Brisbane Virgin incident - what are the facts?

[Lodown]

Dick, as pointed out above, Class E is not OCTA!

What does "OCTA" mean in your quote from the “NAS Training Coordinator”?

I had thought that OCTA both as a definition and as an official classification was removed from existance years ago. In my understanding, "OCTA" no longer exists because it has no application in ICAO airspace.

Exactly how does your quote referring to "OCTA" apply to Class E airspace anyway?

Dick, if you have some confusion over the use of this term and procedural application in Class E, then what hope for the controllers or anyone else? Confusion with NAS is just compounded with errors like this.

[VVS Laxman]

Ergo – ATC did in fact have a responsibility to “initiate avoiding action” in the SMOKA incident unless ATC had been absolved of that responsibility under some other provision.

What action should they have used, the lancair pilot reported visual with the 737, any avoidance initiation (turn) may have compromised the 'self' separation that the VFR was applying. Vertical, which height?

What regulation says that controllers are not allowed to intervene, as Ted Lang has claimed?

Perhaps the context is missing, damned if you do intervene and they hit, damned if you don't and they miss...?

MATS 4.1.1.1

What a crock, that is a catch all, not a published procedure; a lame attempt to say the procedure isn't safe but it's your fault if it doesn't work. The legal eagles would have a field day with that one. In fact our internal OoLC has said nice try, try again... Under 4.1.1.1 nothing will hit ever... because the controller will intervene, happened in a CTAF, MBZ, in G, controller should intervene, I think not...

The original intent of 4.1.1.1 was to cover off an unconceivable event; this is hardly in that category.

Perhaps we should be 'police' and enforce VCA prevention; what frequency would we use?

[karrank]

"This may comprise of: a. traffic information"

As 4711 points out, this part of MATS doesn't cover this situation and it dates from the days when aircraft were either in or out of CTA. Regardless of that (and irregardless of what you choose to underline) one of the options for this situation is (as above if you've forgotten) is PASS TRAFFIC. Traffic was passed. ATC did their job. You got what you wanted. As usual you are still whinging.

"Nothing in this chapter precludes a controller from using discretion and initiative"

Read it in context. This is supposed to cover unusual circumstances. An example. I'm an enroute controller. Approach controllers sit behind me. If they all drop dead (they're pretty old you know) I can't walk over and drive their consoles, but I could use my discretion and initiative to regain contact with my inbound traffic and provide them with whatever services I can. This paragraph is what I need to do it.

Using your idiotic reasoning I could also use it to, at the start of my shift, broadcast to everybody that I'm providing a C service today, so all the VFR speak up so I can give you clearances...

The service level applicable to an IFR flight regarding VFR is a traffic service, that is what you implemented. Deal with it or admit YOU GOT IT WRONG DICK.

[Four Seven Eleven]

captain marvellous

Simply: The paragraphs relied upon by Dick Smith to contend that the controllers acted incorrectly have no application to the circumstances of the SMOKA, CANTY or LT incidents.

The Virgin 737 was :
• operating IFR
• in controlled airspace (class E)
• radar identified
• receiving a radar control service in respect of other IFR aircraft and a radar derived traffic information service in respect of VFR aircraft.

The Lancair was :
• operating VFR
• in controlled airspace (class E)
• radar identified
• receiving a radar derived traffic information service.

Yes, the facts you quote are largely correct.

In each of these NMACs, both aircraft were wholly within controlled airspace.

The MATS references are, as pointed out by others before me, are applicable in circumstances where one aircraft is in CTA and the other is outside CTA. For example, an aircraft in class E at 9000ft i.r.o. an unknown aircraft outside CTA at unverified mode C of 8,500FT. Controllers in this case have discretion to act if it is believed prudent to do so.

To rely on these references at all in attempting to find procedures for Class E airspace is wrong.

What is missing from any of the procedures, training or documentation is guidance on what to do when an IFR and VFR are in routine conflict and where issuing of traffic information appears not to be working.

What regulation says that controllers are not allowed to intervene, as Ted Lang has claimed?

All of the documentation, training and philosophy behind Australian NAS Class E has been that controllers must provide traffic information to the IFR aircraft. If that appears not to work, the next recourse available to the controller is a ‘traffic alert’ which is considered to be an emergency procedure. There is no documented procedure, nor is there any training, which allows controllers to attempt ‘pseudo-separation’ in circumstances where they believe that only following the documented procedure is ‘unsafe’.

