Erebus 25 years on
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"McMurdo ATC issued descent clearances contrary to those requirements because the company never advised them of those restrictions."
This is not correct, the Captain requested a VMC descent, in no way is that a clearance for anything. From an earlier post that hopefully you read.
From that court.
" It is clearly established that, when the pilot told Mac Centre he wished to descend VMC, he effectively informed the controllers that he could see where he was going. In so doing, he took sole responsibility for separating the airplane from other aircraft and the terrain, and he was on his own."
As they were never identified on McMurdo radar how could the controllers have cleared them for anything, they had no idea where they were.
I am sure that the clearance for a VMC descent mentioned by Capt Wilson was to be after they were identified by McMurdo Radar and position established positively.
This is not correct, the Captain requested a VMC descent, in no way is that a clearance for anything. From an earlier post that hopefully you read.
From that court.
" It is clearly established that, when the pilot told Mac Centre he wished to descend VMC, he effectively informed the controllers that he could see where he was going. In so doing, he took sole responsibility for separating the airplane from other aircraft and the terrain, and he was on his own."
As they were never identified on McMurdo radar how could the controllers have cleared them for anything, they had no idea where they were.
I am sure that the clearance for a VMC descent mentioned by Capt Wilson was to be after they were identified by McMurdo Radar and position established positively.
Last edited by prospector; 27th Jan 2008 at 23:11.
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Desert Dingo you are correct when you state
(See my post #135.)
Just watch someone jump out of the crowd soon and accuse you of illogical reasoning and terminating debate on the issue.......................
......................but don't worry they'll be back!
but you can't get past the fact that the company briefed the pilots that they had approval to descend below 6000 feet VMC with ATC clearance.
Just watch someone jump out of the crowd soon and accuse you of illogical reasoning and terminating debate on the issue.......................
......................but don't worry they'll be back!
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As stated above they requested a VMC descent, they were never CLEARED for anything.
Chippendales words
On the Captain’s instructions the co-pilot asked “McMurdo Centre” for a clearance to let down VMC to 2,000 feet and proceed visually to McMurdo. Immediately after this approval was given a further descent was commenced. Report 79-139
and
ATC did give a clearance to descend to 2,000 ft VMC and proceed visually to McMurdo. Royal Commission
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"It is clearly established that, when the pilot told Mac Centre he wished to descend VMC, he effectively informed the controllers that he could see where he was going. In so doing, he took sole responsibility for separating the airplane from other aircraft and the terrain, and he was on his own."
They approved his request for a VMC descent, as they had never identified him on radar, and had no means of knowing what the position of the aircraft how could they give them a clearance to descend????
" he took sole responsibility for separating the airplane from other aircraft and the terrain, and he was on his own."
This is what they requested, a VMC descent, MacCentre approved a VMC descent.
"ATC did give a clearance to descend to 2,000 ft VMC and proceed visually to McMurdo."
All they were doing, as the captain had assumed responsibility for his own terrain clearance and separation from other aircraft, with his request for VMC descent, was advising him of no known conflicting traffic.
It is patently obvious that Mahon had no understanding of, and obviously got no accurate advice on, the meaning of a VMC descent. The controller had no way of knowing the position of the aircraft, or the weather it was encountering, the captain had by requesting VMC descent taken on all responsibility for terrain clearance and separation from other aircraft upon himself, in complete disregard of the mandatory requirements for descent.
Surely the end result speaks of the folly of this decision.
They approved his request for a VMC descent, as they had never identified him on radar, and had no means of knowing what the position of the aircraft how could they give them a clearance to descend????
" he took sole responsibility for separating the airplane from other aircraft and the terrain, and he was on his own."
This is what they requested, a VMC descent, MacCentre approved a VMC descent.
"ATC did give a clearance to descend to 2,000 ft VMC and proceed visually to McMurdo."
All they were doing, as the captain had assumed responsibility for his own terrain clearance and separation from other aircraft, with his request for VMC descent, was advising him of no known conflicting traffic.
