Airspace Design - Some Background

[Four Seven Eleven]

The proposition that, somehow or other, a proven international aviation airspace management system—which is used in a country where there are four times the levels of aviation activity as there are in Australia, where the weather is less clement than it is in Australia, and where the aviation safety record is outstanding—is somehow not safe or is less safe than what we have now is palpably nonsense. I remain absolutely consistent in my view that moving to NAS is in the interests of the travelling public of Australia.

So, the goal posts are gradually shifting. The same minister who claimed that NAS would make aviation in Australia safer, is now reducing his argument to weasel-words such as those above.

No one is suggesting it is ‘not safe’ in the absolute sense. What many (including myself) are suggesting, Minister, is that it is ‘less safe’. You, Dick Smith and the others who perpetrated NAS have provided not one iota of evidence to show that you even bothered to find out whether or not it was.

If I were to say that ” The proposition that, somehow or other, a proven international automotive system—which is used in a country where there are four times the levels of automotive activity as there are in Australia, where the weather is less clement than it is in Australia, and where the automotive safety record is outstanding—is somehow not safe or is less safe than what we have now is palpably nonsense”, many would be quick to point out that the US:

a) Does not mandate seat-belts in all jurisdictions.
b) Has experienced child deaths in vehicles caused by air-bag deployment in light collisions
c) That these child deaths would not occur in Australia because our air-bags are ‘low-impact’ types, designed to be used in conjunction with seat-belts.

Only someone who had a pre-determined agenda would consider scrapping the Australian Design Rules in relation to air-bag deployment, in favour of the US rules without considering the legislative and other differences between the two countries. It would be a foolish minister indeed who accepted the argument that “it works in the US, therefore it is safe.” A wise member of a theoretical “Automotive Reform Group” would be aware of these differences and would want safety to be analysed before adopting any changes.

The simple fact is that the US, being a strong and free country accepts certain risks in exchange for those freedoms. It also is willing to pay the financial costs of ameliorating those risks.

In the case of motor vehicles, drivers’ groups have lobbied to avoid compulsory seat-belt laws. They see this as a basic freedom. In Australia, we have gone the other way, mandating seat-belt laws. Which approach is better is a moot point.

The important point is that:
1) A car manufactured for US conditions will be more dangerous in Australia than one manufactured for Australian conditions.
2) A car manufactured for Australian conditions will be more dangerous in the US than one manufactured for US conditions.

Perhaps all involved in this sad debacle are coming to realise that:

1)NAS reduces safety. The available facts support this proposition. If confirmation was needed, Dick Smith’s silence and evasiveness on the question provide ample evidence.

2)NAS has cost over $50,000,000, only to now require ‘enhancements’. Who knows what this will eventually cost.

3) NAS has harmed Australia’s reputation as a safe aviation climate. This will jeopardise the aviation industry in its attempts to attract foreign business for the GA industry.

Why, Mr Smith, if you care about the aviation industry, are you not willing to prove that NAS is safer? What is there in the evidence that you are unwilling to let us know? Or did you just not even bother about safety, relying on "it works in the US' as your only safety 'analysis'?

[missy]

4711, I was thinking of introducing the automotive comparison myself...

Hey Dick, why don't we drive on the right hand side of the road, after all it's gotta be safer, oops, sorry, for the overall benefit of the Australian travelling public.

The US has more vehicular traffic, better roads, harsher weather but let's give it a go. No need for a design safety case and the implementation should be as simple as one, two, three. Certainly now where near the 50 elements of the NAS plan.

[Desert Dingo]

These buggas are everywhere!

"NAS is working perfectly."
"I have detailed information about the situation...which completely proves that what they allege are illusions . . .
They lie every day."
(With apologies to Muhammed Saeed al-Sahaf, the Iraqi Information Minister)



Mr Anderson says the new system is being introduced progressively and will not be abandoned.
"The National Airspace System (NAS) will produce better safety outcomes for the travelling public in the country," he said.
"It will allow for a more relevent concentration of finite safety resources in areas of greatest safety risk.
"I remain absolutely consistent in my view that moving to NAS is in the interests of the travelling public of Australia

[Woomera]

Mr D Dingo

Love em or hate em I just love your work, needed a good belly laugh.