It should be remembered that, after traffic information has been passed, there is no documented or routine requirement for either aircraft to advise how they intend to act upon the information. The controller does not know, for instance, whether what looks like an impending NMAC is in fact perfectly safe visual acquisition and self-separation.

So, to clarify my point: The MATS references do not apply inside Class E. NAS has been introduced with no procedures which allow controllers to do anything other that provide traffic information and then leave it to the pilots to ‘self-separate.’ If it is done differently in the United States, then this demonstrates yet again how badly, amateurishly and dangerously this airspace reform process has been conducted in Australia. We urgently need to correct this shambles before a disaster occurs.

I note with little surprise and immeasurable disgust that Dick Smith cares so little for safety that he has not even responded to his own thread.

[AirNoServicesAustralia]

CM, the nature of the job we do as controllers is in effect that we "work to rule". You are taught very early on that if you step outside the rules you do so at your own peril. You turn the IFR under your control away from the VFR with no clearance at your own peril. You level off the IFR under your control above the level you think the VFR with no clearance will level off at, at your own peril. Why is it that Controllers should have to hang their arse on the line to keep a less safe system up and running, when the previous system was safer, more efficient, and as is becoming increasingly clear cheaper. I agree with all the above comments about MATS 5.2.1.1, that has always been a legal cover all for AirServices, and never has a controller been instructed or trained to read that paragraph as being a licence to deviate even in the slightest from the specific rules contained in the remainder of the document.

[Lodown]

CM, it might seem a small thing, but the OCTA abbreviation is a carry-over from previous eons when there was just controlled airspace and uncontrolled airspace. It has no application in ICAO airspace. Flights in Class G, Class F and VFR in Class E (as Dick seems to consider as OCTA) have slightly different responsibilities and procedures, so the classification of OCTA has no meaning. OCTA was removed from official definition lists some years ago. While it is still used unofficially within the industry out of convenience, it has no official meaning. (In fact, its use appears limited to describing flight without talking with ATC, rather than in its previous reference to a particular airspace.)

If I had a guess, I would venture that some well-meaning person wrote those procedures referenced above in a hurry and under direction to just get them done. I doubt there was sufficient time to allow for anything but rudimentary copy checking or fact checking prior to NAS implementation. If a very basic error has been included in the NAS documents, what does this say about the more complex procedures? I think many in the industry have issues with the paucity of information when it comes to procedures.

Safety is enhanced with well understood and sensible procedures. As an armchair observer, it appears to me in this incident with the involvement of several pilots and ATC, that the participants suddenly and unexpectedly found themselves in this big procedural hole with no clear idea of the next step. The controller lost control of the situation and the pilots resorted to Class G traffic avoidance.

The statement that we were getting the North American airspace system has been a fallacy. My concern with NAS is that these holes have started to appear seemingly quickly and frequently so soon after implementation. The difficult part is trying to work out where the other holes may be before we fall in them and the scary part is knowing that there are probably going to be some that we won't find until we're in them.

[QSK?]

Why are you guys even bothering to reply to DS?

All he is trying to do by starting up new threads, is to use PPrune to start ingratiating himself with those controllers and pilots he has marginalised. He's just now trying to save face and trying to re-enter the NAS debate and this is his method of doing it.

After what he's done to the airspace system and considering his strongly expressed views on the value and integrity of professional pilots and controllers, I would be inclined simply just to ignore the p#@*k!

If everyone ignored his postings, this would be a clear indication to Govt (and Govt does read this forum) that DS has no credibility or support within the industry. By answering his queries, you are lending him credibility and support which, I believe, he is not entitled to.

[Four Seven Eleven]

captain marvellous

I am somewhat troubled by your use of the qualifier “largely”. If you disagree about those basics in any way then please state how and why you disagree. It would be exceedingly difficult to have a sensible discussion if we are unclear on the fundamentals.

I did not intend to cause any concern or confusion by the term ‘largely’. The qualifier was only used because I was not absolutely certain about the last point: i.e. that the VFR aircraft was “receiving a radar derived traffic information service.” I will have another look at the circumstances, but don’t believe that has a major bearing on the topic of this discussion.

Is it not the case that airspace classes A, B, C, D and E can collectively be referred to as “controlled airspace”, and that airspace classes F and G can collectively be referred to as “uncontrolled airspace”?

I agree. It is, as many have said a carry over from a simpler time, but can be applied in ‘alphabet’ airspace.

We seem to be in heated agreement that MATS 5.2.1.1 did NOT apply to the SMOKA incident because both aircraft were in controlled airspace.