It is patently obvious that Mahon had no understanding of, and obviously got no accurate advice on, the meaning of a VMC descent. The controller had no way of knowing the position of the aircraft, or the weather it was encountering, the captain had by requesting VMC descent taken on all responsibility for terrain clearance and separation from other aircraft upon himself, in complete disregard of the mandatory requirements for descent.
Surely the end result speaks of the folly of this decision.
Last edited by prospector; 28th Jan 2008 at 07:19.
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Prospector,
I don't doubt your knowledge of the guidelines to crew and I full know the responsibilities of the PIC BUT the fact remains that:
- the crew, without briefing or knowledge of "whiteout conditions," really believed that they were in VMC conditions; and
- really believed, due to their Air NZ briefing and navigational data provided by the operator, that they were proceding down the center of McMurdo Sound and that they were (or should be - from the CVR transcripts) well clear of Erebus.
Do you really believe that Air NZ is totally clear of blame in regard to this tragedy?
Do you really believe that Air NZ had considered every possibility of risk mitigation before authorising Antarctic flights?
I don't doubt your knowledge of the guidelines to crew and I full know the responsibilities of the PIC BUT the fact remains that:
- the crew, without briefing or knowledge of "whiteout conditions," really believed that they were in VMC conditions; and
- really believed, due to their Air NZ briefing and navigational data provided by the operator, that they were proceding down the center of McMurdo Sound and that they were (or should be - from the CVR transcripts) well clear of Erebus.
Do you really believe that Air NZ is totally clear of blame in regard to this tragedy?
Do you really believe that Air NZ had considered every possibility of risk mitigation before authorising Antarctic flights?
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"Do you really believe that Air NZ is totally clear of blame in regard to this tragedy?"
As stated many times, no.
"Do you really believe that Air NZ had considered every possibility of risk mitigation before authorising Antarctic flights?"
They never had the final say on approving these flights, CAA had that responsibility, they laid down the requirements for descent. It was because CAA were very lax in policing these requirements that they got their wrists smacked, in fact there was an airline inspector scheduled to go on that flight, because of a family illness he had to cancel. I would find it hard to believe that the flight would have been carried out the way it was if that inspector had of been onboard.
As stated many times, no.
"Do you really believe that Air NZ had considered every possibility of risk mitigation before authorising Antarctic flights?"
They never had the final say on approving these flights, CAA had that responsibility, they laid down the requirements for descent. It was because CAA were very lax in policing these requirements that they got their wrists smacked, in fact there was an airline inspector scheduled to go on that flight, because of a family illness he had to cancel. I would find it hard to believe that the flight would have been carried out the way it was if that inspector had of been onboard.
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in complete disregard of the mandatory requirements for descent.
really believed that they were in VMC conditions
Last edited by Brian Abraham; 28th Jan 2008 at 13:44.
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Brian Abraham,
"This was referred to in a Company memorandum to Antarctic crews, OAA:14/13/28 dated 8 November 1979. Headed McMurdo NDB NOT AVAILABLE, it was succinct and unambiguous.
Delete all reference in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note the the ONLY let-down procedure available is VMC below FL160 to 6000ft as follows.
1. Vis 20 Km plus.
2. No snow showers in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 degrees Grid through 360 degrees grid to 270 degrees grid from McMurdo Field, within 20nm of TACAN CH29.
4. Descent to be co-ordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.
Despite some claims to the contrary, my information is that a copy of this memorandum was recovered from the cockpit wreckage.
What many people seem to ignore are these requirements, none were complied with, no radar contact, no lock on to TACAN, nowhere near the approved descent area, the weather as given to the crew was below their limits for the approved descent, so they designed their own descent. And the result being just exactly what these requirements were to designed to make sure never happened.
"This was referred to in a Company memorandum to Antarctic crews, OAA:14/13/28 dated 8 November 1979. Headed McMurdo NDB NOT AVAILABLE, it was succinct and unambiguous.
Delete all reference in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note the the ONLY let-down procedure available is VMC below FL160 to 6000ft as follows.
1. Vis 20 Km plus.
2. No snow showers in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 degrees Grid through 360 degrees grid to 270 degrees grid from McMurdo Field, within 20nm of TACAN CH29.