I thought Muhammed Saeed al-Sahaf should have got an Oscar that year for best stand up comedy routine.
I used to look forward to his press conferences the same way I look forward to the cartoon in the morning papers.
I always had that sneaking suspicion that he was really just playing the game all along.

[Voices of Reason]

Flawed Safety Case

We have been encouraged to re-enter this discussion, and to provide further information.

We have been pointed to transcripts of your senate estimates committee in which testimony was provided by representatives from various organisations involved in the airspace reform debate. We found the responses both amusing on the one hand, and deeply disturbing on the other.

One point that appears to have been lost totally on your regulator – and we would argue that this is significant enough to call into question the integrity of your regulator as a whole – is the set of statements relating to the use of training and education as a major safety mitigation.

In and of itself, training and education IS a very good safety mitigator – but ONLY if it can be demonstrated to be effective.

We understand that the safety regulator has examined implementation safety cases provided by your service provider and airspace change proponents which contain such education and training requirements – and has actually sighted the training material has sighted and noted the training schedule for affected controllers, and has witnessed the delivery of that training, and has sighted the assessment material that demonstrates competence – that is, demonstrates that the training and education material has been delivered effectively, and has achieved the desired safety mitigation.

It is therefore reasonable to say that all of the safety obligations within the implementation safety case have been effectively discharged – BY YOUR SERVICE PROVIDER.

However, the service provider is but one element of the safety equation. Pilots are the other. Clearly, from the material we have seen, and from transcript evidence presented to your Senate committee, whilst several people – including a senior representative from your Department of Transport and Regional Services undertook to ensure training material was created and distributed – there is ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE that the safety requirement for effective training and education – the CORE safety mitigator - has been met.

Has your regulator examined airline training records to ensure that the training material was appropriately tailored for their operations, delivered effectively, and that delivery recorded? Has your safety regulator examined the training records associated with charter operations, aerial work operations and general aviation operations to ensure that the training material was effectively delivered and understood? Has your regulator examined the training records of the Defence establishments in your country to ensure that training material was effectively delivered and understood and tested?

If the airline certification process in Australia is similar to other major countries, there should be a process that requires a proper “check and training organisation” within the airlines. BEFORE the changes were committed – as appears to have been the case in relation to a Sunday evening meeting referred to in the transcripts, your regulator should have been able to demonstrate – in fact should have required your airspace reform program managers to demonstrate – that airlines and other operators could effectively deliver training in the required time.

You CANNOT create a Safety Case that requires safety mitigation from ALL parties – and then measure its effectiveness by the compliance of one party. Neither can you say that simply putting the training material “in the post” satisfies a safety obligation.

We have to question the competence of your regulator. This is a fundamental failing and calls into question the whole safety case process for your airspace reform.

[Wirraway]

ABC "PM" transcript

Qantas endorses air traffic control system PM - Thursday, 19 February , 2004 18:38:00
Reporter: Alison Caldwell

MARK COLVIN: But what does Australia's leading airline think about the airspace reforms introduced in November last year?

Qantas' Chief Pilot is Captain Chris Manning. He says the airline has recorded no incidents as a result of the changes, and apart from a few minor concerns, Qantas is happy with the system as it stands.

Captain Chris Manning spoke to Alison Caldwell.

CHRIS MANNING: As we currently know it we have issues, they are small, they're called fine-tuning. But we consider the air space system safe, otherwise we wouldn't be flying in it.

ALISON CALDWELL: What are your issues?

CHRIS MANNING: The issues we have are a couple of issues around charting, that is, how the charts are presented. Those issues have been accepted by the NAS (National Air Services) implementation group, and a couple of issues of airspace, and they are being accepted. So we have no problem with the way it's being conducted at the moment.

ALISON CALDWELL: What's your view of the call from some pilots to immediately introduced controlled airspace to cover all regular public transport areas near major airports in Australia?

CHRIS MANNING: You'd have to ask pilots who said that why they want it. Our issue is we would not allow the aircraft, Qantas aircraft to fly in airspace that wasn't safe. The current system is safe.

We have had no incidents involving a breakdown of separation attributable to the National Airspace System. I will say that there will always be errors when human beings are involved – they occurred under the old system, they will occur under the new system. What we have to do is mitigate those errors and they are mitigated.

ALISON CALDWELL: So you don't agree that it's an inherently flawed system?

CHRIS MANNING: We are very happy to fly within the current airspace system.

