Freedom Boeing 737 grounded
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The Captain's Chair
A great question Raw Data, and one which I'm not sure wasn't a leading one. 
In a past life I was a P3 driver: hence my nick; and while I can't say that I was in the 'natural' category, I did see enough of them around the traps to be able to try and model my command style on them.
I also saw a few Grey-boat skippers in action, and admired the way they were successfully able to delegate authority for action without losing overall command of the situation. All the ships I saw had a 'Captain's chair' from which the Captain would command his vessel: but from that chair he couldn't reach the helm or fire the ship's missiles or gun - he had a crew to do that: all he had to do was say so.
For the 'real-worlders' among us, the P3 is one of a small class of warfighting aircraft with a crew spanning more than one hand, or even two. Within that large complement rest a variety of personality types, personal motivations and circumstances. Given the overarching requirement to get the job done with the available resources, I firmly believe that we had to practise CRM in its full crew manifestation long before the rest of the aviation world had caught on - and no, I'm not gloating: as I said before, I'm no 'natural'.
What relevance to current discussion? It is my personal feeling that the command skills I learnt in my single-seat training do need a great deal of adaptation to a modern commercial cockpit. It is unfortunate, perhaps, that most if not all of my collegues share at least a little of my 'traditional' aviation background, even if they're from a GA or instructional background.
Where I'm coming from is that, given the proliferation of threats to flight safety which originate from outside the 'traditional' aviation environment - be they from customer service agents, corporate HR or wherever - perhaps the personality or behavioural type that needs to be cultivated in the modern aircraft commander is also somewhat distant from our traditional 'aviation' type.
We would, I think, identify with some moments of Top Gun, or Blackadderself - all good for a laugh; but I'd like to offer for the forum's consideration of CRM two other TV shows - both named Star Trek.
On my recurrent CRM days, which my airline to its credit conducts as a combined Tech/Cabin extravaganza, I highlight the difference in leadership and management styles between Captains Kirk and Picard, and ask with which one of the two the coursemembers would prefer to serve. The answer is unanimous; and with good reason.
From my perspective, Picard seems to implement those elements of successful command which I have seen in real life in the Grey-boat commanders, and in the 'naturals': namely the ability to exercise directive control while maintaining the big picture. Jean-Luc is not your 'root-em, shoot-em' type of commander that I feel much initial pilot training ends up breeding.
I do feel that the increasingly complex yet automated environment in which we work establishes an intellectual distance from the detail of the task at hand, but too often the measures put in place by airlines to address this issue are misguided, and attempt to remedy that distance in an effort to mitigate potential consequences, rather than accepting that the paradigm has changed, and that so must a commander's skill set.
Perhaps an example will illustrate that convoluted paragraph. We are all familiar with RNAV systems which incorporate their own error-trapping algorithms. These systems are sufficiently accurate that we can use them as sole means of navigation within particular pieces of airspace. Nevertheless, my airline still insists on conducting repeated checks of the system against raw data rather than an initial serviceability check against that raw data and thence monitoring the integrity of system's errortrapping.
What I'm trying to get at is that, irrespective of finer points of the navigation question, it seems apparent that the two approaches demand different operational mindsets and, in the event of things going awry, different error-trapping methodologies and command skills.
In summary, I believe that the Grey-boat-, Picard-type approach of oversight but not involvement is extemely applicable to today's and tomorrow's cockpits: it's just that we weren't brought up that way.
It's late over here and I'm off to bed. I'd like to be able to tie that all together a little better, but perhaps someone else will do that for me.
Best regards
FP
In a past life I was a P3 driver: hence my nick; and while I can't say that I was in the 'natural' category, I did see enough of them around the traps to be able to try and model my command style on them.
I also saw a few Grey-boat skippers in action, and admired the way they were successfully able to delegate authority for action without losing overall command of the situation. All the ships I saw had a 'Captain's chair' from which the Captain would command his vessel: but from that chair he couldn't reach the helm or fire the ship's missiles or gun - he had a crew to do that: all he had to do was say so.
For the 'real-worlders' among us, the P3 is one of a small class of warfighting aircraft with a crew spanning more than one hand, or even two. Within that large complement rest a variety of personality types, personal motivations and circumstances. Given the overarching requirement to get the job done with the available resources, I firmly believe that we had to practise CRM in its full crew manifestation long before the rest of the aviation world had caught on - and no, I'm not gloating: as I said before, I'm no 'natural'.
What relevance to current discussion? It is my personal feeling that the command skills I learnt in my single-seat training do need a great deal of adaptation to a modern commercial cockpit. It is unfortunate, perhaps, that most if not all of my collegues share at least a little of my 'traditional' aviation background, even if they're from a GA or instructional background.
Where I'm coming from is that, given the proliferation of threats to flight safety which originate from outside the 'traditional' aviation environment - be they from customer service agents, corporate HR or wherever - perhaps the personality or behavioural type that needs to be cultivated in the modern aircraft commander is also somewhat distant from our traditional 'aviation' type.
We would, I think, identify with some moments of Top Gun, or Blackadderself - all good for a laugh; but I'd like to offer for the forum's consideration of CRM two other TV shows - both named Star Trek.
On my recurrent CRM days, which my airline to its credit conducts as a combined Tech/Cabin extravaganza, I highlight the difference in leadership and management styles between Captains Kirk and Picard, and ask with which one of the two the coursemembers would prefer to serve. The answer is unanimous; and with good reason.