4. Descent to be co-ordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.
Despite some claims to the contrary, my information is that a copy of this memorandum was recovered from the cockpit wreckage.
What many people seem to ignore are these requirements, none were complied with, no radar contact, no lock on to TACAN, nowhere near the approved descent area, the weather as given to the crew was below their limits for the approved descent, so they designed their own descent. And the result being just exactly what these requirements were to designed to make sure never happened.
Last edited by prospector; 28th Jan 2008 at 18:02.
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Prospector:
You are correct. Item (c) in my post #172 is the memorandum to which you refer. As there was no mention of the 16000 ft limit I thought it was a different document.
Despite some claims to the contrary, my information is that a copy of this memorandum was recovered from the cockpit wreckage.
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Brian,
Prospector is pushing the company argument that was convincingly demolished by the facts that came to light during the Royal Commission inquiry conducted by Justice Mahon.
151 (part)
164 (d)
Although the descent restrictions remained in force, the airline consistently disregarded them, although protesting total compliance with them at the enquiry.
Prospector asks
Captain Hawkins (and others) may have been telling fibs.
In the Auckland Star of 22 October 1977 an article appears with “At the controls Captain Hawkins brings the DC10 down to 200m over Scott and McMurdo Bases – well below the towering volcano Erebus belching smoke only 40 km. away.”
Now I know we all have a pretty poor opinion of media accuracy about aviation, and the journalist later admitted that he should have said 400m not 200m ( just a slight exaggeration – how surprising) but I expect he could tell the difference in flight at 400m (1300 ft) and 6000 feet.
There are numerous other examples of press reports, company newsletters and publicity brochures confirming that flights were regularly conducted below 6000 feet.
Significantly, Mr B Thompson, Superintendent of the D.S.I.R., had been on four flights and testified that he believed they had all flown below the MSA rules. One of these flights (8 November 1977) was under the command of Captain Johnson, Flight manager Line Operations, who then testified that he had descended to 3000 feet. This was a breach in the otherwise unified front of the management pilots that nobody ignored the MSA rules. Justice Mahon says (rather tongue-in-cheek, I think) that he does not wish to suggest that Captain Johnson felt obliged to admit breaking the unified front because it could be so easily proved that he had descended below 6000 feet.
This is the same Captain Johnson who wrote the memo Prospector relies on so much in his arguments.
So, there is incontrovertible evidence that flights were being regularly operated below 6000 feet and that the crews were specifically authorized to do so during the briefing.
Note that this specific authority was orally given to flight crews during the course of the audio-visual presentations.
Orally.
This means that perhaps the only written record would be the notes taken by the pilots during the briefing.
Justice Mahon’s report shows that there were times when the company had control of documents recovered from the crash site, and he does not believe Captain Gemmel did not know about the changed waypoints when he had possession of those documents.
If you had a suspicious mind you might wonder why the only documents recovered at the crash scene and shown at the enquiry were ones that supported the company argument.
Why were there no pages left in Captain Collins’ otherwise undamaged ring-binder notebook?
What happened to the rest of the documents carried by Captain Collins on that flight?
Why did the company recover FO Cassin’s briefing notes, then they were never seen again?
Who was behind the burglaries?
Does “an organized litany of lies” apply here?
Believe in conspiracies and a cover-up? Who, me?
Prospector is pushing the company argument that was convincingly demolished by the facts that came to light during the Royal Commission inquiry conducted by Justice Mahon.
151 (part)
…… But because the flight levels of 16000 feet and 6000 feet and the flight path over Mt Erebus still remained as part of the official approval of Civil Aviation Division as at 28 November 1979, both the airline and Civil Aviation Division immediately seized upon these official conditions as being the vital factor in the disaster. From the point of view of both organizations they could obtain, so they believed, absolution from their own numerous errors by merely ascribing the disaster to a failure by Captain Collins to observe a minimum flight level of 16000 feet …..