Yes, we do.

But MATS 5.2.1.1 describes a situation where a controller “has no responsibility to initiate avoiding action”.

Yes, but it applies to a specific instance and has no bearing upon class E operations. If you seek guidance as to Class E operations, then you need to look elsewhere.

It is drawing a very long bow indeed to say that:
1) This describes a situation different to the one in the SMOKA incident;
2) In these different circumstances, a controller “has no responsibility to initiate avoiding action”;
3) Therefore in all other circumstances, a controller does have that responsibility.

Quite simply, the paragraphs cited by Smith are not applicable. They are irrelevant. Apart from providing traffic information to the IFR, there are no published procedures for Class E airspace. That is why it is so dangerous.

The bit where he says : “Fancy even suggesting that an air traffic controller could sit and watch two aircraft come together” clearly and forcefully implies that the controllers did NOT just sit there and watch the aircraft come together. Ted Lang was refuting Dick Smith’s assertion that the controllers had “basically allowed it to happen”.

But then in the very next breath Ted Lang contradicts himself, saying : “the situation that happened at Maroochydore, that is exactly what they have to do. There is no way that in the wide world that an air traffic controller can intervene in that circumstance.”

So which was it? Did they sit there and watch, or didn’t they?

They did not. They applied the procedures stipulated in MATS. That is, they passed traffic information to the IFR aircraft in Class E airspace in respect of a radar observed VFR aircraft. There is no contradiction in saying:
1) They did not just sit there and watch, they provided traffic information, as specified in all of the documentation;
2) That is exactly what they have to do;
3) There is no way that an air traffic controller can intervene (further) in that circumstance.
4) We agree this is dangerous
5) We warned the minister beforehand that it was dangerous
6) We are still convinced that it is dangerous, but there is nothing else we are authorised to do.
7) We want the system changed to make it safe.

There seems to be a bit of a theme coming through that unless MATS explicitly authorises the use of common sense, then common sense is banned. Are controllers robots? Does MATS really need to spell out common sense?

Every organisation representing aviation professionals in Australia pointed out, prior to NAS being implemented that:
1) Australian Class E airspace was being introduced without adequate procedures to safeguard traffic;
2) The procedures relied solely upon provision of traffic information to the IFR aircraft for ‘self separation’ when in conflict with VFR traffic;
3) That the information being provided could not safely be relied upon because the intentions of the VFR aircraft could never be known with any certainty;
4) There are no provisions, in MATS, AIP or any training documentation, nor is there any practical training provided, to clarify what measures, other than traffic information, should be applied;
5) Where (Australian) Class E replaces Class C, the safety levels drop dramatically, for no apparent benefit.

I don’t like to say this, but is this mentality part of some kind of orchestrated “work to rule”?

No. We don’t even know what the ‘rule’ is meant to be. Dick Smith seems to believe there is more to it than has been documented. He is dangerously wrong.

But I am entirely unclear on what role Dick Smith has in the Airservices Australia training department. Isn’t Airservices Australia responsible for the training of its employees? Is it not the case that controller training is provided by.... the controllers themselves? I fail to appreciate how Dick Smith is responsible for the quality of that training.

There was nothing wrong with the quality of the training per se. It was the quality of the procedure they were forced to train for that is in question. I could train you very well how to play Russian roulette. The quality of the training might be excellent. That still does not make it safe. It is the application of that training in a stupid and dangerous procedure that will kill you.

The training provided was exactly in accordance with the published procedures. The controllers providing the training could only do so in accordance with those procedures.

They knew they were unsafe. The controllers being trained knew they were unsafe. They told their management. They were told to shut up, by the Minister, by management and by Dick Smith.

Dick Smith and the Minister were instrumental in pushing for the rapid introduction of NAS, without adequate safety assessment, procedures or documentation and without understanding the fundamental differences between what they were implementing and what occurs in the United States.

Until we rectify these fundamental flaws in the design, the implementation and the procedures associated with NAS, lives will continue to be put at risk.

Remember, the first incident (at CANTY) occurred very soon after NAS2B was implemented last year. What did the Minister do to improve air safety after that incident?

We then had the LT incident. What did the Minister do to improve air safety after that incident?

We have since had the AY, DN and SMOKA incidents. What has the minister done?

How many more incidents will it take? How serious do they have to be?

QSK?

If everyone ignored his postings, this would be a clear indication to Govt (and Govt does read this forum) that DS has no credibility or support within the industry. By answering his queries, you are lending him credibility and support which, I believe, he is not entitled to.