ALISON CALDWELL: What did you make though, the other day, of the Minister for Transport, John Anderson, expressing complete confidence in the system, yet on the other hand within a few hours, the Chief of Airservices Australia announced a full and comprehensive review into this system and a complete risk analysis of the system, and admitted that it had acted illegally in its implementation of the system?

CHRIS MANNING: I think you'd probably have to talk to those two gentlemen who would doubtless explain, or, as I said before, we are happy to fly within the current airspace system.

We have not been told of any review formally, we've only read about it like you've read about it. But as I said before we are happy with the current airspace system, we were happy with the previous one, we'll probably be happy with the next one.

All I can say is we've now been operating for the best part of three months with not an incident of breakdown of separation. When our pilots have sighted other aircraft the National Airspace System has worked as planned.

ALISON CALDWELL: But yet it's under review now.

CHRIS MANNING: Well, you'll have to ask the regulator why it's under review. I'm sure they'll tell you.

ALISON CALDWELL: If we could interview them we would, believe me. Look, air traffic controllers also don't like this, their union says that change is needed; do you think that they're just crying wolf?

CHRIS MANNING: No, I don't. I mean, you would have to see their union, and I'm sure they'll be very happy to explain why it's wrong, and what's wrong, what incidents have occurred.

But I just speak for the airline and we have had no incidents. And we are very happy, we do risk analysis on these changes, we are very happy that we have continue to operate very safely.

MARK COLVIN: Qantas' Chief Pilot, Captain Chris Manning, speaking to Alison Caldwell.

============================================

[Niles Crane]

Voices,

You have brought up a very good point!

When the training material arrived on my desk 6 days before "The Date", I showed the video and training material to a number of our pilots and they asked more questions then the video and training packed answered.

I then deduced that we would have to rewrite the material for training our regional airline pilots as the material was written for private pilots.

My next action was to get onto CASA and notify them that training would not be conducted in time!

There answer was "no problem, you do not have to do anything as Airservices has passed the training package and no further training is required"

Casa was not prepared to "Buck Dick"!!

[WhatWasThat]

"We are happy with the current airspace system"

Joe Public takes this statement from the "chief pilot" of Qantas as an endorsement by ALL Qantas pilots!

I really don't think this is the case, I have not personally heard a single heavy metal pilot with anything even slightly positive to say about NAS 2biscuit. Perhaps the Qantas pilot community might like to ensure that this does not go unchallenged.

[Philthy]

Below are the recommendations made by the French Bureau Enquetes-Accidents (BEA - equivalent to the ATSB) following their investigation into the mid-air collision between Airbus A320 F-GJVG and Grob 103 F-GCXB on 12 February 1999. The translation from the French is mine so there may be some detail inaccuracies, however I believe that the substance of the recommendations has been rendered into English accurately.

To set the scene, this accident occurred while the A320 was following a STAR in Class G airspace on arrival into a Class D CTR at Montpellier Mediterranee, France, in VMC. Although warned of the presence of glider activity (OCTA) by a broadcast on the ATIS, the crew of the A320 did not see the other aircraft until too late. Neither did the crew of the glider see the A320 until too late. Naturellement, the glider was not transponder equipped.

Although both aircraft took avoiding action, a collision occurred. By great good fortune, although both aircraft were damaged they were both landed safely without further incident.

This was the second mid-air collision in France within six months between an RPT aircraft and a VFR aircraft, in VMC in Class G airspace. Of course, Class E airspace would have made no difference.

Recommendations of the Bureau Enquetes-Accidents following the mid-air collision between Airbus A320 F-GJVG and Grob 103 glider F-CGXB near Grenouillet, France, on 12 February 1999.

Several measures were taken following the accident:
- the center of gliding of Montpellier Pic Saint Loup will temporarily maintain all of its activity at an altitude lower than 4 500 feet.
- During a meeting held on March 16, 1999, the director of airspace decided to change the limits and the classification of the airspace relating to the airport of Montpellier Mediterranee. These modifications, which came into force on May 20, 1999, will be published to users by way of the aeronautical information service.