From my perspective, Picard seems to implement those elements of successful command which I have seen in real life in the Grey-boat commanders, and in the 'naturals': namely the ability to exercise directive control while maintaining the big picture. Jean-Luc is not your 'root-em, shoot-em' type of commander that I feel much initial pilot training ends up breeding.
I do feel that the increasingly complex yet automated environment in which we work establishes an intellectual distance from the detail of the task at hand, but too often the measures put in place by airlines to address this issue are misguided, and attempt to remedy that distance in an effort to mitigate potential consequences, rather than accepting that the paradigm has changed, and that so must a commander's skill set.
Perhaps an example will illustrate that convoluted paragraph. We are all familiar with RNAV systems which incorporate their own error-trapping algorithms. These systems are sufficiently accurate that we can use them as sole means of navigation within particular pieces of airspace. Nevertheless, my airline still insists on conducting repeated checks of the system against raw data rather than an initial serviceability check against that raw data and thence monitoring the integrity of system's errortrapping.
What I'm trying to get at is that, irrespective of finer points of the navigation question, it seems apparent that the two approaches demand different operational mindsets and, in the event of things going awry, different error-trapping methodologies and command skills.
In summary, I believe that the Grey-boat-, Picard-type approach of oversight but not involvement is extemely applicable to today's and tomorrow's cockpits: it's just that we weren't brought up that way.
It's late over here and I'm off to bed. I'd like to be able to tie that all together a little better, but perhaps someone else will do that for me.
Best regards
FP
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Raw Data
Your question is really good. In my view there are very great similarities - as some of the recent contributors have said - and great differences.
The reason I reacted sensitively to MOR was not because of ego, but because I am sensitive to the dangers in the belief that there is nothing to learn from people who are not in the aviation industry, and, even worse, that there is nothing sensible to be said about flying planes by people who don't fly planes. (I got my CPL and IR not because I was a pilot wannabe, but so that I could at least part way get past that). It is really pleasing to me to see that this thread is showing that there are more and more people who realise that these things are not so.
Let me give an example. I am currently working for a European national rail system where the challenge is to get more trains running on existing tracks without speed increases. The answer they are developing is a combination of GPS, computerised train control, and Eurofighter adapted HUD's in the cabs. This reverses 50 years of shifting towards the dream of 'automatic' driverless trains, back to placing most of the judgements with the driver.
In other words in this case increasingly sophisticated technologies are requiring INCREASES in driver skills and responsibilities. The railway company in this case is learning from aviation technology, but I believe that the human factors and competency challenges they are struggling with have a lot to offer to aviation safety.
In response to your main question - the things that cannot be transported across settings are such things as the inability to stop an aeroplane immediately you have a problem, the fact that when you stop a train or a truck there is always the risk of something going up your backside, and the slow response time of ships coupled with their inability to fly above the weather.
Where they are most similar is that basic human physiology and psychology is the same whatever sector you are in, that costs and operational pressures are always in tension with optimally safe practice, and that the emotional and the cultural always have startling ways of creating unintended consequences when new technolgies are introduced.
The trick in cross-sector learning is to apply the high level learnings and translate them into the specific industry context.
Your question is really good. In my view there are very great similarities - as some of the recent contributors have said - and great differences.
The reason I reacted sensitively to MOR was not because of ego, but because I am sensitive to the dangers in the belief that there is nothing to learn from people who are not in the aviation industry, and, even worse, that there is nothing sensible to be said about flying planes by people who don't fly planes. (I got my CPL and IR not because I was a pilot wannabe, but so that I could at least part way get past that). It is really pleasing to me to see that this thread is showing that there are more and more people who realise that these things are not so.
Let me give an example. I am currently working for a European national rail system where the challenge is to get more trains running on existing tracks without speed increases. The answer they are developing is a combination of GPS, computerised train control, and Eurofighter adapted HUD's in the cabs. This reverses 50 years of shifting towards the dream of 'automatic' driverless trains, back to placing most of the judgements with the driver.
In other words in this case increasingly sophisticated technologies are requiring INCREASES in driver skills and responsibilities. The railway company in this case is learning from aviation technology, but I believe that the human factors and competency challenges they are struggling with have a lot to offer to aviation safety.
In response to your main question - the things that cannot be transported across settings are such things as the inability to stop an aeroplane immediately you have a problem, the fact that when you stop a train or a truck there is always the risk of something going up your backside, and the slow response time of ships coupled with their inability to fly above the weather.
Where they are most similar is that basic human physiology and psychology is the same whatever sector you are in, that costs and operational pressures are always in tension with optimally safe practice, and that the emotional and the cultural always have startling ways of creating unintended consequences when new technolgies are introduced.
The trick in cross-sector learning is to apply the high level learnings and translate them into the specific industry context.
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Rongotai
Just for your info, in all the courses I have done on Human Factors/CRM, only one (of about seven) has been run by pilots. All the rest have been run by HF professionals or experts from other industries.
The rationale behind this is of course that people outside the industry tend not to come to the course with all the accumulated baggage of an airline pilot.
Personally I wouldn't have it any other way, which is why I was not being in any way insulting when I inferred that you may not be in the industry.
Having said that, non-industry folk don't always understand the nuances of the job, or some of the technical aspects, hence the long (and pointless, it seems) post on FDR/CVR and SOP's.
Right, back to Mt Panorama...
Just for your info, in all the courses I have done on Human Factors/CRM, only one (of about seven) has been run by pilots. All the rest have been run by HF professionals or experts from other industries.
The rationale behind this is of course that people outside the industry tend not to come to the course with all the accumulated baggage of an airline pilot.