The prepared text of the briefing and the constant reference to minimum safe altitudes of 16000 feet and 6000 feet were verbally contradicted by Captain Wilson in the 1978 and 1979 flights by indicating to the crews that they were authorized to descend to any altitude approved by the United States Navy Air Traffic Controller, and it is significant to point out that at the time when the chief inspector signed and published his report, he had not been told by Captain Wilson, or by anyone else, that this specific authority was orally given to flight crews during the course of the audio-visual presentations to which I have referred. Captain Wilson admitted this. (T. 1236)
Prospector asks
Why do you not also quote from Capt M. Hawkins, who stated "I was in no doubt at the briefing that the lower limit was 6000ft, the weather on my flight was perfect, with clear skies and 100 miles visibility. Ice tower asked me for a low run, but I kept to 6000 feet".
In the Auckland Star of 22 October 1977 an article appears with “At the controls Captain Hawkins brings the DC10 down to 200m over Scott and McMurdo Bases – well below the towering volcano Erebus belching smoke only 40 km. away.”
Now I know we all have a pretty poor opinion of media accuracy about aviation, and the journalist later admitted that he should have said 400m not 200m ( just a slight exaggeration – how surprising) but I expect he could tell the difference in flight at 400m (1300 ft) and 6000 feet.
There are numerous other examples of press reports, company newsletters and publicity brochures confirming that flights were regularly conducted below 6000 feet.
Significantly, Mr B Thompson, Superintendent of the D.S.I.R., had been on four flights and testified that he believed they had all flown below the MSA rules. One of these flights (8 November 1977) was under the command of Captain Johnson, Flight manager Line Operations, who then testified that he had descended to 3000 feet. This was a breach in the otherwise unified front of the management pilots that nobody ignored the MSA rules. Justice Mahon says (rather tongue-in-cheek, I think) that he does not wish to suggest that Captain Johnson felt obliged to admit breaking the unified front because it could be so easily proved that he had descended below 6000 feet.
This is the same Captain Johnson who wrote the memo Prospector relies on so much in his arguments.
So, there is incontrovertible evidence that flights were being regularly operated below 6000 feet and that the crews were specifically authorized to do so during the briefing.
Note that this specific authority was orally given to flight crews during the course of the audio-visual presentations.
Orally.
This means that perhaps the only written record would be the notes taken by the pilots during the briefing.
Justice Mahon’s report shows that there were times when the company had control of documents recovered from the crash site, and he does not believe Captain Gemmel did not know about the changed waypoints when he had possession of those documents.
If you had a suspicious mind you might wonder why the only documents recovered at the crash scene and shown at the enquiry were ones that supported the company argument.
Why were there no pages left in Captain Collins’ otherwise undamaged ring-binder notebook?
What happened to the rest of the documents carried by Captain Collins on that flight?
Why did the company recover FO Cassin’s briefing notes, then they were never seen again?
Who was behind the burglaries?
Does “an organized litany of lies” apply here?
Believe in conspiracies and a cover-up? Who, me?
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Desert Dingo,
The Mr Bob Thomson who you have brought into the debate also wrote in his "History of New Zealand Antarctic Research Program 1965-88".
"Air New Zealand and NZALPA went to some lengths to ensure that their senior pilots and members were seen as professionals who knew it all and did not therefor need to seek advice from elsewhere, such as the RNZAF, USAF USN, or the Division.
"Nor did Air New Zealand take advantage of the experience gained by the members of their aircrews who flew on earlier flights. Apparently the NZALPA saw the Antarctic flights as a special perk for their members and had an agreement with Air New Zealand that flight crews should be spread widely amongst its members.
Therefore aircrews, including aircraft captains, usually had not any previous experience on these flights, an experience which would have avoided the Erebus Disaster from ever happening"
It is interesting that you bring in Bob Thomson, he is not qualified aircrew, but has apparently over 75 trips to the Antarctic, at least 50 approaching from the North. He was in fact scheduled for the subject flight but had to change his plans. When asked that but for twist of fate he would have been on the fatal flight his reply was "Not at all, I always insisted on a complete circuit of Ross Island before letting down below 17000ft. That way I could get an idea of the complete situation and what the weather was like.
He also stated that "The Captain didn't give attention to problems he might have around there. These people were taking a Sunday drive. When I heard the transcript of the CVR I fell out of my chair."
