NAS - This might be of interest to all of you.
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NAS - This might be of interest to all of you.
"For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled."
This is the last sentence of Richard Feynemans excellent dissenting report into the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster.
I respectfully suggest that this report is worth reading in the context of the NAS system.
http://www.ralentz.com/old/space/feynman-report.html
Richard makes the point that the use of statistics by managers can cause error - because managers and technologists can be caught by the logical error that just because something has not occurred YET, then as time goes on it is less likely to occur.
In the case of Challenger, it was the O-Ring seals in the solid rocket boosters that failed, causing hot gas to escape and ultimately failure of the booster and spacecraft. These seals had eroded on previous missions, but had never actually eroded enough to cause failure until the Challenger Disaster. The mistake that NASA managers made was to assume that because complete failure had not occurred in previous missions, then it would never occur.
I think this is worth remembering in the context of the NAS debate by all parties connected with it.
I have skimmed Prof. O'Niells report. I have not read the NAS risk assessment document, but I am sufficiently disturbed at the methodologies apparently used by BOTH sides in this debate to post a hopefully helpful link to Richard Feynemans brilliant observations on the use and misuse of statistics.
To put it another way, I think safety is too important to be a political football. I do not wish to wake up one morning to very bad news, followed by a public enquiry that establishes that the risks involved in NAS were understated.
In addition, in my past professional life risk managment was a tool that is used to compute the cost and probability of accidents as a means of calculating the amount that should be invested in preventing said accidents. I am not sure what is today decided to be an "acceptable" risk, but I would believe it used to be in the order of 4,000,000 to one.
I therefore ask if the monetary consequences of a major collision are outwieghed by the savings that may occur under a changed system, on a discounted cash flow basis?
This is the last sentence of Richard Feynemans excellent dissenting report into the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster.
I respectfully suggest that this report is worth reading in the context of the NAS system.
http://www.ralentz.com/old/space/feynman-report.html
Richard makes the point that the use of statistics by managers can cause error - because managers and technologists can be caught by the logical error that just because something has not occurred YET, then as time goes on it is less likely to occur.
In the case of Challenger, it was the O-Ring seals in the solid rocket boosters that failed, causing hot gas to escape and ultimately failure of the booster and spacecraft. These seals had eroded on previous missions, but had never actually eroded enough to cause failure until the Challenger Disaster. The mistake that NASA managers made was to assume that because complete failure had not occurred in previous missions, then it would never occur.
I think this is worth remembering in the context of the NAS debate by all parties connected with it.
I have skimmed Prof. O'Niells report. I have not read the NAS risk assessment document, but I am sufficiently disturbed at the methodologies apparently used by BOTH sides in this debate to post a hopefully helpful link to Richard Feynemans brilliant observations on the use and misuse of statistics.
To put it another way, I think safety is too important to be a political football. I do not wish to wake up one morning to very bad news, followed by a public enquiry that establishes that the risks involved in NAS were understated.
In addition, in my past professional life risk managment was a tool that is used to compute the cost and probability of accidents as a means of calculating the amount that should be invested in preventing said accidents. I am not sure what is today decided to be an "acceptable" risk, but I would believe it used to be in the order of 4,000,000 to one.
I therefore ask if the monetary consequences of a major collision are outwieghed by the savings that may occur under a changed system, on a discounted cash flow basis?
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Sunfish
Please accept my humble apologies for it seems, attempting to teach you to suck eggs in relation to DNV type metrics as it appears you are well aquainted with the concept.
You have hit the nail on the very head of the issue.
If you had been around and forgive me if you have, since about Day 1, that has been the very nub of the issue, with the lack of any formal analysis in its implementation beyond being defended on " it works there, so it must work here" and "I believes" by the proponents.
The independently produced to protect their corporate backsides, as they should, Broome DAS was the seminal document.
It is a long time since I did serious stats and I am aware of the work by Feynman, thank you I will go and have another read.
His closing sentence indeed should be tattooed on the forehead of all who in these fields.
BTW I do not nor ever have worked as an ATC for Airservices.
Please accept my humble apologies for it seems, attempting to teach you to suck eggs in relation to DNV type metrics as it appears you are well aquainted with the concept.
You have hit the nail on the very head of the issue.
If you had been around and forgive me if you have, since about Day 1, that has been the very nub of the issue, with the lack of any formal analysis in its implementation beyond being defended on " it works there, so it must work here" and "I believes" by the proponents.
The independently produced to protect their corporate backsides, as they should, Broome DAS was the seminal document.
It is a long time since I did serious stats and I am aware of the work by Feynman, thank you I will go and have another read.
His closing sentence indeed should be tattooed on the forehead of all who in these fields.
BTW I do not nor ever have worked as an ATC for Airservices.
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Sunfish,
Would you believe that every ATC in Airservices has recently been through training sessions on the Airservices Safety Management System.
The motto of Airservices SMS is, "Every individual is responsible for safety". It has been driven home long and hard to every ATC. There is a strong safety "culture" within Airservices, and consequently, every ATC feels responsible to report anything they feel unsafe. This is evident in the posts on pprune about NAS.