Personally I wouldn't have it any other way, which is why I was not being in any way insulting when I inferred that you may not be in the industry.
Having said that, non-industry folk don't always understand the nuances of the job, or some of the technical aspects, hence the long (and pointless, it seems) post on FDR/CVR and SOP's.
Right, back to Mt Panorama...
Having operated internationally for some years especially in Asia, many difficult and problem airports with poorly defined or confusing markings spring readily to mind. Delhi in India and SUB in Indonesia are obvious candidates.
But strangely enough, some of the most difficult airports are situated in the Western world. These include airports such as the taxiways in the backblocks of LAX and SFO with shocking taxy markings, restricted manouevre room and poor wingtip clearance. Even a modern airport such as Narita is a confusing nightmare day or night trying to get to or from the new parallel runway.
So when I hear of an incident like this, I pose myself the question; “What are the possible range of factors that can give rise to the type of visual illusion that will cause a highly experienced Captain and his qualified copilot to depart the high-stressed paved surface during taxying?”
Was the edge correctly marked with blue lights, double yellows etc? Were the yellow markings actually visible against the light coloured concrete surface when illuminated with a taxi light. Was the taxi light turned off to prevent blinding an aircraft approaching touchdown?
Perhaps the results of this investigation will be rather "illuminating" to some of the posters.
I still get chills thinking about the factors and visual illusion which caused an experienced crew of three in a Singapore Airlines B747 attempt a takeoff on a very poorly marked taxiway which used to be Runway 05R in TPE with tragic consequences.
A quick look at CASA
http://www.casa.gov.au/avreg/rules/d...A/Chap11_2.pdf
Taxiway edge markers and markings
8.11 Taxiway edge markers and markings are provided to show pilots the edges of taxiways where they might not otherwise be visually clear.
8.12 Taxiway edge markers are to be provided at the edges of unpaved taxiways or graded taxiway strips, where necessary. Where provided, they are to comprise yellow cone markers secured to the ground.
8.13 For sealed taxiways, where the edges are not visually evident, yellow lines consisting of two continuous 0.15m wide lines, spaced 0.15m apart and located at the taxiway edge as shown in Fig 11.21 should be used. The edge of graded taxiway strips should be marked by yellow cone markers.
But strangely enough, some of the most difficult airports are situated in the Western world. These include airports such as the taxiways in the backblocks of LAX and SFO with shocking taxy markings, restricted manouevre room and poor wingtip clearance. Even a modern airport such as Narita is a confusing nightmare day or night trying to get to or from the new parallel runway.
So when I hear of an incident like this, I pose myself the question; “What are the possible range of factors that can give rise to the type of visual illusion that will cause a highly experienced Captain and his qualified copilot to depart the high-stressed paved surface during taxying?”
Was the edge correctly marked with blue lights, double yellows etc? Were the yellow markings actually visible against the light coloured concrete surface when illuminated with a taxi light. Was the taxi light turned off to prevent blinding an aircraft approaching touchdown?
Perhaps the results of this investigation will be rather "illuminating" to some of the posters.
I still get chills thinking about the factors and visual illusion which caused an experienced crew of three in a Singapore Airlines B747 attempt a takeoff on a very poorly marked taxiway which used to be Runway 05R in TPE with tragic consequences.
A quick look at CASA
http://www.casa.gov.au/avreg/rules/d...A/Chap11_2.pdf
Taxiway edge markers and markings
8.11 Taxiway edge markers and markings are provided to show pilots the edges of taxiways where they might not otherwise be visually clear.
8.12 Taxiway edge markers are to be provided at the edges of unpaved taxiways or graded taxiway strips, where necessary. Where provided, they are to comprise yellow cone markers secured to the ground.
8.13 For sealed taxiways, where the edges are not visually evident, yellow lines consisting of two continuous 0.15m wide lines, spaced 0.15m apart and located at the taxiway edge as shown in Fig 11.21 should be used. The edge of graded taxiway strips should be marked by yellow cone markers.
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MOR
Quite agree about the nuances of the job. People like me thinking they know it all are just as dangerous as pilots who think they know it all (because we work at the level of the whole system).
The very best are those who are professional pilots and are also trained at the generic safety systems level - the best in the world in my view is the Chief Pilot of Aer Lingus.
Flexible Response.
" I pose myself the question; “What are the possible range of factors that can give rise to the type of visual illusion that will cause a highly experienced Captain and his qualified copilot to depart the high-stressed paved surface during taxying?”
If everyone in the industry asked themselves questions phrased like that first, then the whole industry would be a learning one, and one way we would know it would be that flame wars such as broke out earlier in this thread would not occur on professional discussion forums.
Quite agree about the nuances of the job. People like me thinking they know it all are just as dangerous as pilots who think they know it all (because we work at the level of the whole system).
The very best are those who are professional pilots and are also trained at the generic safety systems level - the best in the world in my view is the Chief Pilot of Aer Lingus.
Flexible Response.
" I pose myself the question; “What are the possible range of factors that can give rise to the type of visual illusion that will cause a highly experienced Captain and his qualified copilot to depart the high-stressed paved surface during taxying?”
If everyone in the industry asked themselves questions phrased like that first, then the whole industry would be a learning one, and one way we would know it would be that flame wars such as broke out earlier in this thread would not occur on professional discussion forums.
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reminds me of the example when you get new tarmac (or road) and they black out the old lines after painting the new lines;
at night and in the wet the old blacked out lines are usually more prominent than the new ones.
at night and in the wet the old blacked out lines are usually more prominent than the new ones.