Lastly, it is expected that new agreements will be negotiated in order to integrate the gliding activity of Saint Martin de Londres in the airspace thus modified. Taking note of these measures, the BEA:

4.1. Makes again the following recommendation, put forth on February 24, 1999 within the framework of the investigation into the mid-air collision which occurred on July 30, 1998 in the Bay of Quiberon between Beech 1900 D registered F-GSJM and Cessna 177 registered F-GAJE:
- that within the shortest time, the DGAC makes provisions so that the crew of any aircraft involved in the public transport of passengers, under the IFR, can be informed of any aircraft representing a potential risk of collision. This objective could be met by the three following complementary strategies:
1) the designation of classes of adapted airspaces, or specific airspace, ensuring the protection of published IFR routes;
2) the equipment of aircraft carrying out the public transport of passengers with TCAS, without awaiting the limiting date fixed by regulation;
3) requirement for the use of transponders with altitude reporting for any aircraft operating above revised reference levels.

4.2. Recommends:
- that the DGAC makes, on a purely transitional basis, provisions so that, except in the event of operational need or reasons related to safety, aircraft on an IFR flight plan do not receive clearances to deviate from a published route when this is likely to lead them to be operated in airspace where the knowledge of any aircraft presenting a potential risk of collision is not guaranteed.

4.3. Recommends:
- that, when portions of airspace managed by the Defence organization and crossings by arrival and departure routes are not active any more, they can be used by Civil aviation in order to protect these routes and to allow continuity in the application of the supervising authority.

4.4. Recommends:
- that meetings are regularly organized by the services of the Civil aviation authority at general aviation aerodromes in order to discuss with users questions relating to their activity, in particular when changes are brought in the organization of the airspace and that if need be, draft agreements binding the users to the Civil aviation authority and with the Defense authorities are amended.

4.5. Note that, contrary to the aeroplane flight guide, the existence of traffic IFR in class G airspace does not appear explicitly in the gliding flight guide. This gap was not identified as being contributory to the accident, the two occupants of the sailplane being also powered aeroplane pilots, but it represents a potential weakness of the safety system. It was also raised in the ultralight flight guide. Even if the taking into account of the first three recommendations decreases the probability of the presence of IFR traffic in class G airspace, this remains possible. Consequently, the BEA recommends:
- that theoretical training manuals for glider and ultralight pilots are amended in order to bring to pilots knowledge of IFR flights in class G airspace.

[ferris]

Voices of Reason.
What test is applied to any mitigation in relation to a safety case? Who says that just because "adequate training" is listed as a mitigator, even if "adequate training " is then conducted, that it is an adequate mitigation?

Good to see the QF chief pilot standing up to be counted when required. The politics are mind-boggling.

[Voices of Reason]

Ferris,

Thank you for your question. We don’t mean to lecture here – neither be patronizing - but the background below may help you and other readers to better understand the true nature of safety case and hazard identification and management.

A safety case is, in its most simplistic form, the recording of a number of structured actions that have been taken to provide assurance as to the safety of a design or a model or the implementation thereof. A safety case is – or should be - a clear demonstration of a robust process of risk assessment and treatment strategies. It may not – and most often does not – identify all of the risks associated with a project – but well conducted, with appropriately qualified people participating in the hazard identification process, it will identify those risks that are most likely to be present in the system. The ongoing nature of a safety case means that once identified and recorded, hazards must be regularly reviewed, the effectiveness of the hazard treatments examined, hazards removed as they are superceded, and other hazards added and treated as they arise.

What is more relevant to your question is the effectiveness of the determination of hazards that may contribute to, or increase the levels of, risk associated with the project – and then determination and assessment of the available options for reducing those risks to “as low as reasonably practicable – ALARP”.

First, the hazard identification process needs to be carried out “without fear or favour”. That is, the participants within any group examining risks should be free to identify and record ANY hazard that they feel is appropriate. That said, the hazards must be able to be clearly linked to the major hazard, which, in the case of aviation, is most likely the “potential for a collision between aircraft”.

So the process must be one that says: “event x could occur, which would lead to an increase in the potential for a collision between two aircraft” – not “event x could happen which I don’t like”, or "event x could happen which would increase our charges", etc.

It is desirable - but not essential – that the identifiers of a hazard then identify activities or actions, which – in their opinion – may bring about a reduction in that hazard. Here again, such mitigators should be suggested without fear or favour. It is not appropriate to dismiss any mitigation at this point – even if it is obviously unlikely to be implemented. In some cases, it may not be possible for the parties present to develop a mitigation. If other parties determine the mitigators independent of the hazard jury, the hazard jury should be given the opportunity to examine the mitigators, and comment on their suitability.