And the case study Airservices uses to demonstrate how not having a safety culture and robust Safety Management System can lead to catastrophic failure......Space Shuttle Columbia disaster (the second space shuttle hull loss) and NASA.
Yep, even the Americans can get it wrong. What about airspace?
DP
Would you believe that every ATC in Airservices has recently been through training sessions on the Airservices Safety Management System.
The motto of Airservices SMS is, "Every individual is responsible for safety". It has been driven home long and hard to every ATC. There is a strong safety "culture" within Airservices, and consequently, every ATC feels responsible to report anything they feel unsafe. This is evident in the posts on pprune about NAS.
And the case study Airservices uses to demonstrate how not having a safety culture and robust Safety Management System can lead to catastrophic failure......Space Shuttle Columbia disaster (the second space shuttle hull loss) and NASA.
Yep, even the Americans can get it wrong. What about airspace?
DP
Last edited by DirtyPierre; 7th Sep 2004 at 23:31.
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BROOME DAS
Gaunty,
The Broome DAS was not done to protect our corporate butt, it was done after Mike Smith told me Broome was going to become a CTAF(USA) and no CAGRS.
We had seen too many near misses when BME was a 15nm MBZ to believe that BME as a CFAF was an aceptable risk. Legally we could have sat back and let the process happen as directed by CASA.
I reported the matter to our board, including the advise that no safety study was to be done by ARG/NASIG and that they were saying airports like BME existed in the USA with no RADAR, G Class airspace, CTAF procedures and our level of RPT and GA traffic.
I further advised them that our extensive research had found this was probably a complete lie and dispite repeated letters to DOTRS ARG NASIG etc. asking to give us some examples of such USA airports our request were not even answered!!
The Board decided that we had a moral obligation to do a proper DAS to ensure lives were not being put at considerable risk. The rest is history.
Strangly enough we are now in a more difficult position, legally, if CASA tries to reduce our CAGRS/MBZ boundary to 10nm during CAGRS hour. As the final engineering/mathematic modelling of uncontrolled terminal airspace is nearing completion and confirms the semi-quantative findings in the DAS that there is an increase in risk if this change from 30nm to 10nm occurs.
If we have proof (which we do) that the change increases risk for no cost saving to the airport users, how far do we take it before saying you are the regulators we will knowingly obey.
My belief is we should injunct the CASA regulations and get them to try to explain to a Federal Court, why they want us to comply to an regulation that aeronautical risk analysis has shown increases risk and by the ruling of the Chief Justice of the High Court is a negligent act to which we could be joined.
There is ways to solve this impass:
1 CASA proves there is no increase in risk and that our consultants got it wrong and we as directors can therefore accept a CAGRS 10nm radius.
2 We refuse to comply to any such CASA directive and seek injunctive relief and are subsequently ordered by the Court to comply, or CASA is ordered to amend the legislation.
3 We leave CAGRS at 30nm and revert to a 10nm CTAFR outside CAGRS hours.
Though the DAS has cost $150,000 and the legal battle will cost more than that, especially if we lose! I believe the Board will determine that we have a moral obligation to the public using our airport and decide it must be one of the above alternatives.
Sometimes in life you have to say "this is more important than profits" and slug it out and unfortunately we are in that position unless we can negotiate solution 3.
Cheers
Mike Caplehorn
Chairman BIA Group
The Broome DAS was not done to protect our corporate butt, it was done after Mike Smith told me Broome was going to become a CTAF(USA) and no CAGRS.
We had seen too many near misses when BME was a 15nm MBZ to believe that BME as a CFAF was an aceptable risk. Legally we could have sat back and let the process happen as directed by CASA.
I reported the matter to our board, including the advise that no safety study was to be done by ARG/NASIG and that they were saying airports like BME existed in the USA with no RADAR, G Class airspace, CTAF procedures and our level of RPT and GA traffic.
I further advised them that our extensive research had found this was probably a complete lie and dispite repeated letters to DOTRS ARG NASIG etc. asking to give us some examples of such USA airports our request were not even answered!!
The Board decided that we had a moral obligation to do a proper DAS to ensure lives were not being put at considerable risk. The rest is history.
Strangly enough we are now in a more difficult position, legally, if CASA tries to reduce our CAGRS/MBZ boundary to 10nm during CAGRS hour. As the final engineering/mathematic modelling of uncontrolled terminal airspace is nearing completion and confirms the semi-quantative findings in the DAS that there is an increase in risk if this change from 30nm to 10nm occurs.
If we have proof (which we do) that the change increases risk for no cost saving to the airport users, how far do we take it before saying you are the regulators we will knowingly obey.
My belief is we should injunct the CASA regulations and get them to try to explain to a Federal Court, why they want us to comply to an regulation that aeronautical risk analysis has shown increases risk and by the ruling of the Chief Justice of the High Court is a negligent act to which we could be joined.
There is ways to solve this impass:
1 CASA proves there is no increase in risk and that our consultants got it wrong and we as directors can therefore accept a CAGRS 10nm radius.
2 We refuse to comply to any such CASA directive and seek injunctive relief and are subsequently ordered by the Court to comply, or CASA is ordered to amend the legislation.