"I always had a chart in the cockpit and checked the lat and long readout, but the crew of the fatal flight never referred to it"
"Your statement of oral briefing is a bit like oral history, gets changed in the telling. Not like the laid down mandatory requirements from CAA, that were written instructions and it is a known fact that the crew had access to them.
I would also like to add that your faith in the infallability of Justice Mahon is quite touching, if misplaced.
The Mr Bob Thomson who you have brought into the debate also wrote in his "History of New Zealand Antarctic Research Program 1965-88".
"Air New Zealand and NZALPA went to some lengths to ensure that their senior pilots and members were seen as professionals who knew it all and did not therefor need to seek advice from elsewhere, such as the RNZAF, USAF USN, or the Division.
"Nor did Air New Zealand take advantage of the experience gained by the members of their aircrews who flew on earlier flights. Apparently the NZALPA saw the Antarctic flights as a special perk for their members and had an agreement with Air New Zealand that flight crews should be spread widely amongst its members.
Therefore aircrews, including aircraft captains, usually had not any previous experience on these flights, an experience which would have avoided the Erebus Disaster from ever happening"
It is interesting that you bring in Bob Thomson, he is not qualified aircrew, but has apparently over 75 trips to the Antarctic, at least 50 approaching from the North. He was in fact scheduled for the subject flight but had to change his plans. When asked that but for twist of fate he would have been on the fatal flight his reply was "Not at all, I always insisted on a complete circuit of Ross Island before letting down below 17000ft. That way I could get an idea of the complete situation and what the weather was like.
He also stated that "The Captain didn't give attention to problems he might have around there. These people were taking a Sunday drive. When I heard the transcript of the CVR I fell out of my chair."
"I always had a chart in the cockpit and checked the lat and long readout, but the crew of the fatal flight never referred to it"
"Your statement of oral briefing is a bit like oral history, gets changed in the telling. Not like the laid down mandatory requirements from CAA, that were written instructions and it is a known fact that the crew had access to them.
I would also like to add that your faith in the infallability of Justice Mahon is quite touching, if misplaced.
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"Not at all, I always insisted on a complete circuit of Ross Island before letting down below 17000ft. That way I could get an idea of the complete situation and what the weather was like.
"Your statement of oral briefing is a bit like oral history, gets changed in the telling.
I would also like to add that your faith in the infallability of Justice Mahon is quite touching, if misplaced.
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Protecting who??
The Erebus disaster and Justice Mahon brought to light a number of things that are usually swept under the carpet with the convenient "pilot error" finding. These things often occur in lots of other organisations, all over the world.
We ignore them at our peril.
One that we should give thought to is the perceived integrity, and therefore effectiveness of company or other instructions. Often it appears that the instructions are mainly to protect people who are not in the aeroplane. I have seen this situation elsewhere, where the company instructions were impractical and were ignored. In one case there was documented evidence in company files that this occurred, and no-one discussed it. The regulator did not either. It was perfectly safe procedure, but was contrary to company instructions.
I believe the latest description is "normalisation of deviance".
Pilots are reluctant to discuss such matters as they fear being labelled "undisciplined" or some other such term, and lose career opportunities.
I do not wish to comment on the instructions given by Air NZ for antarctic flights. Justice Mahon did that, much better than I could.
But I still cannot accept the simplistic, conclusion that "pilot error" was the cause of the disaster. Surely we are smarter, and more sincere than that.
We ignore them at our peril.
One that we should give thought to is the perceived integrity, and therefore effectiveness of company or other instructions. Often it appears that the instructions are mainly to protect people who are not in the aeroplane. I have seen this situation elsewhere, where the company instructions were impractical and were ignored. In one case there was documented evidence in company files that this occurred, and no-one discussed it. The regulator did not either. It was perfectly safe procedure, but was contrary to company instructions.
I believe the latest description is "normalisation of deviance".
Pilots are reluctant to discuss such matters as they fear being labelled "undisciplined" or some other such term, and lose career opportunities.
I do not wish to comment on the instructions given by Air NZ for antarctic flights. Justice Mahon did that, much better than I could.
But I still cannot accept the simplistic, conclusion that "pilot error" was the cause of the disaster. Surely we are smarter, and more sincere than that.