At this point, the suggested mitigators can be evaluated to determine both their cost, and benefit. Most certainly, if a mitigator can be introduced at relatively low cost, WITHOUT substantially altering the characteristics of the change proposed, then it should. If a mitigator is expensive, and the cost would be disproportionate to the benefit – AND the residual risk is within the ALARP range – AND the responsible authorities are prepared to accept the risk – then the mitigator may be discarded – BUT the it must be stated within the safety case that a mitigation was considered and abandoned. In fact the reason for not applying any particular mitigation MUST be recorded.

It is NOT appropriate that hazard mitigations be limited by the convenors of the hazard identification process – even if it is clear that only certain options may be available.

Now to your question regarding effectiveness.

Having identified a mitigator, a process must be put in place – and its effect measured – preferably BEFORE – but most certainly immediately after implementation. That is why we made the point that simply identifying training and education as a mitigator – and apparently a primary mitigator at that – and then dispatching the material – does NOT fulfill the obligations of the safety case. The authors of the safety case MUST be able to demonstrate that the training and education material ACHIEVED THE DESIRED EFFECT.

How is that measured? In the identification of the hazard, it is important that the hazard is correctly specified, so that the causal chain can be seen, and the expected effect of the mitigation seen and recorded. So “event x could happen, …- if we educate the pilot about the hazard and its impacts, then educate the pilot about actions that would reduce the likelihood, then the potential for this hazard reduces”.

This allows two things to occur. First, it is possible to tell the training specialists exactly the event for which the training material is required – i.e., specific hazard related training rather than glib PR material.

Second, it is possible to test the effectiveness of the material by examining pilots, checking their responses, and determining if the education material is “fit for purpose”. This is usually done with a pilot study, or with a sample group of affected staff before material is released into the public domain.

In all, even for a relatively minor change, we believe that with over 50,000 pilots in Australia, you would need at least to 3 months to develop, test and evaluate, and then deliver training material – AND examine and record IN THE SAFETY CASE that it has been delivered effectively. Adjustments to training material for major change may require the training period to be extended to 6 months or more. Your regulator should only allow a go/no go decision date to be passed ONLY if there is evidence that training and education has been delivered and recorded – or can be delivered and recorded before the start date. This latter situation would probably only occur if there was evidence of prior compliance.

We hope this helps.

[ftrplt]

Dick Smith said:

There is little doubt in my mind that if Class C airspace is required in the link airspace above Launceston, then Class B airspace would be required where the collision risk is far greater in the area close to the runway.

This is the basis behind all of your reasoning for the airspace class changes, however it highlights totally your flawed logic.

- 'There is little doubt in my mind'; to me implies you have based your belief on opinion only and not backed by facts

- It is nonsense to assume that just because Class C may be justified for an arrival area, then Class B is automatically required in the terminal area. Who says the collision risk automatically increases?

If what you say is true, then the risk of collision in the SYD apt terminal zone in the Director radar pattern must be automatically higher than in the terminal arrival airspace where there are three airports and a couple of VFR lanes as well as mixing it with PJR ops.

How about a mythical piece of arrival airspace that services 3 or 4 large airports in close proximity, are you saying that the terminal airspace of each individual airport is automatically riskier than the arrival airspace where traffic for all airports is mixing??

It is easy to see that Class C arrival airspace automatically requiring Class B terminal airspace is silly. It is entirely sensible that Class C arrival AND Class C terminal airspace may be entirely justifiable.

[4Greens]

We are now entering a very dangerous stage in the airspace problems. Changes to changes are a prescription for real trouble. Any variations to procedures should be incremental and slowly and carefully implemented.

[ferris]

VoR.
Thanks for the response. I'm still troubled by

How is that measured? In the identification of the hazard, it is important that the hazard is correctly specified, so that the causal chain can be seen, and the expected effect of the mitigation seen and recorded

What level of mitigation is being offered? Are the same people responsible for determining "expected effect"? eg. If see and avoid between jets and C172s is identified as a hazard, and the mitigation offered is 'switch on your lights', at what point is that mitigation measured for effectiveness ie. will switching on lights adequately mitigate? If it is determined afterwards that it happens to be a piss-poor mitigator, what happens- everyone just shrugs and says "the safety case wasn't very good"?