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flame wars such as broke out earlier in this thread
My other observation would be that there are two different realities at work here. It may well be that the Flight Safety Officer, the Fleet Manager, and the Chief Training Captain all simply want to get to the cause and learn the lesson; but other senior managers in the company, perhaps more aware of the damage done to the reputation and bottom line of the company, will be screaming for blood. Often, even in relatively enlightened airlines, there will be a call for somebodies' head. I've seen it happen way too often.
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So MOR;
It must be time now for that thread we talked about earlier on how we might work out an industry system that deals equitably with the two seemingly opposing realities consequences of an action based on a line of yours which rang out of the rest of the stuff on this thread, well for me anyway.
IMHO the seemingly opposing realities handled correctly are in fact the same and it should be possible for them to be resolved without the neccesity for him/her to be publicly disembowelled.
It's so messy and their blood on the walls and floor really doesn't settle the punters down any time soon.
Prod nudge push
My other observation would be that there are two different realities at work here. It may well be that the Flight Safety Officer, the Fleet Manager, and the Chief Training Captain all simply want to get to the cause and learn the lesson; but other senior managers in the company, perhaps more aware of the damage done to the reputation and bottom line of the company, will be screaming for blood. Often, even in relatively enlightened airlines, there will be a call for somebodies' head. I've seen it happen way too often.
It must be time now for that thread we talked about earlier on how we might work out an industry system that deals equitably with the two seemingly opposing realities consequences of an action based on a line of yours which rang out of the rest of the stuff on this thread, well for me anyway.
Sometimes, the responsibility of being the captain involves simply raising your hand and saying "I screwed up".
It's so messy and their blood on the walls and floor really doesn't settle the punters down any time soon.
Prod nudge push
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Now that you've all got that out...
I actually spoke to a few of the crew from that flight in the elevator in the hotel that night. Would anyone like to know what was said?
Hmmmm?????
Hmmmm?????
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Woomera/MOR
Your latest interchage brings the discussion to the point that I think is most significant.
We design safety enhancing processes that are designed around some abstract and idealised propositions such as:
The captain has the ultimate responsibility and is in command
The FO will challenge the captain when he doesn't follow the manual
We will put our mistakes on the table for discussion so we can all learn from them
... and these get operationalised in real life situations such as....
Here is an Asian airline flight deck with an expat captain and a local FO, and they both have the worst possible general attitudes towards each other
This captain has ways of humiliating FOs who piss him off
The company screams for blood if anyone makes a mistake
The most global of these is the fiction that the flight crew can make safety stimulated decisions that have commerical consequences for their employers without there being any personal penalty, and that even if there were personal penalties flight crew will always put safety considerations above everything else when making operational decisions.
In my view we have got to the point in technology and personnel training where in the future large investments will produce small safety gains. I believe that we will find the best future safety gains by concentrating on the socio part of socio-technical systems, on organisational and flight deck cultures, and on management practices. And I further believe that one of the best ways to do this is to do a better of job openly discussing the operational implications of the inevitability of safety-commercial trade offs, and to stop pretending that flight crews are TRULY totally in charge of whether the flight goes or stays in all circumstances.
Your latest interchage brings the discussion to the point that I think is most significant.
We design safety enhancing processes that are designed around some abstract and idealised propositions such as:
The captain has the ultimate responsibility and is in command
The FO will challenge the captain when he doesn't follow the manual
We will put our mistakes on the table for discussion so we can all learn from them
... and these get operationalised in real life situations such as....
Here is an Asian airline flight deck with an expat captain and a local FO, and they both have the worst possible general attitudes towards each other
This captain has ways of humiliating FOs who piss him off
The company screams for blood if anyone makes a mistake
The most global of these is the fiction that the flight crew can make safety stimulated decisions that have commerical consequences for their employers without there being any personal penalty, and that even if there were personal penalties flight crew will always put safety considerations above everything else when making operational decisions.
In my view we have got to the point in technology and personnel training where in the future large investments will produce small safety gains. I believe that we will find the best future safety gains by concentrating on the socio part of socio-technical systems, on organisational and flight deck cultures, and on management practices. And I further believe that one of the best ways to do this is to do a better of job openly discussing the operational implications of the inevitability of safety-commercial trade offs, and to stop pretending that flight crews are TRULY totally in charge of whether the flight goes or stays in all circumstances.
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Rongotai
"some abstract and idealised propositions such as:
The captain has the ultimate responsibility and is in command"...
Whilst I'd be happy to agree that the other propositions are abstract, the role of the captain is enshrined in legislation, and can therefore be treated a little differently. I know from experience, when refusing to take an aircraft into what I considered to be dangerous weather conditions, that I had to seriously consider the consequences of that decision on the future eating habits of my family. I knew I had the right to say no, and I also knew I'd almost certainly win the ensuing disciplinary hearing - or, if it came to it, the Unfair Dismissal Tribunal. However, I also knew that ultimately the airline management would win the war, no matter how many battles I might win.
This brings to light the frequent duplicitousness of airline managements. In the (UK) airline alluded to above, we had been told during our conversion courses that we had the "clear and unambiguous right to say "no" if we felt the situation warranted" - pause - "-but don't you bl**dy well try it!"
To me, this is the nub of the problem. The innate behaviour of most airline managements is to agree that regulation is a good thing, that an open reporting system with no penalties is necessary, and that learning is the key - and then do everything in their power to subvert those processes. Pilots understandably then stop using the processes.