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Desert Dingo,
"It doesn't appear he was very successful with his insisting when he was on the four air New Zealand flights that he testified flew below 6000 feet."
On the contrary, they successfully missed Erebus every time.
" FFS Prospector! Does the fact that it was the sworn testimony of the person who gave the briefing mean anything to you. Are you suggesting he was another one telling fibs?"
Another one telling fibs?? was it only the people that disagreed with Mahons theories the ones that told fibs.
If you are so convinced Mahon was correct, how do you explain the following from the Privy Council???
In their judgement, delivered on 20 Oct 1983, the five Law Lords of the Privy Council dismissed thje commissioners appeal and upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal decision, which set aside the costs order against the airline, on the grounds that Mahon had committed clear breaches of natural justice. They demolished his case item by item, including Exhibit 164 which they said could not "be understood by any experienced pilot to be used for the purpose of navigation", and went even further, saying there was no clear proof on which to base a finding that a plan of deception, led by the company chief executive had ever existed.
They demolished his case item by item, including Exhibit 164 which they said could not "be understood by any experienced pilot to be used for the purpose of navigation",
Surely that from the highest law court available should tell you something, but perhaps not.
"It doesn't appear he was very successful with his insisting when he was on the four air New Zealand flights that he testified flew below 6000 feet."
On the contrary, they successfully missed Erebus every time.
" FFS Prospector! Does the fact that it was the sworn testimony of the person who gave the briefing mean anything to you. Are you suggesting he was another one telling fibs?"
Another one telling fibs?? was it only the people that disagreed with Mahons theories the ones that told fibs.
If you are so convinced Mahon was correct, how do you explain the following from the Privy Council???
In their judgement, delivered on 20 Oct 1983, the five Law Lords of the Privy Council dismissed thje commissioners appeal and upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal decision, which set aside the costs order against the airline, on the grounds that Mahon had committed clear breaches of natural justice. They demolished his case item by item, including Exhibit 164 which they said could not "be understood by any experienced pilot to be used for the purpose of navigation", and went even further, saying there was no clear proof on which to base a finding that a plan of deception, led by the company chief executive had ever existed.
They demolished his case item by item, including Exhibit 164 which they said could not "be understood by any experienced pilot to be used for the purpose of navigation",
Surely that from the highest law court available should tell you something, but perhaps not.
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Hi Prospector
Can you just confirm for me please, that, in relation to the quote you have provided from the Privy Council, you understand it to mean that the law lords demolished Mahon's case only in relation to his allegations that there had been a cover up, and not his "opinions" as to cause.
Please tell me yes.
dh
Can you just confirm for me please, that, in relation to the quote you have provided from the Privy Council, you understand it to mean that the law lords demolished Mahon's case only in relation to his allegations that there had been a cover up, and not his "opinions" as to cause.
Please tell me yes.
dh
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deadhead,
To my understanding it applies to all the findings.
Exhibit 164 from memory was a chart that Mahon based many of his theories on, certainly nothing to do with any alleged cover up.
The Court of Appeal addressed several aspects that were brought to the commissioners notice during the enquiry but ignored by him.
The Privy Council agreed with the Appeal Court decision.
It states "and went even further" making the finding of no cover up a separate issue.
There are many who believe the following is correct. The Mahon report remains unqualified, still the version quoted in law schools, without the rebuttals formed by the subsequent Court of Appeal and Privy Council judgements. There has been no movement to record those officially and correct the Mahon version of the reasons behind the disaster.
To my understanding it applies to all the findings.
Exhibit 164 from memory was a chart that Mahon based many of his theories on, certainly nothing to do with any alleged cover up.
The Court of Appeal addressed several aspects that were brought to the commissioners notice during the enquiry but ignored by him.
The Privy Council agreed with the Appeal Court decision.
It states "and went even further" making the finding of no cover up a separate issue.
There are many who believe the following is correct. The Mahon report remains unqualified, still the version quoted in law schools, without the rebuttals formed by the subsequent Court of Appeal and Privy Council judgements. There has been no movement to record those officially and correct the Mahon version of the reasons behind the disaster.