Second, it is possible to test the effectiveness of the material by examining pilots

Education may reduce the hazard, but maybe only by an infinitely small amount. How will we know? Is that adequate? Given that the error event is catastrophic, is it worth finding out the 'hard way'?

All this assumes a safety case is even attempted. Here I was thinking safety cases were just hastily cobbled-together shams written to achieve a set objective. Cynical?

ftrplt. Too right. You'll only get emotive argument out of Dick.

[Voices of Reason]

Ferris,

Perhaps an example of how we might approach a change, similar to one enunciated in your latest reform efforts:

Proposed design change: Class C in the terminal transition airspace to Class E.

BENEFITS

Benefit and Value 1. Reduced separation responsibility for air traffic control potentially translates to reduced workload to controller potentially reduces staffing requirement. If tower and approach function integrated and one man tower – net benefit zero.

Benefit and Value 2: Greater freedom of access for VFR aircraft. If VFR aircraft regularly diverting around controlled airspace, or delayed in obtaining clearance or subject to restrictive clearances, potential fuel and time cost. For small and quiet tower, assume minimal disruption to VFR operations, assume cost to VFR at $200 per day times 365 days equals $75k per year.

Benefit and Value 3: Better relationship between levels of risk and services provided to mitigate risk – i.e., best practice. Value – cultural not directly monetary.

Net potential benefit: $75,000.00

RISKS

Primary Hazard: Inability to communicate with, control, or manage VFR flights in relation to IFR flights increases to potential for collision in terminal transition airspace. Class C risk calculated/estimated at [say one accident per 200 years(not validated – example only)]. Risk in Class E calculated/estimated at [say one accident per 100 years (not validated – example only)]. Cost of a hull loss equals $50M plus passenger value at $2M times 75 equals total $200M amortized over the change in risk years [$200M/100years] equals $2M per year.

RISK MITIGATION

In order for this equation to make sense, one of two things needs to happen.

1. An authority needs to state that a change in risk of this magnitude is acceptable.
2. Risk needs to be managed so that the differential between cost and benefit is reduced to a more reasonable ratio.

Examining risk mitigations:

1. Primary radar – cost $5M plus annual maintenance - unacceptable
2. Secondary radar plus transponder carriage and activation - $5M plus maintenance – unacceptable
3. Reliance on TCAS – not permitted
4. enhanced see and avoid – minimal cost [but refer 6 below]
5. training and education – cost at, say, $100,000 one off.
6. etc

Enhanced see and avoid, from what we have seen and read, means training in scanning, and activation of lights. A search of the web will immediately turn up more than a dozen studies that argue that scanning and lights are of somewhat limited value [refer previous posts]. If this means is to be pursued, the proponents of change would need to do and record substantial studies on the subject, and specifically tailor training and education to that subject.

Training and education would probably concentrate on avoidance techniques – i.e., ways to avoid the flight paths of IFR aircraft and so on [but refer the benefit argument above].

…etc…

We think you see where we are heading here.

There is little or no benefit, for a substantial initial cost, AND a substantial risk increase.

One thing that should be noted is that safety cases do not just show when it’s “safe” to do something. They are also used to tell you when you shouldn’t do something. This is a classic case where there is no benefit in a change, other than the potential cultural shift.

[DirtyPierre]

Wow!!

Voices of Reason,

WOW!

That last post postively demonstrates how our airspace reform should proceed. Not the Australian, "she'll be right, they do it overseas mate!"

Thank you for your objective and logical dissertion on this very important topic.

Thanks mate!

[AirNoServicesAustralia]

Sorry Voice of Reason, but as an ATC I can't stomach the whole idea of crunching numbers (involving hull losses and peoples lives being lost) and deciding based on economics if a change to procedures/airspace is acceptable or not.

It reminds me of the big US car companies who on finding a defect in their cars, don't automatically recall the car, but first do an analysis of how many people the defect will kill, and then based on the litigation costs from those peoples families versus the cost of a total recall, it is decided whether or not those faulty cars are left on the road or not. That whole process makes me sick.

As a controller, my decider on whether a change to airspace/procedures is acceptable is the same as used when deciding whether or not to validate a new controller, that being "would I be happy to have my family fly with this controller" (in this case in this airspace). I know economic rationalism has taken over the world and my "voice" may be old fashioned and out of date, but I still feel that one hull loss and one life (who may be my son, or mother, or father) lost is one too many, and in Australia at least we have always achieved a perfect record when it comes to RPT jets getting safely around the country, so lets keep that.