So, yes, you are correct about safety-commercial trade-offs, but I am not sure how that problem can ever be fixed. Airlines will think commercially, (most) pilots will think safety - mainly because they will probably be the first to die if a miscalculation is made.
I personally believe that any commercial trade-offs required in the pilots' decision-making process will untimately degrade safety. I also believe that in many cases, the pilot is the only one in a position to make critical safety decisions - which is why pilots are trained as they are, and why we don't have monkeys flying the aircraft.
On the flip side, you do have pilots who can be excessively cautious, or have another motivation for refusing a flight, and this can be enough to alter the fine authority balance between pilots and management.
Anyway, it seems to me you are now dealing with the very basic core of human nature. As we have seen with a variety of professional bodies over the years, self-regulation rarely works 100% of the time, and adherence to a rigid safety culture by an airline management is equally dubious - not because there is necessarily an intent to stray from the rules - but because humans are fallible.
I'm not sure all the preceding is very well written, but I don't have time to do it again - so my apologies if the thinking appears a little twisted.
One last thing - the day that I lose the authority to make safety decisions in the flight deck - in other words, if I were to become aware that I was not "TRULY totally in charge of whether the flight goes or stays in all circumstances" - will be the day I jack it in and do something else.
Once in my career, I let myself get talked into going off to Bergen in Norway on a particularly crappy day. It was early, and no reports were available from Bergen - but the forecast was horrible. We were in a 50 seat turboprop, and by the time we got to our PNR (Point of No Return), we were still unable to get the weather reports from Norway. I had only been in the company a few months, and had been told by a senior manager that if I wanted to stay employed, I had better bl**dy well get on with it.
So I found myself over the North Sea in the middle of winter, the sun had yet to rise, and we were in moderate icing. By the time we got within VHF range of Norway, we discovered that our destination and all three of our alternates were technically unusable due to excessive crosswinds. Well, we couldn't go back, so we just had to choose the best one and have a go. We chose Bergen, made the approach in a gusting 60 kt crosswind. We had a 50 degree crab angle on down the approach. I really had no idea whether I would ever see my family again. My F/O - also new to the company and the aircraft - was white with fear and totally unable to function. The turbulence was severe and the cloud very low.
Anyway, to cut a long story short, I got in onto the ground, managed to stop it leaving the runway, and eventually slid to a halt right on the edge. It was all done completely on instinct. I hate to think what my heart rate was, but it has never been as high before or since. We were very, very lucky.
After that, I vowed never again to let myself be influenced by management when it comes to any safety-related decision. You can only have one person in charge in the cockpit.
That's what I reckon; open to discussion...
"some abstract and idealised propositions such as:
The captain has the ultimate responsibility and is in command"...
Whilst I'd be happy to agree that the other propositions are abstract, the role of the captain is enshrined in legislation, and can therefore be treated a little differently. I know from experience, when refusing to take an aircraft into what I considered to be dangerous weather conditions, that I had to seriously consider the consequences of that decision on the future eating habits of my family. I knew I had the right to say no, and I also knew I'd almost certainly win the ensuing disciplinary hearing - or, if it came to it, the Unfair Dismissal Tribunal. However, I also knew that ultimately the airline management would win the war, no matter how many battles I might win.
This brings to light the frequent duplicitousness of airline managements. In the (UK) airline alluded to above, we had been told during our conversion courses that we had the "clear and unambiguous right to say "no" if we felt the situation warranted" - pause - "-but don't you bl**dy well try it!"
To me, this is the nub of the problem. The innate behaviour of most airline managements is to agree that regulation is a good thing, that an open reporting system with no penalties is necessary, and that learning is the key - and then do everything in their power to subvert those processes. Pilots understandably then stop using the processes.
So, yes, you are correct about safety-commercial trade-offs, but I am not sure how that problem can ever be fixed. Airlines will think commercially, (most) pilots will think safety - mainly because they will probably be the first to die if a miscalculation is made.
I personally believe that any commercial trade-offs required in the pilots' decision-making process will untimately degrade safety. I also believe that in many cases, the pilot is the only one in a position to make critical safety decisions - which is why pilots are trained as they are, and why we don't have monkeys flying the aircraft.
On the flip side, you do have pilots who can be excessively cautious, or have another motivation for refusing a flight, and this can be enough to alter the fine authority balance between pilots and management.
Anyway, it seems to me you are now dealing with the very basic core of human nature. As we have seen with a variety of professional bodies over the years, self-regulation rarely works 100% of the time, and adherence to a rigid safety culture by an airline management is equally dubious - not because there is necessarily an intent to stray from the rules - but because humans are fallible.
I'm not sure all the preceding is very well written, but I don't have time to do it again - so my apologies if the thinking appears a little twisted.
One last thing - the day that I lose the authority to make safety decisions in the flight deck - in other words, if I were to become aware that I was not "TRULY totally in charge of whether the flight goes or stays in all circumstances" - will be the day I jack it in and do something else.
Once in my career, I let myself get talked into going off to Bergen in Norway on a particularly crappy day. It was early, and no reports were available from Bergen - but the forecast was horrible. We were in a 50 seat turboprop, and by the time we got to our PNR (Point of No Return), we were still unable to get the weather reports from Norway. I had only been in the company a few months, and had been told by a senior manager that if I wanted to stay employed, I had better bl**dy well get on with it.