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OK, I am beginning to see a problem.
AirNZ appealed Mahon's finding that there had been a cover-up. They appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal upheld their appeal. In turn, Mahon appealed to the Privy Council, whereupon his appeal was dismissed. The appeals were only ever in relation to Mahon's claim that there had been a cover-up.
It is very common for people to assume that (and then praise) the law courts for "overturning" Mahon's conclusions as to "cause." What adds a certain irony is that these are the same people that tend to criticise Mahon for being a non-aviation judicial officer making some big calls in areas he knows little about. That may be so, but that is the nature of a Royal Commission. The Commissioner(s) need only take advice from specialists, which of course Mahon did.
The Judicial Committee went out of its way in praising Mahon's "painstaking" work and even stressed that the question as to cause was, in fact, not put before them. You can read the entire judgments of both the Court of Appeal at www.gutenberg.org (search for erebus) and I think you can access the Privy Council judgment online also. If you can't find the PC judgment, I will email it to you.
I have to say that your arguments have been impeccable thus far, but I do have to question your claim that the accident crew complied with none of the four points in the briefing paper. On the first point, there was no evidence to suggest that the visibility was less than 20KM, on the second point there was no evidence of any snow showers in the area, on the third point the aircraft was not equipped to receive azimuth signals from the TACAN, the only way they could have complied with this instruction would have been to use the INS (a task it was not set up to do, nor were the crew instructed in any way on ANY methods using the INS, the only possible method left was VMC, and this was what the crew were doing), and to the fourth point, the meaning of the requirement was only that descent be coordinated with the local radar controller. This was, in fact, taking place with the radar controller at "Ice Tower" through the "Mac Centre" controller on HF. Radar identification was not a requirement of the briefing condition, although there is no doubt that it should have been.
This leads me to an interesting question. Just what is a "VMC descent?" In New Zealand, the closest thing is a visual descent below MSA. The only way you can do that is by conducting a visual approach, or by radar. I agree that neither of these things applied to the accident flight, therefore I do not know what was going on there.
There should have been a clear cut prohibition on descents below 6000ft if that had been the intent of the briefing. That people who were there can argue about what the briefing said (or meant) attests to its complete failure to provide anything of the sort.
Briefings are supposed to assume that pilots are stupid. A safe system also assumes that pilots are stupid, and goes out of its way to help them discharge their responsibilities. In this case the system badly let down the captain and crew of this flight. You can argue all day about who carried the responsibility yada yada yada, but ultimately 257 people died because the captain was unable to outwit a stupid and flawed system that covertly obstructed him at every turn.
AirNZ appealed Mahon's finding that there had been a cover-up. They appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal upheld their appeal. In turn, Mahon appealed to the Privy Council, whereupon his appeal was dismissed. The appeals were only ever in relation to Mahon's claim that there had been a cover-up.
It is very common for people to assume that (and then praise) the law courts for "overturning" Mahon's conclusions as to "cause." What adds a certain irony is that these are the same people that tend to criticise Mahon for being a non-aviation judicial officer making some big calls in areas he knows little about. That may be so, but that is the nature of a Royal Commission. The Commissioner(s) need only take advice from specialists, which of course Mahon did.
The Judicial Committee went out of its way in praising Mahon's "painstaking" work and even stressed that the question as to cause was, in fact, not put before them. You can read the entire judgments of both the Court of Appeal at www.gutenberg.org (search for erebus) and I think you can access the Privy Council judgment online also. If you can't find the PC judgment, I will email it to you.
I have to say that your arguments have been impeccable thus far, but I do have to question your claim that the accident crew complied with none of the four points in the briefing paper. On the first point, there was no evidence to suggest that the visibility was less than 20KM, on the second point there was no evidence of any snow showers in the area, on the third point the aircraft was not equipped to receive azimuth signals from the TACAN, the only way they could have complied with this instruction would have been to use the INS (a task it was not set up to do, nor were the crew instructed in any way on ANY methods using the INS, the only possible method left was VMC, and this was what the crew were doing), and to the fourth point, the meaning of the requirement was only that descent be coordinated with the local radar controller. This was, in fact, taking place with the radar controller at "Ice Tower" through the "Mac Centre" controller on HF. Radar identification was not a requirement of the briefing condition, although there is no doubt that it should have been.