3 We leave CAGRS at 30nm and revert to a 10nm CTAFR outside CAGRS hours.
Though the DAS has cost $150,000 and the legal battle will cost more than that, especially if we lose! I believe the Board will determine that we have a moral obligation to the public using our airport and decide it must be one of the above alternatives.
Sometimes in life you have to say "this is more important than profits" and slug it out and unfortunately we are in that position unless we can negotiate solution 3.
Cheers
Mike Caplehorn
Chairman BIA Group
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Hi, Y’all,
It’s me again. This Gaunty fella knows all the right words, for sure and certain, I just kinda wonder if he knows what they mean. He reckons this Professor O’Neill ain’t independent, but them their lot workin for that bloke at Broome, they’s trooly independent.
Even tho’ he’s payin the freight.
This here “independent” ain’t any kind of independent I know, must be samesame all the “independent” little bits that once made up the old USSR.
I kinda think he just read them words DVN to, but he don’t rightly know what them DNV fellas said about risk and all that, couple o’ years back. Cause if he done read that DNV stuff for Airservices, they didn’t find E any problem, no way.
They don’t do him no good, not even just a little bit.
And ah kinda think if this Sunfish, whose kinda almost on the right heading, and this Gaunty fella had really and troolly read what Richard Feynman had to say, they’d kinda figure out why Airservices got it all wrong, relying on some real way way out maths, and kinda ignoring the real world.
Like, totally, man.
This O’Neill guy, he was right on t’ that, so was that ex FAA semi head honcho, Broderick, and that ex air force guy, Mills.
If it ‘tain’t real world stuff, ain’t worth nuffin.
I don’t rekon some of you lot, like this Gaunty, know safety from shinola.
Yehaaaah
’t ‘li’l fella.
It’s me again. This Gaunty fella knows all the right words, for sure and certain, I just kinda wonder if he knows what they mean. He reckons this Professor O’Neill ain’t independent, but them their lot workin for that bloke at Broome, they’s trooly independent.
Even tho’ he’s payin the freight.
This here “independent” ain’t any kind of independent I know, must be samesame all the “independent” little bits that once made up the old USSR.
I kinda think he just read them words DVN to, but he don’t rightly know what them DNV fellas said about risk and all that, couple o’ years back. Cause if he done read that DNV stuff for Airservices, they didn’t find E any problem, no way.
They don’t do him no good, not even just a little bit.
And ah kinda think if this Sunfish, whose kinda almost on the right heading, and this Gaunty fella had really and troolly read what Richard Feynman had to say, they’d kinda figure out why Airservices got it all wrong, relying on some real way way out maths, and kinda ignoring the real world.
Like, totally, man.
This O’Neill guy, he was right on t’ that, so was that ex FAA semi head honcho, Broderick, and that ex air force guy, Mills.
If it ‘tain’t real world stuff, ain’t worth nuffin.
I don’t rekon some of you lot, like this Gaunty, know safety from shinola.
Yehaaaah
’t ‘li’l fella.
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poison_dwarf,
Gee, I hope you don't actually talk like that as well!
Maybe you should do an active listening/reading course. Of course there is nothing wrong with E. Just be careful were you put it, ie. mixing non talking VFR with high speed jet and turbo prop acft on climb or descent.
Heh?
Gee, I hope you don't actually talk like that as well!
Maybe you should do an active listening/reading course. Of course there is nothing wrong with E. Just be careful were you put it, ie. mixing non talking VFR with high speed jet and turbo prop acft on climb or descent.
Heh?
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Thanks Mike, my apologies if by conflating the issues by using a bit of shorthand to save me time I caused any confusion. You did make us aware of the actual "trigger".
Your reply does however reveal the "difficulty" position in which you and we all have been placed by the philosophy and method
of the original implementation process.
They can hardly say they were not warned of the possible consequences.
1.The tick from CASA route might be a problem as I understand it was them who provided Airservices with the confidence to sign off on the 2b implementation safety case.
2. Expensive rock and a hard place.
3. I thought this NAS thing was supposed to make things simpler.
A most ingenious paradox worthy of a G & S opera plot.
What happened to the days when our Public Service was supposed to "do" all this stuff, and why does a private corporation now have to spend a substantial amount of money to protect themselves from them and the consequences of their action or inaction.
I see the lunatics are still with us, I would have said court jesters, but they were in fact, rather clever.
Your reply does however reveal the "difficulty" position in which you and we all have been placed by the philosophy and method
of the original implementation process.They can hardly say they were not warned of the possible consequences.
1.The tick from CASA route might be a problem as I understand it was them who provided Airservices with the confidence to sign off on the 2b implementation safety case.
2. Expensive rock and a hard place.
3. I thought this NAS thing was supposed to make things simpler.
A most ingenious paradox worthy of a G & S opera plot.
What happened to the days when our Public Service was supposed to "do" all this stuff, and why does a private corporation now have to spend a substantial amount of money to protect themselves from them and the consequences of their action or inaction.
I see the lunatics are still with us, I would have said court jesters, but they were in fact, rather clever.