So I found myself over the North Sea in the middle of winter, the sun had yet to rise, and we were in moderate icing. By the time we got within VHF range of Norway, we discovered that our destination and all three of our alternates were technically unusable due to excessive crosswinds. Well, we couldn't go back, so we just had to choose the best one and have a go. We chose Bergen, made the approach in a gusting 60 kt crosswind. We had a 50 degree crab angle on down the approach. I really had no idea whether I would ever see my family again. My F/O - also new to the company and the aircraft - was white with fear and totally unable to function. The turbulence was severe and the cloud very low.
Anyway, to cut a long story short, I got in onto the ground, managed to stop it leaving the runway, and eventually slid to a halt right on the edge. It was all done completely on instinct. I hate to think what my heart rate was, but it has never been as high before or since. We were very, very lucky.
After that, I vowed never again to let myself be influenced by management when it comes to any safety-related decision. You can only have one person in charge in the cockpit.
That's what I reckon; open to discussion...
It's not only Pilots who have this problem. Large companies do it too, the most specatcular being an oil company by the name of Esso (its all right the details are in the Longford court records).
The procedure is pretty simple, they have reams and reams of SOP's you are supposed to comply with, and they make it very clear that as the supervising engineer, it is YOUR responsibility and you have the authority. The only problem is that they never give you the resources to comply, and they reward cost cutting. The result is that you are encouraged to go along with the deciept in the hope you will be posted before anything bad happens.
And when something bad does happen, as it eventually does, they blame the engineer/pilot/operator for non compliance with company procedures.
When I sussed this out thirty years ago, I left Esso and went and joined Ansett, they had a safety culture way back then and even a slightly paranoid chief inspector to keep the pressure on.
Of course when the Longford oil terminal blew up, Esso acted true to type and blamed the plant operators. It took a royal commission to finally discover Esso's total responsibility.
The procedure is pretty simple, they have reams and reams of SOP's you are supposed to comply with, and they make it very clear that as the supervising engineer, it is YOUR responsibility and you have the authority. The only problem is that they never give you the resources to comply, and they reward cost cutting. The result is that you are encouraged to go along with the deciept in the hope you will be posted before anything bad happens.
And when something bad does happen, as it eventually does, they blame the engineer/pilot/operator for non compliance with company procedures.
When I sussed this out thirty years ago, I left Esso and went and joined Ansett, they had a safety culture way back then and even a slightly paranoid chief inspector to keep the pressure on.
Of course when the Longford oil terminal blew up, Esso acted true to type and blamed the plant operators. It took a royal commission to finally discover Esso's total responsibility.
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MOR
Yes, I agree with your analysis - except that you yourself make my point that while the legislation may be unambiguous, the operational reality IS ambiguous.
My central point is that in the professional discussion of safety we should not pretend otherwise. People operate more safely when they have openly confronted and thought about the actual tensions that impact on their decision making.
Now I am off to spend 28 hours on assorted airliners. The fact that I do so without any qualms whatsoever tells you of my basic faith in you guys. The more I learn about the inside the more confident I become. Driving to the airport is another matter entirely........
I have enjoyed this debate. You will note that I have been registered here for a long time, but only burst forth occasionally. I do believe that these forums are primarily for you professionals, so I only contribute when I think I have a real contribution to make.
Yes, I agree with your analysis - except that you yourself make my point that while the legislation may be unambiguous, the operational reality IS ambiguous.
My central point is that in the professional discussion of safety we should not pretend otherwise. People operate more safely when they have openly confronted and thought about the actual tensions that impact on their decision making.
Now I am off to spend 28 hours on assorted airliners. The fact that I do so without any qualms whatsoever tells you of my basic faith in you guys. The more I learn about the inside the more confident I become. Driving to the airport is another matter entirely........
I have enjoyed this debate. You will note that I have been registered here for a long time, but only burst forth occasionally. I do believe that these forums are primarily for you professionals, so I only contribute when I think I have a real contribution to make.
Moderate, Modest & Mild.
This has been an interesting discussion to date, and as evidenced by several posts, many are all too quick to jump on the crew and blame them.
In many cases the crew ARE that final net that can prevent an incident or accident, however there may also be other circumstances that contribute heavily to the cause.
I'd like to share an experience I encountered many years ago, however I am going to feed you the incident details as they unfolded, allowing some discussion between events.
What might at first seem like an quick open and shut case was, in fact, not.
I telephoned Ansett Crewing on a wet, cloudy early morning in Brisbane, to ask whether my flights had been changed, due to the previous night's heavy rain, low cloud, and misty conditions in BNE, and reports of several flight cancellations and diversions.
After a brief chat, the Crewing Officer - Geoff, John, Murph, Dick, Floyd or Holtie - commented that he "was looking at a very interesting sight....a twin-engined turbo prop, that had run off the taxiway and down into the storm water drain."
Following a series of phone calls, I finally located the pilot - who by this time was back at home. I called her, and asked her if she felt she would like any assistance I might be able to offer her, using the resources of the AFAP.
She replied that she would.
On arriving at her house, she described how she had been taxi-ing the aircraft (a Cessna Conquest, from memory) late the previous night trying to follow the taxiway lights and markings, whilst continually having to use a cloth to wipe the fog from the interior of the windscreen.
Her visibility this night was impaired not only by the external rain, mist, and fog, but also internally because of the fogging of the windscreen.
All taxi way lights were serviceable.
During the taxiing, she dropped the cloth, leaned down to pick it up, and suddenly found the aircraft running downhill into the stormwater drain.
She had not yet (thankfully) submitted an Incident Report (the old 225).