This leads me to an interesting question. Just what is a "VMC descent?" In New Zealand, the closest thing is a visual descent below MSA. The only way you can do that is by conducting a visual approach, or by radar. I agree that neither of these things applied to the accident flight, therefore I do not know what was going on there.
There should have been a clear cut prohibition on descents below 6000ft if that had been the intent of the briefing. That people who were there can argue about what the briefing said (or meant) attests to its complete failure to provide anything of the sort.
Briefings are supposed to assume that pilots are stupid. A safe system also assumes that pilots are stupid, and goes out of its way to help them discharge their responsibilities. In this case the system badly let down the captain and crew of this flight. You can argue all day about who carried the responsibility yada yada yada, but ultimately 257 people died because the captain was unable to outwit a stupid and flawed system that covertly obstructed him at every turn.
Last edited by deadhead; 29th Jan 2008 at 08:41.
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Round and round we go
Prospector said:
C’mon Prospector, you are starting to lose the plot. You can do better than that. Please try to back up your assertions with some evidence.
The privy council did not demolish any of Justice Mahon’s conclusions as to the cause of the accident.
Yes, the Privy council did uphold the Court of Appeal decision which set aside the costs order against the airline, on the grounds that Mahon had committed clear breaches of natural justice. They thought that the “organized litany of lies” went a bit too far.
However, the privy council appeal verdict did not overturn any of Justice Mahon’s conclusions as to who was to blame for the disaster.
The privy council said (my comment in brackets)
836
And
You may care to go back to #88 in the thread where I tried to explain this to you before in greater detail.
If you are so convinced Mahon was correct, how do you explain the following from the Privy Council???
In their judgment, delivered on 20 Oct 1983, the five Law Lords of the Privy Council dismissed the commissioners appeal and upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal decision, which set aside the costs order against the airline, on the grounds that Mahon had committed clear breaches of natural justice. They demolished his case item by item, including Exhibit 164 which they said could not "be understood by any experienced pilot to be used for the purpose of navigation", and went even further, saying there was no clear proof on which to base a finding that a plan of deception, led by the company chief executive had ever existed.
They demolished his case item by item, including Exhibit 164 which they said could not "be understood by any experienced pilot to be used for the purpose of navigation",
Surely that from the highest law court available should tell you something, but perhaps not.
In their judgment, delivered on 20 Oct 1983, the five Law Lords of the Privy Council dismissed the commissioners appeal and upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal decision, which set aside the costs order against the airline, on the grounds that Mahon had committed clear breaches of natural justice. They demolished his case item by item, including Exhibit 164 which they said could not "be understood by any experienced pilot to be used for the purpose of navigation", and went even further, saying there was no clear proof on which to base a finding that a plan of deception, led by the company chief executive had ever existed.
They demolished his case item by item, including Exhibit 164 which they said could not "be understood by any experienced pilot to be used for the purpose of navigation",
Surely that from the highest law court available should tell you something, but perhaps not.
The privy council did not demolish any of Justice Mahon’s conclusions as to the cause of the accident.
Yes, the Privy council did uphold the Court of Appeal decision which set aside the costs order against the airline, on the grounds that Mahon had committed clear breaches of natural justice. They thought that the “organized litany of lies” went a bit too far.
However, the privy council appeal verdict did not overturn any of Justice Mahon’s conclusions as to who was to blame for the disaster.
The privy council said (my comment in brackets)
836
The Royal Commission Report (Justice Mahon’s report) convincingly clears Captain Collins and First Officer Cassin of any suggestion that negligence on their part had in any way contributed to the disaster. That is unchallenged. (The conclusion of the Privy Council)
their Lordships have very reluctantly felt compelled to hold that, in the various respects to which their Lordships have referred, the judge failed to adhere to those rules of natural justice that are appropriate to an inquiry of the kind that he was conducting and that in consequence it was not open to him to make the finding that he did in paragraph 377 (the organized litany of lies bit) of his report.