to an orchestrated litany of lies.”
3. The New Zealand government and Air NZ were furious and had the findings overturned. Not a popular decision with most of the victim's families. In 2004, appeals to the U.K. Privy Council were abolished in NZ. In 2009, Air NZ's Chief Executive stated, "Air New Zealand inevitably made mistakes and undoubtedly let down people directly affected by the tragedy." That would include families of the crew.
So, there are three sides to this debate. Mahons, Air NZ & NZ government supporters (for brevity referred to as "Others") and the TRUTH. As can be seen by all contributions in this thread, the TRUTH will never be established so it will remain Mahon vs "Others" until infinity.
Amen
1. The crew did not survive the accident, therefore it is only speculation on what was briefed at the planning stages (before the aircraft got airborne), during the cruise and prior to descent. (MSA, discussion about the route down Mc Murdo Sound, the actual weather at the time (NOT forecast) etc,.)
2. Mahon found during his inquiry; “The palpably false sections of evidence which I heard could not have been the result of mistake, or faulty recollection. They originated, I am compelled to say, in a pre-determined plan of deception. They were very clearly part of an attempt to conceal a series of disastrous administrative blunders and so… I am forced reluctantly to say that I had to listen to an orchestrated litany of lies.”
3. The New Zealand government and Air NZ were furious and had the findings overturned. Not a popular decision with most of the victim's families. In 2004, appeals to the U.K. Privy Council were abolished in NZ. In 2009, Air NZ's Chief Executive stated, "Air New Zealand inevitably made mistakes and undoubtedly let down people directly affected by the tragedy." That would include families of the crew.
So, there are three sides to this debate. Mahons, Air NZ & NZ government supporters (for brevity referred to as "Others") and the TRUTH. As can be seen by all contributions in this thread, the TRUTH will never be established so it will remain Mahon vs "Others" until infinity.
Amen
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3 Holer,
[QUOTE]In their judgement, delivered on 20 Oct 1983, the five Law Lords of the Privy Council dismissed the commissioner's appeal and upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal decision, which set aside the costs order against the airline, on the grounds that Mahon had committed clear breaches of natural justice. They demolished his case item by item, including Exhibit 164 which they said could not "be understood by any experienced pilot to be intended to be used for the purpose of navigation", and went even further, saying there was no clear proof on which to base a finding that a plan of deception, led by the company's chief executive, had ever existed.[/QUOTe
That taken from John King publication. I think it shows very clearly what the New Zealand Court of Appeal, and the Privy Council thought of Justice Mahons methods and utterances.
2. Mahon found during his inquiry; “The palpably false sections of evidence which I heard could not have been the result of mistake, or faulty recollection. They originated, I am compelled to say, in a pre-determined plan of deception. They were very clearly part of an attempt to conceal a series of disastrous administrative blunders and so… I am forced reluctantly to say that I had to listen to an orchestrated litany of lies.”
As long as you and others keep on quoting the views of Mahon, that have been completely disagreed with by his peers and superiors in the law world, and have been printed in this forum many times, then one is left wondering as to the point of trying to establish fact. You may disagree with the Appeal Court of New Zealand, and disagree with the finding of the Privy Council, but you can go to no higher court to challenge them.
[QUOTE]In their judgement, delivered on 20 Oct 1983, the five Law Lords of the Privy Council dismissed the commissioner's appeal and upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal decision, which set aside the costs order against the airline, on the grounds that Mahon had committed clear breaches of natural justice. They demolished his case item by item, including Exhibit 164 which they said could not "be understood by any experienced pilot to be intended to be used for the purpose of navigation", and went even further, saying there was no clear proof on which to base a finding that a plan of deception, led by the company's chief executive, had ever existed.[/QUOTe
That taken from John King publication. I think it shows very clearly what the New Zealand Court of Appeal, and the Privy Council thought of Justice Mahons methods and utterances.
2. Mahon found during his inquiry; “The palpably false sections of evidence which I heard could not have been the result of mistake, or faulty recollection. They originated, I am compelled to say, in a pre-determined plan of deception. They were very clearly part of an attempt to conceal a series of disastrous administrative blunders and so… I am forced reluctantly to say that I had to listen to an orchestrated litany of lies.”
As long as you and others keep on quoting the views of Mahon, that have been completely disagreed with by his peers and superiors in the law world, and have been printed in this forum many times, then one is left wondering as to the point of trying to establish fact. You may disagree with the Appeal Court of New Zealand, and disagree with the finding of the Privy Council, but you can go to no higher court to challenge them.
Do you really think that a vis of 5K would be of any use at 260kts?
For the Antarctic flights at what point did it become non VFR?
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I do not believe there is an answer to that question, they were never VFR, the captain requested a VMC descent, which in effect made him responsible for his own terrain and traffic separation.
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For the Antarctic flights at what point did it become non VFR?
I do not believe there is an answer to that question, they were never VFR, the captain requested a VMC descent, which in effect made him responsible for his own terrain and traffic separation.
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I do not believe there is an answer to that question
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There were from memory 5 or 6 criteria required to descend below MSA on that flight. Didn't matter that the waypoints were changed, there was still a f*cking big mountain in the area whichever of the routes were being flown and the MSA was high for both routes accordingly.
They had 2 of the 5 or 6 criteria required, just 2.
I get that Vette did a lot to show that they didn't have the visual picture they thought they had and I thank him for that. And I get that other flights busted SOP and descended when they shouldn't have. So someone else was doing it so that made it ok? That's the kind of argument I have with my 4 year old.
And I get that previous flights that didn't descend had a bunch of unhappy pax who saw nothing but cloud tops for hours so the viability of the flight itself was in question.
But it doesn't alter the question as to what were they doing down there, that low, in the first place. The person in the LHS is the skipper, he operates the aircraft to the SOPs which is what the AOC is based on. The aircraft was, let's not forget, perfectly serviceable. If the crew had all got gastro half way to Antartica and ended up in the bathroom the aircraft would have happily flown all the way down to Antartica and all the way back to NZ without so much as a scratch.
To apportion none of the blame to the crew is ludicrous.
They had 2 of the 5 or 6 criteria required, just 2.
I get that Vette did a lot to show that they didn't have the visual picture they thought they had and I thank him for that. And I get that other flights busted SOP and descended when they shouldn't have. So someone else was doing it so that made it ok? That's the kind of argument I have with my 4 year old.
And I get that previous flights that didn't descend had a bunch of unhappy pax who saw nothing but cloud tops for hours so the viability of the flight itself was in question.
But it doesn't alter the question as to what were they doing down there, that low, in the first place. The person in the LHS is the skipper, he operates the aircraft to the SOPs which is what the AOC is based on. The aircraft was, let's not forget, perfectly serviceable. If the crew had all got gastro half way to Antartica and ended up in the bathroom the aircraft would have happily flown all the way down to Antartica and all the way back to NZ without so much as a scratch.
To apportion none of the blame to the crew is ludicrous.