Management wanted her immediate termination, and had told her she was to see them the following day.
Comments please.
In many cases the crew ARE that final net that can prevent an incident or accident, however there may also be other circumstances that contribute heavily to the cause.
I'd like to share an experience I encountered many years ago, however I am going to feed you the incident details as they unfolded, allowing some discussion between events.
What might at first seem like an quick open and shut case was, in fact, not.
I telephoned Ansett Crewing on a wet, cloudy early morning in Brisbane, to ask whether my flights had been changed, due to the previous night's heavy rain, low cloud, and misty conditions in BNE, and reports of several flight cancellations and diversions.
After a brief chat, the Crewing Officer - Geoff, John, Murph, Dick, Floyd or Holtie - commented that he "was looking at a very interesting sight....a twin-engined turbo prop, that had run off the taxiway and down into the storm water drain."
Following a series of phone calls, I finally located the pilot - who by this time was back at home. I called her, and asked her if she felt she would like any assistance I might be able to offer her, using the resources of the AFAP.
She replied that she would.
On arriving at her house, she described how she had been taxi-ing the aircraft (a Cessna Conquest, from memory) late the previous night trying to follow the taxiway lights and markings, whilst continually having to use a cloth to wipe the fog from the interior of the windscreen.
Her visibility this night was impaired not only by the external rain, mist, and fog, but also internally because of the fogging of the windscreen.
All taxi way lights were serviceable.
During the taxiing, she dropped the cloth, leaned down to pick it up, and suddenly found the aircraft running downhill into the stormwater drain.
She had not yet (thankfully) submitted an Incident Report (the old 225).
Management wanted her immediate termination, and had told her she was to see them the following day.
Comments please.
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From the Koru Club.
Nice problem.
1. Dropping the cloth and trying to pick it up while moving is a training issue regardless of the circumstances.
Whether it is a termination issue depends on a hell of a lot of variables:
2. Had she been put any pressure to operate the flight against her own objections?
3. I'm assuming you are describing a single pilot operation. But was it planned as single pilot, or did some last minute problem turn it into one?
4. What was her experience of single pilot operations in poor weather? What was her experience of the Conquest? If experience of a/c and/or conditions and/or single pilot ops were limited what were the circumstances under which her employer despatched the flight?
5. Was the windscreen fogging because of an equipment falure? If so was it known or unknown prior to starting up? Were there any other equipment failures known in advance or not - such as with nosewheel steering?
6. Apart from any of the above had there been any other disputes or problems during the pre-flight period?
7. How long had she been on duty at the time of the incident? Had she exceded her duty hours?
8. Had she any record of mistakes or lapses of a similar nature?
9. Were there any other reports of similar incidents at that point of the taxiway in any conditions? Why was the aircraft running DOWNHILL into the drain?
10. Were there any personal reasons why her employer would want to default to termination without investigation?
11. Was Ansett still flying at the time? If not, why not?
From the Koru Club.
Nice problem.
1. Dropping the cloth and trying to pick it up while moving is a training issue regardless of the circumstances.
Whether it is a termination issue depends on a hell of a lot of variables:
2. Had she been put any pressure to operate the flight against her own objections?
3. I'm assuming you are describing a single pilot operation. But was it planned as single pilot, or did some last minute problem turn it into one?
4. What was her experience of single pilot operations in poor weather? What was her experience of the Conquest? If experience of a/c and/or conditions and/or single pilot ops were limited what were the circumstances under which her employer despatched the flight?
5. Was the windscreen fogging because of an equipment falure? If so was it known or unknown prior to starting up? Were there any other equipment failures known in advance or not - such as with nosewheel steering?
6. Apart from any of the above had there been any other disputes or problems during the pre-flight period?
7. How long had she been on duty at the time of the incident? Had she exceded her duty hours?
8. Had she any record of mistakes or lapses of a similar nature?
9. Were there any other reports of similar incidents at that point of the taxiway in any conditions? Why was the aircraft running DOWNHILL into the drain?
10. Were there any personal reasons why her employer would want to default to termination without investigation?
11. Was Ansett still flying at the time? If not, why not?
Moderate, Modest & Mild.
So as not to keep you in suspenders 
for too long, Rongotai, I'll answer those Q's as accurately as I can.
1. Dropping the cloth probably wasn't a problem - obviously the recovery of it was a major contributory factor.
2. No, she was under no pressure to operate this flight.
3. Yes, it was planned as a single pilot operation.
4. She had several thousand hours as a m/e ifr pilot, and from memory in excess of several hundred on the Conquest.
5. You're getting warm.
It was not until I went out to see the Chief Pilot, and started "digging" that the following came to light.The fogging on the aircraft (and again I want to cover myself here by saying I think it was a Cessna Conquest) was a known problem, and an AD had been issued stating that a demister had to be fitted, however as they were in short supply, this one was not.
Further investigation revealed that the (2) owners of the company had, in fact, received the part, but had then re-sold it to another operator for a handsome profit!
There were no other known equipment failures.
6. Immediately pre-flight, there were no other disputes or problems.
7. It had been quite a long duty day, however she was within limits.
8. No, no other similar problems.
9. There were no NOTAMS issued indicating any problems on that particular section of the taxiway. Plans obtained indicated that all taxiway lighting had been installed in accordance with the requirements, eg. spacing, colour, geometrical range of visibility. A visual check ( ride in the yellow car) confirmed that all lights were servicable.
The ground falls away at a gentle slope from the sealed section of the taxiway to the drains.