Let the economists crunch the numbers all day long, but I know without the figures, that E airspace is less safe than C and it does not reduce controller workload (hence doesn't reduce controller numbers, hence where is the saving coming from???), so the changes have and always will be unwarranted.

[Chris Higgins]

Now from the blue corner...

Alright, enough beating up on Dick! At least he's got balls enough to come on line in his own name and defend his ideas. Don't back him into a corner, let's help him find a solution.

Mr Smith, no matter how you you cut it, the present system just won't fly: get over it!

I am a domestic and international charter jet captain who flies 700 hours a year on average. I am based in Pittsburgh, but learned to fly in Port Macquarie, under Bob Needham, who has since retired. I used to live in Alice Springs, then Mt Isa, Townsville and Sydney. I did a short stint in New Zealand before meeting my American bride and have been living Stateside for fourteen years.

Mr Smith, you are forgetting one thing when you fly around Australia in your Citation...how few tax payers there really are!

It is true that less than nine million people in Australia pay their full burden of income tax. With that, we build roads, educate children, run a skeleton military and among other things, support a NAS. In the US there are more than 200 million workers with tax withdrawals coming from their pay cheques every other Friday. This means they can build roads, educate children, bomb the sh!t out of people and HAVE NATIONWIDE RADAR COVERAGE.

In 1990, when I first married, I read a commercial brochure for the Pittsburgh International Airport. It states, "Pittsburgh is within 90 minutes flying time by commercial jet of 50% of the US population and 50% of the Canadian population". It would certainly make sense than, that the busiest "center"(centre) in the world is now Cleveland. It would also make sense that the load is so high that you must program at least a dozen communication frequencies to complete a one hour flight anywhere.

How does this relate to Australia? IT DOESN'T!

Australia has neither the resources, trained staff, nor the willingness of the industry to participate in such a needless process. It doesn't have the weather to require it either. I have frequently departed in less than 600 feet of forward visibility this last winter, I doubt we do that too much in Port Macquarie or even Melbourne.

VFR flying cannot be considered an excuse to not participate in a reportable, accountable and completely identifiable flying transaction. It used to be...it was called FULL-SAR, FULL Details.

Remember that Dick? It was one of the first things you stopped when you came up with that new idea of changing the safest airspace system in the world. Now VFR guys leave a note with mum.

Admit you screwed up and bring it back!

Next, fix the bloody exams. They are completely corrupted now. Any parrot could recite the answers and now you have pilots with alarmingly low intelligence operating in the airspace system.

Charles Dickens had many themes in his writings. One is that you become what you hate. It seems that at times you have shown disdain for things from foreign countries, yet it is America that you seem to be trying to turn Australia into. Australia will always be Australia, and I will always be Australian. How 'bout you Dick? Are you content with "affordable safety"? Do you want someone with very little experience and/or low academic achievement becoming an "airline captain". Do you really want to live through the dark days of USAir, where they had five fatal crashes in five years before anybody raised their hands to ask a friggin' question? What is your end game? What do you want exactly?

[Capcom]

Nail on the head

VoR



One of the NEW hazards in changing C to E was of unannounced, uncontactable and perhaps unseen VFR and the resultant consequential potential for collisions with IFR and other VFR.
It was raised by field Controllers repeatedly only to be told that it was an inherent risk in E and that because it was an accepted risk in the US that it was OK here without local analysis. No aeronautical studies with respect to local traffic densities, mix, terrain , meteorology etc.

The fact that was it was not previously a hazard in C in the context of normal system operation did not trigger an analysis (aeronautical study) for change to E i.e. In C the hazard only existed if the result of a VCA or ATC/Pilot error. Clearly the Increase in MAC opportunity in E would under any objective analysis be unacceptable when as indicated above it does not require a system fault to create a risk and not withstanding there is not an identified cost benefit to offset the identified increased risk.

Add to that another fundamental flaw i.e. The US consider VFR conducting instrument training in E will as a natural consequence of "head down" necessity, be treated as "IFR" and separated. It too was completely left out although it to was raised repeatedly. A known "US" mitigator left out of AusNAS.