I tend to disagree. It is only through consistent coverage in the media, through these forums and through routine channels that this Minister might be shamed into acting to restore Australian air safety. It may take a change of government, but I would be disappointed if only one side of politics was interested in air safety and the viability of the aviation industry in Australia.

I am willing to believe that this Minister is not fully aware of how close we have come to a disaster in Australian airspace. I fail to see how or why he would persist with this dangerous airspace if he were cognisant of the danger.

I can only believe that the Minister is being fed information from one end of the spectrum only. Even in his latest press releases, he continues to call the Civil Air campaign a ‘political’ and ‘industrial’ campaign. The fact that the very dangers which Civil Air warned of have come to fruition seems not to convince him. The fact that the only justification for an industrial campaign would be if his own department was blatantly lying about the lack of any danger to controller jobs seems to escape him. I have no idea at all what he means when he calls it a ‘political’ campaign.

[trafficwas]

CM,
aahh the beauty of hindsight.
You have made your argument for the prosecution. A well reasoned argument that may hang the controller for trying to do the best in a bad situation.

But then in the very next breath Ted Lang contradicts himself, saying : “the situation that happened at Maroochydore, that is exactly what they have to do. There is no way that in the wide world that an air traffic controller can intervene in that circumstance.”

I heard it, and that may have been a statement relating to the DS comment regarding the Virgin aircraft. DS suggested that the ATC was to instruct the Virgin crew to stop your descent at 16000 ft.
I can see no reference to ATC offering vertical separation instructions in E in AIP, MATS or any other Document including NAS Pilot "training". Perhaps such an instruction would have been unlawful in Australia. With your rhetoric perhaps you could defend the unfortunate controller when two do come together. You have a lovely turn of phrase.

It was so simple before NAS came along. Separation breakdown, controller gets punished. Separation achieved, everyone was happy. Even VFR pilots who asked for clearances. Those halcyon days of the fifties.
USA developed theirs in the fifties too didn't they?

[Four Seven Eleven]

Dick Smith - still in hiding now the truth is out?

Brisbane Virgin incident - what are the facts?
You be the judge on the facts.

Well, you asked the question, now you should have the courage to respond. My judgement, based upon the facts and the correct reading of the documentation is that you got your facts wrong. The system that led to an incident ” so horrific I cannot believe it” still exists to this day. It is your reliance upon the wrong documentation and your inability to read that documentation correctly that demonstrates that you have a basic, fundamental and dangerous ignorance of your own reform program.
You quoted the ““NAS Training Coordinator” dated 30/7/03” document, relying on the sentence:

ATC has no responsibility to initiate avoiding action with unknown aircraft OCTA; UNLESS considered a hazard to the aircraft under control. (Airservices original underlining)

As has been pointed out previously, this has absolutely nothing to do with Class E procedures, and anybody who ‘believes’ that it does exposes themselves as dangerously ignorant of Class E procedures in AusNAS.
You also failed to quote the following paragraphs from the training documentation, which refers specifically to Class E procedures:

• IFR aircraft are NOT separated from VFR aircraft
• VFR aircraft are NOT separated from IFR or VFR aircraft (Airservices original capitalisation)

If you cannot read procedures correctly, what credibility do you have left?

Despite this, you do not even have the courage to re-visit your own thread and admit that you got it dangerously wrong.

Why is it that when you are shown to have got it wrong, you run and hide? What are you scared of? Is it the fact that you so frequently get it wrong, and so frequently rely upon ‘beliefs’ rather than evidence that makes you afraid to respond to this thread? Are you not interested in fixing this mess and restoring aviation safety and economic viability? What is your real agenda, if air safety pays no part in your plans.

As the person primarily responsible for the introduction of this system, and having failed to understand the dangers when it was implemented, what are you doing now that you are aware of the ‘horrific’ consequences of your actions. Are you deliberately and wilfully waiting for the ‘horrific’ to become ‘tragic’ before you will act?

I won’t hold my breath expecting Dick Smith to respond to this. He has shown his colours before. (You can roll out the ‘anonymity excuse again if you wish. It has as much credibility as anything else you have said. You obviously read your own website as well as you read procedures.)

[Lodown]

Just wanting to keep the thread on the front page and hoping for a response from Dick in respect of whether he deems modifications/adjustments to the NAS model necessary to reduce the likelihood of this incident occurring again in the future.

Vain hope perhaps???

[Blastoid]

ST,

You know this is futile.