10. Hmmm. The Chief Pilot indicated that she had cooked an engine several weeks prior to that, and that she was being "watched". At the meeting the following morning, the owners also raised this issue, so imho my opinion would be to reply "Yes" to your question.
11. Yes, normal services had resumed by this time.
for too long, Rongotai, I'll answer those Q's as accurately as I can.1. Dropping the cloth probably wasn't a problem - obviously the recovery of it was a major contributory factor.
2. No, she was under no pressure to operate this flight.
3. Yes, it was planned as a single pilot operation.
4. She had several thousand hours as a m/e ifr pilot, and from memory in excess of several hundred on the Conquest.
5. You're getting warm.
It was not until I went out to see the Chief Pilot, and started "digging" that the following came to light.The fogging on the aircraft (and again I want to cover myself here by saying I think it was a Cessna Conquest) was a known problem, and an AD had been issued stating that a demister had to be fitted, however as they were in short supply, this one was not.
Further investigation revealed that the (2) owners of the company had, in fact, received the part, but had then re-sold it to another operator for a handsome profit!
There were no other known equipment failures.
6. Immediately pre-flight, there were no other disputes or problems.
7. It had been quite a long duty day, however she was within limits.
8. No, no other similar problems.
9. There were no NOTAMS issued indicating any problems on that particular section of the taxiway. Plans obtained indicated that all taxiway lighting had been installed in accordance with the requirements, eg. spacing, colour, geometrical range of visibility. A visual check ( ride in the yellow car) confirmed that all lights were servicable.
The ground falls away at a gentle slope from the sealed section of the taxiway to the drains.
10. Hmmm. The Chief Pilot indicated that she had cooked an engine several weeks prior to that, and that she was being "watched". At the meeting the following morning, the owners also raised this issue, so imho my opinion would be to reply "Yes" to your question.
11. Yes, normal services had resumed by this time.
I think we can all agree that when you can’t see where you are going, it’s completely obvious that you will need to call for help in the form of a “follow-me” or a tow.
But it’s when you think you can see where you are going but can’t, that is a whole new ball game.
But it’s when you think you can see where you are going but can’t, that is a whole new ball game.
(Sigh) Even I think I know the answer to this one!
Silver, I think the point of this thread is that the crew were rational human beings who were lured in some way into error. We are waiting for the report to find out how.
"If you cant see the taxiway lines you stop! Endex." - what if they thought they could see them?
"Stick to the lines (it keeps you safe from the lawyers).....if you cant, then STOP. (and you'll live to fight another day)." - what if they thought they were sticking to the lines?
"Folks its a no brainer" - remind me never to fly with pilots who think that something is a no brainer.
Silver, I think the point of this thread is that the crew were rational human beings who were lured in some way into error. We are waiting for the report to find out how.
"If you cant see the taxiway lines you stop! Endex." - what if they thought they could see them?
"Stick to the lines (it keeps you safe from the lawyers).....if you cant, then STOP. (and you'll live to fight another day)." - what if they thought they were sticking to the lines?
"Folks its a no brainer" - remind me never to fly with pilots who think that something is a no brainer.
Moderate, Modest & Mild.
There's a lot of "ruly good advoice" coming from people who have yet to make the grade, methinks.
It is so easy to "can" these guys, when one possesses such Superior Intellect and Knowledge - but is that Superior Intellect and Knowlege...and experience..enough to gain you a CHANCE to have a go at getting either of the seats that these 2 pilots are QUALIFIED to sit in?
For the professional pilots reading this, you will understand the "culling" process that each of these pilots had had to endure to get to where he is.
To the "amateurs" - the PPL'ers, and leisure CPL'ers - your input is welcome.
But without trying to p!55 in anyone's pocket...to get to where these 2 guys are now, has taken a HELLUVA LOT of blood, sweat & tears.
And many a good man failed, where these 2 did NOT!!
Not EVERY pilot who starts training, with the objective of achieving airlines is successful, regardless of enthusiasm, academic knowledge, wealth, birthright, or belief in oneself.
The hurdles and obstacles are many, and varied, and the course strewn with failures...paved with failures.
So for all of you so quick to condemn, think of precisely WHAT this crew had to achieve, to get to where they now are.
And then ask yourself, "Am I REALLY qualified to pass judgement? Is it possible that I might have - and COULD in the future - make the same/similar mistake?"
The answer is a "no brainer"!!
It is so easy to "can" these guys, when one possesses such Superior Intellect and Knowledge - but is that Superior Intellect and Knowlege...and experience..enough to gain you a CHANCE to have a go at getting either of the seats that these 2 pilots are QUALIFIED to sit in?
For the professional pilots reading this, you will understand the "culling" process that each of these pilots had had to endure to get to where he is.
To the "amateurs" - the PPL'ers, and leisure CPL'ers - your input is welcome.
But without trying to p!55 in anyone's pocket...to get to where these 2 guys are now, has taken a HELLUVA LOT of blood, sweat & tears.
And many a good man failed, where these 2 did NOT!!
Not EVERY pilot who starts training, with the objective of achieving airlines is successful, regardless of enthusiasm, academic knowledge, wealth, birthright, or belief in oneself.
The hurdles and obstacles are many, and varied, and the course strewn with failures...paved with failures.
So for all of you so quick to condemn, think of precisely WHAT this crew had to achieve, to get to where they now are.
And then ask yourself, "Am I REALLY qualified to pass judgement? Is it possible that I might have - and COULD in the future - make the same/similar mistake?"
The answer is a "no brainer"!!