That said, it is clear that if and when these analysis are carried out it will likely support a return to C when it is clear NO overall safety or cost benefit is gained by E.
Until then we are operating with untested and arguably “demonstrably” less safe airspace (See ATSB 200305235 Launceston). Criminal!

VoR et al, In advance of the following, I do not wish to detract from the very erudite discussion of these matters.
It is however, frustrating in the extreme to be discussing the very concerns that were raised and glossed over/ignored before 27 Nov. Clearly our concerns/questions were valid.
I cannot help being very bent outa shape over this whole mess. Those responsible seem blissfully uninterested in the problems it has caused.
This Industry has given me much over the years, and I am personally very angry at the systematic damage being caused by a handful of self-interested Pro-NAS dills.

RANT – select – ON (Full)
EMOTION – select – ON (Genuine, MAX)

So Dick, this is what your AusNAS 2b has delivered us:-

Negative effects:-

- VFR are NOT charged for en-route ATS, so there is No cost benefit C to E
- In the context of IFR to VFR, there is no longer 3rd party separation services - An Increase in risk for no cost or safety benefit
- Possibility for frequency congestion (Mutual Traffic ATC to Pilot - Pilot to Pilot). Increase in risk for no cost or safety benefit
- Less ability to plan separation sequencing into terminal areas - Increase in risk for no cost or safety benefit.
- Less SA for both Pilots and ATC - No cost or safety benefit
- VFR diversions from direct track to avoid IFR routes - No cost or safety benefit, especially considering there were very few delays for VFR in CTA prior to 2b
- VFR now need to know IFR tracks and APP/DEP routes etc in order to remain clear of them - No cost or safety benefit
- There are others but those above seem the most compelling

Positive effects:-

- VFR do not have to use a pesky radio- No cost and one could argue NO safety benefit (Not having to use a radio and look-out offset against the lack of separation services would seem to be a net negative safety effect. Certainly in the context of IFR conflict possibility)

Yep, AusNAS 2b, what a winner!!

With the money wasted on AusNAS (Probably over A$100mil when all is said and done), imagine how much good could have been invested into industry via training, education and infrastructure that would have enhanced all sectors including VFR (GA in particular). Another opportunity down the dunny. Things such as:-

Every VFR (GA) Pilot could have had a 2-3 day course on:-

- Use of the radio and interaction with the ATS system
- How to use the ATS system safety to their advantage
- Famil visits to ATS operations, awareness opportunities

As well as things like:-

- An Online and or Operations operator Q&A for operational questions and feedback
- ATS established after analysis where a need "probably exist" i.e. AYE, Broome etc
- FSS Briefing and SAR
- Infrastructure to support enhanced Pilot SA (ADS-B subsidised introduction to supplement ATS in a similar fashion to TCAS)
- Reduced costs to industry (Subsidised services to regional and GA aerodromes provided by a re-investment of the profit dividend given to the Fed Gov't each year)
- Scholarships in ATS, Engineering, Operations etc

The list goes on, what’s more it is all achievable if only the "rudders" in CB would take the view that the industry needs support now more than ever, not screwing it for greater profits to Gov't. Bean counters have their place but should not be in the drivers seats.

Higher costs and less service, which we have seen in recent years just leads to de-skilling of pilots in ATS procedures and a reluctance on their part to utilise/participate in the very tangible benefits ATS can provide. Their fear of appearing amateurish due lack of familiarity or being ESIR'd for inadvertent transgression’s would seem to be a result of their ongoing exclusion from the ATS system. Those who grow up in the system do not fear it! Fact!

Nothing will improve for our industry until these fundamentals are addressed!

All in all an unmitigated disaster!

EMOTION – Select – OFF
RANT – Select- OFF




Nurse……..Nurse……….

[ferris]

VoR.
Thanks, it took a while, but we finally got there........

There is little or no benefit, for a substantial initial cost, AND a substantial risk increase

Note to all: Dick Smith has stated on this very thread that he agrees with Voices of Reason. I expect he will immediately begin "lobbying" the Minister for Foot-in-Mouth, DSC (Distinguished Spin Cross) with bar, to halt this farce.

You will, won't you Dick? After all, it's a matter of personal integrity.

ANSA. Welcome to the 'brave new world' (best practice, that is).

Capcom. It's hard to check the emotions at times. Keep fighting the good fight.



Why are all the NASites so quiet? Busy eating crow? Back-peddling, arse-covering excuses for men.