No MAC = no airprox. Simple.

[WhatWasThat]

Captain Marvellous,
You are not by any chance our old friend BIK risen from the dead are you?
The tag seems entirely consistent with the ego of that circumlocutious old NAVAID.

[Four Seven Eleven]

Well Smith,

Still haven't found the courage to admit you goit it wrong??

Pathetic.

Why will you not act now to prevent the accidents your misunderstanding and bungling will inevitably cause? Now that your ignorance has been demonstrated to you in your very own thread, you no longer have any excuse.

What are you going to do about it? (You may try to run from answering this thread, but you cannot hide from the judgement 'on the facts' that you yourself called for.)

[scramjet77]

judge on the facts?

Dick, after having slandered ATC and then your terribly embarrassing back down on talk-back radio, the transcript of the second interview clearly has you blaming the Virgin crew for the near miss event. The ATSB report clearly shows the Virgin crew turning AWAY from the light aircraft. You play fast and loose with the truth. If you want people to judge on the facts, then how about you present the facts in their entirety, unaltered and as they are in reality, rather than twisting the truth to suite your own arguments.

Furthermore, what is your response to the article below? In all the time that I have been watching this debacle unfold, you have never once given a direct answer to a direct question. Are all the pilots of the world guilty of an industrial campaign against your NAS?

NAS UNREALISTIC - IFALPA: NAS is "unrealistic" for Australia, according to the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations president Captain Dennis Dolan He said it was unrealistic for the Australian NAS to be modelled on the US ATC system.
"The US and Australian airspaces are completely different in terms of the level of traffic and radar coverage that exists in the US," he said. "One cannot compare a country that has more than 85% radar coverage to one that has only 15%.
"Australia has moved from a much safer system, to one where the responsibility of separation has been transferred from the professional air traffic controllers and pilots to the amateur recreational pilot, and placed a greater reliance on 'see and avoid' procedures.
"This method of separating aircraft has been acknowledged internationally as a last resort procedure, and is completely unsuitable for high speed jet transport operations."
Dolan was in Sydney for the 59th International IFALPA conference, attended by 300 pilots from 48 member countries.

[Spasmodic Aberration]

Dear Mr Smith

Regarding your comments on the [4BC Transcript (not proofed) 23.4.04]

I am not suggesting that you were deceitful, maybe badly advised or had difficulty understanding the facts.

You are quoted,
“if the airline pilot had followed the air traffic control instructions and just kept descending, that the planes would have passed many miles apart.”
wrong

You are quoted,
“What I just couldn't believe is that a pilot would actually, when he was told to descend by air traffic control, would actually climb and turn right into the path of another aeroplane. And that's what's happened So it just simply wasn't the air traffic controller's fault. I apologise for that.
I can actually imagine the air traffic controller sitting there just in horror to see this plane turn right into the - the airline turn right into the path of the small plane and then climb without even telling the air traffic controller what he was doing. So that was just horrendous...”
You are wrong Dick
The sink was reduced to about zero and a right turn, through 15deg, AWAY from the inbound a/c.
We must rely now on the highly trained light aircraft pilot and we must ignore our instincts, experience, pucker valve, common sense etc and wait for the ultimate RA.
Looking towards the sun, trying to determine which speck on the window, amongst the bug body parts, is a small high performance aircraft, is easier said than done.
See and avoid with high closure rates is bs. Dick


COMPERE: Yes, well Dick, good on you. It takes a strong man to say I'm sorry and I got it wrong, which is always the mark of a good man.

Looking forward to the good mans next soapbox transmit to the understandably gullible masses


You are quoted,
“I think it was serious but I'm sure it all goes back to training because I don't think these airline pilots have been trained correctly and I think that's very serious.”

Too much thinking..
Does this mean that CASA, who sign off the check and training approval are at fault?

Spasmodic Aberration

[FarCu]

Why doesn't Dick reply?

He doesn't have to reply to your queries, his name appears on almost everyone's reply. The ego has been fed.
Dick isn't building an RV8 in his spare time is he?

[RV8builder]

Wish he was building one, I've got 800+ second hand 3/32 cleckos I'd off load for the right price!

Gee fellas, six months and the sky still hasn't fallen in!

[AirNoServicesAustralia]

Never was worried about the sky falling, just its contents. That has almost happened on at least 4 occasions already. But I guess thats acceptable.

[Here to Help]

Gee fellas, six months and the sky still hasn't fallen in!

RV8builder,

The sky wasn't falling in before NAS, so what is your point?